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Abstract  
 
Technology permeates education’s discourses and practices, and further dialogue 
between philosophy of education and philosophy of technology is urgently needed. 
This thesis attempts to do this by engaging critically with the thought of Martin 
Heidegger, Jacques Derrida and Bernard Stiegler in order to show that both 
education and technology are processes of human formation (Bildung). 
Heidegger’s philosophy of technology underlines the way technology conditions 
human action and thus allows for an investigation of the constitution of the human 
being. At the same time, Heidegger’s philosophy maintains certain essentialist 
elements that make it unresponsive to the digital technologies that increasingly 
form our milieu. In matters of technology the nature of nearness is always at issue, 
and digital technology accelerates the changes that occur in this respect. For this 
reason, and notwithstanding Heidegger’s achievements, it is necessary to 
challenge his account in certain respects. Through a deconstruction of Heidegger’s 
theory, I attempt to show that thinking and technology intertwine in his critique of 
metaphysics. In fact, thinking and technology function according to 
presuppositions about image (Bild), imagination (Einbildungskraft) and education 
(Bildung), and both inextricably involve metaphorisation in various ways. In this 
thesis, I analyse the notion of metaphor either as passive or active transfer of the 
self. The role of image, as I have already noted, is very important for this process, 
and it is for this reason that Heidegger’s distinction between ‘representative’ 
image and ‘originary’ image becomes very important for this investigation. For 
Heidegger, the possibility of originary image opens up the path towards a non-
technologically mediated truth (alētheia) that offers true nearness to things, 
whereas representative image condemns thinking to uncritical repetition and 
existence to a state in which everything is equally far and equally near. This 
discussion and the specific chain of notions (Bild, Einbildung, Bildung) offers a 
new way into the investigation of those current digital image-technologies that 
purport to afford us nearness to things and people. It examines their effects on 
thinking and imagination, and education’s role in relation to these developments.  
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Technologies of Being in Martin Heidegger: 
Nearness, Metaphor and the Question of Education 
 
 
      In Dasein there lies an essential tendency towards closeness...
   Heidegger, 1927 
 
(T)his frantic abolition of all distances brings no nearness; 
for nearness does not consist in shortness of distance. 
Heidegger, 1950 
  
Introduction 
 
We are currently experiencing an obsessive desire for connectedness based on a 
certain understanding of networking −especially digital networking. This is itself 
conceptualised as the bringing-close of dispersed nodes that await connectedness 
and thus actualisation. This specific interpretation of connectedness emphasises 
the process of bringing-close, whilst downplaying the way the nodes are 
themselves constituted by this process. The transformations effected are often 
understood as the inevitable or even natural outcome of a general and universal 
process of nearing, which is initiated by technology, and amplified especially now, 
by digital technologies. These  technologies seem to offer the reassurance that we 
are indeed connected to what feels comfortable and familiar even in cases that the 
exact opposite is desired; that is, the escape of familiarity and the encounter of the 
new, the thought-provoking or even the adventurous.  
 
These implications, the risk and the possible cost of the dominance of the digital 
networking paradigm as the only model of connectedness, deserve further 
investigation. Connectedness may appear as something comfortable, but it also 
appears to threaten what is most precious in the experience of bringing-near. In 
this thesis, I rely on Martin Heidegger’s (1889-1976) work in order to discuss the 
complicated nature of this phenomenon. This is because Heidegger was among 
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the first to pay heed to connectedness –translated as closeness or nearness1− and 
its relation to technology, thinking, time, space and politics. This is evident 
throughout his career. In his lecture The Thing (1971e), however, Heidegger’s 
awareness of our current globalised world is especially accentuated. There, he 
argues that: ‘All distances in time and space are shrinking’, since we are now able 
to reach ‘overnight, by plane, places which formerly took weeks and months of 
travel’ (p. 165). Heidegger detects a new kind of experience effected by the 
possibility to know about things and events whilst taking place. For Heidegger 
this new way of being-in-the-world, that is, the ‘abolition of every possibility of 
remoteness’ was instantiated by television which he thought would ‘pervade and 
dominate the whole machinery of communication’ (ibid.). Even though it was the 
computer or cybernetics that ended up doing this, Heidegger acknowledged the 
fact that we currently experience this paradox; the extension of our space-time 
tends to level down the experience of connectedness. Heidegger puts this in the 
following terms 
…the frantic abolition of all distances brings no nearness; for nearness 
does not consist in shortness of distance. What is least remote from us in 
point of distance, by virtue of its picture on film or its sound on the radio, 
can remain far from us. What is incalculably far from us in point of 
distance can be near to us. Short distance is not in itself nearness. Nor is 
great distance remoteness. …Everything gets lumped together into 
uniform distancelessness. How? Is not this merging of everything into 
the distanceless more unearthly than everything bursting apart? (1971e, 
p. 165). 
Heidegger’s discussion raises a great many points here. The development of 
means of transportation but more importantly of new media, that offer instant 
connectivity and real-time interaction with whatever takes place in the world, 
have changed our very own place in the world. The concentration in front of the 
screen that gives us the news of the world changes the very world we live in, since 
it produces a dispersal of the self in multiple concerns. This notion of multiplicity, 
however, which usually implies a certain richness of experience, signifies 
currently something else. If engagement with all things is engagement with 
                                                 
1
 The standard translation of Being and Time as given by J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson renders 
the ‘the word Nähe… from nah, “near”’ as closeness. This is the same word which is later 
rendered as nearness and is etymologically close to the word neighbourhood ‘Nachbarschaft’, 
which is also used by Heidegger in order to denote certain relations between thinking and other 
notions (Inwood, M. 1999, p. 138). 
 
 9 
information and if the mode of engagement of information remains the same then 
what we experience is distancelessness and not nearness. This is perhaps what 
Heidegger is describing when he says that: ‘Everything gets lumped together into 
uniform distancelessness.’ This ‘lumping together’, this arbitrary grouping, which 
at times may appear to be creative, is an especially obscure procedure but it does 
rely, as I will show, on processes of profiling that identify individual 
characteristics and construct the user in very specific ways.   
 
Distancelessness thus refers to a process that makes it impossible to be near to 
something in a rich way. This, of course, does not mean that distancelessness is 
necessarily a bad thing since its ‘thin’ nature may allow space for experimentation. 
In this respect, I aspire to understand both nearness and distancelessness, and 
describe the role of technology for the construction of these experiences. I also 
want to describe what alternatives are lost when distancelessness prevails. These 
alternatives have to do with ways of thinking or being that are excluded on the 
basis of corporate interests. This is according to Bernard Stiegler (2009) a serious 
political matter that needs to be addressed. In fact, he warns that  
 
If we do not enact an ecological critique of the technologies and the 
industries of the spirit, if we do not show that the unlimited exploitation 
of spirits as markets leads to a ruin comparable to that which the Soviet 
Union and the great capitalist countries have been able to create by 
exploiting territories or natural resources without any care to preserve 
their habitability to come ‒the future‒ then we move ineluctably toward 
a global social explosion, that is, toward absolute war (pp. 81-82). 
 
In order to investigate this phenomenon, I will turn to Martin Heidegger’s work, 
since he is the philosopher who showed a determined interest in nearness as a 
phenomenon tightly connected to thinking. This is because in early Heidegger the 
experience of being close to a thing implies a certain spatiotemporality that is 
usually technologically mediated. In later Heidegger nearness is unreservedly 
related to the possibility of thinking. This means that when later Heidegger 
discusses the possibility of being near to the essence of things he does not simply 
refer to modalities of thinking but to a world constructed in such a way that it 
either allows nearness or not. In Heidegger’s later thought there is nothing outside 
of this possibility. In either case technology plays the role of that which allows 
nearness or that which inhibits it.   
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To be more precise, Heidegger (2008a), as early as 1927, believes that in the 
human being ‘there lies an essential tendency towards closeness’ (p. 140/105). 
There is, however, one important aspect of this condition that is persistently 
underscored by the philosopher; things, objects, tools − in one word technology − 
is what allows the opening of spaces in which closeness is experienced. To be 
close is to be close to something or to put it in other words; something that is 
close is something used. Closeness is mediated by technology. Later Heidegger’s 
thought, however, is more abstract. For later Heidegger modern technology’s 
essence is nothing technological; it is a framework, a way of thinking (Gestell) 
that understands everything as resource − human beings included.  
 
The technologisation of thinking cannot, however, explain the experience of 
distancelessness and the impossibility of nearness. In fact, later Heidegger does 
not explain how the conquering of distance, which is understood as an existential 
characteristic of the human being in early texts, affects thinking in order to 
produce distancelessness. This is, actually, one of the reasons that his later 
discussions sound like a nostalgic lament; everything is equally far and equally 
near. But what does this mean for thinking? How is this experienced? How is 
perception altered and how does this affect the individual human being and 
society? The technologisation of thinking is something that Heidegger sees 
emerging from Plato’s thinking and culminating in our time. Thus he does not 
actually talk about modern technology’s distancelessness effect on thought. And 
this is because he does not explicitly discuss the way technology is implicated in 
perception and imagination. This, in turn, leaves a dangerous gap in his theory. 
On the one hand, Heidegger sees Gestell’s dominion as a very possible 
eventuality. On the other hand, he argues that there still exists the possibility of 
meditative thinking that is not mediated by technology. But what is there in 
thinking that makes it possible to be mediated by technology? Should not this be 
our question? Is not the technologisability of thinking what is important here?  It 
seems that, in order to find a way out of this tangle, we need to discuss if all 
thinking is in any case mediated by technology and on this ground discuss the 
possibility of difference.   
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In pursuit of answers I will return to Heidegger’s understanding of nearness, 
which I understand as a relation that implicates thinking and technology, and 
attempt to do what Heidegger advocated: to truly understand technology in order 
to have a free relationship to it. For this reason, I will attempt to trace whatever is 
excluded and whatever presences itself from every consecutive stage of 
Heidegger’s thinking concerning nearness. This tracing seems to embrace the 
biographical approach of studying Heidegger’s work referring to early and later 
Heidegger (see Pattison, 2000; Luchte, 2011), but it does so only deconstructively. 
By that I mean that I present Heidegger’s work in these stages, and in fact, refer to 
the middle Heidegger as well, in order for nearness to be thoroughly studied in all 
its guises and designs. However, I do not blindly adopt the clear-cut 
characterizations that come with these periods. In other words, the adoption of the 
biographical approach does not imply that I embrace the interpretations that come 
with it concerning, for example, the supposed phenomenological and existential 
approach adopted solely in Heidegger’s earlier writings, the unfortunate 
philosophical misreadings taking place in the middle period and the post-
subjectivist, non-phenomenological and poetical approach embraced in the later 
period. The chronological distinctions are used here only provisionally, and 
perhaps instrumentally, in order to show that despite this supposed fragmentation 
of approach and content, there is continuity of concerns and notions in 
Heidegger’s thought, in fact, ones not recognised by the philosopher himself. In 
this respect, I see what I am doing as participating in another line of thought in 
Heideggerian scholarship, in fact, one that detects continuities throughout 
Heidegger’s work. This would be congruent with the writings of Iain Thomson 
(2005), for example, which pay heed to Heidegger’s persistent effort to 
deconstruct western ontotheological structures. This is in line with Heidegger’s 
own take on his work, as expressed in the preface to William J. Richardson’s 
(2003) book Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought. In this preface 
Heidegger (1962) informs Richardson: 
 
The distinction you make between Heidegger I and II is justified only on 
the condition that this is kept constantly in mind: only by way of what 
[Heidegger] I has thought does one gain access to what is to-be-thought 
by [Heidegger] II. But the thought of [Heidegger] I becomes possible 
only if it is contained in [Heidegger] II. (1962, p. xxii) 
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This approach, which is in its heart genealogical, intends to pay attention to 
neglected continuities in Heidegger’s thought that shed light to the path of his 
work. By tracing the life-cycle of notions integral to Heidegger’s phenomenology, 
like the lassen relationship (letting things be) and nearness, I will be able to open 
up opaque notions like distancelessness and relate these to other notions like 
thinking and education. 
 
In fact, the technological mediation of nearness is a matter of educational 
importance. Education aspires through its own technologies (curricula, books, 
discourses, practices) to bring the world near. What happens, however, if 
technology is one step ahead? Technology can be the very thing that opens up the 
existential possibilities for learning even before the individual receives any type 
of formal education. It is for this reason that education needs to turn its critical 
gaze inwards, to assess its ends and to investigate whether these are in harmony 
with its means of teaching and learning. This might allow for the true relation 
between technology and education to come to light, and education to face its 
responsibility to form ways of nearness that might be in conflict with those of 
technology. In this light, this thesis relies on Heidegger’s thinking but not only in 
order to show the effects of technology on education in general but also to open 
up a dialogue concerning the nature of learning, technology’s use as a form of 
passive learning and technology’s contribution to the construction of the common 
space of individuation in which people learn. For this reason, I intend to 
investigate nearness as a possibility for thinking and to understand its complicated 
nature. In order to do so this thesis is structured in the following way: 
 
In the first chapter I discuss the need for a dialogue between philosophy of 
education and philosophy of technology, given the fact that technology permeates 
education’s discourses and practices. Technology and education appear to co-
constitute the formation of the human being. The way technology and education 
interact needs to be illuminated. Heidegger’s philosophy of technology underlines 
the way technology conditions human action and allows for an investigation of the 
constitution of the human being. At the same time, Heidegger’s philosophy 
maintains certain essentialist elements that make it unresponsive to digital 
technologies that concern us today. For this reason, it is necessary to challenge 
 13 
this theory. In order to do so, I need to deconstruct what Heidegger understands as 
modes of nearness to the world, namely, language and technology, in order to 
move to phenomenological descriptions of digital technologies that involve them 
both. 
   
Through this deconstruction, I will attempt to show that thinking and technology 
intertwine in Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics. These notions function 
according to presuppositions about image (Bild), imagination (Einbildungskraft), 
and education (Bildung) and they implicate metaphor. In fact, quite early on 
Heidegger makes the distinction between ‘representative’ and ‘originary’ image 
and this becomes very important for his thought. The possibility of originary 
images is believed to open up the path towards originary truth as alētheia. This 
chain of notions (Bild, Einbildungskraft, Bildung) can offer a new path into the 
investigation of current image-technologies, their effects on imagination and 
nearness and education’s role in all this. This approach will direct attention to 
phenomenological descriptions of specific technological instances and thus depart 
from the standard Enframing discourse that is employed in educational thought 
and that mostly addresses the technologisation of educational systems. It will 
move towards the sketching of connections between technology, learning and the 
formation of Dasein.   
 
The second chapter attempts to explain the deep connection between technology 
and existence. Technology, according to Heidegger, permeates thinking since 
technology participates in the constitution of time but it also forms thinking 
indirectly through metaphysics. Dasein (being-there) is a being that exists through 
interpretation. This interpretation, however, is structured through our relatedness 
to things (closeness/nearness) and our understanding of Being, which is 
technologised (metaphysics). Actual technologies are let-to-be-involved in our 
current affairs, but Being is itself the process that lets all things be and lets them 
come near as they are. In this light, Heidegger seems to maintain a distinction 
between the process that lets things be without the mediation of technology and 
the process of technology itself. In consequence, the first process brings forth 
authentic time whereas the second produces inauthentic time. 
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If, however, we attempt to understand Heidegger’s notion of lived time via Kant’s 
transcendental imagination, we come to the conclusion that temporality is 
synthesis; it is the reproduction of a past and the fore-sight of a future that 
constitutes the way we perceive the present. In this light, Dasein can be 
understood in terms of inheritance. Dasein inherits a past that Dasein has not lived 
but is in position to repeat. This inheritance is transmitted and accessed through 
technology, which can be understood, according to Stiegler, as pros-thesis: it 
precedes me both spatially and temporally. In order for this inheritance to become 
my ‘there’, it has to be learned. In this respect, technology constitutes a specific 
type of learning that implicates imagination in perception. Imagination, I argue, 
can be understood as a type of formation that depends on the types of images we 
perceive. These images, though, rely on inscription, exteriorisation, and 
technology and do appear to challenge Heidegger’s belief in a type of thinking or 
‘originary’ image that is not mediated by technology.  
 
The Kantian influence on Heidegger’s notion of temporality creates an 
opportunity to look at time in a different light and, in fact, detect further 
connections between time, imagination, perception and technology. Heidegger’s 
own thought attempts to move away from subjectivism and, in consequence, 
makes these valuable connections obscure. In what I have called the “hinge 
section” I focus on the structure of imagination, in order to conclude that Kantian 
imagination as appropriated by Heidegger is affected by exterior image during a 
process of transfer. In other words, the ‘interior’ cognition relies on ‘external’ 
support in order to be formed and form. In this respect, the interior is not prior to 
the exterior. In fact, such dualism does not exist. This realisation makes the 
process of metaphor, that is, the transfer of the interior onto supplements 
(objective and technologically produced images) extremely important. This take 
on metaphor relies on the Greek connotations of the word metaphora (μεταφορά) 
and suggests transfer, movement, transportation and even transference. It refers to 
an immediate transfer of the self onto things, which is mediated by technology. It 
is a process of connectedness: a thing is synthesised by being brought close. This 
interpretation implies a distinction between this type of metaphor termed here 
existential metaphor and linguistic metaphor which is itself understood anew.  
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As we move in the third chapter the notion of metaphor allows me to go deeper 
into the interaction between technology and language. Despite Heidegger’s earlier 
emphasis on time, space is also very important. In fact, Heidegger’s description of 
experience takes place through spatial metaphors and this implies a deep 
interaction between time and space, language and technology. This interaction 
ultimately produces each community’s social space that affords individuation. 
This phenomenological insight remains in the margin, since Heidegger treats 
metaphor with suspicion. He considers metaphor the culprit for the construction of 
western metaphysics, and he believes that metaphor solidifies the dichotomy 
between the sensuous and the suprasensuous, which is invoked through the 
technological paradigm of Being. In this respect, metaphor and technology refer 
to the same type of technologised thinking that is set against language. In this 
chapter, I attempt to deconstruct this dichotomy and present a new understanding 
of metaphor, which shows that metaphor shares many of imagination’s 
synthesising powers. Metaphor is, similarly to imagination, a seeing as. Metaphor 
is a movement of nearness that connects different realms, even technology and 
language. 
    
In the fourth chapter I investigate how nearness is discussed in the middle phase 
of Heidegger’s thought in order to show that the exclusion of technology from the 
analysis of the polis results in misinterpretations and political mistakes. This 
shows that technology’s role in the construction of our milieu and the analysis of 
this phenomenon is a political matter. The belief that there can be a polis and a 
political system that is not mediated by technology but is instead rooted in a 
supposedly non-technologically mediated Greek beginning leads Heidegger to 
align his views with the Nazi political vision. In order to sketch this possibility 
Heidegger misuses phenomenology, and his analysis focuses on the metaphor of 
home, which is itself exclusionary. This illustrates that the types of linguistic 
metaphors we choose to understand our being-in-the-world are especially 
important.  
 
In the fifth chapter I turn to Heidegger’s later work and explore further his 
analysis of language and metaphor, and metaphor’s connection to nearness. In 
consequence, I illuminate how metaphor is based on analogy. In order for an 
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analogy to be drawn, however, there must be a previous trait that makes analogy 
possible. This trait refers to the possibility of the copula of the verb “is” and takes 
us back to the question of Being and the ontological difference. Being can be in 
analogy to beings and being can be in analogy to Being. This kind of analogical 
and metaphorical synthesis resembles Kantian imagination and the as-structure. 
This structure, however, is both pre-theoretical, as in the case of the ready-to-hand, 
and theoretical, as in the case of the present-at-hand. These two modalities of 
being can refer to two different types of metaphor. The first type of metaphor, 
namely, existential metaphor, refers to the immediate transfer of the self onto 
things: metaphor as exteriorisation that takes place through the body, which is 
transformed by tools. In this light, being human lacks an origin. It can only be the 
human being it is through the use of tools. Every new tool brings about a 
reiteration of being human. This is a kind of passive learning. Building exhibits 
this process. The human being is transferred onto the things it builds, and thinking 
is formed by dwelling.  
 
The second type of metaphor, namely, linguistic metaphor, suggests a more active 
way of thinking and refers to a certain potentiality of language to defamiliarise the 
world through imagination and inventiveness. Imagination is, however, always 
already formed by the first type of metaphor. Existential metaphor is itself effable 
to the point that it is through the copula, that is, through language. This means that 
both types of metaphor implicate language and technology but they constitute 
different relations of these ways of revealing. Where does this leave us? 
Technology is metaphorical. Language is metaphorical. Being is metaphorical. 
Through metaphor, interpretation circles back to itself.  
 
In the sixth chapter I examine the kind of nearness or distancelessness we 
experience with current digital technologies through Martin Heidegger’s and 
Bernard Stiegler’s critique and the underscored emphasis on metaphor. Digital 
technologies employ different techniques of nearness that usually work on the 
principles of similarity, identity and representation, and can possibly disrupt the 
very possibility of disruption, imagination and differance. In other words, digital 
technologies tend to colonise both types of metaphor and enforce unimaginative 
repetitions of ourselves. This poses a problem both for education and the polis 
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since imagination is at the heart of human thinking as that which allows the 
perception of things and the experience of nearness. Digital technologies, however, 
precisely because of their immense possibility for connectedness, can potentially 
bring closer images that tend to open up our relatedness to the world.
2
  
                                                 
2
 At the beginning of each chapter there is a numbered list summarising the main points to be 
discussed. 
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Chapter 1  
Philosophy of Technology in Education 
 
 
This chapter discusses the following: 
 
1. Technology and education are contributing processes for the formation of the 
human being. The way these factors interact needs to be illuminated. In order to 
do that, however, we need to move beyond instrumental understandings of 
technology.  
 
2. Technology conditions human action, and this needs to be addressed further. Is 
technology an autonomous force or not? The answer will help to illuminate 
education’s potential to influence the formation of society and the individual. 
 
3. Technology has been traditionally viewed by philosophy as instrument, as an 
element found outside thinking and thus outside philosophy itself. Cartesian and 
Kantian thought emerge in the light of the dichotomies between interior and 
exterior, mind and matter, and technology and nature. Prevailing educational 
policies and practices uphold some of these dualisms making us blind to 
technology’s role in the process of human formation (Bildung).  
 
4. Essentialism offers an alternative perspective by singling out a dominant 
characteristic of technology but marginalising, at the same time, specific 
instances of technology that reveal further aspects of technology’s 
instrumentality. Heidegger’s theory of Enframing is such a perspective. It is very 
illuminative but not entirely adequate to explain current phenomena of digital 
connectedness.  
 
5. Educational theory is very much aware of Heidegger’s theory but lacks 
responsiveness to new technologies. It is, thus, necessary to challenge Enframing 
as a means of addressing all of our problems. In order to do this, we need to 
deconstruct Heidegger’s modes of revealing, namely, language and technology. 
This will allow us to phenomenologically describe and explore different instances 
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of modern digital technologies that can potentially inform us about technology’s 
instrumentality in general.  
 
6. Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics also refers to interconnections between 
thinking, truth and technology. These notions intertwine in a very rich way and 
in fact according to their specific presuppositions about image (Bild), imagination 
(Einbildungskraft) and education (Bildung). Quite early on Heidegger makes the 
distinction between ‘representative’ image and ‘originary’ image and this 
becomes the backbone of his thought. The search for images of the second type is 
believed to clear the path towards originary truth (alētheia). This chain of notions 
can offer a new path into the investigation of current image-technologies, their 
effects on imagination and education’s role in all this.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the paper ‘Towards Philosophy of Technology in Education: Mapping the 
Field’ Michael A. Peters (2006) makes the case for a new critical perspective in 
education by way of the study of technology. The perspective alone could be 
taken as proof of technology’s persistent tendency to force things and thinking 
into its own measures. But in this chapter, I argue, that this danger can be avoided 
when we give the complex relationship between technology and thinking the 
serious philosophical scrutiny it deserves. Peters claims, further, that this 
theoretical perspective  
  
promises the possibility of an understanding of technology that may be 
important not only to public policy but also in helping to conceptualize 
intellectual approaches to the study of technology and, indeed, to 
shaping new fields of knowledge and research. These approaches to the 
study of technology, clearly, have a significant role to play in 
curricularizing technology in all levels. Philosophy of technology may 
also have a role to play in relation not only to structuring a largely 
disparate and inchoate field but also more directly in teaching and 
learning about technology (p. 96). 
 
In this light, philosophy of technology’s potential contribution to education is not 
to be limited to an instrumental take concerning technology’s use. On the contrary, 
a clarification of technology’s nature might show how individuals, society and 
institutions ‒education included‒ are conditioned by technology, since technology 
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constitutes −to what degree remains to be deciphered− the possible modalities and 
objects of our thinking. Setting the discussion on this ground opens up new 
questions concerning thinking and its relation to teaching and learning that 
challenge the very concepts of humanity or childhood. Unfortunately philosophy 
of technology has yet to engage systematically with such a task, and this is also 
the case for philosophy of education. The former’s negligence can be attributed to 
the field’s already dispersed attention to the multiplicity of technologies. The 
latter’s omission is also explicable but not excusable. 
 
Education as a process of human formation (Bildung), or at least a factor 
influencing the child’s becoming, should be sensitive to all the techniques that 
contribute to the construction of childhood, especially because education’s own 
practices are in-formed  through or even in resistance to technology’s effects. 
Does this mean, however, that technology precedes education? Books, for 
example, can be understood as the imperceptible access to knowledge, but the 
process of reading itself demands a certain kind of learning that conditions the 
way we learn in general. This complicated relationship should be taken into 
consideration by philosophy of education, a field that is concerned with the 
formation of human beings.   
 
In order for such an approach to emerge we need to move beyond the instrumental 
understanding of technology. If we carry on believing that technologies and 
especially what Derrida (2002) calls ‘teletechnologies’, that is, communication 
and information technologies, can be used as mere instruments, we will remain 
oblivious to the types of thinking they either make possible or inhibit. In this 
respect, education must think about technology whilst eschewing futile attempts 
to handle and master something that is always one step ahead of the one who 
attempts to handle. This critical look will probably underscore Hannah Arendt’s 
(1998) opinion when she writes:  
 
The human condition comprehends more than the conditions under 
which life has been given to man. Men are conditioned beings because 
everything they come in contact with turns immediately into a condition 
of their existence. The world in which the vita activa spends itself 
consists of things produced by human activities; but the things that owe 
their existence exclusively to men nevertheless constantly condition their 
human makers. … The objectivity of the world ‒its object-or thing-
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character‒ and the human condition supplement each other; because 
human existence is conditioned existence, it would be impossible 
without things, and things would be a heap of unrelated articles, a non-
world, if they were not the conditioners of human existence (p. 9). 
 
Human existence is conditioned, supplemented and re-invented, and this 
fascinates philosophy of technology. Things appear to be the products of human 
action, but they also allow the time and place of action. The degree of 
technology’s autonomy in this process but also the mode of its emergence is 
critical and, in fact, a matter of controversy. Philosophy of education should 
tackle this matter before restricting technology to an instrumental role and, in fact, 
respond to the question that philosophy of technology has been preoccupied with, 
namely, the following: Is technology autonomous and how does it interact with 
the individual and society?
 
(Feenberg, 2005). This is a broader question that refers 
to the complicated interaction between the technological,  existential, social and 
political realm. In the rest of the chapter, I present different answers to the 
question derived from philosophy of technology. 
 
2.1. Instrumentalism and the neglect of things 
 
Technology has been ignored or even demonised by philosophy. Plato’s Phaedrus 
attests to that. In this dialogue Socrates recounts a myth about the invention of 
writing. The myth talks about the Egyptian God Theuth, who presents writing to 
King Thamus arguing that his invention will be the cure for memory. Thamus 
responds that writing is the exact opposite; it is what will weaken memory since 
people will rely on it in order to remember. The twofold nature of writing as 
pharmakon (drug understood simultaneously as cure and poison) has been 
extensively discussed by Derrida (1981) in Plato’s Pharmacy. In this essay 
Derrida points out that whilst Plato, through the dialogue, disfavours Theuth’s 
invention, he nevertheless employs writing in order to formulate his thinking. In 
this respect, philosophy’s neglect of writing −and technology in general− is 
constitutive of philosophy itself, that is, writing allows philosophy to think about 
thinking.  
 
It seems that technology has always been constitutive of philosophical endeavour: 
it can be the very medium of philosophy –in the form of writing−, the subject of 
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its contemplation −even if its negative aspects are accentuated−, or one of the 
fundamental elements that form the very milieu in which philosophy emerges as a 
way of thinking. Still, technology is explicitly downgraded by philosophy. Arendt 
(1998) explains that this goes back to the ancient Greek philosophy that 
understands vita contemplativa or bios theōrētikos (life of theory) to be the way 
towards the ‘eternal’ and ‘immortal’ (p. 14). In Nicomachean Ethics, for instance, 
Aristotle (2004) argues that 
  
contemplation is both the highest form of activity (since the intellect is 
the highest thing in us, and the objects that it apprehends are the highest 
things that can be known), and also it is the most continuous, because we 
are more capable of continuous contemplation than we are of any 
practical activity (X II77 20- 25).  
 
Aristotle’s take on technology is formed around a subject-object dualism that was 
initiated according to Heidegger (1977c) in ancient Greece. Things are either 
something thought or something used. The individual can choose to associate or 
dissociate themselves from things at will. Things exist either as material beings 
when used in practical endeavours or abstract entities when we think about them. 
In any case, things are neutral and their value depends on the subject’s will.  
 
The prioritisation of theory over other forms of human activity is derived from the 
presumed neutrality of the process of production. Aristotle (2004) in fact, 
differentiates between production and action arguing that the former operates ‘in 
the sphere of the variable’, that is, ‘(w)hat can be otherwise’ (II4oa 2 and II4oa 23, 
footnote, I, p. 149). He also argues that production does not obey any eternal or 
essential rule; it is rather driven by ‘chance’, contrary to the ‘object of scientific 
knowledge’, which is driven by ‘necessity’ (II4oa 18, p. 149). The scientific 
object cannot be otherwise. For Aristotle, science ‘is eternal, because everything 
that is of necessity in the unqualified sense is eternal; and what is eternal cannot 
come into being or cease to be’ (II39a 25, p. 148). Art (technē), conversely, has no 
specific aim or origin, and its products can be otherwise or not even be at all. 
Aristotle states: ‘Every art is concerned with bringing something into being, and 
the practice of an art is the study of how to bring into being something that is 
capable either of being or of not being, and the cause of which is in the producer 
and not in the product’ (II4 oa 11-14, p. 149). Aristotle’s anthropocentric 
interpretation has further implications for the construction of another dualism that 
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differentiates between art (and technology) and nature. Webster F. Hood (1983) 
explains that 
 
The natural form of something is intrinsic to that thing ‒that is, an oak 
tree is an oak tree because of some intrinsic principle that determines its 
growth and operations. A natural form has some power to define and 
effect operation; it is not “neutral.” Yet the forms that technology brings 
forth in matter as technics and products are given extrinsically by the 
artisan, are “artificial.” …Since technical productions have no intrinsic 
principle of definition or operation they may be said to be neutral. They 
will not operate by themselves, they depend upon human use
 
(p. 348).  
         
In this light, things are neutral in their making and in their use. This, in 
consequence, suggests that technology is simply instrumental and there is no need 
for the philosophical exploration of its nature. In fact, Aristotle (2004) states that 
the ‘prudent man’, that is the one who possess practical wisdom (phronēsis), is 
‘able to deliberate rightly about …what is conducive to the good life generally’, 
which naturally involves action not production (II4 oa 27-29, p. 150). Hood (1983) 
asserts that this points the fact that the 
 
The goal of technē, its work or product −the article of clothing, the house, 
or whatever− which the activity of making posits as its object, is strictly 
instrumental to something else from which it receives its complete 
justification. And this “something” else is the use to which it is put 
−wearing the article of clothing, living in the house− for the sake of 
some activity that ultimately is its own end, namely moral or intellectual 
activity. Accordingly, technology is subordinate to practical wisdom, to 
moral and intellectual activities which are their own justification
 
(p. 349). 
 
The instrumental understanding of technology, that is, the belief that things are 
means to a certain end and without an intrinsic value of their own, prevailed for 
centuries (Feenberg, 2005).
 
This perspective assumes that things have nothing to 
do with the way we live, perceive and experience the world, and this is how the 
need to explain how an observing mind that is outside the world accesses things 
that are in the world first emerges. To put it in other terms, this helps to explain 
how the thought-experiment of the human being as ‘a brain-in-a-vat’ could ever 
come to light (Latour, 1999, p. 4).
3
 In order to respond to this question, 
                                                 
3
 Bruno Latour (1999) comments that whilst Descartes responded to this question with the 
invention of a benevolent God ‒that would not deceive him about the existence of the world‒ Kant 
responded with ‘a form of constructivism’ with the description of ‘the outside world (that) …turns 
around the mind-in-the-vat, which dictates most of the world’s laws, laws it has extracted from 
itself without the help from anyone else’ (p. 6). 
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philosophy differentiates itself from and against the very object of its study, that is, 
the object itself and the way it comes into being. Bernard Stiegler (1998) 
comments 
 
At the beginning of its history philosophy separates tekhnē from 
epistēme, a distinction that had not yet been made in Homeric times. The 
separation is determined by a political context, one in which the 
philosopher accuses the Sophist of instrumentalizing the logos as 
rhetoric and logography, that is, as both an instrument of power and a 
renunciation of knowledge (Châtelet 1965, 60-61). It is in the inheritance 
of this conflict −in which the philosophical epistēme is pitched against 
the sophistic tekhnē, whereby all technical knowledge is devalued− that 
the essence of technical entities in general is conceived… (p. 1). 
 
The specific historical understanding that Stiegler describes resulted in 
philosophy’s blindness concerning its constitution, the role of technology and, of 
course, the nature of thinking as such. Unfortunately, some strands of educational 
thought uphold this tradition and these are discussed next.  
 
2.1.1. The effects of instrumentalism on education 
We can currently detect four dominant conceptualisations of technology’s nature, 
which, despite their differences, are to some degree affected by instrumentalism 
and at the same time themselves influence the assumptions we have concerning 
education, teaching and learning. These conceptualisations can be identified as 
follows:  
(a) The common sense perspective maintains the neutrality of technological means. 
David Lewin (2013) explains that: ‘The idea that technological devices are neutral 
certainly appeals to common sense. It would seem bizarre to imagine that devices 
could have subjectivity, desires, or could determine their own ends. Rather we 
assume that devices are subject to our will - to human purposes.’ (p. 2) In this light, 
education attempts to emulate the ubiquity of technological devices, which are 
after all neutral, characteristic of society. Courses like Information and 
Communication Technology, Media Education and Digital Literacy are treated as 
resources that provide the skills necessary for survival in the real world. This 
perspective takes childhood to be the preliminary stage of development and 
technology the neutral means that familiarise children with society’s ways. It is, of 
course, assumed that children already familiarised with technology will be 
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equipped for success in adult life. Within this framework the demands of the 
market dictate what is good for growing up and learning. David Buckingham 
(2003), in fact, comments that: ‘Computers are aggressively marketed to parents 
and teachers as an educational medium –indeed, as the indispensable educational 
tool for the modern world’ (p. 174). The success of this marketing strategy can be 
perhaps attributed to the limited understanding of technology’s instrumentality. 
Buckingham continues  
Yet computers are largely seen here as delivery mechanisms ‒as neutral 
means of accessing ‘information’ that will somehow automatically bring 
about learning. ‘Wiring up’ schools is often seen to produce immediate 
benefits, irrespective of how these technologies are actually used (ibid.). 
Buckingham’s comments point to a rather confused position. On the one hand, 
technology is understood as a neutral means and for this reason is uncritically 
introduced to schools, but on the other hand, is perceived as something producing 
learning by itself.  
(b) The enhancement perspective resonates with the common sense perspective, in 
the respect that it takes technology to be a ‘tool’ that enhances human activities 
and especially production. It is subsequently inferred that if technologies used 
‘outside’ increase productivity, then these technologies would have the same 
effect on education. Technology should enhance learning. Enhancement, however, 
is usually limitedly perceived in terms of efficiency and thus increases the demand 
for demonstrable results in learning. This assumption, however, usually fails to 
consider the complicated coupling between technologies and learners even though 
mismatches have been reported. Andrew Dillon and Ralph Gabbard (1998), for 
example, argue that ‘the evidence does not support the use of most hypermedia 
applications where the goal is to increase learner comprehension’ even though this 
is what practitioners fervently attempt to do (p. 334). Martin Oliver and Keith 
Trigwell (2005), however, point to a further complication, since some of the 
forms of the enhanced learning that technology supposedly offers, like ‘blended-
learning’, that is, the mixing of different media and technologies of learning, 
‘attribute[s] to learning something that, in terms of what we know, only applies to 
teaching or instruction.’ (p. 21) 
 
  
 26 
 (c) The constructivist perspective, inspired by thinkers like John Dewey, Jean 
Piaget and Lev Vygotsky, supports the idea that learning should not be about 
following instructions, but about the ways the learners use their own experiences 
to construct knowledge and things. Since the learner constructs knowledge 
technology is understood as a tool that allows the learner to construct better and 
more efficiently. Even though this perspective acknowledges the importance of 
the environment and technology −in fact, technology becomes indispensable for 
learning− it can also identify the student ‘as the active subject that makes sense of 
a passive learning environment’ (Ream and Ream, 2005, p. 583).4 In this respect, 
constructivism reinforces the subject-object dualism and, in consequence, 
instrumentalism.  
 
(d) The cognitive perspective is the most recent discourse to have captivated 
education’s attention. Cognitivism has quite a diverse history. In its inaugural 
stage it perceives thinking as the following of internalised instructions and thus 
attempts to build computer programs based on this premise. This, in turn, made 
the case that the original (the human mind) works like the model (the computer). 
Robert B. Kozma (1987), for example, argued that: ‘To be effective, a tool for 
learning must closely parallel the learning process; and the computer, as an 
information processor, could hardly be better suited for this’ (p. 22, cited in 
Friesen and Feenberg, 2007). As already noted, this perspective at times 
understands tools designed to replicate specific thinking processes -and, in fact, 
particularly the tools of information processing- to be mirrors of the human mind 
in its entirety. This can force practice into a vicious circle where teachers attempt 
to reproduce what in research has been restrictively understood as thinking. 
Learning about learning is an arduous task, especially because the tool is always 
already involved in the possibility of understanding the human mind. Varela, 
Thompson and Rosch (1991) comment:  
 
knowledge has become tangibly and inextricably linked to a technology 
that transforms the social practices which make that very knowledge 
possible− artificial intelligence being the most visible example. 
Technology, among other things, acts as an amplifier. One cannot 
separate cognitive science and cognitive technology without robbing the 
                                                 
4
 This is not to say that these thinkers and especially Dewey’s line of thought cannot initiate rich 
discussions about technology, but the instrument is not often directly addressed in the educational 
appropriation of these theories.  
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one or the other of its vital complementary element. Through technology, 
the scientific exploration of mind provides society at large with an 
unprecedented mirror of itself, well beyond the circle of the philosopher, 
the psychologist, the therapist, or any individual seeking insight into his 
own experience (pp. 5-6). 
 
The first three conceptualisations of technology show that understanding 
technology as a neutral means constitutes a weak perspective that leads education 
to rather risky decisions; the last one, however, underscores that technology’s 
purported neutrality is also naive and misleading and that technology itself 
participates in the understanding of human  ‘nature’. For this reason, technology 
needs to be understood beyond instrumentality or, to put it in different terms, 
instrumentality should be perceived in its multifacetedness.  
 
2.2. The challenge of Essentialism 
 
General David Sarnoff, the founder of the National Broadcasting Company 
(NBC), and one of the founders of commercial radio and television in the USA, 
once said: ‘We are too prone to make technological instruments the scapegoats for 
the sins of those who wield them. The products of modern science are not in 
themselves good or bad; it is the way they are used that determines their value’ 
(cited in McLuhan, 2009, p. 11). Marshall McLuhan (2009) reacting to this writes:  
 
That is the voice of the current somnambulism. Suppose we were to say, 
“Apple pie is in itself neither good nor bad; it is the way it is used that 
determines its value.” Or, “The smallpox virus is in itself neither good or 
bad; it is the way it is used that determines its value.” Again, “Firearms 
are in themselves neither good nor bad; it is the way they are used that 
determines their value.” That is, if the slugs reach the right people 
firearms are good. If the TV tube fires the right ammunition at the right 
people it is good (p. 11). 
 
McLuhan believes in the inherent value each technological object or medium has. 
For him, what is of the most importance is not what we watch on TV but the fact 
that there is a thing like TV. He, thus, explains, that 
 
For the “message” of any medium or technology is the change of scale 
or pace or pattern that it introduces into human affairs. The railway did 
not introduce movement or transportation or wheel or road into human 
society, but it accelerated and enlarged the scale of previous human 
functions, creating totally new kinds of cities and new kinds of work and 
leisure (p. 8). 
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Andrew Feenberg (2005) calls McLuhan’s understanding of technology 
‘substantive’ since it assumes that technology has a specific substance or 
‘embodies specific values’ (p. 2). In McLuhan’s (2009) case this is summarised in 
his famous phrase ‘the medium is the message’ (p. 7). As soon as the theory is put 
in these terms, literally any artefact or process can be a medium of some sort; 
electricity, for example, can be the medium of light, the very medium that 
transforms night into day. In this respect, what matters is not what the light is used 
for but the fact that there is light. He writes 
 
Whether the light is being used for brain surgery or night baseball is a 
matter of indifference. It could be argued that these activities are in some 
way the “content” of the electric light, since they could not exist without 
the electric light. This fact, merely underlines the point that “the medium 
is the message” because it is the medium that shapes and controls the 
scale and form of human action (p. 9).  
  
McLuhan’s take on technology is very close to Heidegger’s more explicit 
‘essentialism’5 that is expressed in his famous essay The Question Concerning 
Technology. In this essay Heidegger (1977c) argues that modern technology has 
an essence, not as substance but as a way of revealing, and that this ‘essence of 
technology is nothing technological’ (p. 4). It is rather Gestell or Enframing, that 
is, a framework that conditions the way we think about the world or, even better, 
the way the world is revealed to us. Existence is conditioned by technology’s way 
of thinking and this increasingly becomes the only way we experience the world. 
In fact, Heidegger describes this world as follows 
 
Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately on 
hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further 
ordering. Whatever is ordered about in this way has its own standing. 
We call it the standing-reserve [Bestand]. The word expresses here 
something more, and something more essential, than mere “stock.” … 
Whatever stands by in the sense of standing- reserve no longer stands 
over against us as object
  
(p. 17).  
  
 
Heidegger describes the essence of technology in these terms but before doing so 
he offers descriptions that support his belief. He says for example that the earth 
‘now reveals itself as a coal mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit’ 
                                                 
5
 The term is proposed by Feenberg (2005, p. 15). 
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(emphasis added, p. 14). Heidegger, similarly to McLuhan, attributes an essence 
or a dominant trend to technology. Both philosophers support their belief with 
descriptions of specific instances of this trend. This specificity and particularity 
tends, however, to be marginalised when the dominant trend is established. When 
Heidegger argues that ‘everywhere…everything’ is in the specific way that it is, 
because of modern technology’s dominance, particular instances of technology 
that might tell a different story are quietened. This in turn, can make technology 
even more opaque blocking any possibility of difference or thinking about 
difference. At the same time ‘substantive’ theories can be read as ‘transposing an 
inadequate concept of agency from human beings to technology itself’. (Lewin, 
2006, p. 519) It is then no wonder that Feenberg (2006) argues that Heidegger’s 
understanding of technology as Enframing, that is, a sweeping power that reduces 
everything into a resource deprives technology of ‘a socially and historically 
specific context and content’ (p. 17). In consequence, by excluding the social 
dimension from the technological sphere, Heidegger denies any possibility for 
human agency, meaning, transformation and by extension the possibility of the 
democratization of technology. As he puts is 
 
Today it rages over the whole planet as a human deed: modern 
technology. But a universe ordered simply by the will has no root and no 
intrinsic meaning. In such a universe, man has no special ontological 
place but it is merely one force among others, one object of force among 
others. Metaphysics swallows up the metaphysician and so contradict 
itself in the terrible catastrophe that is modernity. Heidegger calls for 
resignation and passivity (Gelassenheit
6
) rather than an active program 
of reform which would simply constitute a further extension of modern 
technology (p. 184) 
 
There are, however, so many misreadings and forced conclusions here since 
Feenberg remains within the very tradition of subjectivism that Heidegger 
attempts to escape throughout his career. Heidegger’s direct address of 
technology’s essence is nothing but the last stage of a long thinking path that 
attempts to deconstruct metaphysics, challenge the centrality of the subject and its 
will and dismantle dualisms like the activity-passivity one.  It is only, however, 
within this tradition that Heidegger’s theory of technology would have been ‘a 
matter of accepting or rejecting agency (alternatives which uncritically accept the 
                                                 
6
 This term will be discussed extensively in subsequent chapters in connection to phenomenology. 
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prevailing view of it) rather of deconstruction so as to reveal the insufficient 
anthropology and ontology that lie hidden within it.’ (Lewin, 2006, p. 532)  
David Lewin (2006) continues:   
 
What is left is not a new agency that somehow arises with the deference 
of human will. Such a new agency would carry with it the subjectivist 
baggage on the prevailing view. The notion that technology itself 
becomes the determining agent of modern life carries with it those 
assumptions of the rational subject. It should be obvious, then, that 
Heidegger cannot be a substantivist in this sense. (ibid.) 
  
Heidegger as the thinker who thinks the human being as Dasein (being-there) and 
not a subject that willingly represents the world and controls it should not have 
been the subject of this kind of critique. There remain, however, many questions 
regarding Heidegger’s understanding of technology, the human being’s place in 
the world and the interaction between technology, the human being and the world 
in general. The fact that the human being becomes a being-there in the world  
does not make things easier. If anything it makes them more complicated since 
this unbreakable bond between the human being and the world does not offer 
clear cut pairs we can think about. Feenberg (2005) makes things even more 
complicated adding that Heidegger’s theory is abstract, one-dimensional and 
unhistorical since ‘it interprets a historically specific phenomenon in terms of a 
transhistorical construction’ (p. 15). However, answers to this critique can be 
found in Heidegger’s understanding of time, metaphysics and his own 
phenomenological and hermeneutical approach. It is for this reason that I think 
that the notion of Enframing is useful but it can also blind us to the actual 
technological instances and relationships that are formed and conditioned by 
technology.  
 
For example, one of the main technological tendencies of our own time, that is, 
the levelling of the experience of nearness, cannot be understood simply through 
the notion of Enframing. Of course, the obsessive pursuit of nearness is 
maintained by technologically and economically driven motives that attempt, 
through profiling and grouping, to turn people into exploitable resources, but this 
is not the way these processes are experienced by users who often find the 
connectedness afforded by new technologies liberating and empowering. These 
matters are often debated on an ethical basis, but there is also an ontological 
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aspect to this. What does it mean to come near to things and people in this specific 
technological and digital way? Does digitised nearness open up or limit thinking? 
And, if indeed digitisation does affect thinking, what element in the human being 
makes this influence possible? These questions constitute a phenomenological and 
hermeneutical challenge. 
 
Heidegger certainly thinks that the effects of modern technology are devastating 
and for this reason he opposes the distanceless, uniform and mediated 
technologically experience of connectedness to the rich engagement of the 
fourfold (Geviert), the ethical stance of Gelassenheit (let things be) and meditative 
thinking
7
. All these notions refer to different ways of thinking and being, in fact, 
ways that at first look are not technologically mediated. It is precisely for this 
reason that the specificity of the networking type of thinking needs to be 
illuminated. In order to do that we must provisionally challenge Enframing, as our 
main method for critique, and discuss once more Heidegger’s thinking about 
technology in connection to thinking itself. This task is perhaps often obstructed 
by the dominance of the discourse of Enframing that has turned out to be a very 
handy tool among educationalists who wish to describe the strong impact of 
technology on education (Hogan, 2002; Standish, 1997; Stone, 2006; Thomson, 
2005). In what follows I discuss the richness but also limitations of this 
perspective. 
 
2.2.1. The discourse of Enframing in education 
 
Publications concerned with modernity’s fascination with improvement, 
assessment and efficiency cannot avoid Enframing’s discourse and, in fact, offer 
accounts of education according to this theory (Fitzsimons, 2002; Peim and Flint, 
2009). What these accounts have in common is the emphasis on technology’s 
versatile presence in education; as an influence on policy formation, an 
agglomeration of technological artefacts incorporated in teaching and learning, a 
collection of subjects that construct the curriculum, a worldview that understands 
the world as technological or even as a specific kind of language that allows the 
thinking of entities only in technological terms. In this light, any aspect of 
                                                 
7
 These notions are discussed in a subsequent chapter.  
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education can be understood through the particular metaphysical frame of 
technology. It is in this respect, that Enframing could turn out to be an all-purpose 
analytical tool, an idea that is utilised without being questioned.  
 
Paul Standish (1997) offers a Heideggerian account of the ‘technologization’ of 
education when he argues that the field of further education
8
 is formed by ‘the 
new managerialism with its vocabulary of efficiency and effectiveness, choice and 
markets’, which at the same time finds an ally in ‘a certain legacy of 
progressivism’, ‘child-centred primary education’ and even ‘the pedagogy of 
oppression derived from Paulo Freire’ (p. 440). The theoretical justification for 
such an education is easily understood; in order to serve individual differences 
better we should work on an efficiency-oriented plan with set standards that 
ensure that these needs are being served. It is individual differences, however, that 
are often jeopardised in the process. Students might feel that they have the liberty 
to choose but what they are choosing, precisely because it is designed to serve 
everybody’s needs, might not be able to correspond to their specific needs, talents 
and personal transformation. Lynda Stone (2006) proceeds to a similar discussion 
when she investigates the effects of Enframing on research and affirms that US 
graduate study in educational research entails a standardised over-emphasis on 
methodology. Such training technologises research, reproduces knowledge and 
limits the possibilities for educational change and reform (p. 541).  
 
These discussions are obviously critical for making us aware of technology’s 
effects on the way we think and act in education. They are also constructive since 
they proceed to retrieve the potential of education through Heidegger’s 
understanding of technē (art), or poiēsis (poetry). For Heidegger art and poetry are 
not simple human endeavours. They are ways of connecting to the world and 
constitute a creative and authentic engagement with things. Language is 
indispensible for this possibility. Heidegger sees language as a process of 
revealing, which is open and receptive to the particularity of things as opposed to 
technological revealing, which tends to represent things according to 
                                                 
8
 The term refers ‘primarily to post-compulsory education in institutions which typically offer an 
extraordinary range of vocational and general education on a full-time and part-time basis. This 
extends to the education of adults. It does not normally include advanced academic work of the 
sort commonly associated with degree level (and beyond) in universities’ (Standish, 1997, p. 458). 
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predetermined metaphysical assumptions. These accounts are very important 
since they do offer alternative ways of thinking about educational issues. However, 
these accounts neglect to discuss how it is even possible to overcome Enframing’s 
totalizing effects in order to retrieve these possibilities. And this is, in fact, a 
matter that needs serious consideration. Heidegger (1977b) states that: ‘The rule 
of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to 
enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more 
primal truth’ (p. 28). Accordingly, this means that the possibility to be poetically 
engaged with things might be concealed in a technologised world. What then, if 
this possibility is the very reality we are experiencing now? If Enframing is the 
specific way the world is structured through and through how can there even be a 
possibility for thinking these alternatives? Furthermore, how can education, which 
is concerned with the learner’s becoming, offer new possibilities for connecting to 
the world if this world remains essentially conditioned by a certain technological 
mode of existence? It seems that what is necessary for us to do right now is to 
challenge the essence of Enframing. We need a deconstruction of Heidegger’s 
modes of revealing, namely language and technology, in order to see what it is 
that makes both of them types of revealing. The fact that both language and 
technology allow the individual to connect to the world and bring things near is a 
first indication of their capacity to affect the human being or perhaps even to 
allow for a being like the human being to exist and use words and tools.  A 
phenomenological description of different instances of modern digital technology 
might inform us about aspects of these types of revealing and instrumentality, that 
are not explicitly discussed in Heidegger.  
  
Only when these matters are addressed will we be able to break the rigidity of 
Enframing and rediscover the possibility of difference. Otherwise, the mere 
application of Heidegger’s theory becomes a frame that itself directs thinking 
towards a reproduction of a specific description of (post-) modernity. Enframing 
becomes a concealing metaphor. In order to proceed to new descriptions, in fact, 
ones that are indeed required by technology’s evolving presence, Enframing 
cannot be a mere tool for educational thought; it cannot be ready-to-hand, 
transparent and unobtrusive. On the contrary, it needs to become absent, 
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unavailable and broken, so that we become aware of the relationship between 
human beings and technology.  
 
This task can be achieved by way of a return to Heidegger’s philosophy of 
technology. This kind of return is not merely concerned with the explicit and even 
abstract discussions of technology, as is the case with The Question Concerning 
Technology, but is also concerned with Heidegger’s explicit discussions of 
various technologies   as is the case with Being and Time and essays like The 
Thing and Building Dwelling Thinking   and interested in illuminating the deep 
connections that bind together technology, language and thought. This type of 
investigation will illustrate the continuity of Heidegger’s concerns about 
technology and allow an analysis of the current technologies of nearness and 
image.  
 
In this respect, this thesis does not follow the trajectory of Enframing adopted by 
many philosophers of education. On the contrary, it allows Heidegger’s thought to 
be appropriated by things as expressed in the philosopher’s own methodology in 
Being and Time and essays like The Thing, The Origin of the Work of Art, and 
Building Dwelling Thinking. In order for this to take place, I will focus on 
Heidegger’s phenomenological method so as to show that phenomenology 
remains a methodological possibility that shelters Heidegger’s central notions of 
the letting-relationship (lassen), imagination, image, time and Being. The 
illumination of Heidegger’s phenomenological method points to a possible path 
towards which philosophy of technology and philosophy of education can move 
jointly, and it is in line with contemporary trends in philosophy of technology that 
underscore the point that:  
 
[t]echnology becomes most concrete and evident in (technological) 
devices, in objects such as television sets, central heating plants, 
automobiles, and the like. Devices therefore represent clear and 
accessible cases of the pattern or paradigm of modern technology. 
(Borgmann, 1984, p. 3)  
 
Albert Borgmann’s device paradigm, which draws attention to the ways modern 
technologies function outside of specific contexts, is able to problematize our 
current being-in-the-world by ‘attaining a careful and resourceful vision of the 
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crucial features and dimensions of our world and our place in it’ (p. 40). This 
empirical take on philosophy of technology allows for multiple descriptions of the 
world as it is conditioned by different technological artefacts. Another such 
approach comes from postphenomenological research that gives emphasis on the 
material conditions of interpretation. As the founder of this approach, Don Ihde 
(2008) explains the necessity for phenomenology to look at individual instances 
of technology arguing that: ‘At the core of phenomenology in practice there is 
variational theory. In looking at any phenomenon, one must place it within its 
possibilities, its variations’ while he adds that ‘many phenomenological structures 
turn out to be multistable’ (p. 6). Because of this multiplicity, Ihde clarifies that 
‘postphenomenology emphasizes both a strong sense of embodiment, including 
perspectivalism or situated knowledges, and a sensitivity to materiality’ (pp. 6, 7). 
Ihde’s (1999) own approach of ‘material hermeneutics’ consists in expanding 
traditional hermeneutics in order to ‘find ways to give voices to the things, to let 
them speak for themselves’ (p. 151). In fact, he asserts that instruments as already 
used in science are not neutral tools that represent reality but hermeneutical 
devices that interpret reality for human beings. Peter-Paul Verbeek (2008) affirms 
this and also adds ‘that technologies help to shape practices and interpretations of 
reality which form the basis of moral decisions.’ (p. 12) 
 
Heidegger has neglected many aspects of the human-technology relation as comes 
to place with different technological instances. Among these neglected aspects are  
the involvement of the body, the transfer of the self onto things, the manifold 
nature of metaphor, the formation of Dasein through technology and the co-
constitution of the hermeneutical as-structure by technology and language. A turn 
to phenomenology will allow the inclusion and consideration of these aspects and 
the study of specific technological artefacts, but this can take place only when it is 
established that phenomenology in its different guises and focuses persists 
throughout Heidegger’s thought, even perhaps in concealed ways. These focuses 
have to do with image, imagination, temporality and the letting relationship. In 
what follows, I begin to sketch these continuities by discussing the role of image 
in Heidegger’s thought.         
 
 
 36 
 
3. Technology and Thinking: The role of Image 
 
In 1907 Heidegger read Franz Brentano’s 1862 dissertation and became interested 
in ‘the intrinsic ambivalence of ὄν’ (Richardson, 2003, p. 10; Sheehan, 1984). The 
ὄν is a participle of the Greek verb εἰμί (be) and ‘as such may be used either as a 
noun (v.g. can a human being live on the moon?) or as an adjective with a verbal 
sense (v.g. being curious, we want to know)’ (Richardson, 2003, p. 10). This 
ambivalence that suggests that ὄν, namely that which is, refers both to beings 
(ὄντα) and also to that ‘ultimate “ground” ‘that is either a common property of all 
beings (ὄν καθόλον, κοινόν) or that ‘being, supreme among the rest (ὄν καθόλου 
ακρότατον), and because supreme, often called “divine” (θεῖον)’ resulted into the 
‘onto-theo-logical’ constitution of metaphysics (Richardson, 2003, pp. 10,11).  
 
According to Heidegger’s Plato’s Doctrine of Truth, ontotheology first becomes 
possible through the theory of forms. In this text Heidegger discusses the different 
notions of truth and, in fact, believes that finding the proper kind of truth will 
allow him to think what the essence of education should be. Education should be a 
path towards truth. More precisely, with this text Heidegger attempts to do two 
things: ‘trace the technologization of education back to an ontological ambiguity 
already inherent in Plato’s founding ontological vision’ and ‘show how forgotten 
aspects of the original Platonic notion of paideia remain capable of inspiring 
heretofore unthought possibilities of the future of education’ (Thomson, 2005, p. 
124). In order to do so, Heidegger (2009) attempts to delineate different notions of 
truth inherent in Platonic thought, discuss them in connection to the 
technologisation of Being and sketch his vision for education in terms of paideia 
and Bildung.  
 
As it becomes obvious and, in fact, quite early on in the text both Heidegger’s 
critique and Plato’s original text constitute critical reflections on image. Plato’s 
allegory, after all, can be understood as an image that contains other images and 
poses the question concerning the perception of images. In this respect, we have 
two families of words running through the text both echoing connotations having 
to do with image. On the one hand, Heidegger’s text contains words like Bild 
(image) and Bildung (human formation) and on the other hand, Plato’s text 
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contains words like eidos (aspect, look, image) and idea (visible form, idea). 
Heidegger criticises Plato for conceptualizing Being as something visible, 
represented and produced, and this makes image focal for his critique. As he sees 
it, image becomes what dictates a certain notion of truth as correctness and this 
opposes another, most powerful, notion of truth as alētheia. Both notions of truth 
are found in the Platonic text, and Heidegger proceeds to explain the way these 
two notions simulate different stages narrated in the allegory. Towards this end 
Heidegger recounts all the different stages the prisoners go through, while the 
process of liberation becomes an analogy for the educational process.  
 
Thus, in the first stage the prisoners ‘live chained inside the cave, engrossed in 
what they immediately encounter’, that is to say, the shadows projected on the 
walls of the cave (2009, p. 168). Given that these people have been prisoners 
since childhood the shadows constitute their only experience of the world. At the 
second stage, the prisoners have their chains removed and since they can ‘turn 
around’ they see the actual things that ‘were previously carried along behind 
them’ and, of course, the fire that allowed for the shadows. Heidegger comments: 
‘Those who before looked only at shadows now come μᾶλλον [126] τι ἐγγύτερω 
τοῦ ὂντος (515 δ2), “a little nearer to what is.” (ibid.) He also adds that before ‘the 
things offer(ed) their visible form in a certain way, namely in the glow of the 
man-made fire of the cave.’ (p. 169) The prisoners’ eyes begin to adjust to the 
new situation and during the third stage the prisoners move into the open. There, 
after experiencing blindness because of the intensity of the sun light they finally 
see the things presenting themselves as they are. He explains: ‘The looks that 
show what things themselves are, the εἶδη (ideas), constitute the essence in whose 
light each individual being shows itself as this or that, and only in this self-
showing does the appearing thing become unhidden and accessible.’ (pp. 169-170) 
With the description of the slow adjustment of the eyes to the sun light, Heidegger 
appears to give an almost phenomenological interpretation of truth as a movement 
of nearness (ἐγγύτης) into the essence of things.  
 
This essence is described by Plato as a specific type of image; it is the look that 
sustains beings and allows them to be what they are. The essence (idea) of 
treeness for example allows all trees to be trees. This process is portrayed at the 
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same time as a movement into the ‘more unhidden’ which is called by Plato 
‘ἀληθέστερον’. (p. 170) For this reason, Heidegger comments that true liberation 
is not simply the ‘removal of the chains’ but ‘the continuous effort at accustoming 
one’s gaze to be fixed on the firm limits of things that stand fast in their visible 
form.’ (ibid.) The essence of truth as orientation towards the unhidden, the true or 
ἀληθές 9  also ‘fulfils the essence of παιδεία as a turning around’ because its 
essence ‘can be achieved only in the region of, and on the basis of, the most 
unhidden, i.e., the ἀληθέστατον, i.e., the truest, i.e., truth in the proper sense.’ 
Heidegger, therefore, concludes that: ‘The essence of “education” is grounded in 
the essence of “truth.”’ (ibid.) Finally, Heidegger says that there is the fourth stage, 
which is the stage of liberation and refers to the acceptance of responsibility about 
the freedom of others and is enacted through the return-descent of the liberated 
person to the cave. This whole process, that is, the process of moving into 
unhiddenness or truth is called ἀ-λήθεια and is distinguished from the Roman 
veritas. The image of the cave itself, Heidegger argues, is organically 
incorporated in this notion. In fact, the nature of ἀλήθεια makes it possible for 
Plato to use this image. He says: 
 
This “allegory” can have the structure of a cave at all only because it is 
antecedently co-determined by the fundamental experience of ἀλήθεια, 
the unhiddenness of beings, which was something self-evident for the 
Greeks. (p. 172) 
  
In this respect, the allegory is an image made out of images such as ‘the fire, the 
fire’s glow and the shadows it casts, the brightness of day, the sunlight of the sun’; 
it refers to other images (eidos and idea) and debates the very notion of image as 
related to truth and thinking (ibid.). But what are the consequences of this 
emphasis? Heidegger argues, that in Plato’s text the stress falls on the εἶδος as 
‘visible form’ and ἰδέα as that which ‘brings about presencing’. In this light: ‘A 
being becomes present in each case in its whatness.’ (p. 173). This emphasis on 
the whatness, which is translated by the Romans as essence, transforms 
apprehension into the grasping of an idea, an image or representation that is 
already known. In this light, apprehension becomes a way of thinking that gains 
precedence over alētheia. It becomes a process of correspondence between the 
                                                 
9
 Alētheia etymologically comes from the privative (a) and the word for forgetfulness, namely, 
lēthē which was also the mythological river of unmindfullness and forgetting located in Hades. As 
such it denotes a movement or revealing, a coming-out from forgetfulness.  
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universal idea and the particular object. It becomes correctness. The consequences 
of this are various and Heidegger feels the need to expose them in order to 
destruct this tradition. He says  
What results from this conforming of apprehension, as an ἰδεῖν, to the 
ἰδέα is a ὁμοίωσις, an agreement of the act of knowing with the thing 
itself. Thus, the priority of ἰδέα and ἰδεῖν over ἀλήθεια results in a 
transformation in the essence of truth. Truth becomes ὀρθότης, the 
correctness of apprehending and asserting. (p. 177)   
One of the main differences between truth as alētheia and truth as orthotis is the 
fact that the former remains a characteristic of beings whereas the latter concerns 
the ‘human comportment towards beings’ (ibid.). In this respect, orthotis paves 
the way towards subjectivism and anthropocentrism that turn the world into an 
object, image and representation. This is the inherent ambiguity in Plato’s 
understanding of truth, that is, truth conceived both as alētheia and correctness. 
According to Heidegger, Aristotle follows this tradition favoring the latter notion 
of truth by ascribing to the human intellect the ability to decipher truth. For 
Heidegger, both Descartes and Nietzsche sharpen this thesis allocating to the 
human being the capacity to shape truth.  
 
The second consequence of this limited understanding of truth, Heidegger 
comments, is the inauguration of philosophy as metaphysics. In fact, he locates 
this at a specific point in the Platonic text. He says: ‘In the passage (516) that 
depicts the adaptation of the gaze to the ideas, Plato says (516 c3): ‘Thinking goes 
μετ’ ἐκεῖνα,“beyond” those things that are experienced in the form of mere 
shadows and images, and goes εἰς ταῦτα, “out toward” these things, namely the 
“ideas.”’ (p. 180) Heidegger explains  
 
These are the suprasensuous, seen with a nonsensuous gaze; they are the 
being of beings, which cannot be grasped with our bodily organs. And 
the highest in the region of the suprasensuous is that idea which, as the 
idea of all ideas, remains the cause of the subsistence and the appearing 
of all beings. Because this “idea” is thereby the cause of everything, it is 
also “the idea” that is called the “good.” This highest and first cause is 
named by Plato and correspondingly by Aristotle τό θεῖον, the divine. 
Ever since being got interpreted as ἰδέα, thinking about the being of 
beings has been metaphysical, and metaphysics has been theological. (pp. 
180-181) 
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For Heidegger metaphor is constitutive of the possibility of metaphysical 
abstractness.  Metaphor restricts perception; it focuses on a specific aspect of 
things that then elevates at the rank of the divine. In this way the eidos ‘that 
originally designates the visual aspect of a being now denominates what will, in 
fact, never be apprehended by physical eyes’. (Sinclair, 2006, p. 29). For 
Heidegger ‘metaphysics provides each historical “epoch” of intelligibility with its 
ontological bedrock. This means that for each historical time ‘metaphysics 
establishes both the most basic conceptual parameters and the ultimate standards 
of legitimacy for history’s successive epochs of unified intelligibility’ (Thomson, 
2005, p. 8). If Platonic metaphysics hides the ‘proper’ notion of truth it should be 
deconstructed allowing new possibilities for education −whose essence lies on 
truth− to emerge. Heidegger does exactly that, and thinkers like Iain Thomson 
(2005) rely on this text to show how metaphysics constituted as ontotheology is 
very important for the understanding of education’s technologisation. Of course, 
the discussion needs to go much deeper, and, in fact, in a way that would be 
critical of Heidegger’s own reading of Plato. 
 
As already noted Heidegger (2009) points out that if we define what truth is we 
might be able to know what proper education (Bildung) should be. In fact, in this 
very text, in which he repeatedly underlines that Plato’s reliance on image has 
distorted the notion of truth as alētheia, he himself defines Bildung −which is 
supposed to mirror alētheia− through image and production. He explains  
 
On the one hand formation (Bildung) means forming someone in the 
sense of impressing on him a character that unfolds. But at the same time 
this “forming” of someone “forms” (or impresses a character on) 
someone by antecedently taking measure in terms of some paradigmatic 
image, which for that reason is called the proto-type [Vor-bild]. (p. 166) 
 
Some kind of confusion is bound to surface here. Either Heidegger sees image as 
inherently bad and should be excluded from any notion of education or he is now 
referring to a different type of image, an image of the kind of the allegory. What 
complicates things further, is the fact that this specific description of Bildung 
resembles Heidegger’s (1988) own understanding of production as conceptualised 
by the ancient Greeks and mirrored in the Platonic understanding of Being. In fact, 
in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1988) Heidegger argues that with the 
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ancient Greeks perception takes place ‘with a view to production.’ (p. 106). He 
explains:  
 
What is formed is, as we can also say, a shaped product. The potter 
forms a vase out of clay. All forming of shaped products is effected by 
using an image, in the sense of a model, as guide and standard. The thing 
is produced by looking to the anticipated look of what is to be produced 
by shaping, forming. It is this anticipated look of the thing, sighted 
beforehand, that the Greeks mean ontologically by eidos, idea. The 
shaped product, which is shaped in conformity with the model, is as such 
the exact likeness of the model. (ibid.) 
 
Conceptualised as such, production becomes the metaphysical structure that 
permeates the understanding of whatever is and elevates image at the rank of 
universal truth that is accessed by the human subject. Sinclair (2006), in fact, 
comments that ‘Plato’s separation of the eidos from the empirical being itself is 
motivated by the priority of the prototype or paradigm envisaged by the producer 
before the process of production’ (p. 33). This, in turn, endows the human being 
with great power; the human being receives the image and does the forming (re-
presenting of the image in the object) according to preset standards. As it follows, 
production becomes the paradigm of Being, whilst the human being becomes the 
being that gives Being. Put simply, ‘(t)he paradigm is no longer what can simply 
be said of a being, but is instead ποίησις, the particular human comportment that is 
the production of things such as tables, chairs and artworks’ (Sinclair, 2006, p. 30).  
 
Being conceptualised as production and production being conceptualised as the 
representation of pre-existing images has one further implication for the 
discussion of thinking, one that, in fact, implicates imagination as the basic 
faculty of apprehending. Heidegger (1988) explains: 
 
The anticipated look, the proto-typical image (Vor-bild), shows the thing 
as what it is before the production and how it is supposed to look as a 
product. The anticipated look has not yet been externalized as something 
formed, actual, but is the image of imagination (das Bild der Ein-
Bildung), of fantasy, φαντασία, as the Greeks say −that which forming 
first brings freely to sight, that which is sighted. It is no accident that 
Kant, for whom the concepts of form and matter, morphe and hule, play 
a fundamental epistemological role, conjointly assigns to imagination a 
distinctive function in explaining the objectivity of knowledge. The 
eidos as the look, anticipated in imagination, of what is to be formed 
gives the thing with regard to what this thing already was and is before 
all actualization. (p. 107).  
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A great number of points needs to be raised here. Before these are addressed, 
however, I will clarify once more what Heidegger is opposed to, namely, 
‘productionist metaphysics’10. For Heidegger there is a more originary way to 
understand beings and that is in analogy to ‘phusis as η ουσία των φύσει όντων’ 
that is the beingness of the beings of nature (Physics, II, 1, 193a10 cited in 
Sinclair, 2006, p. 23). Heidegger, in fact, believed that what is hidden in the Greek 
word ousia, which is later translated as substance
11
, is not the essence of a certain 
being, but the totality of beings and most importantly the dynamic process that 
brings this beingness forth, namely phusis (φύσις). The juxtaposition between 
technology and phusis will remain constant in Heidegger’s thought, and, in fact, it 
will become constitutive of his effort to sketch an alternative way of thinking and 
connecting to the world. In this respect, he will stay 
 
engaged in a concerted attack on what he sees as Western metaphysics’ 
consistent reliance on models that grasp thinking and being by analogy 
with making, and specifically, with craftsmanship. This model results, 
on the one hand, in the very real development of all forms of thought 
aimed at calculating with and manipulating existent beings, and so in the 
rise of logic and mathematics as well mathematically based natural 
science and technology, on the other. But it is unjustifiably carried over 
to the human being, whose action can then only be made sense of in 
terms of the producing, whose knowing is only validated so long as it is 
a calculating with representations, and whose embodied existence 
becomes, with the rest of material nature, an object for manipulation 
(Geiman, 2001, p. 163). 
 
Having in mind Heidegger’s distrust of the metaphysical-productionist  
conceptualisation of Being, it is indeed surprising that his own formulation of 
Bildung mirrors production. The similarity of the two processes has to do with the 
technologisation of thinking that Heidegger condemns and attempts to escape. 
Both processes, however, implicate image and take place through imagination. As 
already noted this might be because Heidegger appears to have two distinct types 
of images in mind. The first one is of the rank of eidos; it pre-exists perception 
and therefore imagination’s role is to re-present and re-produce it. In The Age of 
the World Picture Heidegger (1977a) gives such an example arguing that we 
                                                 
10
 The term belongs to Zimmerman (1990, p. xvi). 
11
 Heidegger believed that the Roman translation of the Greek terminology irretrievably excluded 
different conceptualizations of Being. In discussing the word ousia Heidegger (2000) says that 
‘(t)he usual thoughtlessness translates ousia as “substance” and thereby misses its sense entirely’ 
(2000, p. 64/46).    
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currently relate to ‘the world conceived as picture’ (p. 129). In this context, 
Weltbild (world picture) does not refer to a certain conceptualisation of the world, 
but to the specific type of connectedness to the world that demands a 
representation of that which we are to relate with. Human beings relate to things 
not through practical concerns, admiration or ethical consideration, but through 
representation, mathematical thinking and calculation. Heidegger plays with the 
expressions ‘get the picture’ and ‘get into the picture’ denoting the image’s 
systematicity and structure to which the human being becomes a part of when 
they connect and understand the world in a certain way (p. 129). In this light, to 
think that the world is as an object has the effect of turning me into a subject; to 
understand the entirety of beings and that which gives beings, namely Being, as 
representation has the effect of making me part of this representation, part of the 
picture. The way we understand things becomes the way we understand ourselves. 
I cannot understand the world as a resource and live at the same time in harmony 
and respect with this world; I cannot understand the process of my education as a 
matter of mere qualifications, without seeing myself primarily as a potential 
resource for a future employer. My relatedness to the world has already formed 
me in a certain way.   
 
The second type of image is that of the allegory. This is a metaphor whose origin 
cannot be pinpointed somewhere specific but rather constantly re-invents and 
shifts itself, clearing new paths for thinking. It suggests a free play of the 
imagination. It is a poetic image. Heidegger says:  
 
The poet makes poetry only when he takes the measure, by saying the 
sights of heaven in such a way that he submits to its appearances as to 
the alien element in which the unknown god has “yielded.” Our current 
name for the sight and appearance [Anblick und Aussehen] of something 
is “image” [“Bild”]. The nature of the image is to let something be seen. 
By contrast, copies and imitations are already mere variations on the 
genuine image which, as a sight or spectacle, lets the invisible be seen 
and so imagines [ein et] the invisible in something alien to it. Because 
poetry takes the mysterious measure, to wit, in the face of the sky, 
therefore it speaks in “images.” This is why poetic images are 
imaginings in a distinctive sense: not mere fancies and illusions, but 
imaginings [Ein-Bildugen] that are visible inclusions of the alien in the 
sight of the familiar. (Heidegger, 1971e, pp. 225-226 parentheses added) 
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Heidegger makes the distinction between ‘representative’ image and originary 
image and this becomes the backbone of his thought. The search for images of the 
second type is believed to be able to show the way towards alētheia. But there 
remains one important question: Are there two types of images functioning in 
imagination? If indeed there are two types of images and only one imagination, 
then it could be the case that imagination does not merely produce images but 
possibly is produced by images: that is, images affect the way imagination works. 
This opens up a whole new discussion concerning the effects of images (Bilden) 
of all types (from the most ‘objective’ type like the photo to the most ‘internal’ 
like the dream) on imagination (Ein-Bildungskraft). It also makes the question of 
technology −especially modern digital technology, which is obsessively 
concerned with the formation of images (Bilden)− especially relevant. Technology 
might be the one that does the forming (Bildung) of the human being instead of 
education (Bildung). If, on the contrary, there are already two types of 
imagination (representative and presentative) we should look into the ways they 
interact with each other and possibly the different types of images with which 
they work. If for example there are representative images that outnumber any 
other kind of image and are constantly reproduced by representative imagination, 
would they not affect presentative imagination? In the light of these questions, 
and in order to form any possible conception of Bildung, or to put it otherwise, in 
order to imagine what education can be, we need to clarify the nature of image 
and imagination and also to discuss the relations between these and technology 
and thinking. Véronique M. Fóti (1985) comments 
 
Although Heidegger does indicate, in passing, that he considers the latter 
sense of Bild (poetic image) to be primary, he leaves the tension between 
the two senses quite unresolved. This is all the more surprising since 
both senses bring into play some of the linguistic complexities which 
Heidegger stresses with respect to the term “Bild.” These comprise the 
links to the notions of Bildung as the education and formation of the 
person, of shaping and form-giving (Bilden), and of phantasia and 
imagining (Einbildung), which in turn is linked, through the cognate 
term Vorstellung, to representation, thetic positing, Gestell. (pp. 66-67) 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
In the rest of the thesis, I continue with the discussion of image, with and against 
Heidegger. For this reason, I attempt to locate different kinds of images, 
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especially those that are potentially neither presentations nor representations and 
possibly constitute presencing itself. Presencing is described in Heidegger as 
imagination, authentic temporality, Sein-lassen, nearness, Gelassenheit and 
Ereignis and is set in contradistinction to representation that is understood as 
technologically mediated image and metaphor. Most of Heidegger’s notions for 
presencing, however, are themselves metaphors and his own thinking is 
performed through metaphors. In any case, Heidegger seems to suggest that 
technology and metaphor limits thinking whereas language is the hope for 
escaping technology’s Enframing effects. Metaphor seems central to this 
distinction, but not because of its metaphysical affinities, as Heidegger would 
have it. Metaphor is the common ground between language and technology. This 
is because metaphor is, after all, in language, but is also, and always according to 
Heidegger, involved in the technological paradigm of Being.  There is thus an 
openness to explain how these two types of revealing, namely language and 
technology, interact and how metaphor and image is central to this. This is always 
implied in Heidegger but never explicitly discussed. This is because Heidegger’s 
attempt to move away from a phenomenology of Dasein results in cryptic 
discussions concerning Being that leave the human being in confusion regarding 
the actual effects of Enframing on its thinking. Why, for example, does modern 
technology, as a specific kind of revealing, conceal all other possibilities? What 
does this mean for Dasein? And what is the connection between originary image 
and language? Fóti comments that Heidegger ‘emphasizes the belonging together 
of saying or of intrinsically poetic language and the non-representing image by 
linking the conception of language as Ereignis, as disclosive and eventful 
appropriation, to Er-giugen or bringing into the play of the glance’ but he never 
addresses the question of image directly (p. 73). She adds 
 
The promise of this new thematization of the image remains nevertheless 
partially unfulfilled, in that Heidegger does not ask whether certain 
modes of showing may be proper to the image and set it apart from the 
showing proper to language. The neglect of this question is the more 
regrettable since it would take up again the issue of the relation between 
logos and aisthesis which Heidegger considers in Being and Time, where 
he gives a rather enigmatic priority to aisthesis as the originary locus of 
truth. (ibid.) 
 
Despite this crucial absence, we can detect an indirect thematisation of logos and 
aisthesis through Heidegger’s understanding and use of metaphor. This 
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thematisation implicates imagination and raises questions concerning the types of 
images that are mediated through language and technology. In order to address 
this question, I concentrate in what follows on imagination and metaphor.  I also 
address these matters by implicating the critiques of Jacques Derrida and Bernard 
Stiegler so that Heidegger’s understanding of instrumentality will be 
supplemented and his theory of Enframing will become handy again.  
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Chapter 2 
Technology, Thinking and Imagination 
 
 
This chapter discusses the following: 
 
7. Technology, according to Heidegger, is part of our existential condition, either 
through actual technologies that condition our practical behaviour, or 
technologised thinking that conditions existence. Dasein (being-there) is an 
interpretive being and interpretation is constituted through metaphysics that, in 
turn, is grounded on the technological understanding of Being (ontotheology).  
 
8. We thus need to study how actual technologies saturate thinking. In Being and 
Time (henceforth BT), for example, it is stated that a tool is something that is let-
to-be-involved. In this thesis, this is termed the letting relationship (Seinlassen), 
and this is considered very important in Heidegger’s thought.  
 
9. Heidegger understands phenomenology as the letting-something-be-seen and 
Being as that which gives beings in their differentiation. Being lets things be. Being 
lets things come near and be perceived as certain things. 
 
10. This is, in turn, referred to as imagination. Even earlier than BT Heidegger 
attempts to reinscribe Kantian transcendental imagination as temporality that 
grounds the Seinlassen (letting things be), the as-structure and the possibility to 
access beings. 
 
11. Imagination is synthesis. It is the reproduction of a past and the fore-sight 
(anticipation) of the future that constitutes the present and as such participates in 
perception. In this light, Kantian imagination becomes Heidegger’s temporality 
and it refers to the letting relationship as a process of synthesis. In consequence, 
imagination, since it involves reproduction of the past, is mediated by technology. 
 
12. Heidegger, however, differentiates between authentic temporality, which is 
defined by our being towards death, and inauthentic temporality, which is 
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mediated by technology. This mediation is present in our everyday dealings with 
tools. 
 
13. A close study of imagination’s structure, and, in consequence, temporality’s 
structure, shows, however, that the previous distinction cannot be sustained. The 
possibility of authenticity arises amidst technologised time. Reproduction and 
representation participate in the synthesis of time, any time. Dasein can, in fact, 
according to Bernard Stiegler’s interpretation, be understood in terms of 
inheritance. Dasein inherits a past that Dasein has not lived but can potentially 
repeat. This inheritance is transmitted and accessed through technology, which is 
understood as pros-thesis, as it precedes Dasein both spatially and temporally. In 
order, however, for this inheritance to become my situatedness, it needs to be 
learned. In this respect technology can be understood in terms of a specific type 
of learning that implicates imagination. 
 
14. Heidegger prioritises authentic time over inauthentic time, and this is grounded 
in his distinction between originary image and representation (or between 
alētheia and eidos). Authentic time, though, is constituted within inauthentic time. 
Heidegger’s belief in the possibility of originary image blinds him to the fact that 
all types of images implicate inscription, exteriorisation, spatialisation and 
ultimately technology.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
[In Heidegger] technology is part of the existential structure of man’s 
being. Man does not stand in some external relation to technology ‒that 
is, it is not something apart from his being. Technology is grounded in 
man. Thus the relation between man and technology can be understood 
and the structure of technology fixed only by coming to terms with the 
being of man. The meaning of technology can be seen by exhibiting its 
ground in man’s being along with the characteristics it receives from 
such grounding (Hood, 1983, p. 352). 
 
Webster Hood’s remark clarifies the role of technology in Heidegger’s thought. In 
early Heidegger technology permeates the existential structure of the human being 
and in later Heidegger it refers to the technologisation of Being that frames 
thinking (Enframing). In this respect, there is a strong belief throughout 
Heidegger’s work that technology mediates existence. This is because the human 
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being is radically an interpretive being that is constituted through its interpretation 
of the world. On Heidegger’s (2008a) account, the human being is not a subject 
that stands outside the world representing it, but a thoroughly situated existence 
called Dasein, that is, being-here/there. As a matter of fact, Dasein is its there 
(Da). Its thinking about the world, its interpretation for this world constitutes its 
existence. Dasein constitutes itself by questioning its own being and Being in 
general. Heidegger explains that ‘Dasein is an entity that, in its very Being, 
comports itself understandingly towards that Being.’ (p. 78/53). William J. 
Richardson (2003) puts it in the following terms:  
 
The comprehension is not simply a theoretical knowledge but a manner 
of being in such a way as to comprehend Being. As a radical 
comprehension of Being, There-being’s own Being, sc., that by which it 
is what it is, is to be concerned about Being. Hence the relationship to 
Being (the comprehending
12
) constitutes the very ontological structure of 
There-being. Further, this comprehension of Being embraces not only its 
own Being but the Being of that by all other beings as well. (p. 35). 
 
In our age, Heidegger argues, we are not concerned with the question of Being. 
Our concerns are formed through a productionist metaphysics that, in turn, 
conceals the ‘ontological difference’. This is the difference between beings and 
Being, that is, the difference between beings and the process that gives beings, 
that is, the process that makes beings perceptible. In this respect, the question that 
best defines our existence, namely, ‘what is Being?’ is neglected and forgotten 
since it has already been answered and answered in the wrong way. By this I 
mean that, according to Heidegger, everything is understood through the paradigm 
of production. In this way, we perceive everything as a product. This short 
explanation
13
 suggests that there is a constant preoccupation in Heidegger’s work: 
the question of thinking and technology’s role in revealing or concealing its 
possibilities.
14
 
                                                 
12
 Richardson (2003) comments that he translates ‘Verstehen by “comprehension” because: the 
normal meaning of “comprehension” corresponds to the normal meaning of verstehen¸ sc. to 
“understand.” Yet the etymology permits it to suggest the Heideggerian sense: – prehendere (“to 
grasp, seize”) suggests the seizure of Being, both in its anticipation (precedent structure) and in its 
coming-to-pass (construction); cum- (“with”), sc. with itself, suggests that the Being of this being 
is such that it seizes Being’. (p. 34)  
13
 The role of technology in the construction of metaphysics has been discussed extensively in the 
first chapter.  
14
 It is important to note that even though it is easy to pass over this word lightly, ‘possibility’ is a 
key term for Heidegger because his conception of temporality is oriented towards the possibility of 
the future. 
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In early Heidegger (2008a), this concern is instantiated through the discussion of 
the availability of tools and the way they are let-to-be-involved in our time. The 
possibility of allowing or ‘letting’ (Sein-lassen) something be involved is 
described as closeness
15 . In closeness we experience things’ manifestation as 
tools. This is, in fact, one of Heidegger’s most important phenomenological 
insights in BT (p. 117/85). In later texts, however, Heidegger argues that modern 
technology makes things accessible by reproducing and representing them; it turns 
them into images and renders their essence unapproachable. In other words, 
modern technology short-circuits the possibility of originary nearness (the letting-
something-be-encountered) and turns it into distancelessness, that is, meaningless 
connectedness. Since, however, these latter descriptions belong to Heidegger’s 
supposedly non-phenomenological, non-subjectivist period, nowhere do we hear 
about the way this process is experienced by the ‘subject’16 and its precise effects 
on thought. In effect, this creates a confusion regarding the role of the human 
being in a highly technologised world and the possibility to escape it (Feenberg, 
2005). In order to discuss this we need to have recourse to the Heideggerian 
insight, that, for me, remains unvarying throughout the philosopher’s work, 
namely, the letting relationship. This element is integral to Heidegger’s 
phenomenology, and thus expected to have been abandoned along with 
phenomenology in his later thought. Spiegelberg (1971), for example, comments 
that: ‘Heidegger himself has dropped all references to phenomenology from his 
later writings’ and that phenomenology ‘was fundamentally nothing but a phase in 
his development’ (pp. 273, 349). This, however, is not the case. The letting 
relationship comes in different guises in Heidegger’s thought, but it is never 
abandoned. In fact, first, phenomenology itself is described as a letting-
something-be-seen and then authenticity is presented as a letting-something-be-
heard (namely, the call of consciousness). Later this element is transformed into 
meditative thinking (Gelassenheit as letting-things-be) (1969b). In what follows, I 
attempt to trace the elements, namely, imagination and phenomenological 
                                                 
15
 As already explained closeness is a translation of the word ‘Nähe’. The standard English 
translation of the same word in Heidegger’s later texts is nearness.   
16
 Of course, Heidegger never refers to the human being as subject precisely because he wants to  
escape subjectivism.  
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awareness, that allow this notion (the letting relationship) to maintain a certain 
consistency despite its transformations.   
 
2. Phenomenology in Heidegger 
 
William Richardson (2003) studied most of Heidegger’s oeuvre and wrote his 
now classic book Through Phenomenology to Thought. Heidegger himself, 
responding to the author’s request for a preface, suggested that the preposition 
‘through’ should substitute the original ‘from’ since he understood 
phenomenology ‘as the [process of] allowing the most proper concern of thought 
to show itself’ (Richardson, 2003, p. xvi). This ‘allowing’ or ‘letting’, which 
assumes an anti-subjectivist, non-representing disposition, becomes the 
cornerstone of the thinking Heidegger is attempting to describe throughout his 
career, which began, as noted, in 1907 with the study of Franz Brentano’s 1862 
dissertation titled On the Manifold Senses of Being in Aristotle and dealt explicitly 
with the question of the ontological difference.  
 
Brentano’s investigation led him to phenomenology and the study of mental 
experience (Sheehan, 1984). In his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint 
(1874) Brentano concluded that ‘all mental experiences is directedness toward or 
reference to a meant object . . . whether or not that object actually exists in the 
world’. He also believed that: ‘The essence of mental experience is intentionality 
‒ the minding-of-the-meant’ (Sheehan, 1984, p. 291).17 This means according to 
Herbert Spiegelberg (1971) that ‘Brentano for the first time uncovered a structure 
which was to become one of the basic patterns for all phenomenological analysis’ 
(p. 41).  
 
Brentano elaborated further on the nature of directedness and distinguished three 
types of mental experience; ‘representations’, ‘judgements’ and ‘acts of love and 
hatred’ (ibid., p. 42). Among the three he thought representation to be the most 
significant kind of mental experience because of its ‘relative simplicity, 
independence, and omnipresence in all psychological phenomena’ (ibid., p. 43). 
He asserted that representations are ‘characterized by temporal modes’ and that 
                                                 
17
 Physical phenomena, in contrast, lack such directedness (Spiegelberg, 1971). 
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‘present time is given to us directly’ whereas ‘past and future times appear to us 
only by way of our present representations of ourselves as experiencing the past 
or as experiencing the future event’ (ibid., p. 44). Even though Brentano made the 
distinction between the presentation of appearances in the present and the re-
presentation of appearances in imagination (in the past and the future), he also 
talked about ‘original association’ as a function of imagination ‘Phantasie’. 
According to Brentano imagination associates the present appearances of a 
temporal object to past appearances giving it its meaning (Mulligan, 2004, p. 78). 
In this way, phenomenology implicates, even at this inaugural stage, imagination 
in perception.  
 
Brentano’s student, Edmund Husserl, diverged from his mentor’s approach 
attempting to safeguard the centrality of the present. For Husserl, imagination 
works to represent the past, whereas perception allows the emergence of the 
present. The moment that has just passed is not yet part of the past. On the 
contrary, it is oriented towards the present and as such is involved in perception. 
In this way, Husserl ‒as will be explained later at length‒  maintains the primacy 
of the present, which he attributes to the productive activity of perception, 
whereas he allocates past and future to the realm of reproductive imagination 
(Stiegler, 1998). 
 
In Logical Investigations Husserl underlined that intentionality meant 
‘directedness toward an object rather than that of the object’s immanence in 
consciousness’, whilst he claimed that intentionality does not characterise all 
phenomena (Spiegelberg, 1971, p. 107). Husserl also turned more explicitly to  
 
the consciousness of the knowing subject to whom these phenomena 
appeared, i.e., in something he later came to call “transcendental 
subjectivity.” Thus the “turn to the object” was supplemented by a “turn 
to the subject” by way of a new kind of reflection which left his 
erstwhile followers on the road to the “object” far behind (ibid., p. 82). 
 
Husserl also made the distinction between simple and categorial intuition. 
According to him, simple intuition presents the object of perception ‘immediately’, 
whereas categorial intuition is far more complicated since it allows us to ‘intend 
objects which cannot be intended in the simple founding acts, like “being red,” 
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“being a book”.’ (Husserl, 1984, p. 674, 674 ff. cited Lahmar, 2006, p. 116). 
Sheehan (1984) explains the difference with an example: 
 
Taking expressed language as his clue, Husserl showed that not all parts 
of an assertion can find intuitive fulfilment in sensuous perception. For 
example, in the statement “The paper is white,” the intentions 
represented by “paper” and “white” can indeed be filled in by the 
corresponding sense perceptions, but the state of affairs corresponding to 
“is” (the paper as being white) does not appear to sensuous intuition. It 
remains a surplus over and above the content of sensuous intuition and 
so requires another act, founded on sensuous intuition, to render it 
immediately present: the categorial intuition. The dimension of the 
categorial corresponds to what the tradition called “being.” More 
specifically, it is the “being-as” dimension of phenomena (X as Y = X is 
Y). Therefore, by freeing being from its mere status as a copula and by 
seeing it as a directly given phenomenon, Husserl showed that the full 
range of phenomenological immediacy covers not just entities but 
entities-in-their-mode-of-being, entities as being such or so. 
Intentionality in its full range is intrinsically ontological, a disclosure of 
entities in their being (p. 291). 
 
Husserl thus supported that we can ‘obtain full adequate intuitive understanding’ 
of beings that do not correspond to a sense datum. This meant that we can intuit 
‘general essences’ that are the result of a certain process that relies on specific 
instances in order to reach a generalised ‘ideation’ (Spiegelberg, 1971, p. 118). 
 
Following the example of his mentor, Heidegger also rejected his mentor’s theory 
of consciousness considering it to be too subjective. He transformed intentionality 
into a kind of directedness grounded on the premise that a human being is already 
in the world and directed toward things that already have meaning because of 
their own situatedness in the world. Heidegger relied on the assumption that there 
is something that allows us to perceive things as things. For Heidegger this as-
structure is allowed by Being, which he investigates phenomenologically and 
kinetically, since he sees Being not as a substance but as a movement that 
presences something out of absence (Sheehan, 1984). 
 
Even though, Husserl was the first to demarcate this phenomenon, he did not 
study it further. Heidegger understood Being as the absence that allows the 
intuition of a presence that lacks sensuous correspondence, and he studied it 
phenomenologically. His version of phenomenology, as already noted, is not 
centred on a subjective consciousness, but on Being itself, that is, on that absence 
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that allows beings to present themselves to the human being (ibid.). In this respect, 
Heidegger’s ontology presupposes the existence of Being, which lets things be as 
certain beings. For this reason, his version of phenomenology is grounded on an 
openness in perception, that is, an awareness that lets beings be received. For 
Heidegger, similarly to Husserl and Brentano, this awareness is strictly 
temporal,
18
 and for this reason his own questioning is concerned with the 
possibility of authentic temporality.  
 
Heidegger (2008a) believes that questioning, and especially questioning about 
Being, is one of Dasein’s modes of Being. For this reason, he states that: ‘(T)he 
very asking of this question is an entity’s mode of Being; and as such it gets its 
essential character from what is inquired about −namely, Being’ (p. 27/8). Since 
for Heidegger Dasein’s mode of being is temporal, and since Being is also 
temporal, Dasein’s thinking is mostly conditioned by time. He explains it as 
follows: ‘As understanding, Dasein projects its Being upon possibilities’ (p. 
188/48). Through this understanding ‘‒that which is understood‒ is already 
accessible in such a way that its ‘as which’ can be made to stand out explicitly. 
The ‘as’ makes up the structure of the explicitness of something that is understood. 
It constitutes the interpretation’ (p. 189/49). The ‘as-structure’ constitutes the 
openness that allows beings to be perceived and it is ‘grounded in something we 
see in advance‒in a fore-sight’. As such, it is also grounded in Dasein’s 
‘primordial state’ as ‘projection’ (pp. 191,192/150,151). This underlines the 
temporal constitution of Dasein and shifts the traditional focus from the present 
onto the future, that is, onto something that is not here yet, an absence instead of a 
presence, a possibility instead of an actuality that allows something to come near. 
Heidegger explains:  
 
The way the Present is rooted in the future and in having been, is the 
existential-temporal condition for the possibility that what has been 
projected in circumspective understanding can be brought closer in a 
making-present, and in such a way that the Present can thus conform 
itself to what is encountered within the horizon of awaiting and retaining; 
this means that it must interpret itself in the schema of the as-structure. . . 
Like understanding and interpretation in general, the ‘as’ is grounded in 
the ecstatico-horizontal unity of temporality  (p. 411/360). 
                                                 
18
 In this way, the focus of phenomenology is temporal, as was envisioned by its founders 
Brentano and Husserl. 
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Many points can be raised here. First, for Heidegger the present is constituted 
from the future (awaiting) and the past (retaining), and this points to the absence’s 
importance for the manifestation of things in the present. This allows Heidegger 
to move away from the metaphysical focus on presence and towards the 
phenomenological exegesis of the kinetic nature of Being. Second, Being works 
through the as-structure, which is itself allowed through a certain kind of 
association between the dimensions of time that brings about a unity of meaning. 
The third point, has to do with the equation of the movement of bringing-close 
and the process of making something present and perceptible. The fourth, and 
perhaps the most important point, has to do with the striking resemblance between 
Heideggerian temporality and Kantian imagination. This point is explicitly 
discussed in several Heideggerian texts, especially in the Kantbuch and in Basic 
Problems of Phenomenology. It is also discussed in BT, when the philosopher 
mentions that he intends to include ‘Kant’s doctrine of schematism and time, as a 
preliminary stage in the problematic of temporality’ 19 in the first division of Part 
Two of BT ‒which was, of course, never written (Heidegger, 2008a, p. 64/40). In 
the rest of the chapter, I aim to discuss precisely this, that is, the way Heidegger 
re-inscribed imagination as a type of temporality that lets things be as the things 
they are. As soon as these connections are made clear, we will be able to 
understand what closeness20 is and how it is affected by imagination.  
 
3. Phantasia, Imagination, Einbildungskraft 
 
Heidegger’s (2008a) inquirer, namely, Dasein does not possess an essence, rather 
‘it has its Being to be’ (pp. 32-33/12); and since this being is in the world, a 
phenomenological investigation of Dasein cannot be based on a fixed ‘standpoint’ 
or ‘direction’ but must be understood as a ‘methodological conception’ that does 
not ‘characterise the what of the object of philosophical research as subject-matter, 
but rather the how of the research’ (p. 50/27). In this respect, Heidegger’s 
methodology is an open-ended ontological investigation that attempts to let things 
                                                 
19
 The implications of this connection will he discussed in the next section. 
20
 At this early stage, Heidegger uses the term closeness. The later term (nearness) is broader, but 
maintains the existential connotations of the earlier one and its closeness to terms such as 
imagination, the as-structure, temporality, the letting relationship, Being, etc.  
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present themselves as they are, instead of conforming them to what is known. In 
this way, his own investigation attempts to bring things closer. 
 
Heidegger points out that phenomenology stems from the Greek words φαίνεσθαι 
(to show itself) and λόγος (discourse, language). Most importantly, he explains 
that λόγος (as discourse) has, according to Aristotle, the character of ἀποφαίνεσθαι, 
that is, it ‘lets something be seen (φαίνεσθαι)’ (p. 56/32). Since ‘the λόγος is a 
letting-something-be-seen, it can be true or false’. It is thus a vehicle of truth, not 
as we understand it ‘in the sense of “agreement”’ but as ἀλήθεια, that is as an 
original unveiling or revealing of that which is hidden (p. 56/33). For Heidegger 
this process cannot refer beforehand to any specific entity since part of the process 
is the discovery of the entity that needs to be investigated. He writes: 
 
‘Phenomenology’ neither designates the object of its researches, nor 
characterizes the subject-matter comprised. The word merely informs us 
of the “how” with which what is to be treated in this science gets 
exhibited and handled. To have a science ‘of’ phenomena means to 
grasp its objects in such a way that everything about them which is up 
for discussion must be treated by exhibiting it directly and demonstrating 
it directly (pp. 59/34-35). 
 
If then the phenomenon is what shows itself from itself, and discourse (λόγος) is a 
letting of what shows itself to show itself from itself, then phenomenology is a 
twofold letting-be-seen that both describes and names that which is hidden so that 
it can be seen in its mode of being. Description is such a big part of the 
phenomenological process that Heidegger argues that the term ‘descriptive 
phenomenology’ is ‘tautological’. (p. 59/35). He explains that the 
 
investigation itself will show that the meaning of phenomenological 
description as a method lies in interpretation. The λόγος of the 
phenomenology of Dasein has the character of a ἑρμηνεύειν, through 
which the authentic meaning of being, and also those authentic structures 
of Being which Dasein itself possess, are made known to Dasein’s 
understanding of Being. The phenomenology of Dasein is a hermeneutic 
in the primordial signification of this word, where it designates this 
business of interpreting (pp. 61-62/37). 
 
In Heidegger, hermeneutics is transformed: it no longer refers to the interpretation 
of a text but to the interpretation of the being that does the interpreting, namely 
Dasein. And since Dasein is always implicated in a ‘toward-which’ project, this 
interpreting has to do with the interpretation of a possibility. The most important 
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of these possibilities is the possibility of being authentic or not (Spiegelberg, 
1971). The perception of such possibilities is allowed through language, which is 
understood not as a representational mechanism, but as the letting relationship. 
Heidegger (2008a) says 
 
When fully concrete, discoursing (letting something be seen) has the 
character of speaking [Sprechens] −vocal proclamation in words. The 
λόγος is φωνή, and indeed, φωνή μετά φαντασίας − an utterance in which 
something is sighted in each case (p. 56/33).  
 
The reference to φαντασία, which is usually rendered as imagination and thus 
bears the connotations of fantasy and illusion, is surprising. In fact, it would seem 
that phenomenology, that is, the method that allows beings to present themselves, 
cannot be further from this notion. John Sallis (1990), in effect, comments that 
imagination, as typically understood, seems contradictory to phenomenology’s 
task. He says 
 
One ought not pass too easily over the paradox that is made to appear as 
soon as imagination is introduced into phenomenology. Set upon 
returning to the things themselves, phenomenology would appear to 
require just the opposite direction from that which imagination is 
believed typically to take. Phenomenology, it appears, could have 
nothing to do with those flights of phantasy, those fictions, with which 
imagination ‒seemingly oblivious to the things themselves‒ will have to 
do (p. 97). 
 
Still, as it will be pointed out, Greek phantasia is very much an integral part of 
Heidegger’s phenomenology, and it is, indeed, very different from fantasy or 
imagination or even some connotations of German Einbildung
21
. The expression 
itself ‒φωνή μετά φαντασίας‒ is one of Aristotle’s five characteristics of reference 
(Sheehan, 1984). The word can be rendered as imagination, but instead of 
connoting something like image, imitation, likeness or representation (all 
connotations that its Latin counterpart, namely, imago, carries), it shares the same 
φα-stem (light) as the words φαινόμενο and απόφανσις. This suggests that 
φαντασία refers to a process of bringing something to light, similarly to perception, 
or alētheia. Φαντασία is a movement out of forgetfulness. This is why Sallis 
                                                 
21
 The German word Einbildung bares the connotations of imagination, but also, fancy, illusion 
and conceit. This should not cause any alarm, though, since what I attempt here is, precisely, to 
trace the forgotten aspects of imagination which are traced, by Heidegger himself, back to Kant’s 
Einbildungskraft and Aristotle’s phantasia. This seems contradictory to the platonic take on the 
word that points to abstraction and flee from reality.  
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(1990) comments that in order to understand Heidegger’s notion of imagination 
‘(o)ne will need to come back to what Heidegger develops –even if largely in 
reference to the Greeks and to Kant– as the basic problem of phenomenology. As 
a first move toward reinscribing imagination’ (p. 97). 
 
Martha Nussbaum (1985) discusses phantasia’s Greek origin, arguing that one of 
the earliest meanings of the word comes from the verb phainetai (it appears). In 
fact, in Plato’s Theaetatus (152 bc) we find the following brief discussion: ‘Is this 
“it appears” perceiving? . . . Then phantasia and perception are the same in the 
case of that which is warm and everything of that sort’ suggesting that sensuous 
qualities require imagination in order to be perceived (cited in Nussbaum, 1985, p. 
242). Aristotle maintains the connection between phantasia and perception even 
though in some cases he uses the word to refer to representation. Nussbaum 
explains:  
 
In numerous contexts, then, in which he is analysing problems of 
delusion, dreaming and memory, Aristotle speaks of phantasia and 
phantasmata. But the evidence indicates that his basic interest is in how 
things in the world appear to living creatures, what the creatures see their 
objects as (p. 255).  
 
Phantasia in Aristotle is not understood as a flee from reality or as fantasy. On the 
contrary, it is what allows the perception of reality. According to Nussbaum, for 
Aristotle phantasia and aesthesis (feeling, emotion) are both present in perception, 
but whilst aesthesis is more passive in ‘receiving perceptual stimuli’, phantasia is 
active in allowing us to see something ‘as a certain thing’ (p. 259). This 
accordingly means that  
 
reception and interpretation are not separable, but thoroughly 
interdependent. There is no receptive “innocent eye” in perception. How 
something phainetai to me is obviously bound with my past, my 
prejudices, and my needs. But if it is only in virtue of phantasia, and not 
aesthesis alone, that I apprehend the object as an object, then it follows 
that there is no uninterpreted or “innocent” view of it, no distinction ‒at 
least of the level of form or object-perception‒ between the given, or 
received and the interpreted (p. 261). 
  
Phantasia understood from its Aristotelian origin is a transformative, productive 
process that inheres in perception. Never does it register reality as a neutral 
reproductive machine. In fact, there is no such possibility. In this light, phantasia 
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becomes what grounds the letting relationship. In this respect, Heidegger’s task in 
BT, and perhaps even later, is this: to re-imagine imagination as that which lets 
things be received in perception. John Llewelyn (2000), in agreement with John 
Sallis (1990), argues that Heidegger transforms the letting relationship (seinlassen) 
into the receptiveness of the call of conscience
22
 as depicted in Heidegger’s 
discussion of authenticity. He also adds that this ‘brings us back to the root of 
Kant’s Achtung, attentive respect or reverence’ (p. 38). He expounds:  
  
This, for Kant, is regard for persons as ends in themselves. That is the 
voice of conscience in the Kantian context is a pre-echo of the 
ontological conscience that Heidegger articulates with the help of the 
basic structures of Seinlassen and Gelassenheit (ibid.). 
 
There is, however, a deeper connection between Heidegger and Kant, and in order 
to grasp this, we need to understand the role of transcendental imagination in 
Kant’s (2010) Critique of Pure Reason and then relate it to Heidegger’s own 
understanding of this. Kant understands imagination (Einbildungskraft)
23
as 
synthesis, that is, as a productive process that connects the appearances we 
receive in intuition with the concepts we possess in understanding, that is, with 
general rules, about quantity, quality, relation and modality in order to form a 
thing. As he argues,  
 
Synthesis, generally speaking, is . . . the mere operation of the 
imagination −a blind but indispensable function of the soul without 
which we should have no cognition whatever, but of the working of 
which we are seldom even conscious (p. 93). 
 
Kant’s obscure description suggests that imagination functions at such a deep 
level that it becomes inconspicuous. Elsewhere, he states that: ‘By the word 
synthesis, in its most general signification, I understand the process of joining 
different representations to each other and of comprehending their diversity in one 
cognition.’ (p. 92) It seems, that Heidegger (2008a) relies on the term and relates 
it to language, the letting relationship and the as-structure. He writes: 
 
And only because the function of the λόγος as ἀπόφανσις lies in letting 
something be seen by pointing it out, can the λόγος have the structural 
                                                 
22
 This will be explained in the next section. 
23
 Einbildungskraft is the term Kant uses for imagination and it underscores imagination’s power 
(kraft) to form (Bilden) an image (Bild). 
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role of σύνθεσις. Here “synthesis” does not mean a binding and linking 
together of representations, a manipulation of physical occurrences 
where the ‘problem’ arises of how these bindings, as something inside, 
agree with something physical outside. Here the συν has a purely 
apophantical signification and means letting something be seen in its 
togetherness [Beisammen] with something letting it be seen as 
something [etwas als etwas sehen lassen].” (p. 56/33). 
 
The letting-relationship then, or imagination in language, is a ‘perceiving as’ 
(Llewelyn, 2000, p. 15). This means, according to Sallis (1990), that imagination 
is ‘the opening of a space in which beings show themselves as they are, that is, in 
their Being’ and that in this light, imagination is to become in Heidegger ‘the 
meaning of Being’ (pp. 98, 99). This, in consequence, suggests that, despite the 
virtual absence of the word in BT (it is mentioned only once), imagination plays a 
fundamental role in the work and that it is equated with two things: the apophantic 
aspects of language and the unfolding of temporality. Because of this close 
identification imagination is effaced from the text (ibid.). In order to understand 
this we need to pay heed to what Kant understands as imagination and the way 
Heidegger interprets this in order to construct his theory of time.  
 
3.1. Heidegger’s Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant 
 
In Kant (2010) there are two faculties in cognition. On the one hand, there is 
sensibility that receives the sense data and on the other hand, there is 
understanding that sorts out the manifold of data which is subsumed under the 
categories. Since, the two faculties are quite different, Kant argues that ‘there 
must be some third thing, which on the one side is homogeneous with the 
category, and with the phenomenon on the other, and so makes the application of 
the former to the latter possible.’ (p. 138) He continues that: ‘This mediating 
representation must be pure (without any empirical content), and yet must on the 
one side be intellectual, on the other sensuous. Such a representation is the 
transcendental schema.’ (p. 139) 
 
Schemata belong to imagination. On the one hand, productive imagination takes 
the manifold of intuitions received in sensibility and connects them using 
schemata (procedural rules) that apply images to the pure a priori concepts 
(categories) of understanding. These categories are concepts that are innate and 
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independent from empirical reality. On the other hand, reproductive imagination 
retrieves an already formed temporal object that has been synthesised by 
productive, transcendental imagination. In other words, transcendental 
imagination is a condition of, not a result of experience’, whereas ‘reproductive’ 
imagination is a recollection of experience (Furlong, 2002, pp. 116, 119).  
 
The synthesis that takes place in transcendental imagination, and is called 
reproduction, is not the only synthesis in cognition; Kant also mentions the 
synthesis of apprehension that takes place in intuition (sensibility) and the 
synthesis of recognition that takes place in the realm of the concept 
(understanding). However, imagination’s significance lies in the fact that is 
involved in the other two syntheses as well. Heidegger (1997) argues that 
apprehension, which refers to the reception of the manifold of intuition, is not 
possible without the mediation of a certain type of synthesis that reproduces and 
brings forth those intuitions that have just passed and subsequently connects them 
with those that are current. Without such synthesis we would receive a muddle of 
disjointed intuitions instead of sequences. In such a case, 
 
Mind would be tied firmly to each phase of the now. If the whole range 
of the manifold of a region of objects is to be made accessible generally, 
then a possibility is needed for freely connecting what is offered beyond 
each phase of the perceived. The horizon of possible unification dare not 
be limited to the wideness or narrowness of a now which is always 
isolated in itself. Then the mind would constantly fall from one phase of 
the now into another totally unconnected phase, in such a way that the 
earlier would simply be lost. Mind would be delivered over to such a 
sequence of isolated perception… Thus the possibility must first be 
provided in each case for a thorough retainability and a repeated 
bringing forth of what is offered empirically. (p. 238)  
 
For Heidegger this means that: ‘Apprehension itself is not possible without 
reproduction’ (ibid.). 24  In fact, he explains that it is imagination through the 
synthesis of reproduction that ‘keeps open the horizon of alreadyness’ since it 
retains what is ‘no-longer-now’ in unity with the ‘now’, and it is this ‘pure 
synthesis of retaining [that] constitutes the mind’s being able to distinguish 
something like time’ (p. 239). In other words, Heidegger equates the ability to 
retain and access the has-been with the possibility of perceiving time. In fact, he 
                                                 
24
 He also adds that this is in accord with Kant himself. 
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comments that the way the two syntheses are constituted proves that they ‘belong 
to each other’ and that they are ‘related to time, and this not accidentally but 
essentially. Their relational character of unification, is dictated by the essence of 
the now and by time as such. To say “synthesis is related to time” is already a 
tautology.’ (p. 240) If, however, reproduction is needed in apprehension, then this 
is already a first admission of imagination’s involvement in perception. In fact, 
according to Andrew Brook (2011), this is in agreement with Kant’s own theory 
since, in the second edition of his Critique, the philosopher argues that 
apprehension is possible only through imagination. Heidegger, however, wanted 
to move beyond this and to show that, contrary to Kant, the third synthesis, i.e., 
recognition that takes place in the concept, is also related to time. Such a move 
would have overcome the sharp separation that exists, according to Kant, between 
apprehension −which is implicated in intuition and thus in sensibility− and the 
synthesis of recognition −which is implicated in the concept 25  and thus in 
understanding. In order to do that, Heidegger had to show that imagination is 
implicated not only in apprehension and reproduction, but in recognition as well. 
Recognition is what brings all syntheses together. In fact, he believed that by 
detecting the relatedness of all three syntheses to time, and consequently 
imagination, he would verify Kant’s hunch that there truly is a ‘common root that 
lies ‘beneath the two stems of knowledge (understanding and intuition)’ (Blattner, 
2006, p. 167). For this reason, Heidegger (1997) moves on to discuss recognition, 
but first he warns his readers that  
 
in interpreting the third synthesis we go way beyond Kant, because now 
the problem of the common root of both stems of knowledge becomes 
acute. We are concerned with understanding time and the I-think more 
radically and in the direction which is certainly visible in Kant, but 
which is not taken by him, i.e., in the direction of the synthesis of the 
power of imagination. (p. 243) 
  
Recognition refers to the possibility of recognizing (of remembering) earlier 
representations of a concept and associating them with current representations of 
that same concept (Kant, 2010). For Heidegger this synthesis refers to a process 
that enables both apprehension and reproduction precisely because it points to the 
fact that what was retained and what was intuited belong to the same thing, 
namely, the concept. For this reason he argues that ‘the designation “recognition” 
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 These concepts or categories refer to quantity, quality, relation and modality. 
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is quite misleading.’ And he explains: ‘The fundamental act which enables that 
we take what we retain as what we have already intuited and grasp it as the same 
is the act of identification. Without the synthesis of identification it would be 
impossible to grasp any objective interrelation.’ (1997, p. 244) Heidegger then 
investigates whether identification comes prior to apprehension and reproduction. 
First, he infers that this cannot be since identification is based on the fact that: 
‘Identification always already makes use of what is given beforehand and what it 
identifies’. (p. 246) However, he does locate another aspect of identification that 
gives it temporal priority. He writes: 
 
In identifying −and that means apprehending and reproducing− we are 
always already awaiting a unity of beings. Essentially and in the order or 
structure of the syntheses, the synthesis mentioned in the third place is 
the primary one. This synthesis is primarily neither a re-cognition 
[Wiedererkennen] nor an identification but opens up and projects in 
advance a whole −a whole which is in fact in one way or another 
disclosable and appropriatable in apprehension and reproduction. (p. 246) 
 
Heidegger then, and in fact against Kant, understands the third synthesis ‘in terms 
of this advance awaiting of a regional unity of offerable beings’ and proceeds to 
call it the ‘synthesis of pre-cognition’ (p. 256). This was to become the foundation 
of his own understanding of temporality in BT: the future has priority over the 
other dimensions of time since it is a kind of fore-sight that moves through the 
past forming the present. Llewelyn (2000) comments:  
 
A pure synthesis of recognition is already involved in the subsequent 
return to a past now through the production of a pure reproduction of it. 
Such past futurity may be that of a projection I did not, but could have 
made. But I could not have made it without implying that I could now 
make a projection into the future future (p. 42). 
 
For Heidegger the understanding of the third synthesis suggests that all three 
syntheses are related to time, and this proves that both sensibility and 
understanding are related to time. The categories, or concepts, do not belong to 
the subject but are synthesised through time. Time allows for continuity and 
consistency (p. 247). To put it differently,  
 
The synthesis of apprehension is related to the present, the synthesis of 
reproduction is related to the past, and the synthesis of re-cognition is 
related to the future. Insofar as all three modes of synthesis are related to 
time and insofar as these moments of time make up the unity of time itself, 
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the three syntheses maintain their unified ground in the unity of time. (p. 
246) 
 
Heidegger then turns to apperception, that is, another Kantian process, in order to 
elaborate further his account of recognition. For Kant (2010) apperception 
constitutes the possibility for all unity: it is what allows the connection between 
representations. Apperception refers to the ‘I think’ that allows me to ‘join one 
representation to another’ and be ‘conscious of the synthesis of them’ (pp. 111, 
112). Kant adds: 
 
Consequently, only because I can connect a variety of given 
representations in one consciousness, is it possible that I can represent to 
myself the identity of consciousness in these representations; in other 
words, the analytical unity of apperception is possible only under the 
presupposition of a synthetical unity. (p. 112)  
 
This conclusion allows Heidegger to move even further away from Kant. For 
Heidegger the apperception’s ability to synthesise, proves that ‘the original 
synthesis of the three syntheses; that is, the unity of consciousness is in itself such 
a unity of pure time-related imaginative synthesis.’ (p. 277) This in turn is 
transformed into Heidegger’s own structure of temporality. As he explains, 
 
But if the productive power of imagination is in this way nothing but the 
most original unity of the three modes of synthesis, then this power has 
essentially already unified in itself pure intuition and pure thinking, pure 
receptivity and pure spontaneity −or put more precisely, this power is the 
root which releases both from out of itself. The productive power of 
imagination is the root of the faculties of subjectivity; it is the basic 
ecstatic constitution of the subject, of Dasein itself. Insofar as the power 
of imagination releases pure time from out of itself, as we have shown 
(and this means that the power of imagination contains pure time as a 
possibility), it is original temporality and therefore the radical faculty of 
ontological knowledge. (p. 283) 
  
In this light, Heidegger manages to form a theory of temporality that refers to the 
inter-relatedness of three types of syntheses that rely on imagination and allows 
for perception to let beings present themselves. Sallis (1990) thus infers that 
 
transcendental imagination can carry out the forming of time as the now-
sequence precisely because it is identical with originary time, with 
temporality. Hence, in this move the identity of time and imagination is 
not only thought but now thought precisely as identity. (p. 108) 
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Since Heidegger’s original aim is, however, to reconstruct the notion of time, the 
identity of time and imagination makes imagination redundant. In fact, since 
‘transcendental imagination is transformed into something more originary’, then 
‘in his words, “the designation ‘imagination’ becomes of itself inappropriate” 
(Heidegger, 1973, p. 135, cited in Sallis, 1990, p. 108-109). For this reason, it is 
important to remember that much of Heidegger’s discussion of existential 
temporality is a discussion of imagination that allows for ‘agency’ and 
‘receptivity’, which finds expression in his deployment of various terms based on 
the verb lassen. At least at this stage of Heidegger’s thought, time and 
imagination are completely intertwined: imagination forms (Bilden) time; time is 
imagination’s power to form (Einbildungskraft) (Llewelyn, 2000). In this respect, 
both Heidegger and Kant understand imagination as  
 
a forming and re-forming [Nachbilden], that is, of making visible again 
the nows which have been; of an in-advance forming [Vorbilden], that is, 
of letting the now which is not yet present be sighted; and of forming an 
image [Abbilden], which brings the now which is present directly before 
or in front of us [vorbilden]. (Heidegger, 1997, p. 282) 
 
Image re-enters the discussion with a vengeance. In the previous chapter I argued 
that there are in Heidegger’s thought two types of image; the first is understood as 
eidos and the second one as poetic image and alētheia. They both define types of 
thinking, but in the light of the above discussion, they can also be understood as 
forms of synthesis, that is, forms of connectedness that ultimately synthesise types 
of temporality or lived time. They both connect intuitions but eidos produces 
stagnated representations, whereas poetic image, as alētheia, connects 
imaginatively allowing every thing to be synthesised differently. The latter 
process is what Heidegger calls letting things be. It is a special kind of synthesis, 
and since authenticity is one of its exemplary instances, I turn to it next. 
 
3.2. Authenticity as Differential Movement  
 
In the Introduction of BT Heidegger (2008a) describes Dasein as the ‘entity which 
does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is ontically distinguished by 
that fact that, in its very Being, that being is an issue for it’ (p. 32/12). Dasein’s 
understanding of Being is constitutive of Dasein’s existence since ‘it is in such a 
way as to be its “there”’ (ibid., p. 171/133). Dasein is, in fact, cleared for this 
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understanding, not by any other being but by its very own constitution; Dasein is 
the ‘clearing’ (ibid.). Heidegger writes:  
  
Only for an entity which is existentially cleared in this way does that 
which is present-at-hand become accessible in the light or hidden in the 
dark. By its very nature, Dasein brings its “there” along with it. If it 
lacks its “there”, it is not factically the entity which is essentially Dasein; 
indeed, it is not this entity at all. Dasein is its disclosedness (ibid.). 
 
Heidegger indicates that Dasein offers itself as the site of truth. Dasein does not 
create truth voluntarily, but it allows it to shine by offering a place for it. This 
place needs to be cleared; this openness needs to be allowed to stay as such. If it is 
not cleared, if it is not open, then Dasein’s Da will potentially be occupied by 
ways of being that do not belong to Dasein: they will not have been chosen by it 
yet nevertheless will constitute its there. In this way Dasein may lose itself to the 
‘they-self’ (ibid., p. 311/267), that is, the self as expressed through the mass media 
and public opinion that ‘has always kept Dasein from taking hold of the 
possibilities of Being’ (p. 312/268). In this case the inauthentic person may even 
make some choices but it is ‘indefinite who has ‘really’ done the choosing’ (p. 
312/268). In this way we can understand that being authentic is an ontological 
state and not an ethical one: even though both authenticity and inauthenticity are 
states of Dasein’s being, the ‘they-self’ means not having the possibility of being 
a unique self. 
 
The possibility of becoming an authentic self is part of Dasein’s ontological 
constitution. Heidegger explains that ‘the Being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-
Being-already-in-(the world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-
world)’ (p. 237/193). This corresponds to the three ecstasies of time that constitute 
Dasein’s being. Dasein derives itself from the future (ahead-of-itself) while 
existing always already in some situation or other (a past) along with other beings 
and involvements (a present). These three moments are held together as a 
structural whole by ‘care’ (Sorge), whether towards things (concern) or towards 
other Dasein (solicitude) (p. 238/194). It is either through concern or solicitude 
that Dasein moves towards a project that is in the future but that affects the has-
been and the right-now. This futural projection, which like Kantian recognition 
allows both past and present to be involved in the present, has a twofold nature: it 
is constituted by the determinateness of death and the indeterminateness of 
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possibility. Dasein can choose at any moment to be one thing or another. The 
decision to take on a single possibility is realised through ‘anticipatory 
resoluteness’, which is the state of ‘Being towards one’s ownmost, distinctive 
potentiality-for-being’ (p. 372/325). Heidegger explains that this possibility is 
based on the structure of the letting relationship, which is inherently futural:  
 
This letting-itself-come-towards-itself in that distinctive possibility 
which it puts up with, is the primordial phenomenon of the future as 
coming towards. If either authentic or inauthentic Being-towards-death 
belongs to Dasein’s Being, then such Being-towards-death is possible 
only as something futural… (p. 373/325) 
 
Guilt is an inherent element for authenticity. Dasein needs to feel guilty for 
wasting its life and to experience the inevitability of death. It needs to realise that 
death will limit all the possibilities and thus experience the ‘burden’ of having to 
choose for itself. In order to do that Dasein needs to suspend certain possibilities 
and choose one. In this way, Dasein will differentiate itself from its current non-
self, that is, from its undifferentiated ‘they-self’. Bernard Stiegler (1998) detects a 
differential logic in Dasein’s temporal structure: 
 
Dasein is the being who differs and defers [l’étant qui diffère]. A being 
who differs and defers should be understood in a twofold sense: the one 
who always puts off until later, who is essentially pro-jected in deferral, 
and the one who, for the same reason, finds itself originarily different, 
indeterminate, improbable. The being who defers by putting off till later 
anticipates: to anticipate always means to defer. Dasein has to be: it is 
not simply −it is only what it will be; it is time. Anticipation means 
being-for-the-end. Dasein knows its end. Yet it will never have 
knowledge of it. Its end is that toward which it is, in relation to which it 
is; yet its end is what will never be for Dasein. Dasein is for the end, but 
its end is not for it. Although it knows its end absolutely, it will always 
be that in relation to which it will never know anything: the knowledge 
of the end always withdraws, is concealed in being deferred. (p. 231) 
 
Dasein’s temporality raises many questions concerning the modes and resources 
available for its individuation. Heidegger (2008a) states that Dasein has the 
opportunity to have its own self with the ‘call of conscience’ to which ‘there 
corresponds a possible hearing’. He explains that: ‘Our understanding of that 
appeal unveils itself as our wanting to have a conscience [Gewissenhabenwollen]’ 
(p. 314/270). It is not surprising that Heidegger’s description of Dasein’s 
receptiveness takes us back ‘to the root of Kant’s Achtung, attentive respect or 
reverence’, which refers, as already noted, to imagination (p. 38). Imagination 
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allows the synthesis of the call as call. Conscience is able to respond to the call by 
constituting the call as a call because of perception’s imaginative and interpretive 
nature. For this reason, Heidegger (2008a) says that the caller is Dasein itself.  
 
In its “who,” the caller is definable in a “worldly” way by nothing at all. 
The caller is Dasein in its uncanniness: primordial, thrown being-in-the-
world as the “not-at-home” −the bare “that-it-is” in the “nothing” of the 
world. The caller is unfamiliar to the everyday one-self; it is something 
like an alien voice. What could be more alien to the “one,” lost in the 
manifold “world” of its concern, than the Self which has been 
individualized down to itself in uncanniness and been thrown into the 
“nothing”? (pp. 321-322/276-77) 
 
A great many points can be raised here. First, we have to take note of the 
indispensability of the mood of ‘anxiety’, in which Dasein finds itself when the 
world appears unfamiliar (unheimlich) to it; when it loses its feeling of being at 
home and becomes uncanny. It is this feeling that Dasein avoids when it exists 
through the ‘they-self’. The caller who is Dasein appears unfamiliar to its usual 
self, the world itself seems unfamiliar, and it projects a possibility of difference. 
In this respect, the possibility for an authentic self appears to a self that is not 
authentic yet. How can there be such a possibility though? Heidegger asserts that 
the inauthentic self lives time inauthentically. This time is constituted by daily 
concerns like going to work, shopping, or reading a newspaper. Incidentally, this 
everyday world is constituted as such through technology, since it is my car that 
takes me to my job, it is the computer that allows me to do my work, and it is 
machines that allow the production and conservation of the food I eat. Heidegger 
pays special attention to the role of the media that produce what he calls the ‘idle 
talk’, that is, the meaningless gossip and instrumentalised language that allow 
Dasein to surrender to the numbing, familiar existence of the quotidian. 
Inauthentic temporality, however, seems to emerge hand-in-hand with the 
closeness we experience towards the things we use and the projects we are 
involved with, and thus along with Dasein’s spatiality. How then can authentic 
possibility emerge from this inauthentic there? Heidegger’s analysis suggests that 
it both can and cannot: ‘The call comes from me and yet from beyond me.’ (p. 
319/275)  
 
On the one hand, the differential logic of Dasein’s existence suggests that at any 
time there is the opportunity to experience the unfamiliarity of the world and 
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differentiate our existence. In fact, Heidegger’s description suggests that the 
traditional inside-outside and presence-absence distinctions cannot be sustained 
because of this call. On the other hand, his firm separation between inauthentic 
and authentic time does suggest that it is impossible for authenticity to arise in an 
inauthentic self (there) that is part of the everyday, inauthentic and technological 
there. According to Bernard Stiegler (1998) this is an inherent ambiguity in 
Heidegger’s thought, and, in fact, one that suggests that technology’s participation  
in the constitution of Dasein’s time needs further investigation. In order to do this, 
I focus, in the next section, on the decisive moment for authentic temporality. 
 
3.2.1. Augenblick: The moment of Vision 
 
The understanding of Dasein’s temporality is based upon Kant’s transcendental 
imagination, but the discussion of the moment of vision makes this connection 
even clearer. The moment of vision or, to put it differently, the blink of the eye, is 
critical for Heidegger’s discussion of authenticity and lived time, and it has been 
the subject of much discussion by many thinkers before him −Kierkegaard, 
Nietzsche and Husserl to name just a few. For Heidegger (2008a) the Augenblick 
refers to Dasein’s temporality. In contrast to the usual metaphysical understanding 
of the present as the now moment, it constitutes its ‘authentic Present’ (p. 
388/338). For Heidegger the Augenblick is the exemplary moment when Dasein is 
able to seize the opportunity to become authentic, but this possibility is afforded 
by Dasein’s general temporal constitution. As Heidegger points out  
 
Only an entity which, in its Being, is essentially futural so that it is free 
for its death and can let itself be thrown back upon its factical “there” 
by shattering itself against −that is to say, only an entity which as 
futural, is equiprimordially in the process of having-been, can, by 
handing down to itself the possibility it has inherited, take over its own 
thrownness and be in the moment of vision for ‘its time’. Only 
authentic temporality which is at the same time finite, makes possible 
something like fate  ‒that is to say, authentic historicality. (p. 437/385) 
 
Heidegger understands lived time as essentially futural, but inherent to this 
futurity is the possibility to repeat the having-been. This take on time contrasts 
with Husserl’s privileging of the present as the instantaneous and indivisible blink 
of the eye (Derrida, 1973). For Husserl, even the moment that has just passed 
belongs to the present. In this light, perception is a process that is constituted by 
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three elements: the primal impression of the temporal object that is presented to 
my consciousness, the retention of the object as soon as the primal impression has 
passed and the protention as anticipation of the object’s continuation in the future. 
Brough and Blattner (2006) give the following example:  
 
If a melody I am hearing appears to me as in part now, in part past, and 
in part to come, then each phase of my act of hearing it must not only be 
conscious of the now-phase of the object but also reach out beyond the 
now to elapsed and future phases. If I did not preserve a consciousness 
of the elapsed tones as they slip ever more deeply into the past, I would 
hear only a single note and never the whole melody or even an extended 
part of it. Similarly, I must be open to further experience of the melody, 
or at least to the experience of something that will follow it. But 
preservation of what has elapsed and anticipation of what is to come will 
not by themselves account for the perception of the temporal object. (pp. 
128-129) 
 
Husserl calls the preservation of the has-been retention and the anticipation of 
what is to come protention, and these very much resemble the Heideggerian 
ecstasies and Kant’s structure of transcendental imagination. However, the 
approaches diverge with regard to the significance they appoint to each temporal 
dimension. For Husserl the now is the absolute site of experience and “the source-
point of all temporal positions” (Husserl 1991, p. 74, cited in Brough and Blattner, 
2006, p. 128). Both retention and protention are oriented towards the now and 
retention ‘is the actual holding on to what has elapsed as it moves away from the 
now’, whereas protention is understood as ‘a moment of the actual phase of the 
ongoing perception that immediately opens me up to further experience, usually 
of what I am presently experiencing, without running through it in advance as if it 
were present’ (pp. 128, 129). In this respect, both retention and protention refer to 
the now and constitute perception. However, according to Husserl (1991), 
 
For that to occur, presentation and anticipation must be tempered by 
modification. If I were simply to preserve the elapsed notes of the 
melody without modification, I would not hear a coherent melodic 
succession but “a disharmonious tangle of sound, as if [I] had struck 
simultaneously all the notes that had previously sounded” (p. 11, cited in 
Brough and Blattner, 2006). 
 
This process of necessary modification sounds a lot like Kantian synthesis, but in 
Husserl this process is not attributed to imagination. For Husserl the retention of 
the elapsed moment refers to primary memory and is inscribed within perception. 
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Imagination, on the contrary, refers to the reconstitution of a past event −let us say 
my summer vacations in Italy− that is re-collected and re-presented in secondary 
memory. As follows, Husserl opposes any effort –such as the one undertaken by 
Brentano− to include imagination in perception; the reproduction of the elapsed 
moment refers to primary memory and thus perception. According to Husserl, the 
inclusion of imagination −or representation− in perception, would have rendered 
any distinction between the different dimensions of time impossible (Stiegler, 
1998). For Husserl perception and imagination are distinctly different, and, in fact, 
they are different not only from each other, but also from ‘tertiary’26 memory. 
This third type of memory is also called ‘image-consciousness’ and refers to 
externalised representations like works of art and any other type of simulacra. He 
writes:  
 
Perception . . . is the act that places something before our eyes as the 
thing itself, the act that originarily constitutes the object. Its opposite is 
representation [Vegegenwartigung, Representation], understood as the 
act that does not place an object itself before our eyes but precisely 
represents it; that places it before our eyes in image, as it were, although 
not exactly in the manner of a genuine image-consciousness. . . If we 
call perception the act in which all ‘origin’ lies, the act that constitutes 
originarily, then primary memory is perception. . . (p. 43, cited in 
Stiegler, 1998, p. 248) 
 
In this way originary impression and primary retention refer to production in 
perception. Recollection and secondary memory refer to representation in 
imagination, and simulacra refer to tertiary retention in image-consciousness. For 
Husserl, both secondary memory and image-consciousness are excluded from the 
pure moment of presence and the Augenblick. Derrida (1973), however, 
comments that despite Husserl’s desire to constitute an absolute pure present, 
absence −which characterises retention as time elapsed and protention as 
anticipation of that which is yet to come− is already part of the Husserlian 
moment of vision. He writes:  
 
One then sees quickly that the presence of the perceived present can 
appear as such only inasmuch as it is continuously compounded with a 
nonpresence and nonperception, with primary memory and expectation 
(retention and protention). These nonperceptions are neither added to, 
nor do they oc-casionally accompany, the actually perceived now; they 
are essentially and indispensably involved in its possibility. Husserl 
                                                 
26
 The term belongs to Bernard Stiegler and its significance will shortly become evident. 
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admittedly says that retention is still a perception. But this is the 
absolutely unique case −Husserl never recognized any other− of a 
perceiving in which the perceived is not a present but a past existing as a 
modification of the present. . . (p. 64) 
 
Subsequently, for Derrida, this points to the fact that there is indeed a ‘continuity 
of the now and the not-now, perception and nonperception’, and this makes it 
possible to ‘admit the other into the self-identity of the Augenblick; nonpresence 
and nonevidence are admitted into the blink of the instant.’ (p. 65) This alterity 
that is not presence can be, similarly to imagination or because of imagination, the 
very absence that participates in differance, which constitutes the possibility for 
Dasein to differentiate and defer itself. As such it can take many forms and 
interact with the has-been and the not-here-yet.  
 
3.2.2. The implications of the differential nature of perception 
 
Dasein’s temporality is fundamentally futural. It embodies the letting relationship 
and this suggests that absence is integral to Dasein’s constitution. Although 
Heidegger (2008a) favours futural anticipation, he recognises that the repetition of 
the has-been is needed as well. In fact, he argues that Dasein becomes authentic as 
an heir, as the one who appropriates a choice of the past. For this reason the 
authentic self’s realisation cannot simply be the grasping of any possibility, or put 
otherwise, for something to be a possibility it needs to be inherited from Dasein’s 
community and already lived by others. In this respect it is a kind of repetition 
that brings out a new realisation. He writes: 
 
The authentic repetition of a possibility of existence that has been −the 
possibility that Dasein may choose its hero− is grounded existentially in 
anticipatory resoluteness; for it is in resoluteness that one first chooses 
the choice which makes one free for the struggle of loyally following in 
the footsteps of that which can be repeated. (p. 437/385) 
 
This repeatability, however, is not identical to repetition. It resembles rather the 
Derridean form of repetition, namely ‘iterability’, that is, the possibility of a 
repetition that does not refer to an origin but rather injects itself in the 
(im)possibility of an origin. It is an absence that lets something repeat and alter 
itself. In this way, Dasein can differentiate itself from the tradition of its 
community, whilst this space of commonality is conditioned by every individual’s 
different repetition. Heidegger writes: 
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In its factical Being, any Dasein is as it already was, and it is ‘what’ it 
already was. It is its past, whether explicitly or not. And this is so not 
only in that its past is, as it were, pushing itself along ‘behind’ it, and 
that Dasein possesses what is past as a property which is still present-at-
hand and which sometimes has after-effects upon it: Dasein ‘is’ its past 
in the way of its own Being, which, to put it roughly, ‘historizes’ out of 
its future on each occasion. Whatever the way of being it may have at 
the time, and thus with whatever understanding of Being it may possess, 
Dasein has grown up both into and in a traditional way of interpreting 
itself: in terms of this it understands itself proximally and, within a certain 
range, constantly. By this understanding, the possibilities of its being are 
disclosed and regulated. Its own past −and this always means the past of its 
“generation”− is not something which follows along after Dasein, but 
something which already goes ahead of it. (p. 41/20)  
 
Without doubt Husserl’s Augenblick refers to any moment of perception, whilst 
Heidegger’s Augenblick is the exemplary moment. Nevertheless, the Augenblick 
is constituted as such because of the way perception generally works. In 
Heidegger past and future interact in order to give the present. This means that 
Dasein’s temporality is in position, as you would expect, to draw from all types of 
memory −primary, secondary and tertiary− in order to enrich its reservoir of 
choices. For this reason Stiegler (1998) argues that Heidegger’s analysis ought to 
have explained how the past of Dasein’s community ‒which constitutes Dasein’s 
thrownness− is accessed by Dasein in order to produce authentic or inauthentic 
futures. It is, after all, at this point, that Heidegger’s interpretation of temporality 
diverges from Husserl’s. In other words, Heidegger (2008a) raises the question of 
transmission when he argues that ‘[t]he discovery of tradition and the disclosure 
of what it “transmits” and how this is transmitted, can be taken hold as a task in its 
own right.’ (p. 41/20) This kind of ‘historiological inquiry’, he explains, is not 
mere historiography. Rather, it ‘is possible as a kind of Being which the inquiring 
Dasein may possess, only because historicality is a determining characteristic for 
Dasein in the very basis of its Being’ (p. 41-42/20). Dasein, Heidegger argues, is 
in time and is historical because of its access to a history, a time and a past that is 
not lived by Dasein but is in a very definite way constitutive of Dasein. The 
importance of this cannot be stressed enough. In fact, Stiegler (1998) argues that a 
discussion of this point could have served Heidegger’s critique of the Husserlian 
understanding of pure now. He writes:  
 
 74 
It is easy to see in what Heidegger’s critique of Husserl ought to consist: 
the historial
27
 conception of temporality such as it constitutes the who 
(Dasein) would demand that the already-there that is not lived but 
inherited, constituted outside any perception, is nevertheless constitutive 
of presence as such ‒and this is why temporality cannot be conceived in 
terms of the “now.” The response would be an argument in favor of a 
radical revision of the oppositions between the primary, the secondary, 
and the tertiary. Without such a critique the concept of facticity is empty 
of all content. And yet, we shall see how Heidegger holds to these 
divisions. (p. 248, parenthesis added) 
 
In Stiegler’s view Heidegger’s reliance on the already-there elucidates the reliance 
on a past that is absent but at the same time accessible and transmissible. 
Husserl’s division suggests that primary memory is strictly separated from such 
an alreadyness, that is, from tertiary memory (image-consciousness) inscribed in 
things like books, buildings and tools. Now, even though Heidegger takes issue 
with Husserl and does pay heed to the horizon of alreadyness, he restricts this 
discussion to memory produced by Dasein. In this respect, his theory refers to a 
middle stage of the production of memory when inheritance is already received, 
already ready-to-hand and familiar. Dasein, however, as always already thrown in 
a tradition, cannot be understood in isolation, that is, without reference to the 
process of transmission of memory and the interaction with the inherited temporal 
objects that make up this tradition. In BT Heidegger states:  
 
With the existence of historical being-in-the-world, what is ready-to-
hand and what is present-at-hand have already, in every case, been 
incorporated into the history of the world. Equipment and work −for 
instance, books− have their ‘fates’; buildings and institutions have their 
history.... These entities within-the-world are historical as such, and their 
history does not signify something ‘external’ which merely accompanies the 
‘inner’ history of the ‘soul’. We call such beings “the world-historical”. 
(2008a, p. 440/388-389) 
 
Heidegger makes the first step in order to incorporate externalised memory into 
the way Dasein experiences time, but he does not go any further than this. This is 
probably because the discussion of the incorporation of the historical object into 
Dasein’s lived temporality would suggest that the technical object, such as the 
clock or the newspaper, that is, things that Heidegger considers to be forming 
inauthentic time, precedes the actual distinction between authenticity and 
inauthenticity. Time, in that case, would have been always already technological. 
                                                 
27
 This is how the historical is rendered in Stiegler’s English translations in order to denote 
temporality instead of that which belongs to history.  
 75 
Stiegler (1998), conversely, turns to this point: that what is in the world, the 
world-historical, ‘[weltgeschichtlich] is a constitutive dimension of temporality, 
prior to and beyond the opposition between authentic temporality and 
intratemporality’.28 (p. 18) Such a thing as a book is not simply a trace of the has-
been, and it is not a representation of history. It is rather history itself: it is 
formative of the way my world presents itself to me; it is the conservation of 
memory and the inscription of knowledge through a process of ‘externalisation’. 
The book is a prosthesis. Stiegler explains:  
 
Pros-thesis means “placed-there-in-front.” Pros-theticity is the being-
already-there of the world, and also, consequently, the being-already-
there of the past. Pros-thesis can be literally translated as pro-position. A 
prosthesis is what is proposed, placed in front, in advance; technics is 
what is placed before us [la technique est ce qui nous est pro-posé] (in 
an originary knowledge, a mathésis that “pro-poses” us things). 
Knowledge of mortality is knowledge of pro-position, but through these 
kinds of knowledge that are tekhnai; in a profound and diverse manner, 
it is the knowledge of a “primordial” de-fault: the de-fault of quality, of 
having to-be, destiny as predestination. The pro-position or technicity 
summons time. (pp. 235-236) 
  
If Heidegger had problematised technology as the very element that allows 
tradition to be transmitted and repeated, he would have been able to explain how 
the having-been is constitutive of Dasein’s temporality, and how pros-thesis is 
always already part of  the syn-thesis of time. Stiegler, in contrast, understands 
that ‘(t)he question of repetition immediately connotes the question of tekhnē; 
indeed it is this question’ (p. 219). If Heidegger had proceeded to such a 
discussion he would have also discussed tools not as mere instruments that are 
employed in inauthentic time  but as a contributing element to Dasein’s 
temporality and historicity and as I will show later as that which makes up 
Dasein’s spatiality. The consequences of this omission are discussed next.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
According to Stiegler (2003) ‘a structure of inheritance’ is described in BT but 
Heidegger (2008a) ‘does not raise the question . . . of the actual conditions of this 
inheritance’ (pp. 157, 158). In fact, as I will show in the next chapter, Heidegger’s 
existential analytic relies on this inheritance, that is, on an already-there that is 
                                                 
28
 The term refers to the standard English translation of within-time-ness. 
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publicly accessed and synthesised through technology and that allows Dasein 
concernfully to pursue its projects. For Dasein things are already meaningful 
because they are handy and can be used without theoretical contemplation. 
Heidegger, however, understands this type of temporality as inauthentic. He says 
that ‘world-time’, which is originary temporality, is levelled-off with concern, that 
is, with our daily involvements with projects and tools. Heidegger writes: 
 
Thrown and falling, Dasein is proximally and for the most part lost in 
that with which it concerns itself. In this lostness, however, Dasein’s 
fleeing in the face of that authentic existence which has been 
characterized as “anticipatory resoluteness”, has made itself known; and 
this is a fleeing in the face of death ‒that is, a looking-away from the end 
of Being-in-the-world. This looking-away from it, is in itself a mode of 
that Being-towards-the-end which is ecstatically futural. The inauthentic 
temporality of everyday Dasein as it falls, must, as such a looking-away 
from finitude, fail to recognize authentic futurity and therewith 
temporality in general. And if indeed the way in which Dasein is 
ordinarily understood is guided by the “they”, only so can the self-
forgetful ‘representation’ of the ‘infinity’ of public time be strengthened. 
(p. 477/424) 
 
The crucial thing here is time. For Heidegger technology’s mediation results in 
the construction of inauthentic temporality or ‘eidetic’ time, time as representation, 
which cannot lead to resoluteness precisely because it covers up the inevitability 
of death. Technology’s mediation conceals the indeterminateness of death with 
the calculation of time. In this way, death becomes the poetic image par 
excellence; it is what opens up the possibilities for difference, whereas the clock 
fixes time in strict and barren representations; one o’clock is the same as –is part 
of the same system, is in this sense synchronous with– two o’clock and so forth. 
Stiegler (1998) objects to this interpretation by tracing a differential structure in 
technology. He writes: 
 
When Heidegger says that the clock is the time of the with-one-another, 
he means that technological time is public time. Now, it is in this 
common, public time, according to its possibilities, which are each time 
unique, that a time is constituted that is not “private” but deferring and 
differing [différant]. The calculation of time is thus not a falling away 
from primordial time, because calculation, qua the letter-number, also 
actually gives access in the history of being to any différance. (p. 237) 
 
It appears, then, that against Heidegger we can infer that authenticity can exist 
with and sometimes because of the mediation of technology and concern. 
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Heidegger’s decision to set technology against authentic time incurs a number of 
costs. First, with this turn Heidegger does not recognise that the transmission of 
tradition, which is a form of learning, takes place through technology. Second, he 
does not realise that imagination is inherently tied to technology as that which 
intervenes between the having-been (which is technologically inscribed) and the 
future. Imagination’s necessary collaboration with the having-been, which is 
already constituted technologically, suggests that technology (as the conservation 
of memory) sets the ‘criteria of selection’ of what is to be retained and what is to 
be anticipated (Stiegler, 2011, p. 39). 
 
Stiegler sees this limitation and goes back to Husserl in order to undo it. He thus 
argues that when we listen to a temporal object for the second time –a repetition 
made possible precisely by technology− the memory of the first hearing, which 
forms our secondary memory, modifies the impression we have when we listen to 
the melody for the second time. In this way reproduction –and, in consequence, 
imagination, as that which brings-forth the passed impression– participates in 
perception. No two hearings (or repetitions) can be the same. This is because 
during the second hearing ‘I hear from the position of an expectation formed from 
everything that has already musically happened to me ‒I am responding to the 
Muses guarding the default-of-origin of my desire, within me.’ (Stiegler, 2011, p, 
19) The mediation of technology contributes in the establishment of the selection 
criteria of our perception, and it is through these criteria that things either come 
near or remain far. Anticipation is biased. Heidegger, seems to support the view 
that, despite of the technological mediation of imagination, the mere possibility of 
death can determine temporality. For Heidegger there exists the possibility of 
authentic time, but this needs to take place without the mediation of technology. 
The differential structure of the call of conscience, however, tells a different story. 
We can choose to be authentic −and perhaps choose this in many different ways− 
but this should not be a denial of our thrownness; it is integral to it. Stiegler (2003) 
argues that it is through technology’s determinateness that we first discover 
differance. He writes:  
 
I am sure everyone has noticed that if you read the same text three times 
in your life, three different readings happen each time: faced by the 
determined identity of the text (the web of significations), we have an 
especially acute experience of our indetermination, which is also to say 
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of our temporality. It is only starting from this moment that we truly 
experience the ordeal of indetermination. That is in fact why during the 
age of alphabetic writing the figure of the citizen appears who is above 
all a singular individual [une singularité], the affirmation of singularity 
in the collective. On the basis of the identical text on which is written the 
common law, each citizen has the experience of the strangeness of this 
identity which, each time that it is brought into play, produces a 
difference. What Heidegger neglects in the relation between determinate 
and indeterminate is the question of the difference in repetition. And this 
opposition of determination to indetermination that we find in Heidegger 
is a typically metaphysical opposition. (p. 160) 
 
Heideggerian temporality prioritises the future, and this is probably due to the 
prioritisation of the Kantian synthesis of recognition. All syntheses, however, 
implicate the possibility of reproduction, and reproduction is itself tied to 
technology. Heidegger wishes to maintain the priority of futurity, which, as 
absence and openness, is closer to the indeterminateness of originary image and 
ultimately death. Heidegger, however, neglects the fact that even the 
indeterminateness of death comes to us as an inheritance that is biased. This bias 
comes from inscribed memory, and this is something that is learned. This is a very 
important point. Nowhere in BT does Heidegger attempt to discuss the actual 
process of learning the tradition, the familiar and the ready-to-hand. This, 
however, is the very process of technologisation. Learning is the condition of 
technology’s prosthetic nature.  
 
Heidegger, influenced by the Kantian a priority of the schema,
29
 nowhere so 
much as mentions that imagination is itself formable by externalised memory, or 
image/representation. On the contrary, he maintains an image of representation’s  
complete homogeneity. This serves his purpose to preserve the possibility of 
alētheia and originary image as unaffected by externalised technologically 
produced image/representation. This, however, cannot be the case, since 
Enframing is precisely the possibility of alētheia’s impossibility; if imagination 
were not formable by external image, then thinking would not have been 
threatened by technology. If Enframing, however, can homogenise thinking, then 
this also means that some technologies can short-circuit Dasein’s differential 
structure. Yet if this is true, we need to deduce that imagination can be formed. 
And this is how the question of technology becomes the question of learning and 
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 This will be discussed in the next section. 
 79 
education. And the question of Einbildungskraft (imagination) becomes the 
question of Bildung (education). However, in order to lay the ground for this 
discussion, I need to examine imagination’s interaction with image and 
representation. For this reason, there follows a short section that I am presenting 
as a kind of hinge: its purpose is to clarify the connection between technology and 
imagination by illuminating the role of metaphor.  
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Hinge 
 
 
In the previous chapters I drew attention to the connection between Einbildungskraft and 
Bildung. Both notions refer to processes of formation of the human being that implicate 
image (Bild). Image allows a certain kind of inscription that ultimately transfers the self 
outside: the self is inscribed in images and then this image returns to form the interior 
which is then projected as a form of anticipation. This process can be understood as a 
specific type of transfer or, as I shall prefer to say, metaphor. The range of the term 
“metaphor” is more extensive and fluid in its Greek origin (metaphora) than it is in 
English because is connotes movement, or transfer that can be literally rendered as 
transportation (or even means of transportation, in its current Greek use), and of course 
linguistic metaphor that comes to us from Aristotle and describes the transfer of a name 
to a thing. The connotation of metaphor as movement is very fruitful for this thesis 
because it brings to the discussion other notions such as closeness, nearness and 
connectedness which point to the construction of our spatio-temporality. Derrida (2007) 
comments about metaphor are useful here: 
 
It is a very old subject. It occupies the West, inhabits it or lets itself be inhabited: 
representing itself there as an enormous library in which we move about 
without perceiving its limits, proceeding from station to station, going on foot, 
step by step, or in a bus (with the ‘bus’ I've just named, we are already 
circulating in translation, and, within the element of translation, between 
Übertragung and Übersetzung, given that metaphorikos is still a designation today, 
in so-called modern Greek, for what concerns means of transportation). 
Metaphora circulates in the city, it conveys like its inhabitants, along all sorts of 
routes, with intersections, red lights, one-way streets, no-exits, crossroads or 
crossings, and speed limits. We are in a certain way −metaphorically, of course, 
and as concerns the mode of habitation− the content and tenor of this vehicle: 
passengers, comprehended and displaced by metaphor. (p. 48) 
 
Derrida's description points us in the right direction, that is, towards a discussion about 
metaphor as a way of being-in-the-world. We are in metaphor. We are through metaphor. 
We are metaphorical beings, not in the respect that we are not real, or literal, but in the 
respect that metaphor allows us to not just be biologically but to be as human beings.  In 
this thesis, I want to support the view that metaphor is a mode of perception, much more 
basic than a literary contrivance. I also want to argue that metaphor is a function of 
imagination that allows the perception of things as things. Metaphor is inescapable and 
refers back to itself; we explain metaphors through other metaphors; we explain the 
concept of metaphor through metaphor and we explain existence through metaphor. 
Derrida sees this as a process of language in general; this is, after all, the nature of the 
word and the trace. Heidegger also interprets this process as our being in language in 
general. Both views may be mere inferences. Since there is no origin, we are never certain 
about the layers of our reality.  
 
In this section and throughout the thesis, I want to argue that metaphor, that is, the fact 
that we sometimes use language in a way that is not indicative, indicates that there is 
some kind of interaction we are not aware of. This interaction, which brings about new 
needs for designation, is embodied; it is this circulating and inhabiting of a place that 
begs new responses from us, precisely because it is changing. One of the elements that 
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bring about change, I want to argue, is technology. After all, this is why Heidegger calls 
technology another mode of revealing. In this respect, technology and language, both 
modes of revealing and concealing, react to each other and interact creatively through 
imaginative perception. For this reason, the dichotomy between technology and language 
needs to be deconstructed. However, in order, to move in this direction, and, in fact, not 
only to understand the effects of modern technology on imagination, but to detect the 
possibility of escape from Enframing, we need to prove, first, that imagination –that is, 
the one that forms all– is itself formed by ‘external’ images that are in most cases formed 
by technology. This would mean, to put it in Heideggerian terms, that our time is 
synthesised by technology. If the possibility to escape Enframing is real, and if 
imagination is indeed affected by technology, then technology cannot be excluded from 
the possibility of any modality of thinking. If we can indeed answer positively to the 
question of whether the possibility of escape is real, then we need to have a discussion 
about technology and actual technologies, and in fact look at these technologies 
phenomenologically. For this reason, this section acts like a hinge for this thesis, 
discussing the deep connection between imagination, technology and image and 
establishing the important role of metaphor for existence.       
 
This hinge-section discusses the following: 
  
15. Heidegger opposes originary image (poetic metaphor, language, alētheia) and 
objective image (representation, technology, eidos).  
 
16. Derrida perceives this dichotomy to coincide with the juxtaposition between 
presence  and representation, and he attempts to deconstruct it. This is a task, 
however, already taken up by Heidegger. Heidegger, in fact, recognises a third 
possibility, namely, presencing, which is not equivalent to pure presence or origin. 
 
17. For Heidegger alētheia is a presencing out of absence, and absence is not 
representable. Heidegger’s originary image refers to a modality of non-
representative thinking. We need, however, to know what this is, since it is 
Heidegger’s claim that it is precisely this type of thinking that is threatened by 
technologically produced representative-image. If this is the actual threat though, 
we can infer that imagination is form-able by this type of image. Is this the case? 
 
18. As already pointed out, Heidegger gives up on imagination (see, especially, 
section 3.1., Chapter 2), but Kantian imagination is the basis for his 
understanding of temporality. For this reason, we need to go back to Kant and to 
see what other characteristics of imagination inhere in Heidegger’s notion of 
temporality. 
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19. For Kant, perception depends upon the reception of an empirical image by a 
schema, whilst schemata are themselves transcendental. But is the priority of the 
transcendental justified, and does Heidegger sustain it? 
 
20. Kant seems to affirm the priority of the transcendental, but Bernard Stiegler 
shows that even the concept of number cannot be perceived without mediation, 
spatialisation, figuration and external (technological) support. Even in Kantian 
theory there is a hint of this. 
 
21. Heidegger accepts the role of external image but maintains a distinction between 
immediate intuition and reproduction. He would accept, for example, that seeing 
five balls allows the formation of the concept of the number five, but the 
representation of this number −the picture of five balls−  is a derivative form of 
image.  
 
22. When Heidegger, however, attempts to discuss the death-mask, a number of 
contradictions come to the fore. Now it seems that Derrida is right in detecting 
the dichotomy of presence and representation in Heidegger. Representation, 
however, as proven by the example of the death mask, can be an access to the 
unrepresentable. Representation should not be set against absence or death. It is 
constitutive of imagination as that absence that allows things to manifest.  
 
23. Imagination is not pure. It needs transfer (metaphorisation) onto external, 
technologised support in order to actualise itself. This mediation suggests that 
the way imagination connects, transfers and brings near is affected and formed 
by technology. This possibility of imagination’s formation illuminates precisely 
technology’s nature as both threat and hope.   
 
In Plato’s Doctrine of Truth Heidegger (2009) makes a distinction between types 
of images, namely, between originary poetic image and eidetic re-presentation. 
This distinction corresponds to a further distinction between types of thinking, 
namely, between alētheia and ὀrthotis (correctness). But what kind of connection 
is there between types of images and types of thinking? As, I have pointed out in 
the previous chapter, image can refer to the type of time synthesis and 
connectedness performed by imagination. However, what is the relation between 
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time synthesis and connectedness and objective image? In order to answer this, 
we need to return to Plato’s Allegory of the Cave, which was discussed in the first 
chapter. In this text, we have the literary image −or even metaphor− of the 
prisoner ascending out of the cave. Is this image, that is, the movement out of the 
cave, a type of alētheic thinking and why? The story itself has the structure of a 
cave, Heidegger claims, while explaining that this is ‘only because it is 
antecedently co-determined by the fundamental experience of ἀλήθεια, the 
unhiddenness of beings, which was something self-evident for the Greeks’. (p. 
172) In this respect, the emergence out of the cave’s darkness and the subsequent 
exposure to the light points indeed to a process of unveiling, that is, a process of 
ἀλήθεια. But is alētheia antecedent to the allegory, or is the embodied spatial and 
meaningful experience of moving into the light constitutive of the allegory’s –and, 
in consequence, alētheia’s– possibility? Does the embodied spatial experience 
afford the metaphor-image, namely the allegory, which refuses to settle on 
specific representations of truth and thus is re-interpreted anew by its readers? Is 
the metaphor –literally transfer in Greek– of the self, constitutive of metaphor as 
way of thinking? If this is the case, then an originary image is defined with regard 
to the originarity of its repetitions and the possibility of drawing analogies 
between different realms of being. Repetition and not pure presence is the mark of 
originarity.
30
 Representation, however, is supposed to be demarcated from 
presencing. Is this interpretation, though, in accord with Heidegger’s intentions? 
In order to examine this we need to examine the nature of representation in 
Heidegger a little more. 
  
In The Age of the World Picture Heidegger (1977a) suggests that we currently 
relate to ‘the world conceived as picture’ (p. 129). In this context, however, 
Weltbild (world picture) does not refer to a certain conceptualisation of the world 
or life philosophy, but to something much deeper. It is, I argue, a specific type of 
connectedness to the world that synthesises and presences the world as 
representation and object. Heidegger explains:  
 
In distinction from Greek apprehending, modern representing, whose 
meaning the word repraesentatio first brings to its earliest expression, 
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 The term ‘originary’ in Heidegger connotes a sense of imaginative revealing and not the belief 
in an unalterable and pure origin or presence. 
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intends something quite different. Here to represent [vor-stellen] means 
to bring what is present-at-hand [das Vor-handene] before oneself as 
something standing over-and-against, to relate it to oneself, to the one 
representing it, and to force it, back into a relationship to oneself as the 
normative realm. Wherever this happens, man “gets into the picture” in 
precedence over whatever is. But in that man puts himself into the 
picture in this way, he puts himself into the scene, i.e., into the open 
sphere of that which is generally and publicly represented. Therewith 
man sets himself up as the setting in which whatever is must henceforth 
set itself forth, must present itself [sich… präsentieren], i.e., be picture. 
Man becomes the representative [der Repräsentant] of that which is, in 
the sense of that which has the character of object. (pp. 131-132) 
 
In this essay Heidegger plays with the expression ‘[t]o get into the picture’ in 
order to imply the systematicity of image which functions in such a way as to 
incorporate the human being into its structure (p. 129). In this way ‘to get the 
picture’ is already to get into the picture: to understand the world as an object is 
for the human being to be turned into a subject; to understand the entirety of 
beings and that which gives them, i.e., Being, as representation means already to 
be part of that representation. In order to make this point stronger, Heidegger 
equates the German Vorstellung with the Latin repraesentatio, identifying both of 
them as responsible for objectifying beings by forcing whatever exists to presence 
itself before the representer. This analysis can easily lead to the conclusion that 
Heidegger distinguishes between presence (Anwesenheit) and representation. This 
is at least what Derrida (2007) deduces and, in consequence, attempts to 
deconstruct. For this reason he says that 
 
Vorstellung does not immediately seem to imply the meaning that is 
conveyed by the re- of repraesentatio. Vorstellen seems to mean simply, 
as Heidegger emphasizes, to pose, to dispose before oneself, a theme on 
the theme. But this sense or value of being-before is already at work in 
“present.” Praesentatio signifies the fact of presenting and re-
praesentatio that of rendering present, of summoning as a power-of-
bringing-back-to-presence.’ (p. 105)  
 
According to Derrida, we cannot claim that there was a prior, Greek epoch during 
which things were purely present. What representation brings to the fore is the 
‘power-of-bringing-back, in a repetitive way’ (p. 106). This power, however, is 
already inherent in the movement of presencing. In turn, this means two things; 
on the one hand, to present means to ‘bring to presence, into presence, cause or 
allow to come by presencing’, and on the other hand, ‘because to cause or to 
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allow to come implies the possibility of causing or allowing to return, then to 
render present, like all “rendering” and like all restitution, would be to repeat, to 
be able to repeat.’ (p. 106) Repeatability, for Derrida, is already part of any mode 
of making present, and this means that there is no ‘presumed simplicity of 
Anwesenheit’. Presence ‘is not simple, it is already divided and differing, it marks 
the place of a splitting, a division, a dissension [Zwiespalt].’ (p. 115) It is thus 
clear that with the detection of the repeatability inherent in thinking, Derrida 
challenges the very idea of origin, but he also challenges the idea that 
representation has a certain essence that undoes the power of making present and 
the possibility of differance. He says 
 
One should no longer try to represent to oneself the essence of 
representation, Vorgestelltheit. The essence of representation is not a 
representation, it is not representable, there is no representation of 
representation. Vorgestelltheit is not just a Vorstellung. And it does not 
lend itself to this. It is in any case through a gesture of this type that 
Heidegger interrupts or disqualifies, in different domains, specular 
reiteration or infinite referral [renvoi à l’infini]. (p. 111 ) 
 
Derrida’s analysis of the Augenblick shows that the present is constituted through 
absence and perception is constituted through imagination. Derrida, however, 
does not substitute presence with absence. On the contrary, he refers to the 
possibility of differance, that is, a possibility that lacks origin: everything can be 
differed and deferred precisely because presence is always in the making and 
affected by what is not. For this reason, Derrida uses the term ‘trace’. The trace 
does not presuppose an original presence that produces it, but a representation that 
lacks origin and is not identical to itself. This can be thought of as a word that 
attempts to describe something, but this description remains always incomplete 
since we are never certain of that which is to be described. This means that we 
cannot trace the way that signs and semantics work back to an origin: all we find 
is a further sign, which is the trace of something that has gone before. In other 
words, there are no firsts. 
 
But is Heidegger oblivious to the possibility of differential logic? Is not his own 
meditation on the Platonic allegory a representation of an origin that he clearly 
recognises as lacking? Is not Dasein such a process? Fóti (1985) argues that this is 
certainly the case on the grounds that Heidegger’s own philosophizing is afforded 
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through the philosopher’s belief in the dissemination of meaning. This is because 
Heidegger’s thinking  
 
Firstly . . . seeks to engage what remains unthematized and concealed in 
early Greek thinking and what is hence not a representable presence; and 
secondly, it seeks to be true to the Greek beginnings by leaving them so 
as to rejoin them in an unmapped future. (p. 76) 
 
Heidegger’s uncovering of Plato’s ambivalence concerning truth –that is, the 
ambivalence between alētheia and ὀrthotis– suggests this: Heidegger is looking 
for something beyond the presence-representation dichotomy. He is interested in 
the modes of presencing. In this light, Heidegger’s critique 
 
cannot be understood on the model of a diminution or corruption of a 
primary presence (Anwesenheit) by representation, because aletheia is a 
presencing out of absence and into absence, and absence is not 
representable. Representative thinking does not presuppose, for its very 
possibility, a pre-given presence which it then breaks with and seeks to 
restitute; rather it first institutes the ideal of presence. It does so because 
it repudiates the togetherness of presence and absence, or what 
Heidegger calls the “sameness” (without identity) of showing and 
concealing. (ibid., p. 75) 
  
Fóti recognises that alētheia does not coincide with some kind of originary 
presence but connotes rather a mode or presencing that does not correspond to 
either part of the presence-representation dualism. For Fóti, Derrida’s 
deconstruction stays within the frame of the aforementioned dualism. She claims, 
in fact, that in this way Derrida overlooks the proximity that exists between the 
trace and the Heideggerian originary image. However, Fóti argues that: ‘The 
Heideggerian image, though akin to Derrida’s trace, marks out an alternative and 
still insufficiently explored path for non-representative thinking.’ (p. 76) 
 
In this light, the Derridean critique might very well marginalise this alternative, 
which is inherent in Heidegger’s discussion of poetic image, and refers to alētheia. 
Since alētheia is threatened by the prevalence of representative thinking 
(Enframing), the possibility of the Heideggerian originary image opens up a 
number of other questions. The first one is the following: what is the effect on the 
imagination of ‘objective’ images that are produced by modern technologies? 
Given the fact that these images can be repetitively accessed, and indeed accessed 
with greater frequency and speed than other images, it is necessary to ask how 
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they affect thinking. The second question has to do with the consequences of the 
dominance of representative thinking for originary thinking. Furthermore, and 
given the proximity of originary thinking to differance, we need to ask about the 
effects of Enframing on this thinking and education.  
 
As already noted, Heidegger, through his interpretation of Kantian imagination,  
recognises repetition’s role in thinking, which, as pointed out by Stiegler, invokes 
the question of technology. This is because technology, through exteriorisation 
and spatialisation, offers the possibility of retaining what has gone before. The 
book, for example, is memory exteriorised, spatialised and inscribed. Of course, 
the book contains ‘information’, which is synthesised in the perception of the 
reader, but the ‘technology’ of the book, the fact that there is such a thing as a 
book, makes this memory available, accessible, transmittable and interpretable. In 
this respect, imagination’s capacity to reproduce, connect and synthesise 
retentions is already exteriorised and, of course, spatialised. Dasein’s Da is 
constituted through and in the space of this communal mode of exteriorised 
imaginative synthesis. A society with books is individuated quite differently from 
a society without books.  
 
But what is the effect of this exteriorisation on individual imagination? If the 
schemata of imagination are innate and unalterable, how could ‘objective’ images 
such as digital images have an effect on thinking? How can Gestell, as the 
possibility of the domination of a single modality of thinking, namely 
representational image, even be possible? This, I will try to show, is possible 
because of imagination’s mediating nature. As already noted Kant (2010) argues 
that imagination works through the schema    which he calls a third thing    that 
connects the manifold of appearances in intuition with the discrete categories in 
understanding. He also adds that the schema does not have any empirical content.   
 
The fact that the schema is both intellectual and sensuous means that it is 
receptive to the manifold of intuition. Productive imagination through the schema 
needs to connect this manifold, bring close different representations and join them, 
producing unity and continuity. In this respect, schemata need to be understood in 
terms of a matrix but, in fact, one that is both receptive and active: they need to be 
able to receive anything, connect everything and be nothing in particular; they 
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need to receive the exterior by actively turning it into the interior. Schemata are 
innate; they are not produced by experience and thus are transcendental or pure, 
that is, empty of all empirical content. As such, ‘the schema is clearly 
distinguishable from the image’, and for this reason, in Kant, the schema has 
priority over the exterior image (p. 141). Therefore, Kant (2010) argues that: 
 
The schema is, in itself, always a mere product of the imagination. But, 
as the synthesis of imagination has for its aim no single intuition, but 
merely unity in the determination of sensibility, the schema is clearly 
distinguishable from the image. Thus, if I place five points one after 
another . . . this is an image of the number five. On the other hand, if I 
only think a number in general, which may be either five or a hundred, 
this thought is rather the representation of a method of representing in an 
image a sum (e.g., a thousand) in conformity with a conception, than the 
image itself, an image which I should find some little difficulty in 
reviewing, and comparing with the conception. (p. 141) 
 
Stiegler (2011) objects to Kant’s apparent lack of hesitation in drawing such a 
sharp distinction, arguing that a concept like a number presupposes a certain kind 
of exteriorisation that makes the concept or the mental image possible. 
Consciousness, he argues, needs to be ‘transferred onto external supports, as 
prosthetic memory as well as fetishes of the imagination and “projection screens” 
for all its phantasms’ (pp. 53-54, emphasis added). In the light of this, he writes: 
  
A number always in some way presupposes a capacity for tertiary 
retention ‒whether via children’s fingers, a magician’s body, an abacus, 
or an alphanumeric system of writing‒ which alone can facilitate 
numerization and objectification. This capacity has a history, during 
which at one point the concept of one thousand (1000) became possible. 
Properly understood, this conception is first and foremost a process. 
Until a certain point quite recent relative to the long history of humanity, 
the number 1000 was literally inconceivable to a human consciousness 
without the tools for thinking it, when 1000 (“one thousand,” or the 
figure/image…or IIIII0I000) had not yet been elaborated. (p. 51)  
 
In this respect, the schema is a process but also a product of a process that is not 
located merely in the individual. According to Kant, the schema is a 
‘representation of a general procedure of the imagination to present its image to a 
conception’ (p. 140). He also explains that 
 
In truth, it is not images of objects, but schemata, which lie at the 
foundation of our pure sensuous conceptions. No image could ever be 
adequate to our conception of a triangle in general. For the generalness 
of the conception it never could attain to, as this includes under itself all 
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triangles, whether right-angled, acute-angled, etc., whilst the image 
would always be limited to a single part of this sphere. The schema of 
the triangle can exist nowhere else than in thought, and it indicates a rule 
of the synthesis of the imagination in regard to pure figures in space. (p. 
141) 
 
This means that the schema is a certain procedure that the mind follows in order 
to synthesise the manifold of intuition and form it into a thing. In order to do this, 
it needs to subsume the manifold under a conception. Kant, however, points to the 
necessity of spatialisation, figuration and transfer (metaphor as a movement in 
space) in order for cognition to grasp its concepts. In fact, he argues that 
 
We cannot cogitate a geometrical line without drawing it in thought, nor 
a circle without describing it, nor represent the three dimensions of space 
without drawing three lines from the same point perpendicular to one 
another. We cannot even cogitate time, unless, in drawing a straight line 
(which is to serve as the external figurative representation of time), we 
fix our attention on the act of the synthesis of the manifold, whereby we 
determine successively the internal sense, and thus attend also to the 
succession of this determination. (pp. 124-125) 
 
In this light, cognition, because of its own limitations, externalises itself, 
transferring and representing what cannot be grasped in order to figure it out. This 
is how things come near. As Rudolf A. Makkreel (1990) notes in the Second 
Deduction, Kant names transcendental productive imagination ‘figurative’. He 
adds that Kant does not sufficiently explain the change of term, but he notes that 
‘the term “figurative” aptly suggests the graphic, more spatial qualities that the 
imagination contributes to synthesis. Insofar as the imagination synthesises it 
serves the understanding, but in the role it also brings to bear some of its own 
formative power.’ (p. 30) This necessary spatialitisation and figuration, however, 
is not merely internal, but, as I have already pointed out necessarily exteriorised, 
figurative and inscribed in space.  In this respect, there is a constant feed between 
representative-externalised image and internal schema.  
 
Heidegger seems to pass over this procedure, which Stiegler (2011) calls a 
‘process of projection of internal sense into tertiary memories, which are the 
images accessible to external sense’ (p. 53). He also neglects to discuss the 
necessary exteriorisation of temporality’s constitution and imagination’s play as a 
type of transfer into the spatio-technical realm. On the contrary, he maintains the 
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possibility for a kind of thinking (originary presencing) that is not determined by 
technical exteriorisation and, thus, affirms the dichotomy between immediate 
intuition and reproduction and in consequence, representation.  
 
In the Kantbuch Heidegger opposes immediate intuition to objective image using 
the example of the photograph of a death mask. For Heidegger this is an example 
of a representation of representation, a likeness of likeness; the photograph is not 
the immediate intuition of death but the copy of the death-mask, which itself 
represents the face of a dead person. Admittedly, he states that the photograph 
does show itself and also shows the showing of another thing. He also sees a kind 
of interaction between presence and representation, and these comments alone are 
really important. But what is the connection between this discussion and originary 
presencing or authentic thinking? For Heidegger, authenticity originates from the 
possibility of death. Jean-Luc Nancy (2005) dwells extensively on this connection 
since he believes that the example of the death mask can initiate a much broader 
discussion concerning image, thinking and mortality. He explains: 
 
The example of the mask is odd for the simple reason that it exemplifies 
an originary showing-itself through the showing-itself and the outward-
seeming of a dead man, which by definition does not show itself, but 
essentially withdraws itself from all monstration. (p. 91) 
 
For Nancy the use of the example of the death mask becomes even more 
enigmatic when we take into consideration the fact that Heidegger is the 
philosopher who thinks the as-structure and authentic time on the basis of that 
being that lives its life towards death. But for Nancy the example of the death-
mask shows that a representation offers ‘something like an access to the other’s 
dying’ –this through the medium of the photograph (p. 94). But if objective image 
offers access to what is determinative of authenticity and ultimately the 
unrepresentable, what does this mean for the possibility of originary image and 
presencing? What does it mean that the likeness of the photo, which is itself a 
copy, that is, a mere representation, is partially constitutive of the possibility of 
the perception of death that takes place in everyday inauthentic life?   
 
Joris van Gorkom (2009) comments that: ‘When thinking of death as a possibility, 
Heidegger declares that there is nothing to (re-)present, auszumalen, i.e., to 
imagine. The imagination reaches a limit, in (“my own”) death’ (p. 150). But is 
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not this because life itself, that is, time as lived by Dasein reaches its limit? 
Imagination cannot imagine when no more time can be synthesised. And time 
synthesised is afforded through technological spatialised inscription. This 
structure radically disturbs the dichotomy of alētheia (as originary image) and 
representation (as eidos), and it inserts the possibility of the intertwining of 
originary image and technology. For this reason, Nancy claims that 
 
Aletheia ‒as a play of veiling/ unveiling‒ is already at work in the eidos 
as ostension of the aspect. But reciprocally, the eidos already occupies a 
place at the heart of aletheia: the logic of aletheia, with which Heidegger 
will later attempt to overcome the fixity of a given eidetic of the being, 
in order to move toward the inaugural event of a (re)velation of being. . . 
(p. 96) 
 
In this respect, there is still space to figure out what the Heideggerian originary 
image is. It also seems that Derrida is right to detect in Heidegger’s thought 
residues of the presence-representation dualism, even though Heidegger wants to 
move away from this and towards presencing. What holds Heidegger back, is not 
a belief in pure homogenous presence but a belief in homogenous representation. 
Heidegger is not able to move ‘[b]eyond a closure of representation whose form 
could no longer be linear, indivisible, circular, encyclopedic, or totalizing’ (p. 
127). In this respect, by affirming the fixed nature of representation he asserts the 
nostalgia for an origin and the longing for originary image, which is not mediated 
by representation and that which causes its homogeneity, namely, technology. 
 
Nancy’s, Derrida’s and Stiegler’s critique suggests that even the possibility of 
originary image, and thus presencing, is always already conditioned by tertiary 
retentions, which may very well be representations but do converse with the un-
representable, or, at least, with that which is not represented by me. In this light, 
originary image can be understood in connection with imagination, when 
imagination is conceptualised in the following terms:  
 
1. Imagination defies the priority of time on the ground that, in the course of 
its unfolding, time needs space to take place
31
. This is a process of 
imagination’s exteriorisation as transfer and figuration (the role of image 
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 On this point, Paul Ricœur (1978a) wonders: ‘But is not the word “metaphor” itself a metaphor, 
the metaphor of a displacement and therefore of a transfer in a kind of space?’ (p. 145) 
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is essential here), which should be understood on the basis of a new 
understanding of metaphor. This transfer is not a sensuous phenomenon 
devoid of meaning that is afterwards understood through suprasensuous, 
meaning-giving, linguistic metaphor. On the contrary, it is a “transference”, 
that remains at a pre-theoretical and existential level, possibly allowing 
interaction with and co-constitution of linguistic metaphor and thus 
explicit understanding. The word transference is not accidental here. It 
points to a redirection of thought and a connection between past and 
present, presence and absence, presence and representation. In other words, 
it suggests a process of learning which is not explicit or active but does 
allow a transformation of that which is not formed yet. Let us think of 
Kant’s example. Time cannot be cogitated without the mediation of an 
image which is inscribed through a writing tool. The kind of image that is 
produced is certainly important but the medium itself -in this case the 
pencil or a pen- conditions what can be imagined or thought. This is a 
kind of showing that is not determined in its entirety by language. 
Technology conditions this meaningful substratum of being. After all, it is 
onto technological things that Dasein is transferred, and this transfer 
(metaphor) co-constitutes its Da which can be generative of other 
metaphors. This type of metaphor, which I call existential, allows this 
immediate transfer of the self onto things. This does not mean that it takes 
place without the mediation of language. Linguistic metaphor may be able 
to destabilise meaning in a more explicit way; Heidegger’s discussion of 
the allegory but most importantly his poetic philosophical and greatly 
metaphorical word suggests that this is possible. It also points to an 
interaction between existential and linguistic metaphor. This will be 
discussed in the next chapters.   
 
2. Imagination mediates, brings close, connects appearances and produces 
images related to already formed thoughts (memories), and this allows the 
reception of new things. In this light, imagination is the letting 
relationship, the synthesis of temporality and the nearing of different 
things that does not simply bring them together but transforms them in the 
process.   
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3. Imagination is affected by exterior images that in turn affect imagination’s 
function. This means that imagination is trainable through external support, 
and that makes it possible for its processes (representing, bringing close, 
transferring and imaging) to be exteriorised as well. This subsequently 
means that certain ‘objective’ images or representations, such as digital 
images, which favour certain modalities of imagination, can impose a 
specific kind of thinking on the individual, making it impossible for them 
to escape it. This could possibly be the end of difference and 
metaphoricity, and the culmination of Gestell. 
 
 
In the light of these premises and given the importance of imagination’s 
technological exteriorisation in space, technology’s instrumentality needs to be 
further investigated. Technology is a pros-thesis that is always already there -in 
time and space- and trains the imagination turning it into a biased structure of the 
hermeneutical cycle. Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer (2006), writing 
on the culture industries, make remarks that are wonderfully prescient here since 
they discuss the process of imagination’s industrialisation and the subsequent 
effects of this process on society: 
 
Even during their leisure time, consumers must orient themselves 
according to the unity of production. The active contribution which 
Kantian schematism still expected of subjects –that they should, from the 
first, relate sensuous multiplicity to fundamental concepts– is denied to 
the subject by industry. It purveys schematism as its first service to the 
customer. According to Kantian schematism, a secret mechanism within 
the psyche preformed immediate data to fit them into the system of pure 
reason. That secret has now been unravelled. Although the operations of 
the mechanism appear to be planned by those who supply the data, the 
culture industry, the planning is in fact imposed on the industry by the 
inertia of a society irrational despite all its rationalization, and this 
calamitous tendency, in passing through the agencies of business, takes 
on the shrewd intentionality peculiar to them. For the consumer there is 
nothing left to classify, since the classification has already been 
preempted by the schematism of production. (p. 44) 
 
Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s critique precedes Stiegler’s but the latter’s theory 
engages creatively with Husserl’s, Kant’s, Derrida’s and Heidegger’s thought in 
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order to shed light to the actual way that temporal objects are perceived by the 
individual affecting thinking and imagination. In order to investigate this process 
in all its facets, we should now look more closely at the ways technology is 
understood in early Heidegger and its relation to space and time. 
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Chapter 3  
    Closeness in Early Heidegger  
 
 
This chapter discusses the following: 
 
24. As already noted the moment of vision cannot be purely temporal. It needs space 
to unfold.  
 
25. Heidegger describes time with spatial metaphors. This points to the intense 
interaction between thinking, time, language and space. Heidegger, however, 
considers metaphor responsible for western metaphysics. As he sees it, metaphor 
solidifies the dichotomy between the sensuous and the suprasensuous which is 
grounded in the technological paradigm of Being. 
 
26. This is not warranted, however, since metaphor can be understood otherwise. 
Metaphor shows many of imagination’s synthesising powers. It is, similarly to 
imagination, a thinking and a seeing as. Metaphor is similar to Kantian 
schematism, categorial intuition and Heideggerian temporality.  It is a 
“movement of making near” between meaningful spheres. In this light, metaphor 
cannot be understood without space, and existence cannot be understood 
without spatial metaphor. Heidegger’s notions that are pertinent here – 
closeness/nearness and distancelessness - point to this fact.  
 
27. Heidegger describes space as a movement of closeness mediated and constructed 
through the things or tools we use. For Heidegger the tool is something I use 
without thinking; it is ready-to-hand, and it works as reference and assignment 
pertaining to involvement which ‘‘implies letting it [the tool] be involved in 
something. ” This is, however, a temporal relation. The tool and its involvement 
is defined by Dasein’s futural projection.  Heidegger describes the way tools act 
as reference points or nodes to other tools, and this ultimately makes up the 
common space of a community.  
 
28. This space that is conditioned by technology is understood as that which allows 
thoughtlessness and inauthenticity. Technology allows us to pursue different 
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ends, making us oblivious to the ultimate finality, namely death, that is also our 
possibility for being authentic. Closeness appears as Heidegger’s notion of  
technologised synthesis. In later writings, however, Heidegger talks about 
nearness as a proximity that is not technologically mediated.   
 
29. Stiegler deconstructs Heidegger’s dichotomy between authenticity and 
inauthenticity and understands technological familiarity as constitutive of 
authentic thinking. Going a step further, he detects aspects of instrumentality 
that Heidegger does not discuss. The most important of these is technology’s 
pros-thetic nature. Technology is prosthetic because it pro-poses both temporally 
and spatially the memories it retains.   
 
30. Prostheticity can also be understood in connection with embodiment, spatiality 
and metaphor and the kind of passive learning that allows something to be learned 
and to become ready-to-hand. This prosthetic structure may be the pre-
theoretical substratum in which existential metaphor, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, takes place. In this light, the ready-to-hand should be 
questioned concerning its constitution and participation in metaphor.  
 
31. According to Heidegger the use of tools is temporal, as is the letting relationship. 
Even Dasein’s directionality and the differentiation between right and left are 
explained in terms of Dasein’s inability to engage with two things at the same 
time. In this way, Heidegger downgrades Dasein’s spatiality and embodied 
nature. The body, however, can be understood as contributing to the letting 
relationship and imagination; similarly to these processes, the body allows things 
to present themselves while it itself is withdrawn.   
  
32. The bifurcation of the body has an effect on the way we experience the world. 
The human body’s structure is transferred onto things and space, and this 
movement of metaphor (metaphora, transfer) is lived in the meaningful relation we 
share with things. This is an important relation that is experienced in language.   
 
33. Language is set against technology’s instrumentality and, in consequence, the 
body’s interaction with tools. Metaphor, however, points to the fact that there is a 
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common ground that is constituted by their interaction. Both technology and 
language contain memories and co-constitute our already-there. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The moment of vision has been discussed extensively in the previous chapter. 
This discussion has shed light to the fact that the unfolding of time necessitates a 
space that retains the has-been. Space is necessary for Dasein’s possibility of 
producing itself and letting itself receive the possibilities it can imaginatively 
repeat. Technology, however, plays an important role in this process, since it 
allows the inscription of retentions, that is, the conservation of memory that 
ultimately produces the uniqueness of each community’s time-space. As we have 
seen, imagination’s metaphorical functions allow it to interact with exteriorised 
images that are inscribed technologically and can potentially form imagination’s 
forming power and affect Dasein’s temporality. Since technology mediates this 
process conditioning lived space, I examine in what follows the way early 
Heidegger understands technology and its effect on the production of space and 
temporal situatedness that is now understood as closeness. This experience is one 
of eliminating distance; it is a de-severance that constructs Dasein’s spatio-
temporality and lets it be situated in connection with the things it concerns itself 
with. In other words, closeness becomes another description of the letting 
relationship, temporality and imagination. This kind of time, precisely because it 
is experienced with the mediation of technology, is deemed inauthentic since it 
conceals the most important possibility of Dasein, namely, that of dying. 
 
On the contrary, what is later understood as closeness/nearness is set against the 
devastating and dehumanizing effects of modern technology that produces the 
experience of being neither far nor near to something, which is termed 
distancelessness. Nearness will be pursued through language’s deepest 
possibilities, that is, through poetry and poetic metaphor. These two types of 
being-in-the-world (closeness/nearness and distancelessness) are themselves 
descriptions of existential temporality that presuppose an interaction, between 
language, technology, and space, which comes to the surface metaphorically. 
These notions appear to suggest physical proximity, but they denote engagement 
with the world on a very profound level; they describe various modes of being 
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human, but they do not do so by transferring one mode of being which is namely 
spatial to another mode which is temporal. They rather allow the grasping of 
temporality through spatiality which is itself still unexplored, and remains as such 
throughout Heidegger’s work. These expressions then are metaphors in a new way; 
they allow transfer, movement and nearing but between domains that remain 
unfamiliar to us. Their nature is never completely effable even though is intuited. 
 
The way that this interaction is understood, and that metaphor’s contribution to 
the kind of thinking Heidegger is attempting to sketch, becomes an important 
issue that shows Heidegger’s ambivalence regarding both metaphor and 
technology. This is because Heidegger, on the one hand, attempts to sketch 
originary thinking through metaphor, but at the same time deems metaphor the 
very problem of metaphysics that is effected by the technological paradigm of 
Being. This points to an ambivalence in Heidegger regarding technology’s 
implication in metaphor and language. This ambivalence leads Heidegger to 
understand language’s instrumentalisation as one of modern technology’s 
dehumanising effects. In consequence, he never addresses the following question: 
Why is language instrumentalisable in the first place? Heidegger’s shortcoming in 
this respect also translates into an indifference concerning the possibility of 
technology’s and language’s common instrumentality. 
 
Heidegger’s theory shows that the philosopher recognises the interaction between 
technology and language but overlooks at the same time some of their ontological 
characteristics and aspects of their interaction. Heidegger’s prioritisation of future 
and mortality, over other dimensions of time and existence, allows him to deem 
what is lived through technology -that is, quotidian space and time- inauthentic. 
In consequence, he neglects discussing space’s potential contribution to the 
transmission of tradition that makes up Dasein’s historicality and also misses the 
opportunity to discuss both the ontic and the ontological conditions of this 
transmission (respectively, embodiment, spatiality, and technological constitution, 
and learning as the mediated and metaphorical process that initiates Dasein into 
its historicality). With the aim of bringing all these neglected connections to the 
fore, I attempt to show, in what follows, the intricate interaction between language, 
technology, time, space, and embodiment.   
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2. Being-in-the-world and Language 
In early Heidegger (2008a) space is not a container of things or a mere dimension 
but what sustains the ‘worldhood’ of the world, that is, what makes it possible for 
a human being to experience the feeling of belonging to a world. Heidegger turns 
to an ‘a priori’ structure of Dasein’s existence that is bounded neither to a body-
thing that exists in the outside world nor to an intuition contained in the mind. His 
disregard for this tradition is evident: ‘A glance at previous ontology shows that if 
one fails to see Being-in-the-world as a state of Dasein, the phenomenon of 
worldhood likewise gets passed over’ (p. 93/65). He thus examines the ‘unitary 
phenomenon’ he calls ‘Being-in-the-world’. This phenomenon cannot ‘be broken 
up into contents which may be pieced together’, but still it can be studied in its 
‘constitutive items’, which refers to other structures such as the ‘in-the-world’, the 
‘worldhood’ of the world, Dasein as the ‘entity which in every case has Being-in-
the-world as the way it is’, and last but not least, ‘Being-in’ (pp. 78-79/53).  
 
The structure of being-in is very important for philosophy and it has been equated 
quite early on with existence. Aristotle, for example, makes clear that the reality 
of all things ‒except for that of some special entities, like the Heavens, God, 
numbers and points‒ depends on their existence in some place. This, consequently, 
means that if things lack a place, they also lack existence (Casey, 1997). As 
Aristotle (2012) states in the fourth book of Physics, ‘things which exist are 
somewhere (the nonexistent is nowhere – where is the goat-stag or the sphinx?’ 
(2012, p. 1) For the Greek philosopher the state of being-in is equated with the 
actuality of a thing, and it can be understood:   
 
1. As the finger is ‘in’ the hand and generally the part ‘in’ the whole.  
2. As the whole is ‘in’ the parts: for there is no whole over and above the 
parts. 
3. As man is ‘in’ animal and generally species ‘in’ genus. 
4. As the genus is ‘in’ the species and generally the part of the specific 
form ‘in’ the definition of the specific form. 
5. As health is ‘in’ the hot and the cold and generally the form ‘in’ the 
matter. 
6. As the affairs of Greece centre ‘in’ the king, and generally events centre 
‘in’ their primary motive agent. 
7. As the existence of a thing centres ‘in its good and generally ‘in’ its end, 
i.e. in ‘that for the sake of which’ it exists. 
8. In the strictest sense of all, as a thing is ‘in’ a vessel, and generally ‘in’ 
place. (2012, p. 3) 
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Aristotle’s discussion of being-in underscores the metaphorical rendering of 
reality. It also seems to suggest that any literal rendering of being-in would not be 
simply inadequate but also misleading. Heidegger’s existential analytic also 
abounds with metaphors. Aristotle, however, gives patent priority to the literal 
meaning, that is, literal as literality is conventionally understood, which he 
considers the strictest sense of being-in. This prioritisation is in accord with his 
belief that ‘metaphor is “the transport [epiphora] of a foreign name,” under four 
possible scenarios: transport from gender to species, from species to gender, from 
species to another species, and “by analogy”’ (Stellardi, 2000, p. 23). In this 
respect, only literal expressions carry the proper name and these render reality as 
it is. 
 
In Aristotle’s descriptions of being-in we observe most of metaphor’s functions. 
Reality is captured metaphorically and spatially. But is this a matter of 
‘representation’ or presencing? Is there a reality prior to interpretation which is 
not metaphorical? If Dasein is the interpretative being par excellence, what does 
it mean that interpretation cannot escape being metaphorical? Heidegger refrains 
from asking this question since he considers metaphor responsible for the 
ontotheological structure of metaphysics. In Lecture Six of The Principle of 
Reason (1955/56) Heidegger (1996) argues that  
 
The idea of transposing and of “metaphor” is based upon the 
distinguishing, if not complete separation, of the sensible and the 
nonsensible as two realms that subsist on their own. The setting up of 
this partition of the sensible and nonsensible, between the physical and 
nonphysical is a basic feature of what is called metaphysics and which 
normatively determines Western thinking (p. 48). 
 
In this light, Heidegger is compelled to reject metaphor since his own philosophy, 
which is radically a philosophy about Dasein −that is, a being that has always 
already interpreted the world as world− cannot endure the dichotomy of sensible 
and non-sensible. Heidegger goes on to point out that this dichotomy is false since 
beings do not constitute our external reality, that is, beings are not sensuous 
intuitions that later gain meaning but meaningful beings at the very moment we 
perceive them. Dasein does not receive neutral data to which it allocates meaning. 
Being is always interpretive. Heidegger insists that the most basic philosophical 
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concepts that are now understood as metaphors refer to a stage prior to this 
dichotomy. After all, he tells us, Plato named ‘the genuine element of beings ιδέα 
−the face of beings and that which is viewed by us’ and ‘Heraclitus named what 
constituted the genuine element in beings −λόγος– the locution of beings to which 
we respond in hearing’ (1996, p. 47). This etymological clarification suggests that 
there is a compositional function in perception, that allows the thing to appear as 
it is, and precedes the distinction between sensibility and intelligibility. This 
distinction is initiated, as it has already been pointed out, by the technological 
paradigm that perceives beings as matter that is formed by the idea that precedes 
them. In this light, metaphor is metaphysical, whereas his own understanding of 
being moves beyond metaphysics. He explains:   
 
Whatever is heard by us never exhausts itself in what our ears, which 
from a certain point of view can be seen as separated sense organs, can 
pick up. More precisely, if we hear, something is not simply added to 
what the ear picks up; rather, what the ear perceives and how it perceives 
will already be attuned and determined by what we hear. . . Of course 
our hearing organs are in a certain regard necessary, but they are never 
the sufficient condition of our hearing, for that hearing which accords 
and affords us whatever there really is to hear. The same holds for our 
eyes and our vision. If human vision remained confined to what is piped 
in as sensations through the eye to the retina, then, for instance, the 
Greeks would never have been able to see Apollo in a statue of a young 
man or, to put this in a better way, they would never have been able to 
see the statue in and through Apollo. (ibid., pp. 47-48) 
 
It thus becomes clear that metaphor cannot go hand-in-hand with the 
Heideggerian understanding of perception, which is, as we saw, indebted to 
Aristotle’s and (partially) Kant’s understanding of perception. Still, it needs to be 
noted that Heidegger is not rejecting metaphor itself but the specific metaphysical 
construal of metaphor, notwithstanding the fact that he is in no way forced to 
accept this. Stellardi (2000), in effect, argues that ‘Heidegger accepts without 
problem the traditional notion of metaphor, and consequently condemns it with no 
possibility of appeal. Metaphor, whether living or dead, is always for him caught 
up in the circle of representation, technique [Technik], and metaphysics’ (p. 140). 
In this light, metaphor is understood in Heidegger as residing on the opposite site 
of what he envisions as originary image, meditative thinking and alētheia.  
 
This, however, should not be the case. Metaphor can be the creative connecting or 
interacting of a pre-existing substratum of meaning− which is understood in Kant 
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as the concept− with innumerable new possibilities of meaning −which stand for 
empirical instances. This understanding of metaphor resembles Kant’s depiction 
of imagination’s synthesising process, which, as I have pointed out, is the origin 
of Heideggerian temporality. Paul Ricœur (1978a) makes the connection between 
Kantian schematism and metaphor and argues that metaphor, similarly to 
imagination, ‘is both a thinking and a seeing’32 (p. 147). Especially, ‘metaphor by 
analogy’ is a way of seeing as, and this, we can add, immediately evokes 
Heidegger’s Husserlian influences and the origin of his quest to reinscribe 
imagination and temporality (p. 148). Ricœur, however, argues that metaphor is 
able to bring two completely different terms close. He argues that through 
‘predicative assimilation’ the two terms become ‘semantically proximate’. This 
points to a kind of ‘rapprochement’ that confirms ‘a typical kinship [between 
metaphor and] . . . Kant’s schematism’  (p. 148). Ricœur explains:    
 
It is as though a change of distance between meanings occurred within a 
logical space. The new pertinence or congruence proper to a meaningful 
metaphoric utterance proceeds from the kind of semantic proximity 
which suddenly obtains between terms in spite of their distance. Things 
or ideas which were remote appear now as close. Resemblance 
ultimately is nothing else than this rapprochement which reveals a 
generic kinship between heterogeneous ideas. What Aristotle called the 
epiphora of the metaphor, that is, the transfer of meaning, is nothing else 
than this move or shift in the logical distance, from the far to the near. (p. 
147, italics added) 
Ricœur’s discussion is pertinent here, since Heidegger employs the same spatial 
metaphors −that is, metaphors of distance− in order phenomenologically to 
explain what it is to be-in-the-world. Closeness/nearness and remoteness become 
the cornerstone of his thinking, which he insists should not be viewed as 
metaphorical. Do these notions, however, suggest a new conceptualisation of 
metaphor that, as indicated in the hinge-section, draws from the multifaceted 
interaction between technology and language, time and space, interior and exterior? 
Or is metaphor this very interaction? Or could it be both? Could these metaphors 
describe the basic way Dasein’s spatio-temporality is each time synthesised 
implicating space, technology and language? Could these metaphors be the very 
function of imagination that gives Dasein’s its differential structure?  In order to 
                                                 
32
 See also Hausman (1989). 
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investigate this, I will initially turn to closeness, which is understood through the 
tool or, as Heidegger puts it, the ready-to-hand.    
 3. The Ready-to-hand 
Heidegger envisions space as a constant movement of bringing-close conditioned 
by technology. According to Heidegger the tool allows Dasein to pursue its future 
plans, but the tool is not a mere means, since it conditions the experience of time 
and space. Heidegger, contrary to Kant, understands space not as an attribute of 
the mind but as what results from ‘our active being and our practical involvements 
in the world’ (Arisaka, 1995, p. 4). For Heidegger space is lived through the 
‘thinghood’ of objects, and thinking is constituted through Dasein’s 
interconnections with things and other Daseins. Theodore Kisiel (1993) explains: 
 
The field of objects which yields the original sense of being is that of the 
produced object accessible in the course of usage. Accordingly, it is not 
the field of things in their theoretical reification but rather the world 
encountered in going about our producing, making, and using which is 
the basis, the according-to-which and toward-which of the original 
experience of being… (p. 264) 
 
Dasein encounters things like ancient Greeks encountered ‘πράγματα ‒that is to 
say, that which one has to do with in one’s concernful dealings (πρᾶξις)’ 
(Heidegger, 2008a, p. 97/68). For Heidegger ‘the specifically ‘pragmatic’ 
character of the πράγματα’ is equipment which ‘is essentially ‘something in order 
to’ (“‘etwas um-zu. . .”].’ In this light, anything ‒a pen, a car or a spaceship‒ is 
something used in order for a futural goal to be achieved. Heidegger further 
explains that a ‘totality of equipment is constituted by various ways of the ‘in-
order-to’, such as ‘serviceability, conduciveness, usability, manipulability’ and 
also ‘assignment or reference of something to something’ (ibid.).  
 
Because of their ability to refer to something else, tools are constituted through 
the networks they create. Tools are discovered in these networks laden with 
intentions, references and significances. Tools constitute our already-there and 
condition our existence. While using the word-processor, for example, I am 
already conditioned to sit in a specific way, type at a specific speed and choose 
my actions according to the software’s design and affordances. These are mostly 
actions I perform without thinking about them. Heidegger calls this pre-theoretical 
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structure ‘readiness-to-hand’, and it refers to Dasein’s ability to let things be 
involved while Dasein is itself involved in the unfolding of its temporality (ibid., p. 
98/69). Heidegger further explains: 
 
If we look at Things just ‘theoretically’, we can get along without 
understanding readiness-to-hand. But when we deal with them by using 
them and manipulating them, this activity is not a blind one; it has its 
own kind of sight, by which our manipulation is guided and from which 
it acquires its specific Thingly character. Dealings with equipment 
subordinate themselves to the manifold assignments of the ‘in-order-to’. 
And the sight with which they thus accommodate themselves is 
circumspection. (p. 98/69) 
 
Circumspection is the average pre-theoretical way we employ to perceive the 
world. It is an integral function of perception and permeates our dealings with 
technology. In other words, it is the form of sight found in ‘practical behaviour’ (p. 
99/69). Heidegger’s decision to characterise this behaviour as sight is not 
accidental; sight is the prevalent sense in BT. Sight, according to Heidegger is 
traditionally thought as theorisation, but this blinds us to the other ways we can 
relate to the world. 
 
This kind of Being towards the world is one which lets us encounter 
entities within-the-world purely in the way they look (εἶδος), just that; on 
the basis of this kind of Being, and as a mode of it, looking explicitly at 
what we encounter is possible. Looking at something in this way is 
sometimes a definite way of taking up a direction towards something ‒ 
of setting our sights towards what is present-at-hand. It takes over a 
‘view-point’ in advance from the entity which it encounters. Such 
looking-at enters the mode of dwelling autonomously alongside entities 
within-the-world. In this kind of ‘dwelling’ as a holding-oneself-back 
from any manipulation or utilization, the perception of the present-at-
hand is consummated. (p. 89/62) 
 
The theorisation of the world that is inherent in western philosophy refers to the 
way we think about things when we do not have them at hand. It is a theoretical, 
scientific attitude that presents itself when we realise, for example, that a tool is 
‘missing’, is broken or unavailable, and thus the tool enters the ‘mode of 
obtrusiveness’ and ‘reveals itself as present-at-hand and no more’ (p. 103/73) 
Circumspection, on the other hand, whilst allowing the manipulation of things, 
also enables their withdrawal into inconspicuousness. This is because, in our 
everyday dealings ‘that with which we concern ourselves primarily is the work ‒ 
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that which is to be produced at the time’ and not the actual tools we handle (p. 
99/70).  
 
According to Heidegger, when tools are ready-to-hand, they are freed for use. He 
also argues that the ready-to-hand as reference and assignment pertains to 
involvement, arguing that: ‘If something has an involvement, this implies letting it 
be involved in something.’ (p. 115/84) This ‘letting something be involved’ is 
then grounded in the discovery of the purpose for which the ready-to-hand has 
been freed. In other words my keyboard has already been discovered as ready-to-
hand because the intention of writing a text has already been established, and this 
intention, which is basically an anticipation, refers to the future. In this light, the 
future becomes the horizon that structures understanding and allows us to 
encounter the ready-to-hand in its ‘wherein’. As Heidegger puts it:  
 
The “wherein” of an act of understanding which assigns or refers itself, 
is that for which one lets entities be encountered in the kind of Being that 
belongs to involvements; and this “wherein” is the phenomenon of the 
world. And the structure of that to which [woraufin] Dasein assigns 
itself is what makes up the worldhood of the world. (p. 119/86) 
 
Heidegger adds that in the world ‘Dasein already understands itself’, but this does 
not mean that Dasein knows thematically the networks that make up its world and 
its own understanding. This familiarity, which is a ‘relational totality of this 
signifying’, is called by Heidegger ‘significance’, and it is upon this that language 
is founded as well (p. 120/87). In other words, the structure of the world as 
significance and familiarity is ‘a system of Relations’ that is lived unthematically 
and that resists ‘any sort of mathematical functionalization’ (p. 122/88). Precisely 
because of technology’s referential nature, there cannot be a tool that works only 
for me. The tool I use refers me to another tool involved in a region and a project 
that some other Dasein is involved with. In this respect, both of us share the same 
inherently relational, social space. Dreyfus (1991) comments that this is an aspect 
of equipment’s public character. He writes: 
 
Equipment displays generality and obeys norms. First, a piece of 
equipment is the equipment it is no matter who uses it. Hammers, 
typewriters, and buses are not just for me to use but for others too. 
Equipment is for ‘Anybody’- a general user. . . Second, there is a normal 
(appropriate) way to use any piece of equipment. (p. 51) 
 
 106 
Equipment’s fundamentally social character ‘directs attention to the way in which 
being-there is as much a being-with others (Mitsein, MitDasein) as it is a being 
amidst or being-alongside things (Sein bei) and also depicts how entire societies 
are ‘established and constituted through the organization of space’ (Malpas, 2007, 
p. 88). From this we can infer that specific communities have specific 
organisations of space and that their members participate in a communal space 
that is opened up by the specific way technology is used and produced. For this 
reason, when Heidegger discusses the ‘work-world of the craftsman’, he says that 
in the work-activity the craftsman encounters, even if indirectly, ‘those Others for 
whom the “work” [“Werk”] is destined’, that is, the wearers for whom the shoes 
are made (2008a, p. 153/117). Malpas (2007), points out that this means that  
 
involvement with others is organized and oriented through this 
equipmental structure, which is also a social structure. And to the extent 
that the ordering of the world of equipment is something laid out in ‘in 
space,’ so too the ordering of the social is a spatial ordering. (p. 88) 
 
From this a number of points are raised: first, technology conditions our world, 
the ways we understand it and our being-in-the-world in general. In this light, we 
can also assume that technology is implicated in Dasein’s differential unfolding 
as that which co-creates, along with language, the relational familiarity or 
significance in which Dasein dwells. Notwithstanding this, Heideggerian 
existential theory also endorses the idea that technology is responsible for the 
dominion of ‘the they’, that is, the nameless and undifferentiated mass that takes 
over our awareness of the finality of death and the possibility to become authentic. 
Daily concerns are, after all, provisional and pursued through technology. They 
also conceal the ultimate finality of death.  
 
Bernard Stiegler (1998), however, argues that Heidegger is led to this conclusion 
through a one-sided conceptualisation of technology’s instrumentality. For 
Heidegger a tool is a towards-which, a reference, a sign and a finality distinctly 
different from mortality. For Heidegger, it is precisely the realisation of the 
certainty of death that allows the suspension of every other concern and ultimately 
leads to authenticity. Stiegler (1998) comments:  
 
This finality refers to the ultimate instance of the end whose meaning 
will only be revealed in the second part of Being and Time qua being-
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toward-the-end, where reference functions in relation no longer to a 
being-ready-to-hand but to a being-in-the-world, Da-sein, or who. This 
“finality” consequently appears to precede the possibility of an already-
there of the what-ready-to-hand. (p. 249) 
 
In Stiegler’s view, however, Dasein cannot be a pure self-affected entity that 
relates authentically to the world through the possibility of its own death, since the 
‘finality (being-toward-the-end) and the facticity of an already-there are 
inextricable’ (ibid.). He writes:   
 
This finality, experienced in both a prior and actual manner by Dasein in 
all the relations it encounters within-the-world, is an understanding pro-
posed by the play of relations that make up the world, signification. The 
totality of these relations forms the significance that makes the meanings 
of words possible. . . (p. 250) 
 
The already-there or, to put it differently, Dasein’s experiences of familiarity are 
constructed out of the relations effected by tools, language and their interaction. 
This familiarity is always already the world that Dasein is thrown in. This is a 
world that is not authentic, at least, not by Heidegger’s standards. It is, 
nevertheless, the only reality Dasein knows, and it is a pros-thetic reality.  This 
means many different things: first, this pros-theticity precedes individual histories 
and makes them possible. It is a tradition Dasein inherits precisely because 
technology and language contain memories that create a certain alreadyness that 
is Dasein’s thrownness. In this respect, the familiarity constructed by technology 
is not the absence of thinking but a process of learning. In other words, it is the 
process during which Dasein learns the tool so that the tool becomes ready-to-
hand. This learning process is conditioned, however, by factors not explicitly 
addressed by Heidegger, and it contains the possibilities of authenticity. This is a 
differential process during which Dasein has access, through technology and 
language, to memories, retentions and modalities of thinking that are inscribed in 
space. This space is itself conditioned by temporality, and it affords Dasein the 
potentiality to reiterate its history. This is the way perception takes place, that is, 
through a constant modification and synthesis of retentions that are themselves 
affected by protentions. This learning process is to a great degree passive since 
Dasein exterioriorises itself in an environment that is not thematically understood 
but that nevertheless allows certain possibilities for synthesis, thinking and 
imagination. As already noted, Stiegler (1998) calls this process ‘epiphylogenesis’, 
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which refers, by analogy, to epigenesis
33
, to a repetition of behaviours, attitudes 
and ways of connectedness to the world formed by technologies inherited but not 
produced by me. It is thus a form of ‘mathésis’ (p. 140). Stiegler (2001) explains 
the technological structure of this process as an access to 
 
sedimented memory, objectivated “secondary” memories, memories, in 
other words, that have become “tertiary.” This already-there can only be 
reactivated through the presence of a support that is itself present. This is 
the present synthesis of a memory synthesis capable of being reactivated 
within a living present (Stiegler, 2001, p. 246).  
 
Heidegger does not recognise this aspect of technology’s instrumentality. If he 
had seen this aspect, his later critique concerning the effects of modern 
technology and of the media on thinking would have benefited greatly. In fact, 
according to Stiegler, Heidegger’s ‘placing of documents under the category of 
sign, considered in terms of a signal’ does not allow the consideration of tertiary 
memory’s contribution to temporality. (p. 248) Understanding instrumentality’s 
specific historic nature would have allowed Heidegger to discuss the ready-to-
hand as a modality of technology’s nature and to address ‘representative’ or the 
technological image in connection with its contribution to originary thinking. He 
would have also been able to address the type of learning understood in this thesis 
as metaphor and to contrast it with transformational learning.  
 
By contrast, early Heidegger (2008a) discusses learning only in terms of the tool’s 
breakdown. It is only when the tool is present-at-hand that any speculation about 
its nature can begin, but even in those cases learning is not authentic. The 
breakdown of equipment is not the call of consciousness. It is rather the tool 
‘defined mathematically’ (p. 122/80). In this respect, Heidegger seems to suggest 
that neither technology’s familiarity nor its unfamiliarity can be the condition for 
the opening up of originary thinking. The ready-to-hand, which remains 
unthematised in terms of its constitution, cannot contribute to any form of 
learning, and its break-down leads to calculative thinking
34
 and measurement. But 
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 Epigenesis is a term from biology that refers to the process of the organism's development.  
34
  Heidegger (1969b) argues that calculative thinking   
  
consists in the fact that whenever we plan, research, and organize, we always reckon 
with conditions that are given. We take them into account with the calculated intention 
of their serving specific purposes. Thus we can count on definite results. This 
calculation is the mark of all thinking that plans and investigates. Such thinking 
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is not possible that the tool itself is a product of mathematical thinking and 
calculation? If this is the case, does this not produce a connectedness to the world 
that is by necessity always calculative? If the answer to this question is positive, 
then we have to infer that calculation is inherent in technology and thus tools 
cannot participate in the unfolding of authentic time. Heidegger, in fact, 
distinguishes between clock-time and authentic time. He writes: 
 
This public dating, in which everyone assigns himself his time, is one 
which everyone can ‘reckon’ on simultaneously; it uses a publicly 
available measure. This dating reckons with time in the sense of a 
measuring of time; and such measuring requires something by which 
time is to be measured ‒namely, a clock. This implies that along with the 
temporality of Dasein as thrown, abandoned to the ‘world’ and giving 
itself time, something like a ‘clock’ is also discovered ‒that is, something 
ready-to-hand which in its regular recurrence has become accessible in 
one’s making present awaitingly. The Being which has been thrown and 
is alongside the ready-to-hand is grounded in temporality. Temporality is 
the reason for the clock. (p. 466/413) 
 
For Heidegger Dasein’s temporality is mainly futural. In fact, he clearly states: 
‘The “now” is not pregnant with the “not-yet-now”, but the Present arises from 
the future in the primordial ecstatical unity of the temporalizing of temporality.’ 
(p. 479/427) This ecstatico-horizontal unity that is directed towards the future and 
allows Dasein to be ‘ahead-of-it-self’ as mainly protentional permits the discovery 
of the ready-to-hand clock first in nature and then in technology.  
  
As the condition for the possibility that a clock is factically necessary, 
temporality is likewise the condition of its discoverability. For while the 
course of the sun is encountered along with the discoveredness of 
entities within-the-world, it is only by making it present in awaitingly 
retaining, and by doing so in a way which interprets itself, that dating in 
terms of what is ready-to-hand environmentally in a public way is made 
possible and is also required. (p. 466/413)  
 
It is thus affirmed that time is first opened up by the possibility of death and the 
future as that which cannot be determined, whereas the clock standardises, 
measures and makes time public in order to determine it. Stiegler (1998) however, 
                                                                                                                                     
remains calculation even if it neither works with numbers nor uses an adding machine 
or computer. Calculative thinking computes. It computes ever new, ever more 
promising and at the same time more economical possibilities. Calculative thinking 
races from one prospect to the next. Calculative thinking never stops, never collects 
itself. (p. 46) 
 
 
 110 
turns this argument on its head, arguing that it is on the basis of the determinate 
that indeterminateness emerges. He writes: 
 
Dasein is thrown forward to its end as it is thrown into the already-there 
of the factical world. If this is so, the essentially factical dying of Dasein 
is “more often” falling into a concern programmed by public and 
determinable discourse and time. To think of a possibility that is not 
secondary and derived, but is originary, and for which, precisely, being 
is a potentiality: it is on the basis of an originary programmability that 
there is an originary improbable; this improbable is not the contrary of 
this programmability but forms its truth. (pp. 217-218) 
 
This, however, would suggest that time is in any case constituted technologically 
and that authentic temporality cannot be exhaustively defined by the possibility of 
death or, to put it in different terms, death is produced as death but the temporality 
of concern affects its manifestation as well. Following this line of thought, 
Stiegler makes it explicit that Dasein’s differential structure is conditioned by 
technology. He writes: 
 
The gift of différance is technological because the individual constitutes 
itself from out of the possibilities of the One, from the relation with one 
another each time allowed for by the particular technological set-up. One 
is individuated sooner than when the individual à la Heidegger falls into 
the publicity and chitchat of the One; “authentic temporality” always 
comes too late (it is always already “inauthentic,” factical): it is 
epimetheia.
35
 No mortality is originarily absolutely alone: it is only alone 
with others. 
When Heidegger says that the clock is the time of the with-one-
another, he means that technological time is public time. Now, it is in 
this common, public time, according to its possibilities, which are each 
time unique, that a time is constituted that is not “private” but deferring 
and differing [différant]. The calculation of time is thus not a falling 
away from primordial time, because calculation, qua the letter-number, 
also actually gives access in the history of being to any différance. (p. 
237) 
 
                                                 
35
 Stiegler (1998) relies on the myth of Prometheus to utter his philosophy. Through the discussion 
of Plato’s Protagoras, and specifically the part at which Prometheus’ myth is narrated, Stiegler 
presents the ‘origin of technics’ as the ‘origin of mortality’ (p. 16). According to the myth, the 
twins titans Prometheus and Epimetheus are charged with the task of giving powers to all the 
animals in a way that will compensate for their weaknesses. Epimetheus performed this task but he 
forgot the human being which he left a-logo (without reason). Prometheus attempting to 
compensate for this forgetfulness he stole the arts and fire from Hephaestus and Athena 
respectively. In this light, Stiegler affirms that the human being comes to being out of a double 
fault; the accidental forgetting of Epimetheus and Prometheus’ theft. This fault, he says ‘is nothing 
but the de-fault of origin or the origin as de-fault’. (p. 188)  
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For Stiegler calculation, programmability and technology are always already part 
of what allows Dasein to experience time as time. To put it in this thesis’ terms, 
technology contributes to the letting-relationship; it is a letting-be-involved that 
does not in any way describe exclusively inauthentic time; it rather gives the 
possibility of time and co-constitutes the experience of closeness. Heidegger 
discards this possibility. For Heidegger language is the source that gives the 
possibility of authentic time. Phenomenology is precisely the way into the things 
themselves because of language’s potential to make things manifest as things. 
This, however, is an axiological move that cannot be sustained if both language 
and technology are not examined concerning their participation in the constitution 
of the ready-to-hand and, in consequence, closeness. As already noted, the idea of 
metaphor provides a way into this, and it is to this that I turn next.  
 
4. Dasein’s Spatiality  
 
Dasein’s spatiality as being-in is not an experience of ‘insideness’ but a relation 
of closeness (Heidegger, 2008a, p. 134/101). As already discussed, the ready-to-
hand does not imply physical containment but rather refers to a relation of letting-
something-be-involved in Dasein’s projects. It constitutes the movement of 
bringing-close that is not a matter of covering measurable distance. It refers rather 
to Dasein’s temporal constitution through its projects. Heidegger (2008a) explains 
that its essence is not mathematically calculative: ‘Every entity that is “to hand” 
has a different closeness, which is not to be ascertained by measuring distances. 
This closeness regulates itself in terms of circumspectively “calculative” 
manipulating and using’ (p.135/102).  
 
Since, according to Heidegger, closeness has to do with temporal engagement, 
every object has a place ‘with regard to the direction in which . . . [it] is accessible 
at any time’, and for this reason what he calls ‘directionality’ refers not to a 
‘position in space as present-at-hand somewhere’ but to a certain position situated 
within a nexus of significances and assignments, that is, to ‘its place’ (p. 136/102). 
This place, which is relational in the way that was explained in the previous 
section, does not refer to a ‘spatial position’, but to a ‘ “whither”, which makes it 
possible for equipment to belong somewhere, and which we circumspectively 
keep in view ahead of us in our concernful dealings’ and ‘we call the “region” ’ (p. 
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136, 102-103). Region is a notion that is structured temporally and calculatively 
according to usability. Malpas (2007) explains that ‘the term refers to the larger 
realm within which items of equipment are placed in relation to one another (in 
the workroom for example) and so to what is more like a network of “places” ’ (p. 
31). He then continues: 
 
Each thing has a ‘place’ (Platz) within a ‘region’ (Gegend) –the hammer 
has a place where it belongs when being used (in my hand and 
positioned so as to enable, for instance, the driving home of a nail) –and 
in being so located it is also located with respect to other things− with 
respect to saw, drill, the box of nails, the timber. The region is the set of 
places that are implicated with one another by particular forms of 
involvement and activity in the world. (p. 84) 
 
In this respect, the region is not an area within specific borders that can be 
pinpointed on a map. On the contrary, it is a network of temporal and concernful 
associations that may be extended according to the availability of the things 
included. In order to make this distinction clearer I need to turn to Heidegger’s 
own examples of region. Heidegger (2008a) states: 
 
the sun, whose light and warmth are in everyday use, has its own places-
sunrise, midday, sunset, midnight; these are discovered in 
circumspection and treated distinctively in terms of changes in the 
usability of what the sun bestows. Here we have something which is 
ready-to-hand with uniform constancy, although it keeps changing; its 
places become accentuated ‘indicators’ of the regions which lie in them. 
These celestial regions, which need not have any geographical meaning 
as yet, provide the ‘whither’ beforehand for every special way of giving 
form to the regions which places occupy. (p. 137/104) 
 
Access to the tools’ usability is a temporal matter, and this defines closeness and 
the region’s structure. This is obvious from the fact that Heidegger characterises 
life and death as regions. In fact, he claims: ‘Churches and graves . . . are laid out 
according to the rising and the setting of the sun − the regions of life and death, 
which are determinative for Dasein itself with regard to its ownmost possibilities 
of Being in the world’ (p. 137/104). In this respect, Dasein’s being-in-the-world is 
always already a discovery of regions and temporal involvements. Heidegger 
explains that Dasein exists ‘ “in” the world in the sense that it deals with entities 
encountered within-the-world, and does so concernfully and with familiarity’ as 
expressed through ‘de-severance and directionality’ (p. 138/105). He explains: 
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Dasein is essentially de-severant: it lets any entity be encountered close 
by as the entity which it is. De-severance discovers remoteness; and 
remoteness, like distance, is a determinate categorial characteristic of 
entities whose nature is not that of Dasein. De-severance, however is an 
existentiale; this must be kept in mind (p. 139/105). 
 
As already explained, the shortening of distance does not refer to the traversing of 
space that exists between Dasein’s body and another thing; on the contrary, it 
refers to the process that makes something encounterable by Dasein’s concern; it 
is what lets something appear as usable. Heidegger writes: 
 
As Dasein goes along its ways, it does not measure off a stretch of space 
as a corporeal Thing which is present-at-hand; it does not ‘devour the 
kilometers’; bringing-close or de-severance is always a kind of 
concernful Being towards what is brought close and de-severed (p. 
140/106).  
 
The fact that de-severance does not involve Dasein’s body’s specific implacement 
is elucidated by Heidegger’s example of media use. ‘With the “radio”’, Heidegger 
argues, ‘Dasein has so expanded its everyday environment that it has 
accomplished a de-severance of the ‘world’ –a de-severance which, in its meaning 
for Dasein, cannot yet be visualized’ (p. 140/105). This example, which is, in fact, 
extremely important for this thesis, proves that the action of bringing-close 
implies some kind of absorption on the part of Dasein. This is a process in which 
the body participates, but its participation is mostly by way of initiating 
connectedness. In the following quotation this becomes clear:  
 
One feels the touch of it (the street) at every space as one walks; it is 
seemingly the closest and Realest of all that is ready-to-hand, and it 
slides itself, as it were, along certain portions of one’s body-the soles of 
one’s feet. And yet it is farther remote than the acquaintance whom one 
encounters ‘on the street’ at a ‘remoteness’ [“Entfernung”] of twenty 
paces when one is taking such a walk. Circumspective concern decides 
as to the closeness and farness of what is proximally ready-to-hand 
environmentally. Whatever this concern dwells alongside beforehand is 
what is closest, and this is what regulates our de-severances (p.141-
142/107). 
  
The role that Dasein’s body plays in the letting relationship is not investigated 
further in BT, not even in terms of the privation that makes it possible for Dasein 
to be absorbed in something. This topic will be addressed decades later when 
Heidegger discusses the body’s role in the process of making something present. 
He then writes:  
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When the philosopher Thales, lost in thought, walked along a road, fell 
into a ditch, and was ridiculed by some servant girl, his body was in no 
way ‘lost in space.’ Rather, it was not present. . . [W]hen I am absorbed 
in something ‘body and soul,’ the body is not present. Yet, this ‘absence’ 
of the body is not nothing, but one of the most mysterious phenomena of 
privation. (2001, p. 85) 
 
Heidegger’s belated exegesis will be discussed in one of the next chapters. For the 
time being, however, we need to direct our attention to the fact that the body, 
because of its ability to allow things to present themselves while they are 
withdrawn, shows similarities with the letting relationship; it allows presencing 
through absence. In this light, and despite Heidegger’s intentions in BT, the body 
can itself be understood as a being that participates in the unfolding of time but is 
not itself merely temporal. Heidegger’s analysis does not shed more light on this 
because the very things Dasein interacts with via the body, namely tools and 
space, are excluded from the unfolding of authentic time.  
 
The marginalisation of the body in BT becomes evident through Heidegger’s 
prioritisation of the ‘distance-senses [Fernsinne]’ of ‘seeing and hearing’, which 
are conceptualised as temporal, that is, more futural than others. (2008a, 
p.141/107) These senses according to Heidegger ‘go proximally beyond what is 
distantially ‘closest’’, and ‘it is in them that Dasein as deseverant mainly dwells’ 
(ibid.). Olafson (1995) explains the importance of this distinction, which also 
points to the fact that Heidegger’s favouring of the distance-senses tosses him 
back into the structure of metaphysics.
36
 He writes: 
 
There is something about vision, especially, that seems to encourage a 
transcendental way of thinking about perception, in spite of the fact that 
we see with our eyes and from a place that is occupied by our bodies. In 
the case of hearing as well, there is a certain obliviousness to the 
involvement of a specific part of our bodies – the ears – that is hardly 
possible in the case of touch. One may in fact wonder whether a 
representational theory of perception would ever have been developed if 
the sense of touch had played as important role in philosophical thinking 
about perception as vision has. It also seems clear that touch is closely 
associated with action in a way that seeing and hearing rarely does. (p. 
216) 
 
                                                 
36
 In the Zollikon Seminars there is an extended discussion between distance and immediate senses 
that illuminates further the role of the body in perception. This will be discussed in chapter 5. 
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The fact that Heidegger aimed to deconstruct perception as a representing process 
but nevertheless favoured seeing and hearing suggests a kind of contradiction  - a 
contradiction that is necessitated nevertheless by Heidegger’s temporal-futural 
emphasis. In the following quotation Heidegger (2008a) distinguishes between 
touch and sight, but he is still thinking on the basis of the latter and excluding 
tactility’s constitutive role for lived spatio-temporality. He writes: 
  
When, for instance, a man wears a pair of spectacles which are so close 
to him distantially that they are ‘sitting on his nose’, they are 
environmentally more remote from him than the picture on the opposite 
wall. Such equipment has so little closeness that it is proximally quite 
impossible to find. Equipment for seeing-and likewise for hearing, such 
as the telephone receiver-has what we have designated as the 
inconspicuousness of the proximally ready-to-hand (p.141/107). 
 
The ‘sitting on his nose’ phenomenon, which for Heidegger suggests a kind of 
privation of the body, proves the philosopher’s limited interest in touch, despite 
the fact that it is precisely touch that allows him to differentiate between human 
beings and beings in general: Dasein can be touched because Dasein has a world; 
things that cannot be touched do not have a world. The following paragraph 
makes this clear:  
 
An entity present-at-hand within the world can be touched by another 
entity only if by its very nature the latter entity has Being-in as its own 
kind of Being–only if, with its Being-there [Da-sein], something like the 
world is revealed to it (p. 55/81).  
 
For Heidegger objects like chairs and walls can never touch each other or be 
touched by Dasein. This is so not only because “accurate reexamination will 
always eventually establish that there is a space between the chair and the wall” 
but because these entities “are worldless in themselves” (p. 55/81). Touch, 
however, something that ultimately belongs to concern, is understood as a 
temporal movement, a protention that allows Dasein to be ahead of itself. In this 
way the specificity of its particular participation is never discussed. Keeping up 
with this line of thought, Heidegger also explains Dasein’s directionality as 
temporal situatedness since it constitutes Dasein’s movement of orientation and 
discovery within regions ‘by the circumspection of concern’ (p.143, 108). As he 
puts this:  
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Every bringing-close [Näherung] has already taken in advance a 
direction towards a region out of which what is de-severed brings itself 
close [sich nähert], so that one can come across it with regard to its place. 
Circumspective concern is de-severing which gives directionality. (ibid.) 
 
Dasein handles signs in the form of references and significances in order to orient 
itself and moves according to ‘the fixed directions of right and left’. Even though 
Heidegger mentions that Dasein’s spatialisation in its ‘bodily nature has a whole 
problematic of its own’, he never investigates the ways the body participates in 
directionality (ibid.). In fact, according to Dreyfus (1991), he disconnects ‘the 
issue of Dasein’s embodiment from the issue of orientation’. (p. 137) Heidegger 
(2008a) writes: 
 
things which are ready-to-hand and used for the body ‒like gloves, for 
example, which are to move with the hands‒ must be given 
directionality towards right and left. A craftsman’s tools, however, 
which are held in the hand are moved with it, do not share the hand’s 
specifically ‘manual’ [“handliche”] movements. So although hammers 
are handled just as much with the hand as gloves are, there are no right- 
or left-handed hammers. (p. 143/109) 
 
The fact, however, that in Heidegger’s time no left-handed hammers existed does 
not mean that left-handed people were not feeling a certain kind of 
uncomfortableness or uncanniness (unheimlich) originating from the world’s 
unresponsiveness to their specific embodiment. For Heidegger there is no feeling 
associated with right and left, and there is no unfamiliarity in the process of 
handling the ready-to-hand. He writes that ‘(l)eft and right are not something 
“subjective” for which the subject has a feeling’, and he adds that ‘[b]y the mere 
feeling of a difference between my two sides I could never find my way about in a 
world.’ (ibid.) The feeling of right and left, however, can also be understood as a 
feeling of reliance on the body’s potentiality to connect with tools. The left hand, 
for example, which is the ‘right’ hand for me, makes the world accessible, and 
through this handiness the body lets things be involved in Dasein’s projects. On 
the contrary, when my ‘right’ hand is not available because of injury, or some 
other reason, this reliance and the feeling of being-at-home in the world are lost. It 
is, however, only when I need to use the ‘wrong’ hand that I realise this. 
Heidegger’s Dasein, however, does not have such problems. As Caputo (2001) 
puts this, 
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curiously, everybody in Being and Time is healthy, hale and whole: they 
are either resolute, or irresolute, self-possessed or dissipated, and they 
even die, but their bodies, if they have bodies seem, never seem to grow 
ill or lame, diseased or disabled. (p.154)  
 
The diversity inherent in embodiment is not acknowledged in Heidegger, nor life 
after death. Mortality as being-towards-death is the limit of Dasein’s temporality, 
of course, but the limit of an individual is not the limit of Dasein’s being-with. 
Heidegger leaves all these threads hanging even though he relies on Kant’s essay 
Concerning the Ultimate Ground of the Differentiation of Regions in Space in 
order to discuss directionality. In this essay Kant gives an account of the ‘special 
bond’ that exists between the human body, direction and objects in space (Casey, 
1997, p. 204). The discussion goes something like this:  
 
these material entities would be unoriented, lacking the definite 
directionality of “right” and “left,” “up” and “down,” “front” and 
“back.” These paired terms, taken together, describe the three 
dimensions of space” and he (Kant) proposes a distinctively corporeal 
deduction: it is only because our own bodies are experienced as already 
bifurcated into paired sides and parts (e.g., right and left hands, chest and 
back, head and feet) that we can perceive sensible objects as placed and 
oriented in regions that rejoin and reflect our own bodily bifurcations. 
Things are not oriented in and by themselves; they require our 
intervention to become oriented. Nor are they oriented by purely mental 
operation: the a priori of orientation belongs to the body, not to the mind 
(Casey, 1997, p. 205, parenthesis added). 
 
For Kant the human body’s structure is transferred onto things and space, and this 
movement of metaphor (metaphora) is lived in the meaningful relation we share 
with these things. For Lakoff and Johnson (1980) this is a foundational relation 
that is constructed and experienced in language, as is the case with ‘orientational 
metaphors’. This can be understood, for example, in the use of up-down where 
there seems to be a persistent assumption that ‘up’ has positive value and ‘down’ a 
negative one. In the following examples up responds to happiness and down to 
sadness: ‘I’m feeling up!, That boosted my spirits. My spirits rose. You’re in high 
spirits. Thinking about her always gives me a lift. I’m feeling down. I’m depressed. 
He’s really low these days. I fell into a depression. My spirits sank.’ (p. 15) Lakoff 
and Johnson argue that all these phrases have a specific ‘physical basis’ that is 
able to explain, among other things, why ‘[d]rooping posture typically goes along 
with sadness and depression, [and] erect posture with a positive emotional state’ 
(p. 15).  
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Heidegger does not see all these possibilities opened up by metaphor. On the 
contrary, language is set against technology’s instrumentality and consequently 
the body’s interaction with tools. For this reason, metaphor and language are 
dissociated from this interaction’s (tool-body-language) contribution to the 
experience of closeness. For Heidegger directionality is a matter of temporality 
and familiarity, but, as is often the case with BT, familiarity is understood as a 
specific segment of time whose constitution is never questioned. How did right 
and left come to be in the first place? What is the effect on thought and how is 
thought to understand itself through language of the body’s bifurcation? 
Heidegger (2008a) writes: 
  
Suppose I step into a room which is familiar to me but dark, and which 
has been rearranged [umgeraumt] during my absence so that everything 
which used to be at my right is now at my left. If I am to orient myself 
the ‘mere feeling of the difference’ between my two sides will be of no 
help at all as long as I fail to apprehend some definite object ‘whose 
position’, as Kant remarks casually, ‘I have in mind’. But what does this 
signify except that whenever this happens I necessarily orient myself 
both in and from my being already alongside a world which is ‘familiar’? 
The equipmental context of a world must have been presented to Dasein. 
That I am already in a world is no less constitutive for the possibility of 
orientation than is the feeling for right and left (p. 144/109). 
 
For Heidegger, binaries like left and right are to be explained by Dasein’s finitude. 
Dasein cannot be absorbed with two projects at the same time, since there is 
always one futural possibility Dasein is involved with. Dreyfus (1991), however, 
points out that a fuller explanation is needed here. He argues that, for Heidegger, 
 
not all equipment is accessible at the same time. I can turn to one thing 
or another but not both at once. These incompatible fields of action 
group simultaneously accessible things together in opposed regions 
called right/left, and also front/back. But still without the body there 
could be no account of why there are just these regions. We would not 
be able to understand, for example, why the accessibility of right and left 
is not symmetrical, or why we must always ‘face’ things in order to cope 
with them. On Heidegger’s account these would just remain unexplained 
asymmetries in the practical field. This is not inconsistent, but 
unsatisfying. (p. 137) 
 
But the problem goes much deeper than this since Heidegger (2008a) argues that 
orientation is also rooted ‘in the memory [“im Gedächtnis”]’, which is in fact an 
allusion ‘to the existentially constitutive state of Being-in-the-world’ (p. 144/109). 
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But the connection between technology and memory is much deeper. Stiegler 
(1998), for example, understands technology as ‘mnemotechnics’ containing the 
inscription of memories −mneme is memory in Greek (p. 217). Memories are 
inscribed in things, and memories of these things are themselves mediated by 
technology. Stiegler explains:  
 
A tool is, before anything else, memory: if this were not the case, it 
could never function as a reference of significance. It is on the basis of 
the system of references and as a reference itself that I hear the “tool” 
that is “the creaking coach.” The tool refers in principle to an already-
there, to a fore-having of something that the who has not itself 
necessarily lived, but which comes under it [qui lui sous-vient] in its 
concern. This is the meaning of epiphylogenesis. A tool functions first as 
image-consciousness. This constitutivity of “tertiary memory” grounds 
the irreducible neutrality of the who −its programmaticality, including 
above all the grammar governing any language. (pp. 254-255) 
 
In this light, what Heidegger understands as temporality or interpretation, and 
imagination’s synthesizing ability that allows things to present themselves as the 
things they are, needs to be investigated further concerning its constitution. The 
human being exists in a hermeneutical relationship in and with the world, and it is 
already found in an already-there that contributes to this hermeneia. The already-
there is constituted through the interaction of language and technology. This 
complicated relation needs to be investigated further. Language, however, cannot 
be differentiated from technology merely because of the latter’s instrumentality, 
as Heidegger would have it. Instrumentality understood as the conservation of 
memories pertains to language as well. This is their common relational structure 
to which Heidegger also alludes. Words and tools, linguistic and equipmental 
networks, retain the has-been, and every time we use them our intentions and 
anticipations are formed by them: we reiterate and reconstruct them as an origin 
that is always lacking. This lack of originary meaning is the meaning of differance 
and metaphor.  
 
5. Conclusion  
 
Heidegger’s early phenomenological descriptions of the ready-to-hand can be 
applied to any type of object, but what does this tell us about the moment that the 
keyboard works with my hand? Why is even such a coupling possible? While I 
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am typing, the keyboard becomes transparent and thus falls out of the horizon of 
my perception. But what let the ready-to-hand become ready-to-hand in the first 
place? Was embodiment implicated in the letting-something-be-involved 
relationship? Is there a kind of learning that must take place in order for 
something to be turned from being present-at-hand to ready-to-hand? Heidegger 
does not talk about this transition, nor about the kind of learning that is required 
for something to be present-at-hand or ready-to-hand. Heidegger also neglects to 
explain why things are relatable in these two basic ways. In Heidegger the tool 
can never be unfamiliar and cannot be the entry point to any form of learning.  
 
But is this the very process that allows the use of tool a kind of learning that 
Heidegger does not discuss? There are, of course, many ways to handle the tool 
which is ready-to-hand: the expert and the novice may be handling the same tool 
towards the same goal but they interact with it differently. Is this a matter of 
concern, or is it simply a proof of Dasein’s embodied nature? And what about age? 
The child does not have the same hold on the tool that the adult does. There is 
something very important in this realisation, since it is during this very transition, 
between childhood and adulthood, that learning occurs as a process of coming to 
be-at-home in a body with specific potentialities.  
 
It almost seems that Heidegger tells us that if we want to learn something, we 
need to turn to the present-at-hand. It is only through the break-down of 
equipment, thus only when the ready-to-hand ceases to be a possibility of 
relatedness, that we are able to learn something. By this token, then, is his own 
phenomenological approach a consideration of the present-at-hand through the 
present-at-hand? And is this the limitation of Dasein’s thought or just his own? If 
we do not have access to the ready-to-hand, then, is this state forever to be 
excluded from investigation? What is more, does this mean that the present-at-
hand is what grounds the ready-to-hand? (Dostal, 2006)  
 
The very construction of the tool after all has been guided by a hand in order to fit 
a hand; the tool is available precisely because it is built by an embodied 
spatiotemporal being in such a way that it can be available by other embodied 
spatiotemporal beings. The hand seems to be present as a specific potentiality that 
transcends the temporal emphasis. In a certain respect it constitutes the 
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potentiality that Dasein has to be here while moving there. This does not mean 
that being-here-there is not simultaneous. I am here right now using the hammer 
in order to make a table for tomorrow. Intentionally I am already oriented towards 
this goal, I am already having dinner with my family around that very table, and 
this possible future comes to inform my now. The now, however, is more than this 
in its constitution. Heidegger’s phenomenology, however, cannot but focus on 
intentions. David Krell (1992) ponders the question:  
 
Did Heidegger simply fail to see the arm of the everyday body rising in 
order to hammer shingles onto the roof, did he overlook the quotidian 
gaze directed toward the ticking watch that overtakes both sun and moon, 
did he miss the body poised daily in its brazen car, a car equipped with 
turn signals fabricated by and for the hand and eye of man, did he 
neglect the human being capable day-in, day-out of moving its body and 
setting itself in motion? If so, what conclusion must we draw? (p. 52) 
 
The question about the body becomes more acute when in later writings 
Heidegger assumes that the use of tools like the jug is what differentiates 
authentic production from modern technological production. But how would 
Heidegger differentiate between authentic and non-authentic technological things? 
From his own phenomenological point of view both products are ‘towards’ –and 
‘in order to’. In this light, Heidegger’s theory is not adequate to make this 
distinction, precisely because embodiment, space, learning and metaphor as 
transfer remain undiscussed. For this reason, he later confesses that ‘(t)he attempt 
in Being and Time . . . to derive human spatiality from time is untenable’ 
(Heidegger, 1972, p. 23). But why is that? How do the marginalisation of 
embodiment and spatiality result from the prioritisation of time? Authentic 
temporality, that is, resoluteness towards death, is supposed to be the end of care; 
it is the end of technology’s use. But how is time opened up in the first place? 
How is the ready-to-hand discovered and accessed, and what should we call this 
process? Stiegler (2011) supports that this is a process of learning and passive 
synthesis that is  
 
handed down by the effectivity of an already-there itself referring to an 
ineffective already-there (the absolute past), must precede the synthesis 
of judgment – the judgment of the subject constituting the object of its 
belief, of the belief according to which, always, one judges (p. 256). 
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This passive synthesis, otherwise called epiphylogenesis, is not accounted for in 
early Heidegger. But it is on the basis of this silent form of learning that 
something like Gestell is possible, that is, a framework or a way of thinking that 
precedes Dasein in the respect that it constructs its thinking processes and 
conceals any other ways of thinking. This is, however, possible because thinking 
is always already constituted technologically: consciousness works as cinema 
before the invention of cinema, since it relies on selected retentions, in order to 
proceed to a certain form of montage and to produce the next scene (Stiegler, 
2011). This is precisely what Heidegger does not see: that thinking is inherently 
schematisable and industrialisable, and that, for this reason, something like the 
media are produced by it and at the same time are constitutive of it. Externally 
inscribed memories constitute the mind, as the hammer constitutes the hand. This 
is the way technology is prosthetic. Stiegler, in fact, comments: ‘The unheimlich 
character of all prostheses is, besides, what Dasein, with its eye “on the simple 
fact of existing as such,” cannot endure while being from the start supported by it’. 
(p. 219) 
 
Heidegger’s emphasis on the tool as reference and sign explains the emphasis that 
is put on region instead of place. Region is a constant referring instead of a 
gathering, and it seems to apply precisely in the case of search engines, websites 
and the internet in general. A hyperlink refers you to something else and this 
process can continue indefinitely. The tools used in this process present 
themselves merely as signs, and the act of bringing-close becomes such a 
signification. The orientation of tools has nothing to do either with our body or 
their materiality –if indeed they have one‒ but largely depends, on the contrary, 
on their temporal availability. It is in this light that the whole discussion of 
‘leaving the body behind’ and the conceptualisation of the internet as ‘the 
culmination of the Cartesian dream’ comes to life. And it is in this respect, that 
Heidegger’s existential analytic occupies a strange middle ground between a 
negative evaluation of industrialised life and a description of human life that 
cannot but be technological. In this context, the feeling of distancelessness 
resembles the experience of being in a region, that is, of a temporal connectedness 
with things that are publicly accessed by their users and are inherently social. It 
then appears that the Heidegger of BT produces a theory of network that 
constitutes Dasein’s already-there while Dasein itself lacks any knowledge 
 123 
concerning this constitution. This is, probably the reason that later Heidegger will 
revise the notion of instrumentality through a reconsideration of the thing and 
space, but this will not take place before he has attempted to exclude both 
technology and metaphor from the letting-be relationship and nearness.  I turn to 
this middle stage of his thought in the next chapter.  
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  Chapter 4  
Nearness as a Schema of the Political  
 
 
This chapter discusses the following: 
 
34. The Turning is a change in Heidegger’s method and thinking. It attempts to 
answer the question of Being by challenging the centrality of the human being. 
With this type of thinking Dasein is better understood as the there of Being.  
 
35. This stresses the importance of language, which is set in contrast to technology 
precisely because the former makes room for new meaning whereas the latter 
frames thought in order to represent according to specific presuppositions. In 
this respect, language is not merely the medium for the letting relationship but 
nearness itself. 
 
36. In this short middle period Heidegger dissociates nearness from technology 
partly because of its Nazi allegiance. He uses a strong metaphorical language 
centred in the house, the homeland and the polis in order to talk about nearness, 
but this nearness is defined by spirit.  More specifically, this chapter discusses  
 
 what technology is in Heidegger when phenomenology is abandoned 
 what happens to nearness, time and space when their investigation is 
divorced from the mediation of technology 
 what the effects of the previous two points are on the understanding of 
the polis and politics in general 
 what metaphor is like once it is implicated more in the discussion of 
nearness 
  
1. Introduction  
The years following the publication of BT have been characterised by Heidegger 
as the ‘Turning’ (die Kehre) of his thought. This can be understood according to 
Sheehan (2001) as both the construction of the Turning and ‘a shift in the way 
Heidegger formulated and presented his philosophy beginning in the 1930s’ (p. 3). 
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These two, however, are inseparable since in Heidegger the method of 
investigation constructs what is to be investigated. Sheehan, further, comments 
that the Turning is a shift from the ‘the metaphysical ideal of being as full 
presence and intelligibility’ to a ‘radically inverted meaning of being grounded in 
finitude’ (ibid.). In this context Heidegger’s focal question is not what beings or 
Being are, but ‘what brings about being as the giveness or availability of entities?’ 
(ibid., p. 7) This, subsequently, suggests that Heidegger attempts to deconstruct 
metaphysics and dismantle the centrality of the subject. As Heidegger (2008b) put 
it in the Letter on Humanism,  
The adequate execution and completion of this other thinking that 
abandons subjectivity is surely made more difficult by the fact that in the 
publication of Being and Time the third division of the first part, “Time 
and Being,” was held back (cf. Being and Time, p. 87, above). Here 
everything is reversed. The division in question was held back because 
thinking failed in the adequate saying of this turning (Kehre) and did not 
succeed with the help of the language of metaphysics. The lecture “On 
the Essence of Truth,” thought out and delivered in 1930 but not printed 
until 1943, provides a certain insight into the thinking from “Being and 
Time” to “Time and Being.” This turning is not a change of standpoint 
from Being and Time, but in it the thinking that was sought first arrives 
at the location of that dimension out of which Being and Time is 
experienced, that is to say, experienced from the fundamental experience 
of the oblivion of Being (p. 157). 
 
According to this confession, which Spiegelberg (1971) understands as 
Heidegger’s most self-reflective text, the Kehre was intended to be a radical shift 
from the tradition that the philosopher aimed to de(con)struct but never 
successfully did in BT. For this reason, the period following his magnum opus can 
be understood as the philosopher’s dialogue with his previous thought. In this 
respect, Heidegger’s efforts in the later stage do not constitute ‘a reorientation’ 
since they essentially do not aim to replace ‘one set of concepts by another’ but 
shift ‘the weight of emphasis from one term to another within his central 
distinctions’ (Olafson, 1993, pp. 97,98). This means that while early Heidegger 
attempted to reach the meaning of Being by questioning the entity that has Being 
as its problem, namely Dasein, he now attempts to see Dasein through its 
fundamental relationship to Being. For this reason Wolin (1990) comments that, 
in this period ‘when the term “Dasein” appears, it is frequently hyphenated to read 
“Da-sein” ‒Heidegger’s way of indicating that the term is best understood as the 
“there” of “Being,” rather than as an autonomously existent entity’ (p. 131). In 
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this respect, with the Turning there is a shift of focus from the meaning-making 
Dasein to the meaningful character of the world, whilst the emphasis on 
language’s revealing role is intensified: human beings no longer make meaning 
but instead listen to and receive the world’s Saying (Olafson, 1993). For this 
reason, phenomenology’s first person perspective is now considered inappropriate 
and thus substituted by poetic language. This type of language challenges 
technologised thinking and language that, according to Heidegger, are the cause 
of the subject-object binary.  
 
Through poetic thinking, which is essentially metaphorical, Heidegger attempts to 
redefine nearness, employing spatial metaphors that focus on some new notions 
−the home and the ancient polis being the most important ones. In this light, the 
emphasis shifts from time to space, and Heidegger’s Turning appears to be a 
‘(re)turning to Place’ (Casey, 1997, p. 259). This emerging topo-logy is, however, 
devoid of philosophical rigour and constitutes the amalgam of Heidegger’s 
hermeneutic insights and Nazi politics. This is because the beginning of the 
Turning coincides with Heidegger’s allegiance to the Nazi movement, which 
culminated in his Rectorship at the Freiburg University in April 1933.
37
 During 
this period, and in accord with Nazi propaganda, Heidegger thinks nearness 
without any regard to technology’s mediation. On the contrary, he theorises 
technology in connection with spirit (Geist) and gives the notion a deeply 
metaphysical connotation.  For this reason, scholars like Nicholas Tertulian and 
Jürgen Habermas maintain that, ‘beginning with the Rectoral Address of 1933, 
Heidegger’s philosophy itself undergoes a fundamental transformation: it ceases 
to be a pristine “first philosophy”; it becomes . . . a veritable Weltanschauung or 
“world view”.’ (Wolin, 1990, p. 8) Equally, for Jean-François Lyotard (1997) this 
period reveals that Heidegger’s ‘extraordinary thought has let itself be seduced in 
a very ordinary way by the tradition that always offers itself in the immediate 
context, “visible” for the world that succumbs to it. It is overcome by 
Verfallenheit’ (p. 63). Of course, the degree to which Heidegger’s thought can be 
distinguished from his political activities has been a matter of considerable 
criticism. Responding to the bifurcation between the remarkable thinker of BT and 
                                                 
37
 Heidegger resigned from this position in 1934. 
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the Nazi Heidegger, Sheehan (1988), for example,  characterises the state to which 
Heidegger had come as follows:  
 
that is: the dues-paying member of the NSDAP from 1933 to 1945 (card 
number 312589, Gau Baden); the outspoken propagandist for Hitler and 
the Nazi revolution who went on national radio to urge ratification of 
Hitler’s withdrawal of Germany from the League of Nations; the rector 
of Freiburg University (April 1933 to April 1934), who told his students, 
“Let not theories and ‘ideas’ be the rules of your being. The Führer 
himself and he alone is German reality and its law, today and for the 
future. . . (p. 37). 
 
The seminal question then is the following: Is Heidegger’s philosophy inherently 
fascistic? Otto Pöggeler asks: ‘Was it not through a definite orientation of his 
thought that Heidegger fell ‒and not merely accidentally‒ into the proximity of 
National Socialism, without ever truly emerging from this proximity?’ (cited in 
Wolin, 1990, p. 1) There is, of course, the possibility that Heidegger’s philosophy 
during this period is consistent with the philosopher’s earlier work. If this 
philosophy is inherently fascistic, then the philosopher’s Nazi allegiance is true to 
it. If, however, Heidegger’s philosophy is not fascistic, then the Nazi allegiance is 
a betrayal of his philosophy and possibly the manifestation of the philosopher’s 
opportunistic attempts for professional advancement. Of course, it could be 
argued that there is another possibility: that the politics is simply irrelevant to the 
problems the philosophy deals with. Still, any possible scenario is saturated with 
doubts concerning the possibility of trusting a philosopher who himself has 
trusted a dangerous political regime.  
 
For this reason, Thomson (2005) argues that the complete separation between 
Heidegger’s thought and his political actions cannot have any redeeming effects 
on the philosopher, since such a separation would have implied that ‘his politics 
represent arbitrary decisionism (Wolin), careerist opportunism (Pierre Bourdieu), 
and even the fundamental betrayal of his philosophy (Marcuse)’ (p. 81). Thomson 
thus infers that no approach can do justice to ‘the philosophical integrity of 
Heidegger’s thought’ (ibid.), adding that  
 
the ongoing publication of his Gesamtausgabe (Complete Works) makes 
it increasingly obvious the Heidegger invoked his own philosophical 
views as justifications for his political decisions, and, as a result, even 
long-embattled Heideggerians are beginning to realize that a firm 
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separation of Heidegger’s politics from his philosophy is no longer 
tenable (ibid.).  
 
This appears to be true since there are recorded instances where Heidegger makes 
clear that his political decisions are in accord with his philosophy and especially 
his ontological belief that Dasein exists in time as a being that projects itself in the 
future through the decisions it makes. In fact, in a 1936 conversation with 
Heidegger outside Rome, Karl Löwith expressed his belief that ‘his former 
mentor’s “partisanship for National Socialism lay in the essence of his 
philosophy.” Heidegger agreed with Löwith ‘“without reservation, and added that 
his concept of “historicity” was the basis of his political “engagement”.’  (p. 75) 
 
In any case, Heidegger’s political adventures constitute an ironic turn of events, to 
say the least. According to Thomson, it was Heidegger’s concern with thinking 
that led to his political entanglement. In fact, as Thomson argues, the ‘most 
immediate connection between his (Heidegger’s) philosophy and politics is 
Heidegger’s ‘long-developed philosophical vision for a radical reformation of the 
university’ (ibid., p. 84). In fact, Heidegger’s conviction that technology and 
science impose restrictions on thinking and contribute to the compartmentalisation 
of knowledge led him to the hope that the Nazi university policies would allow 
philosophy to regain her ‘throne as the queen of the sciences’ and determine a 
new way of thinking (ibid., p. 116). This effort, goes hand-in-hand with his 
attempt to deconstruct ‘productionist metaphysics’, and his own limited 
understanding of the process of learning that is necessary for the ready-to-hand to 
become ready-to-hand. This, in effect, resulted in his most tragic and regrettable 
political decisions. In the light of these factors, this chapter will attempt to answer 
the following:  
 
(a) how is technology understood in Heidegger when phenomenology is 
abandoned? 
(b) what happens to nearness, time and space when their investigation is 
divorced from technology? 
(c) what are the effects of this on the understanding of the polis and politics in 
general? 
(d) and finally, what kind of development does take place in Heidegger’s 
thought in this phase of his career? 
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2. Technology in middle Heidegger  
 
There are contradictory interpretations of Heidegger’s account of technology in 
connection with human existence in BT. Is this account an ontological ahistorical 
depiction of human everydayness, or is it historical and perhaps politically skewed? 
Michael Zimmerman (1990) argues in favour of the latter, stating that   
 
Being and Time’s phenomenological ‘description’ of everyday life was 
in part a negative political evaluation of industrial society. This political 
slant is partly responsible for the ambiguity present in Being and Time’s 
account of everydayness. On the one hand, it purports to reveal the 
essential, timeless, or transcendental features of everyday life, on the 
other hand, those ‘descriptions’ are in some ways politically charged 
interpretations of everyday life in the specific historical circumstances of 
urban-industrial society. Early Heidegger’s analysis did not make 
sufficiently clear the distinction between what were essential or 
universal features of everyday life and what were historical and specific 
aspects of it. (p. 17)    
 
According to Zimmerman, discussions in BT concerning the degenerate state of 
language as ‘idle talk (Gerede)’ and of its connection to rootlessness illustrate 
how early Heideggerian thought was concerned with questions about urban life, 
technology and the media and, in fact, influenced by the political climate of the 
philosopher’s time (p. 23). Wolin (1990) also takes this stance, situating 
Heidegger in the wider political context of the philosopher’s time. He argues that 
Germany’s defeat in the Great War and the country’s increased industrialisation 
produced various theoretical responses to the question of technology. On the one 
hand, ‘German neonationalist intellectuals’ aspired to ‘a modern community, one 
whose identity and structure would be forged through the utilization of the most 
advanced technological means in all spheres of life’38 (pp. 79, 80). On the other 
hand, there was a powerful anti-technological movement, which according to 
Zimmerman (1990) was divided in two groups: the ‘reactionary thinkers’ who felt 
‘threatened by the advances of modernity and industrial technology’ and aspired 
‘to defend the traditional ways of life that they believed were essential to the 
German identity’, and ‘völkisch ideologues’ who lamented the endangered 
uniqueness of the German people (pp. 3, 21). The latter group also bemoaned the 
 
                                                 
38
 Ernest Jünger, that is, one of the greatest influences on Heidegger’s thought belonged to this 
group.  
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spiritless mentality of modern economic society. . . [This] called for a 
renewed contact with the natural and cosmic forces which, while 
inaccessible to the rational mind, were capable of rejuvenating and 
transforming the increasingly mechanized German spirit. According to 
völkisch ideologues these cosmic forces were at work in the common 
language, traditions, art, music, social customs, religion, blood, and soil 
which united a particular Volk (p. 8). 
 
Völkisch thinkers also believed that ‘spiritual strength came from the rootedness 
in the natural soil of their homelands . . . and called for reconciliation with nature, 
not for the technological domination of it’. They also ‘maintained that scientific 
rationalism, economic and political individualism, and industrial technology were 
behind such rootlessness.’ (p. 9) The influences of the völkisch discourse can also 
be seen in BT in the discussion of Dasein’s authenticity in connection with the 
notion of being-with (Mitsein), the destiny (Geschick) of the community and one’s 
people (Volk). In fact, in BT  Heidegger (2008a) argues:   
 
But if fateful Dasein, as being-in-the-world, exists essentially in being-
with-Others, its historizing is a co-historizing and is determinative for it 
as destiny [Geschick]. This is how we designate the historizing of the 
community, of a people. Destiny is not something that puts itself 
together out of individual fates, any more than being-with-one-another 
can be conceived as the occurring together of several Subjects. Our fates 
have already been guided in advance, in our Being with one another in 
the same world and in our resoluteness for definite possibilities. Only in 
communication and in struggle does the power of destiny become free. 
Dasein’s fateful destiny in and with its ‘generation’ goes to make up the 
full authentic historizing of Dasein (p. 436/384). 
 
Of course, it has been stressed that the repetition of the has-been can be a 
differential process, and Heidegger is here alluding to that. But he also maintains 
a notion of fateful communal destiny that is heading to the opposite direction and, 
in fact, limiting the freedom for creative reiterations of the past. Another 
contradiction is the combination of the unproblematic belief in the co-existence of 
the inauthentic being-with of das Man (the they-self) with faith in collective 
communal völkisch destiny (Geschick). What kind of process can, in fact, allow 
the appropriation of this destiny if coexistence takes place always already in the 
public, common world of inauthentic technological space? Can Heidegger’s 
phenomenological descriptions account for this possibility without accepting what 
Stiegler’s critique has already pointed out, that the possibility of authentic 
temporality emerges out of inauthentic living? And can this be simply transferred 
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to the collective level of the ‘we’ without limiting the process of individuation 
itself? De Beistegui (1998) argues that 
 
It is at this point of the analysis, toward the middle of the section, that 
the text, head on, blind to the consequences, precipitates itself, all too 
hastily, all too carelessly, in the abyss of steely and völkisch rhetoric. It 
will never quite recover from this journey. Could this have been avoided? 
Every text −every great text, paradoxically− escapes at a decisive 
moment, trembles and opens onto an abyss. A text is never a master in 
its own house. The author is not a shepherd, and yet responsibility 
always befalls him. Such is the fate of the thinker: absolute 
responsibility. (p. 16) 
 
This irreconcilable contradiction between Dasein’s outmost possibility to be itself 
and Dasein’s fate to coincide with its community’s destiny points to a greater 
problem in BT, which, I believe, has to do with Dasein’s individuation through 
technology. As I have argued above, technology retains the tradition of the 
community, and it creates a communal mode of access to this tradition. Still, each 
individual Dasein needs to be free in order to choose its heroes, that is, to select 
and perform its own appropriation of the past. Heidegger, in the above passage, 
restricts the possibilities of repetition, and this, I argue, is due to his 
misinterpretation of technology.  
 
During this middle period, Heidegger’s thinking will also be influenced by 
contradictory influences concerning technology’s role in society. One of these 
influences comes from Ernst Jünger, who was, in turn, influenced by Nietzsche. 
Nietzsche had offered a diagnosis of nihilism and the crisis of the West. He 
distinguished between ‘passive’ and ‘active’ nihilism. For him, passive nihilists 
were the “mediocrities”, and active nihilists were the ‘superior character types 
who realized that the western tradition was discomposing. He believed that this 
situation ‘should not be bemoaned, but welcomed, in anticipation of the new 
opportunities for historical greatness that would reappear once the decrepit, 
traditional institutions and values have decayed to a point they have lost all 
credibility’ (Wolin, 1990, p. 80). Jünger was particularly influenced by 
Nietzsche’s Will to Power, that is, the insatiable desire to assimilate everything 
into the same. He thus understood   
 
modern technology as the latest manifestation of the internal but hidden 
Will to Power. The essence of technology, then, was nothing mechanical 
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or technical; rather, the world was mobilized in technological terms 
because humanity itself had become the primary instrument required to 
carry out the latest historical phase of the Will to Power (Zimmerman, 
1990, p. 46). 
  
Heidegger’s own understanding of technology was also informed by Nietzsche’s 
Will to Power, but the interesting thing about it is that Heidegger traces 
technology’s essence back to metaphor. I propose to investigate this connection, 
however, later in the thesis. For the time being, suffice it to say that despite any 
expectations to the contrary, and probably because of his own war experiences, 
Jünger ‘concluded that the best way for humanity to cope with the onslaught of 
technology was to embrace it wholeheartedly’, and he imagined the active nihilist, 
the Nietzschean Overman, as someone ‘who combined human passion with 
technical precision, hot flesh with cold steel.’ (pp. 49-50) In Total Mobilization he 
describes this ‘new breed’ as the ‘worker-soldier’ (p. 51). Wolin (1990) explains:   
 
The “worker” is the new social type corresponding to an age of “total 
mobilization.” He is the self-sacrificing cog that makes the machinery of 
total mobilization turn. Just as the logic of militarization is extended to 
the whole of society, so, conversely, is the regimentation of the 
workplace extended to all spheres of life: in essence, society itself 
becomes a giant factory whose only “product” is war (p. 80-81). 
 
As Zimmerman (1990) points out, ‘Heidegger’s relationship to Jünger’s writings 
is both complex and ambiguous.’ (p. 66) His own understanding of technology is 
similar to Jünger’s in the respect that he ‘concluded that the essence of technology 
was the disclosure of all entities as standing-reserve for enhancing the sheer Will 
to Will’. At the same time, however, he objected to ‘the impulse to transform the 
German people into an “organic construction” in the service of the Will to Power.’ 
(p. 46) This complicated influence surfaces in Heidegger’s writings, especially 
during this middle period. Thus, in agreement with both Jünger’s and Nietzsche’s 
‘authoritative prophecies concerning the destiny and future of western 
civilization’, and ‘on the basis of the doctrine of “heroic nihilism” propounded by 
both men as a solution to the “crisis of the West”’, Heidegger formed the 
amalgam which is his thought during this period (Wolin, 1990, p. 78). Oswald 
Spengler’s pessimistic evaluation of civilisation in The Decline of the West was 
another such influence. In this text, the philosopher talks about   
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The decline of life in and through spirit [Geist]. What spirit, primarily as 
reason (ratio), has formed and created in technology, economics and 
world-commerce, in the whole formation of Dasein, symbolized by the 
great city −that turns against the soul, against life and smothers it and 
compels culture to decline and collapse (cited in Zimmerman, 1990,  p. 
26). 
 
All these influences, which allowed Heidegger to align himself with National 
Socialism, were wildly incoherent, exhibiting at the same time a confidence in 
technology’s instrumental role for the Nazi agenda and technophobia. It is not 
certain how Heidegger dealt with this inconsistency, but like others he turned to 
Hölderlin’s poetic works in order to retrieve the experience of rootedness in the 
German land that was believed to be lost at the time. The reliance on Hölderlin is, 
in fact, so great that Sheehan (1988) comments that ‘Heidegger’s politics (if they 
can be called that) were inspired, more by Hölderlin than by Hitler, more by his 
idiosyncratic vision of Western history than by Nazi mythologies.’39 (p. 44) Stuart 
Elden (2001), however, argues that Heidegger engaged with Hölderlin and 
Nietzsche in an original way and, that his appropriation of these two thinkers 
differed considerably from the standard Nazi interpretation. This may also have 
been guided by Heidegger’s desire to imagine the national realm differently from 
the prevalent technological and political configurations of the nation-state (de 
Beistegui, 1998). How he did this is discussed next. 
 
2.1. A Phenomenological Interruption 
 
Dwelling and being-in-the-world are temporal notions in Heidegger’s early 
phenomenology of closeness. However, the existential relation between a human 
being and a world that is mediated by technology disappears during this middle 
period and is replaced by the relation between a people (Volk) and its rootedness 
in homeland and spirit (Geist). Spirit was, of course, one of the notions Heidegger 
was determined to avoid in BT as he deemed it part of the same metaphysical 
structure that sustained the dichotomies that distorted western thought. 
Heidegger’s aspiration, however, did not come to fruition, especially when his 
thinking was confronted with Dasein’s spatiality. In his words: 
                                                 
39
 Sheehan points out that even though Heidegger’s thinking presented similarities with different 
groups of his contemporaries, it is, however, differentiated from the common Nazi programmatic. 
He points out, nevertheless, that Heideggerian philosophy and Nazi ideology share an interest in 
Hölderlin’s poetry and Nietzschean philosophy.  
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Neither may Dasein’s spatiality be interpreted as an imperfection which 
adheres to existence by reason of the fatal ‘linkage of the spirit to a 
body.’ On the contrary, because Dasein is ‘spiritual’, and only because 
of this, it can be spatial in a way which remains essentially impossible 
for an extended corporeal Thing. (2008, p. 419/368) 
 
As Derrida (1989) comments, in BT spirit is placed in quotation marks. Derrida 
also indicates that, according to Heidegger’s interpretation, Dasein’s spatiality is 
not derived from its corporeality but from its spirituality: 
 
It is thus because it is “spiritual” (this time in quotation marks, of course) 
that it is spatial and that its spatiality remains original. It is by virtue of 
this “spirituality” that Dasein is a being of space and, Heidegger even 
underlines it, only by virtue of such a “spirituality.” (p. 31) 
 
This, however, has many implications for Heidegger’s theory. Heidegger asserts 
that Dasein is spatial because of its being-in-the-world. If, however, Dasein’s 
spatiality is grounded in spirit, it would seem that being-in-the-world is in danger 
of being equated with spirit. A question emerges, then, concerning the distinction 
between the two. If spirit is nothing more than being-in-the-world, which, in turn, 
is explained on the basis of the ready-to-hand, then what exactly is spirit, and why 
is not connected with Dasein’s embodiment? Is spirituality a disembodied aspect 
of existence, that is, another word for mind or soul, or does it implicitly connote 
embodiment? In any case, spirit enables Heidegger to rid himself of the 
phenomenological challenge posed by the body, which as noted in BT ‘hides its 
own problematic’. In fact, instead of a phenomenological account of the body, 
Heidegger has recourse to the very concept he intended to avoid. 
 
Derrida (1989) explains that the summoning of spirit is in accord with the priority 
Heidegger gives to questioning (Fragen). Questioning is for Heidegger what 
opens up the path for thinking and philosophy. Dasein’s spatiality as such is 
differentiated from the animal’s spatiality because the former is understood 
through Dasein’s potentiality (spirituality) to question its being. In the same vein, 
modern technology, which Heidegger takes to be devoid of spirit, prevents Dasein 
from questioning its existence. For this reason technology de-spiritualises the 
world. In this period, Heidegger chooses to talk about spirit in order to find his 
way back to nearness and home. Spirit, in fact, allows him to discuss the 
uniqueness of the German people and the special relation they have with their 
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homeland (Heimat). However, this will be done in a way quite different from that 
adopted by other thinkers, such as Jünger. De Beistegui (1998) explains this 
difference:  
  
To economy proper −that of labor and of the Worker, that of production 
in the age of technology− Heidegger wished to oppose or liberate 
another economy, which he never acknowledged as such, not even as an 
economy: it is the law of the oikos, of the home and the hearth, the law 
of the proper, of the national and the native. This law is not the effect of 
labor and production, but that of (the) work (of art) and the poet. It arises 
out of the necessity to articulate the Da of Sein, to delimit the space or 
the place of being. In other words, it is an economy of being… (p. 158) 
 
This orientation towards the home situates Heidegger’s political beliefs in the 
realm of aesthetic, rather than biological or racial, nationalism. Such an 
orientation might, however, have led him towards a phenomenology of the home 
that defied the priority of time and was extended to other important aspects of 
human situatedness. Instead, Heidegger’s approach becomes more abstract, 
future-oriented and ‘spiritual’. This futurity corresponds to the towards-death and 
delineates an event that is never to become present. Lyotard (1997) argues:  
 
The Dasein here falls again into the inauthentic. The “projecting” toward 
what will come circumscribes, in recrossing what is delivered to it as 
tradition, a region that it does not open, that will remain closed, fallen, 
abject, outside its project. Fully aware that this does not cover everything, 
I will speak at first about an abjection essential to Heidegger’s “politics,” 
that is, essential according to his thought (p. 64). 
 
A philosophy that accepts the differential nature of the present, which is based on 
the absence of the future and the anticipation of death, but at the same time rejects 
the technological co-constitution of the present and technological access to the 
past, is bound to leave the individual helpless with regard to the decisions it has to 
make. Since, nothing that comes from the future is more important than death, 
which is the sole determination for authentic life, then the individual needs to be 
guided towards the direction they need to follow. It is perhaps in the light, and 
only in the light, of this existential analysis that a people needs to follow a leader 
who can tell them what to do. And perhaps this is why Heidegger thinks that his 
own task is to ‘den Führer zu führen −to lead the leader’ (Elden, 2001, p. 30). 
This very idea –that is, that the philosopher can lead the politician, precisely 
because philosophy is ontologically prior to politics– shows another of 
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Heidegger’s misconceptions that originates from his negative evaluations of the 
quotidian, the homely and the technological. De Beistegui (1998) comments:  
 
To put it in yet another way: if we are even to begin to understand the 
motivations behind Heidegger’s politically most decisive gestures, we 
shall have to constantly bear in mind the way in which Heidegger never 
ceased to subordinate the political to the metaphysical. It is the specific 
way in which the relation of precedence and priority of the philosophical 
over the political was established and reformulated, but never called into 
question, that made Heidegger’s support for Nazism possible and, at 
once and simultaneously, irreducible to it. (p. 10) 
 
In the next section I will explain how the remnants of a phenomenology that is 
defined by the certainty of death and is supplemented ‒in the Derridean sense‒ 
with spirit makes up the strange morpheme that is Heidegger’s thought in this 
middle period. In order for this to come to light I will turn to texts such as 
Heidegger’s Rectoral Address, The Self-Assertion of the German University, 
given in 1933. These texts are not strictly philosophical, but they nevertheless 
deserve our attention since they constitute Heidegger’s personal stand regarding 
his own philosophy. As Lyotard (1997) argues,  
 
It is not a matter of a simple projection of a space of thought onto a 
space of action, nor of an analogy comparing public diatribe with a 
meditation in the “workshop.” Heidegger’s “politics” is in itself the 
resolute decision, as it is elaborated in his thought, by which the Volk 
determines one of the possibilities to which it is pro-jected, “served” by 
the knowledge that is delivered to it by the rereading of its “tradition.” 
The rector is here the guide of that learning, the rereader, insofar as he 
performs the service of this knowledge, in its place (which is the first). 
Service only, and guidance only, for, to the “people,” it is the movement 
itself that is “the power that most deeply moves and most profoundly 
shakes its being (Dasein)” (Heidegger III, 475) (p.71). 
 
2.2. Nearness as Spirit 
 
Using a terminology heavily influenced by Nazi ideology and reactionary rhetoric, 
and with echoes of his previous phenomenological-existential approach, 
Heidegger’s Rectoral Address (1985) passionately urges both students and 
teachers to join him in their common ‘spiritual mission’. He says:  
 
The following of teachers and students awakens and grows strong only 
from a true and joint rootedness in the essence of the German university. 
This essence, however, gains clarity, rank, and power only when first off 
all and at all times the leaders are themselves led −led by the unyielding 
 137 
spiritual mission that forces the fate of the German people to bare the 
stamp of its history. (p. 470)  
 
A number of points need to be raised here: First, the impressive comeback of 
spirit. As Derrida (1989) comments: ‘In the wings, spirit was waiting for its 
moment. And here it makes its appearance. It presents itself. Spirit itself, spirit in 
its spirit and in its letter, Geist affirms itself through the self-affirmation of the 
German university’ (p. 31). Second, it is important to note that Dasein’s potential 
to become authentic is here completely overtaken by the Volk’s need to follow its 
destiny. In this respect, the voice of each Dasein’s conscience is now replaced by 
the leader’s voice, whereas phenomenological awareness (the letting-be 
relationship as the call of conscience) is now replaced by conformism and 
compliance. Derrida comments: 
 
Self-affirmation wants to be (we must emphasize this wanting) the 
affirmation of spirit through Führung. This is a spiritual conducting, of 
course, but the Führer, the guide −here the Rector− says he can only 
lead if he is himself led by the inflexibility of an order, the rigor or even 
the directive rigidity of a mission (Auftrag). This is also, already, 
spiritual. Consequently, conducted from guide to guide, the self-
affirmation of the German university will be possible only through those 
who lead, while themselves being led, directors directed by the 
affirmation of this spiritual mission. (p. 32)  
 
The deferment of personal responsibility, which constitutes Heidegger’s first 
betrayal of existential phenomenology, is evident in the philosopher’s 
recommendation that the students should comply with the new Student Law, 
which ‘sought to organise students according to the Führerprinzip in an effort to 
integrate the universities into the National Socialist state’ (explanation of the 
translator in a footnote, n. 8 in Heidegger, 1985, p. 475). This means the banishing 
of ‘academic freedom’, which according to Heidegger is to be welcomed since the 
institution in question has been understood up till then as  
 
freedom from concern, arbitrariness of intentions and inclinations, lack 
of restraint in what was done and left undone. The concept of the 
freedom of the German student is now brought back to its truth. 
Henceforth the bond and service of the German student will unfold from 
this truth (p. 476). 
  
The second suspension of phenomenology comes with Heidegger’s affirmation of 
the Nietzschean will-to-power, that is, a sheer ‘decisionism’ that, according to 
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Zimmerman (1990), ‘resonated not only with Jünger’s writings, but also with 
those of the leading Nazi jurist, Carl Schmitt, and the ideologue Alfred 
Rosenberg’ who ‘scorned the Weimar weaklings who claimed pitifully “that they 
wanted the best, only circumstances were too difficult to achieve it. But they 
forget or do not want to admit that they did not really will it”.’ (p. 72) Likewise 
Heidegger (1985) argued that 
 
Only a spiritual world gives the people the assurance of greatness. For it 
necessitates that the constant decision between the will to greatness and 
a letting things happen that means decline, will be the law presiding over 
the march that our people has begun into its future history (p. 475).  
 
Even though I need to assume that the ‘letting-things-happen’ that Heidegger 
describes here does not refer to the letting relationship but rather to what he 
thought as the laisser-faire state of affairs in Weimar Germany, I cannot help but 
wonder about the way such possible phenomenological connotations so 
effortlessly escape Heidegger’s discussion. Then again, the struggle for national 
determination is coupled with Heidegger’s own vision regarding the university’s 
reformation. This would have been possible only if science was freed from the 
technologised frame of thinking. In the Rectoral Address, Heidegger argues that 
science should be the most radical form of questioning and urges for a type of 
thinking −presumably an originary thinking− that is to be traced back to the 
inception of ancient Greek thought. This argument will be made stronger in 
Introduction to Metaphysics, where Heidegger sketches this type of thinking 
through a specific conceptualisation of the political realm. Even though this type 
of thinking may potentially have philosophical merit, it needs to be noted here that 
in the Rectoral Address Heidegger conceives it instrumentally, that is, as the tool 
that will bring forth Germany’s greatness. In any case, the phenomenological 
aspiration to receive what is unthought is in this period abandoned. Later, in the 
1945 retrospective essay entitled The Rectorate 1933/34−Facts and Thoughts, 
Heidegger argues that his original speech was in favour of ‘(t)he essence of truth 
as the letting be of what is, as it is (1985, p. 487)’, but the structure and wording 
of the address do not allow for such a reading. On the contrary, the speech distorts 
the letting relationship and nearness as well. This is especially evident when 
Heidegger turns his attention to the teacher’s participation in the spiritual mission. 
He states:  
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If we will this essence of science, the body of teachers of this university 
must really step forward into the most dangerous post, threatened by 
constant uncertainty about the world. If it holds this ground, that is to say, 
if from such streadfastness −in essential nearness to the hard-pressing 
insistence of all things− arises a common questioning and a communally 
tuned saying, then it will gain the strength to lead (p. 475). 
  
Questioning –that is, the basic determination of the human being and the spiritual 
realm– is once again set at the same level as nearness. This nearness, though, 
instead of being a unique and uncertain experience of receptiveness, needs now to 
be transformed into ‘a communally tuned saying’. The leader of the leader cannot 
maintain his thought’s phenomenological open-endedness in such critical times. 
The world cannot be given time and space to speak. The leader of the leader must 
speak in its place. In this light, technology cannot speak either: it cannot 
participate in the synthesis of nearness. On the contrary, it needs to be reduced to 
a dangerous threat and be fought as such. Students themselves are encouraged to 
join the Labor Service, the Military Service and the Knowledge Service, which 
according to Zimmerman (1990) ‘correspond to the divisions of the ideal city in 
Plato’s Republic’ (p. 68). Wolin (1990) in addition, sees a correspondence 
between Heidegger’s vision and Jünger’s directives concerning the creation of the 
soldier-worker. He writes:  
 
The inordinate emphasis in the speech on the virtues of labor and 
military service betrays the pronounced influence of Jünger’s doctrines. 
And thus, taking his cue from Der Arbeiter, Heidegger decides that is 
the society of the future will be composed of worker-soldiers and 
soldiers-workers, then the universities, too, must do their part by 
producing student-worker-soldiers. (pp. 88-89). 
 
In this light, Heidegger seems to adopt both instrumental and substantive 
interpretations of technology: technology is the tool that will arm the students and 
at the same time the threat to thought. As Zimmerman (1990) puts it: 
‘Paradoxically, Heidegger believed, moving beyond nihilism and violence 
brought by modern technology was possible only on the condition that humanity 
first submit to the claim of modern technology.’ (p. 47) It thus becomes 
increasingly clear that Heidegger’s understanding of technology −at least during 
this middle period− is inconsistent. In the next section I elaborate on this. 
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2.3. Rootedness and Technology 
 
As noted, there are considerable doubts about whether the evaluation of 
technology in BT is negative. During the middle period of his thought, however, 
Heidegger is confident about modern technology’s negative and dehumanizing 
effects. In Introduction to Metaphysics (2000) he writes:  
 
This Europe, in its unholy blindness always on the point of cutting its 
own  throat, lies today in the great pincers between Russia on the one 
side and America on the other. Russia and America seen metaphysically, 
are both the same: the same hopeless frenzy of unchained technology 
and of the rootless organisation of the average man. When the farthest 
corner of the globe has been conquered technologically and can be 
exploited economically; when any incident you like, in any place you 
like, at any time you like, becomes accessible as fast as you like; when 
you can simultaneously ‘experience’ an assassination attempt against a 
king in France and a symphony concert in Tokyo; when time is nothing 
but speed, instantaneity, and simultaneity, and time as history has 
vanished from all Dasein of all people; when the tallies of millions at 
mass meetings are a triumph; then, yes then, there still looms like a 
specter all this uproar the question: what for? −where to?− and what 
then ? (p. 40/29) 
 
Heidegger’s analysis suggests that means of transportation and communication 
eliminate distance, destroying at the same time the possibility of nearness.  
Germany’s uniqueness is compromised by this nearness. In fact, during this time 
Heidegger replaces nearness with rootedness, which, for him, expresses more 
accurately ‘the power that mostly preserves the people’s strengths, which are tied 
to earth and blood’ (1985, p. 475). Of course, certain other displacements take 
place as well: first, space, which was marginalised in his early thought, becomes 
now the ideological tool par excellence, and second, the experience of 
unfamiliarity (unhomeliness), which was understood as an essential condition of 
authenticity, is understood as a threat. Dreyfus (1989) comments: 
 
Directly contradicting his early emphasis on man’s essential experience 
of not being at home, later Heidegger strives to give us “a vision of new 
rootedness which someday might even be fit to recapture the old and 
now rapidly disappearing rootedness in a changed form.” (p. 75) 
 
In this light, Heidegger’s re-turning to place becomes, in fact, an attack on 
Dasein’s existential spatiality. In the text titled Why Do I Stay in the Provinces? 
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(1934)
40
 Heidegger (2003) argues that the ‘inner relationship of … [his] own work 
to the Black Forest and its people comes from a centuries-long and irreplaceable 
rootedness in the Alemannian-Swabian soil.’ (Heidegger, 2003, p. 17). This 
relationship is not, however, discussed phenomenologically. On the contrary, 
Heidegger resorts to melodramatic explanations that suggest that his ‘work-world’ 
lies in its belonging to the world of peasant life, the purity of which is in stark 
contrast to the ‘the world of the city [which] runs the risk of falling into a 
destructive error.’ (pp. 16, 18) This danger, of course, originates from technology, 
which deprives the inhabitant of the modern city of the possibility of being near 
the essence of things. He writes: 
 
In large cities one can easily be as lonely as almost nowhere else. But 
one can never be in solitude there. Solitude has the peculiar and original 
power not of isolating us but of projecting our whole existence out into 
the vast nearness of the presence [Wesen] of all things. (p. 17) 
  
For Heidegger the technological space of the modern city cannot offer nearness at 
all since it cannot express the rootedness in the Heimat (homeland). In order to 
defend this point Heidegger attempts to illuminate the spirituality of the German 
land through Hölderlin’s poetry. With the study of Germania and The Rhine 
hymns Heidegger traces the possibility of nearness to the homeland and nature. 
Both these lectures were delivered a few months after Heidegger’s resignation 
from the Rectorship, but Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe (1990) argues that ‘his 
“Hölderlinian” preaching is the continuation and prolongation of the 
philosophico-political discourse of 1933’ (p. 12). In fact, Kathleen Wright (1994) 
identifies Heidegger’s distorted hermeneutics and 
 
four “textual strategies” that Heidegger employs in his first lecture 
course on Hölderlin’s late hymns, which serve, she contends, as a means 
of endowing the hymns with a proto-Nazi gloss. These “strategies” are 
(1) “to fragment the textual unity of ‘Germania’ by reading into it 
fragments drawn from Hölderlin’s letters and poems”; (2) “to alter the 
tone or mood of the poem”; (3) “to disregard the tropology of the poem 
both by denying that Hölderlin maintains a distinction between the 
figurative/fictional and the literal/factual and by reversing the meaning 
of images,” and (4) “to regender Germania by substituting a masculine 
for a feminine voice.” (cited in Nowell Smith, 2013, p. 157)  
                                                 
40
 In this text published in a newspaper Heidegger explains why he rejected two invitations (one in 
1929 and another in 1933) to assume a professorship at the Humboldt University of Berlin.  
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In this light, Heidegger’s return to space is not a return at all. Even when 
Heidegger attempts to get rid of the political propaganda his interpretation 
completely temporalises space. With both the Germania and Rhine hymns, 
Heidegger emphasises the historicality of the homeland, a historicality that offers 
to its people the possibility of seizing their future. In this respect, he argues that 
‘(e)arth and homeland are understood in a historical sense’ (GA39, p. 196 cited in 
Elden, 2001, p. 38).  In An Introduction to Metaphysics this understanding 
prevails since Heidegger attempts to reveal a kind of thinking that appeared in the 
Greek polis and that allowed Greek people to experience the city as the site of 
their historicality. De Beistegui (1998) states that with this turn Heidegger  
 
can be seen to be engaged in a double gesture: on the one hand, he thinks 
the possibility of a use of the national that would be free from 
nationalism as well as from the form of the nation-state; on the other 
hand, he re-evaluates this latter and distinctively modern form of 
political organization, that is the nation-state ‒this very state which in 
effect is the vehicle and the most effective servant of technology‒ by 
way of a reflection on its forgotten essence, namely the polis. . . (p. 114) 
 
3. A Re-turn to the Polis 
 
After having forcefully criticised the failures of the historical organisation of the 
nation-state, Heidegger attempts to rethink the political from its origin, that is, 
from the perspective of the ancient Greek polis (De Beistegui, 1998). As a result, 
Heidegger (2000) proceeds to a problematisation of the term: 
 
One translates polis as state (Staat) and city-state (Stadtstaat); this does 
not capture the entire sense. Rather, polis is the name of the site (Stätte), 
the Here, within which and as which Being-here is historically. The polis 
is the site of history, the Here, in which, out of which and for which 
history happens. To this site of history belong the gods, the temples, the 
priests, the celebrations, the games, the poets, the thinkers. . . (p. 162-
163/117)  
 
In this light, Heidegger underscores that the revealing of Being is located in the 
city, which is, as Geiman (2001) puts it ‘neither the structure of human 
community nor a particular interpretive articulation of beings in a world that 
grounds such community but is the original disclosure of Being itself in its 
difference from beings’ (Geiman, 2001, p. 277). In this way, Heidegger equates 
the political with the historical −and the ontological− and it is precisely this 
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identification that, according to Lacoue-Labarthe (1990), is responsible for 
Heidegger’s ideological adventures. He writes:  
 
It is clear that, for Heidegger, ‘political’, in the sense in which he 
became politically committed, means ‘historical’ and that the act of 
1933, having regard to the University, but also, beyond it, to Germany 
and to Europe, is an act of foundation or re-foundation. And is no less 
clear that in 1933 National Socialism embodied that historical possibility 
or at least it was bearer of it. (p. 17) 
 
In Heidegger’s thought, the polis becomes the historical possibility that is not 
defined by human action but essentially involves it. This fact alone makes the 
polis an absolute necessity for the opening of history and the political realm. The 
ancient Greek polis, which was not poisoned by technology, was precisely the 
formation that could offer the opportunity for the reconstitution of the nation-state. 
According to Heidegger’s (2000) belief, which was in fact a belief shared by 
reactionary thinkers as well, the German language was closer to the ancient Greek 
language, and this was taken to imply that the German tradition (language and 
culture) bore the possibility for regeneration. In order to reach this possibility 
Heidegger returns to hermeneutics and reads Sophocles’ Antigone. This reading, 
however, is intensely coloured by his intention to exclude technology from his 
understanding of the Greek city’s constitution. In what follows, I discuss three 
such examples from his reading of these lines from the chorus: 
 
a) (line 334) reads ‘πολλὰ τὰ δεινὰ κοὐδὲν ἀνθρώπου δεινότερον πέλει’, 
which is usually translated ‘Wonders are many, and none is more 
wonderful than man’41 . The line discusses the extraordinariness of the 
human being which is further expounded with the chorus’ examples of 
human achievements, such as fishing, hunting and agriculture. Heidegger, 
however, objects that ‘(t)hese are notions from cultural anthropology and 
the psychology of primitives’ that point to a consideration of the 
‘inception of history’ as ‘primitive and backward’. For him, the inception 
itself is the most ‘uncanny (unheimlich) and mightiest’, and it needs to be 
thought as ‘mystery’ (pp. 165, 166). Heidegger’s own translation is 
especially indicative of his intentions, since he chooses to translate the 
δεινόν not as wonder but as unheimlich, that is, unhomely. Therefore, for 
Heidegger the essence of the human being lies in the transcendence of 
familiarity and its limit. Heidegger detects the necessity of violence in this 
movement of transcendence and explains that ‘(h)umanity is violence-
doing’ (p. 172).  
 
                                                 
41
  See (Sophocles, 1891)  
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b) line 358 describes the human being as ‘παντοπόρος∙ άπορος’. Heidegger 
takes this as a pair of words that go together even though they are 
separated in the text by a semicolon. He subsequently concentrates on the 
meaning of poros as a kind of passing or route, and he relates it to the 
previous line (line 334) in order to suggest that this phrase comes to define 
the ‘deinotaton. For him this suggests that humanity, that is, the uncanny, 
opens paths into ‘all domains of being’ (p. 162). With this deeply 
metaphysical interpretation, however, Heidegger overlooks both the 
necessary and pragmatic technological constitution of path-making and the 
standard translation of pantoporos, which means resourceful and carries 
connotations having to do with technology. 
 
c) the next pair of words Heidegger discusses is: ‘ὑψίπολις∙ ἄπολις’ (line 370) 
which again is separated by a semi colon suggesting that ipsipolis (high-
citied, the citizen who respects the law and belongs to the city) refers to 
the explanation that precedes the word, and apolis (the one who does not 
respect the laws and brings disgrace) describes what follows. Obviously 
for the chorus it is Creon, the king of the city and keeper of its laws, who 
is the ipsipolis and Antigone, the one who defies the laws in order to bury 
her dead brother’s body against Creon’s wishes, who is the apolis, that is, 
the one who is convicted and is to be buried alive, in a cave that is 
probably outside the polis. The opposition here, then, is between the moral 
law of the state and the law of the gods. The two appear to be 
contradictory. Heidegger, however, sees in this pairing an important 
connection. First, he explains that when polis is translated as city-state, 
this does not fully explain what an ancient Greek polis is, since, ‘(t)he 
polis is the site of history, the Here, in which, out of which and for which 
history happens’ (p. 162). In this respect the poets, the thinkers, the priests 
and the rulers, that is, the ‘violence-doers’, the ‘creators’ by ‘rising high in 
the site of history are also apolis, without city and site, lonesome, un-
canny, with no way out amidst beings as a whole, and at the same time 
without ordinance and limit, without structure and fittingness (Fug), 
because they as creators must first ground all this in each case’. (p. 163) 
 
Of course, the point worth raising here is that it is precisely not the creator of the 
laws and the head of the state –that is, Creon– who becomes apolis. On the 
contrary, the one who becomes apolis is Antigone, whose individuation changes 
her personal history and the history of the city. In fact, it is only with Antigone’s 
suicide that it finally becomes clear who was in the wrong and who was in the 
right. In this respect, it is not the creator but the citizen who obeys the gods’ laws 
and becomes apolis. It could then be argued that the two terms cannot refer to the 
same being: the poet, the creator or the philosopher cannot be both ὑψίπολις and 
ἄπολις because the polis is the site of history and, in consequence, the one who 
falls out of the polis falls out of history as well.   Heidegger’s discussion here is 
contradictory, since the violence-doer needs to fall out of history in order to 
transform the city. Casey (1997) comments:  
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But if that is the case, this person also breaks with place −breaks away 
from place and breaks place itself. This is tantamount to leaving the polis 
and to destroying it as a ‘place of history.’ Heidegger does not hesitate to 
draw this consequence, contrary as it is to his earlier praise of the place 
of the polis as a scene of constructive activity. (p. 263)  
 
It is then evident that Heidegger’s analysis of the polis is highly problematic 
because Heidegger’s limited understanding of the city’s temporality cannot 
account for the individuation and transindividuation that take place in and through 
the city. Casey argues that this dead end has profound effects on Heidegger’s own 
individuation and argues that, ‘(i)nspired by his allegiance to a Nazi ideology of 
violence, Heidegger himself, the creative thinker, has here fallen into . . . 
“confusion”’, adding that ‘(t)he creative action undoes its own basis: the limit. By 
becoming undelimited, it ceases to have a place in which to be creative’. (p. 264) 
In other words, if the polis is the site of history, the creative person needs ‘to fall 
outside the polis and thus outside place and history alike’ in order to transcend the 
limit. (ibid.) Antigone’s own individuation is testimony to the necessity for 
dispersal and differentiation. But this is only possible if the polis, contrary to 
Heidegger’s (1984, cited in Elden, 2000) interpretation, is not conceived as 
‘polos’, that is,  as a ‘pole’, or as the ‘vortex’ that gathers everything to the centre, 
but as what allows dispersal, temporal deferral and spatial differentiation. This 
possibility can be traced back to Dasein’s spatiality. Casey (1997) comments: 
 
If the transcendental condition of dissemination is bodily thrownness, 
the transcendental condition for multiplicity is spatiality. For only in the 
spread-outness of spatiality can Dasein disseminate itself into the 
multiplicity of ‘beings which it is not.’ The manyness and otherness of 
these beings ‒ their being outside Dasein and their being next to each 
other ‒ require a laid out-spatiality that answers to, even as it connects 
deeply with, the bestrewed bodiliness of Dasein. (p. 260) 
 
This kind of multifaceted spatiotemporality is constituted as both retention of the 
past (through the technological realm), throwness in the present and as multiple 
projections into the future. Time cannot be a single destiny. This kind of being-
there, however, cannot, according to Bernard Stiegler (2003), be constituted in a 
site that is not mediated by technology. On the contrary, Dasein’s thrownness in 
an already-there, that is, in an unlived past or inheritance, is constituted precisely 
through technologically inscribed retentions in space. In this respect, Antigone is 
able to appropriate her own choices and to choose her own heroes because of her 
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access to the laws of gods as inscribed in temples, social practices and documents. 
Heidegger ignores this necessary technological condition for the constitution of 
the city and the citizen, and it is probably for this reason that he believes that 
Socrates was the purest thinker of the West (the one who did not write)
42
, that the 
ancient Greek polis was the pinnacle of the political realm and, that the German 
spirit should stay faithful to an idealised non-technologically mediated ancient 
Greek culture that never, in fact, existed. Stiegler (2003), in contrast, points to 
technology’s constitutive role for the Greek polis and philosophy. He writes:  
 
It is . . . mnemotechnics that makes possible the writing of laws, the 
founding of cities, the construction of geometric reasoning . . . the 
practice of philosophy. It involves a massive transformation of the social 
group that raises a thousand questions. It overturns, for example, the 
relation to tradition, to spirits, and, more precisely, the articulation 
between the city and religion, the relation between the profane and the 
sacred, the place of the clans inside the city-states or territories [demes], 
and so on. It raises, in short, questions that are not entirely foreign to 
what we are experiencing today, on a global scale, with respect to 
contemporary forms of technology (however novel our current situation 
might otherwise be). (p. 154) 
 
He also comments that technics  
 
appears well before Plato, and appears first of all as the question of 
transformation and becoming [devenir] (raised by the economic crisis 
associated with the development of navigation, money, and thousands of 
other new technics that appear at that time) in the Greek cities. . . And it 
is not simply a question of technics, but also and above all of 
mnemotechnics, that is to say of technics of the future, in its capacity 
profoundly to transform the conditions of being together, the terms of 
the law, the rules of life, etc. (p. 155) 
 
The neglect of technology’s constitutive role for the creation of the polis and the 
constitution of spatiality and nearness results in the construction of new 
oppositions between non-technologically mediated nearness and technologically 
mediated rootlessness. It is for this reason that Heidegger (2000) argues, in his 
reading of Antigone, that the creative violence of the human being should not be 
expressed in terms of technology but in terms of techné, which ‘means neither art 
nor skill’ but refers to a way of ‘knowing’43.  He also moves deeper in this 
                                                 
42
 He mentions that in his essay What is Called Thinking? (1968). 
43
 For this reason, he translates the elements of this type of thinking in terms of knowing and not 
technology. For example, he translates (πόρος) as path and not resource and (μηχαναῖς) as arts and 
not machines. (p. 365) 
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direction and incorporates art (τέχνη) and nature (φύσις) in this way of knowing. 
For Heidegger (2000) nature can be conceptualised as a way of Being that is quite 
different from production. He states: 
 
Phusis means the emerging sway, and the enduring over which it 
thoroughly holds sway. This emerging, abiding sway includes both 
‘becoming’ as well as ‘Being’ in the narrower sense of fixed continuity. 
Phusis is the event of standing forth, arising from the concealed and thus 
enabling the concealed to take its stand for the first time (pp. 15-16/11-
12). 
 
He then refers this type of thinking to the work of art and separates techné from 
technology, consolidating his belief that there can be a polis and a political system 
that is not mediated by technology but is rooted instead in the promise of the 
German land and in the inheritance of its people. In this respect, Heidegger 
blindly ignores the premise that allowed him to address the question of technology, 
that is, that space and time are technologically inscribed and that the process of 
individuation cannot be simply a creative process that grasps possibilities from the 
future. The future itself is already conditioned by the already-there of our 
technologically retained and accessed inheritance; it is a process of differance that 
needs both space and time. As Stiegler (2003) comments, ‘this terrifying political 
outcome is made possible precisely because Heidegger does not raise the question 
here of the actual conditions of this inheritance, inasmuch as they are already 
inscribed in its original technicity’. (p. 158) 
 
This is, however, the question of origin. Heidegger (2000) alludes to this point 
when he wonders about the origin of language, namely, about how human beings 
could have invented language and building when it is specifically these things that 
make them human. This flickering thought, however, is not followed to its 
conclusion. Stiegler (1998), by contrast, questions the notion of origin and resorts 
to a Derridean understanding of technology. The human being, he argues, has no 
origin but exists through the supplement, the prosthesis of technology and 
language. The anthropological evidence, which Heidegger so readily dismisses, 
attests to such an interconnection between, on the one hand, the skeletal and brain 
development of the human being and, on the other, the use of tools and language. 
In this light, technology and language construct, invent and transform the human –
that is, they allow a process of exteriorisation that transforms an interior that does 
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not exist before its exteriorisation. It is in this way that the technological opens up 
time as the space of differentiation. Time then –that is, what Heidegger attempts 
to think apart from the mediation of technology– is technics. Stiegler writes:  
 
It is a temporality within which a living being, in particular the one that 
we call man, is constituted in relation to the temporality of a technics 
which is itself a technical development or becoming, which is the main 
dimension of becoming for human beings. (p. 156) 
 
Heidegger understands the role of technics in the givenness of inauthentic time 
but his aim is to imagine a kind of temporality that is not defined by technology. 
This, however, results in vague descriptions of a type of thinking or being he calls 
distancelessness. It is not clear, though, how technology conditions this type of 
thinking. A way out of this conundrum has already been suggested. When 
thinking and nearness are thought through metaphor, we find that technology, 
language, time, space and embodiment come into the discussion, and this creates 
possibilities for understanding new technologies. 
 
4. Conclusion  
 
The phenomenological study of closeness is suspended in middle Heidegger in 
favour of an ambiguous notion of nearness that is configured in terms of spirit and 
the rootedness of the German people in their homeland. In this respect, the 
experience of being-at-home, which in early Heidegger is coupled with das Man, 
is now considered essential for solitude and nearness. In the ‘pure’ nature of the 
German homeland Heidegger appears to have found ‒even though, he never says 
so explicitly‒ an ‘origin’ that is not mediated by technology. A similar discovery 
is made with the creative type of thinking that is located in the originary political 
experience of the Greek polis. All three discoveries come, however, with their 
shortcomings. First, the notion of the home, even though heavily relied upon, is 
understood one-dimensionally. De Beistegui (1998) in fact, wonders if this 
connection has harmed Heidegger’s thought. He asks: 
 
Are the topoi bound to be thought as oikoi? Not necessarily. I would 
want to suggest that if the spatiality of Dasein as being-in-the-world 
does indeed presuppose a certain mode of dwelling, it does not 
necessarily imply that mode of dwelling that became central to 
Heidegger’s thought in the 1930s, and to which the political engagement 
of 1933–4, as well as the subsequent confrontation with this engagement, 
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remained indebted: the national and the native, the Heimatliche and the 
Heimische. (p. 159) 
 
Leslie Paul Thiele (1995), however, turns this critique on its head since for him 
what is dubious is Heidegger’s reliance on the homeland instead of the household 
(oikos). The unexplored familiarity of the house and its important role in opening 
up the very possibility of everydayness is the great absence in Heidegger’s 
existential analytic. Some of his most important phenomenological notions, such 
as being-at-home, homeliness or the unhomely, rely on an understanding of the 
home that remains unquestioned as it is. In turn, this understanding is formed 
through metaphor and this is another thing that needs further discussion. Such an 
investigation might have incorporated the deconstruction of the familiar and 
inauthentic that is experienced in the house but that subsequently opens up the 
possibility for authentic life. It might also have revealed the radical dispersal of 
Dasein in its bodiliness, which allows the coupling with the ready-to-hand but 
also opens up the possibility of leaving or receiving the one who does not belong 
to the house. Emmanuel Levinas (1990) comments: 
 
One’s implementation in a landscape, one’s attachment to Place, without 
which the universe would become insignificant and would scarcely exist, 
is the very splitting of humanity into natives and strangers. And in this 
light technology is less dangerous than the spirits [genies] of the Place. 
(p. 232) 
 
The homeland, as theorised in Heidegger, tends to exclude in this way. Space in 
early Heidegger is exemplified through the workshop, but this is a space that 
emphasises projection into the future. The workshop, however, is never depicted 
as a gathering: it is rather a node in a network where things and Daseins are 
continuously on the way. In this respect the finished product, a wooden table for 
example, will leave the workshop in order to fulfil its purpose in a house. This 
temporal interpretation of closeness is what interests early Heidegger and not the 
everydayness of the house. What, happens, however, when the house actually 
gathers its inhabitants? What kind of spatial experiences do people have when 
they are gathered in the house, resting, bathing, daydreaming, eating, sleeping or 
tending one another? All these activities and, of course, the spatial, embodied 
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characteristics that go with them are not discussed in Heidegger
44
. For this reason, 
when the question of nearness is raised, the homeland is either inadequate or 
misleading. The home would have offered immense possibilities for 
phenomenological explorations of intimateness and embodiment. The lack of this 
discussion is evident in Heidegger’s discussion concerning Auschwitz: 
 
Agriculture is now a motorized food industry, the same thing in its 
essence as the production of corpses in the gas chambers and the 
extermination camps, the same thing as blockades and the reduction of 
countries to famine, the same thing as the manufacture of hydrogen 
bombs. (Heidegger, 1949 Technik und Gelassenheit, cited in Lacoue-
Labarthe, 1990, p. 34) 
 
Lacoue-Labarthe asserts this direction in Heidegger’s work is ultimately a refusal 
of phenomenology and thought. He asserts that Heidegger ‘refused to admit that it 
was ultimately the duty of thought to confront that particular phenomenon and to 
seek to take responsibility for it.’ (p. 33) In fact he says,   
 
the extermination of the Jews (and its programming in the framework of 
a ‘final solution’) is a phenomenon which follows essentially no logic 
(political, economic, social, military etc.) other than a spiritual one, 
degraded as it may be, and therefore a historical one. In the Auschwitz 
apocalypse, it was nothing less than the West, in its essence, that 
revealed itself. And it is thinking that event that Heidegger failed to do. 
(p. 35) 
 
In this respect, Heidegger’s political mistakes cannot be separated from the 
mistakes of his thought, that is, from the fact that it is a kind of incomplete 
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 Albert Borgmann (1984) offers such a discussion of the house, and especially the stove, in his 
effort to make the distinction between a thing and a device clear. This discussion, is very much in 
debt to Heidegger’s later accounts of things as either gatherings of the fourfold or meaningless, 
always at our disposal, resources (Bestand). In any case, Borgmann’s account points to a possible 
direction of this discussion. He writes: 
 
A thing, in the sense in which I want to use the word here, is inseparable from its context, 
namely, its world, and from our commerce with the thing and its world, namely, 
engagement. The experience of the thing is always and also a bodily and social 
engagement with the thing’s world. In calling forth a manifold engagement, a thing 
necessarily provides more than one commodity. Thus a stove used to furnish more than 
mere warmth. It was a focus, a hearth, a place that gathered the work and leisure of a 
family and gave the house a center. Its coldness marked the morning, and the spreading of 
its warmth the beginning of the day. It assigned to the different family members tasks that 
defined their place in the household. …It provided for the entire family a regular and 
bodily engagement with the rhythm of the seasons that was woven together of the threat 
of cold and the solace of warmth, the smell of the wood smoke, the exertion of sawing 
and of carrying, the teaching of skills, and the fidelity to daily tasks. These features of 
physical engagement and of family relations are only first indications of the full 
dimensions of a thing’s world. (pp. 41- 42)   
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phenomenology, which is focused on futural projection. With the ending of this 
period, however, Heidegger begins to think nearness beyond the focus on the 
future. In the later writings nearness is envisioned as a gathering of multiplicity. 
In The Origin of The Work of Art (originally published 1936) Heidegger (1971c) 
sees history taking place through the strife between earth and world. In fact, he 
writes,  
 
The world is the self-opening openness of the broad paths of the simple 
and essential decisions in the destiny of an historical people. The earth is 
the spontaneous forthcoming of that which is continually self-secluding 
and to that extent sheltering and concealing. World and earth are 
essentially different from one another and yet are never separated. The 
world grounds itself on the earth, and earth juts through world. Yet the 
relation between world and earth does not wither away into the empty 
unity of opposites unconcerned with one another. The world, in resting 
upon the earth, strives to surmount it. As self-opening it cannot endure 
anything closed. The earth, however, as sheltering and concealing, tends 
always to draw the world into self and keep it there. (p. 47) 
 
It would seem that the world stands here for the temporal decision that a people 
sees being revealed as its historical destiny. Yet there is another way of looking at 
this. Contrary to what is said in the Introduction to Metaphysics, one historical 
possibility cannot direct the destiny of a people tout court because existence is 
essentially disseminated in the world. If earth is the concealed already-there, then 
world is constructed through technology and language, through embodiment in 
space. Of course this very conceptualisation of earth depends upon our existence, 
our being-in-the-world. The coupling of bodiliness and technology transfers the 
human being into this realm, into this being-in-the-world, in which the relation 
between earth and world is sustained. His articulation of this in terms of the four-
fold, with earth constituting one element among the four, is a further iteration. 
  
Heidegger asserts that the interaction between earth and world is a process that 
respects the particularity of things. He notes that these two processes might appear 
contradictory, since the one presents a ‘willing’ and the other a ‘nonwilling’ (p. 
82). However, he expounds:  
 
‘Fixed’ means outlined, admitted into the boundary (peras), brought into 
the outline. . . The boundary in the Greek sense does not back off; rather, 
being itself brought forth, it first brings its radiance what is present. 
Boundary sets free into the unconcealed; by its contour in the Greek 
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light the mountain stands in its towering and repose. The boundary that 
fixes and consolidates is in this repose ‒repose in the fullness of motion‒ 
all this holds of the work in the Greek sense of ergon; this work’s 
‘being’ is energeia, which gathers infinitely more movement within 
itself than do modern ‘energies.’ Thus the ‘fixing in place’ of truth, 
rightly understood, can never run counter to the ‘letting happen’. (p. 83) 
 
This position, which is a negotiation between voluntarism and a type of thinking 
that is non-subjective, will later lead to Gelassenheit, that is, the definition of the 
letting relationship. This relationship was from the beginning described as a 
certain kind of perception that is both receptive and active and that includes 
imagination. At this point, however, Heidegger attempts to separate this kind of 
thinking from imagination. In fact, in the same text he adds that  
 
If we fix our vision on the essence of the work and its relation to the 
happening of the truth of beings, it becomes questionable whether the 
essence of poetry [Dichtung], and this means at the same time the 
essence of projection, can be sufficiently thought from imagination. (GA 
5: 60 cited in Sallis, 1990) 
 
Sallis (1990), however, comments as follows: 
 
Certainly, granted the analysis of art that ‘The Origin of the Work of 
Art’ has developed, one would not be inclined to think poetry as a matter 
of imagination in the sense of mere phantasy, of mere imagining as an 
entertaining of images. And yet it is Heidegger, perhaps, most of all who 
has provided the means for surpassing such impoverished concepts of 
imagination, especially through his interpretation of the Kantian 
transcendental imagination, which radicalizes imagination to the point 
where it merges with Dasein itself. If one notes, too, that the entire 
discussion of poetry and of projection in ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ 
serves essentially to elaborate the opening of the Da, the opening of the 
space of truth, then it is doubly surprising that Heidegger, in effect, sets 
imagination aside. Even more so, if one considers the possibility that 
imagination, sufficiently deconstructed, would seem eminently fit to 
name that peculiar active reception that Heidegger has shown to 
characterize artistic creation. (pp. 185-186).  
 
In the next chapter I deal with Heidegger’s attempt to describe a new way of 
thinking that embodies the letting-relationship and that, despite his own 
intentions, involves imagination very much in the way that this was inscribed in 
his earlier thought. I will also look into Heidegger’s use of metaphor in order to 
show that his own thinking implicates imagination, image and technology in the 
experience of nearness and the letting-relationship. 
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Chapter 5  
        Nearness in Later Heidegger 
 
This chapter discusses the following: 
 
37. In later writings Heidegger turns to the essence of interpretation and the 
hermeneutical relation that constitutes Dasein.   
 
38. This hermeneutical relation is not an interpretation of something merely exterior; 
it is not the accommodation of this perception of something external into an 
interior frame of meaning. It is a modification of its own origin, an origin that 
effaces itself so that the world can be received. This is a condition of what 
Heidegger will call ‘the worlding of the world’. This take on hermeneia is in 
accord with Heidegger’s earlier understanding of imaginative thinking as the 
synthesis of time. In the later writings, however, Heidegger considers language 
as the very thing that allows this process. Furthermore, he juxtaposes language’s 
apophantic nature to technology’s concealing nature. 
 
39. Heidegger sees language and the human as constituting each other. This type of 
thinking, however, cannot but rely on the following presupposition: if language 
and human being are processes that constitute each other, this means that there 
must be an early stage at which there is neither language nor a human being as 
we know it, and this opens up the possibility of considering other processes that 
allow for language and humanisation.  
 
40. However, we need to bear in mind another aspect of language. Heidegger says 
that man speaks language but most importantly language speaks through man. 
There is always a surplus of meaning when we utter words. Language affects us 
beyond our intention, and this suggests that there is a stage of passive synthesis 
that allows for meaning that is not always controlled by us. Metaphor is 
indicative of this process because it brings things together that we have not 
hitherto perceived to be close. Sometimes, even after the metaphor is uttered we 
do not know what has allowed this proximity of disparate notions and this 
analogy of relations. 
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41. In this chapter I understand metaphor as indicative of language’s surplus of 
meaning. Metaphor emphasises a movement of nearing. It is also a synthesis that 
allows for modification and imaginative transformation of the nodes it connects 
(whether words or things). Metaphor is another type of production of meaning; 
one that resists representation’s stagnating effects.  
 
42. Metaphor understood as nearness challenges the priority of the name and 
emphasises interaction. What allows this interaction, however, which is basically 
the detection of analogies? What is the possibility of this analogy? Can this be the 
copula provided by the verb "is"? Can this be the categorial intuition; the 
possibility of all possibility; the possibility for something to be uttered; the 
possibility for something to exist since it, in similarity to other beings, too exists; 
it too is? In this light, it can be argued that ‘metaphoricity is constitutive of the 
unity of being’.   
 
43. This metaphoricity can be understood as a mode of schematism (imagination) 
that connects different realms. In Kant this connection concerns the universal and 
the particular realm, in Ricœur language and experience, and in Heidegger and 
Derrida the inherent multiplicity of words and their meanings.  
 
44. In this chapter I diverge from all of them. I believe that metaphor brings together 
the existential as-structure and the apophantic as-structure.  In both of these 
realms there exist two different kinds of metaphor that interact with each other. 
The first, existential metaphor, allows the transfer of the self onto things, while 
the second, linguistic metaphor, allows the negotiation of meaning. Both of them 
exist in both levels and interact with each other. 
 
45. Existential metaphor is pre-linguistic and passive. It underscores the interaction 
between the human being and its space. This interaction is modificatory for both 
of them and embodied since it allows the transfer of the self onto things, 
memories and images. It is precisely because the self is transferred in space in 
this way that the technologies that construct this space are important.  
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46. Heidegger approaches such an understanding when he discusses the typewriter 
or the cabinet maker’s learning process, but he maintains a distinction of 
propriety between types of technologies.  He nevertheless sees how different 
technologies produce different types of the human being and claims that 
ultimately it is language that will reveal how we will escape from Enframing.   
 
47. Linguistic metaphor, like the metaphor Heidegger uses -namely, language 
understood as the house of Being- allows us to think about Being in an original 
and imaginative way. This can be Heidegger’s originary image. But is it merely 
linguistic? 
 
48. Metaphor is needed because there are cases where the word is not available. In 
this lack the copula of the verb "is" presents itself. This specific copula is the 
possibility for anything to exist and be uttered as other things exist and are 
uttered, that is, in analogy to them. In this respect, there is in language a surplus 
and a lack of meaning conditioned by analogy and metaphor. The drawing of 
analogies can take place between the non-theoretical, existential as-structure and 
the theoretical, apophantic as-structure. Both of them are, however, conditioned 
by technology and language in ways that go beyond explicit understanding. In 
this respect, language is metaphorical. Being is metaphorical in that it is 
manifested through a movement of signs that always lead beyond themselves, in 
a process of differentiation.  
 
49. In the later essays technology and language will be implicated in dwelling, but at 
this stage there is a new distinction between nearness as experienced with 
common things, like the wine jug, and distancelessness as experienced through 
the media.  
 
50. Heidegger discussed media such as the radio in BT. But there the analysis of the 
effect of the radio in terms of extending Dasein’s reach was suspended. The radio, 
nevertheless, can be seen to share a common characteristic with other tools in its 
affordance of sociability. With modern media sociability is not a by-product but 
the intended outcome. Nearness almost becomes a metaphysical desire. With the 
use of common things, like the jug, there is kind of gathering, a focus on a single 
time-space that later Heidegger calls the fourfold. This involves a respectful kind 
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of thinking that accepts things as they are. It is a type of hermeneia, a movement of 
different elements into proximity, and an operation of metaphor that allows 
synthesis. Can this type of being and thinking exist with modern technology? 
This will be discussed in connection to actual modern digital technologies in the 
next chapter.  
1. Introduction  
In his later writings, Heidegger understands nearness in connection to thinking. 
Thinking, however, is considered to be threatened by modern technology. This 
means that thinking, especially the receptive, non-subjectivist, poetic kind, is 
juxtaposed to modern technology. This clearly suggests that thinking is amenable 
to technology’s influence, and this proves that there is a kind of communication 
between the two. The nature of this relation is of the utmost importance for this 
thesis. By illuminating this point, I shall be able to discuss how modern 
technology’s characteristics, namely digitisation, influences thinking. Having 
discussed the way that time, the letting relationship and imagination are 
synthesised through technology, and even if this process is understood as 
inauthentic, we find ourselves already on the path of having a free relationship to 
technology. In other words, since technology participates in the synthesis of time, 
then the type of technology that participates each time is bound to bring forth a 
different type of time. To what degree this is the case, and whether or not this has 
a qualitative effect, remains to be deciphered. 
 
Of course, it is not an easy task to address Heidegger’s later thought in terms of 
earlier notions such as imagination. In fact, Heideggerian scholars like Dreyfus 
seem to draw a distinction between Heidegger’s earlier first-person 
phenomenological approach, which is understood as related to the topic of 
imagination, and his later poetic mystical path, which is taken to move away from 
‘subjectivist’ and metaphysical notions such as imagination. In this respect, any 
attempt to track imagination and its relation to technology in the later texts would 
appear futile, since during this period, according to Dreyfus (1989), Heidegger’s 
methodology departs from the phenomenological hermeneutics of hiddenness and 
enters into a different process: this ‘consists in taking some particular scientific 
achievement, political issue, or ritual as a case of “truth setting itself to work” and 
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putting into words what this paradigm means for the practices it brings into focus’ 
(p. 82). Richard Palmer (1984), however, argues that there is a continuity between 
these two types of investigation: ‘Dreyfus [is] pushing Heidegger’, he writes, ‘into 
denying things he did not explicitly deny but kept a resolute silence about’ (p. 85).   
 
In A Dialogue on Language Heidegger (1971b) gives his own justification for 
dropping the terms ‘phenomenology’ and ‘hermeneutics’. He says: ‘That was 
done, not ‒as is often thought‒ in order to deny the significance of 
phenomenology, but in order to abandon my own path of thinking to 
namelessness.’ (p. 29). He then explains that hermeneutics ‘derives from the 
Greek hermeineuein’ and that this refers to the god Hermes ‘the divine 
messenger’, that is, the one who ‘brings the message of destiny; hermeneuein is 
that exposition which brings tidings because it can listen to a message’ (ibid.). He 
adds that it was that ‘original sense’ that prompted him ‘to use it in defining the 
phenomenological thinking that opened the way to Being and Time’; it is the very 
thing that allows him to think the ontological difference, which is now defined as 
the ‘hermeneutic relation’ (ibid., p. 30). In this respect, human existence is 
hermeneutical par excellence. This accordingly suggests a radicalisation of 
Heidegger’s earlier phenomenological insight, namely, that Dasein is through 
interpretation. For this reason Palmer (1984) argues that during the later period 
Heidegger   
 
simply pursues the hermeneutical without naming it, becomes the text-
interpretive philosopher par excellence, meditates on the “eventing” of 
language (the central problem in hermeneutics), and the hermeneutical 
placement of man in the world (without calling it hermeneutics). The 
fact that he did not, after Being and Time, turn away from his guiding 
question of the meaning of being and how being discloses itself to man 
(even though he abandoned a transcendentally oriented way of 
interrogating being) suggests that Heidegger is becoming more not less 
hermeneutical, since hermeneutics is centered on the process of being 
grasped by meaning in an event of disclosure. He abandons 
transcendental modes of thought but he does not abandon the essence of 
the hermeneutical. (p. 90) 
 
The fact that Heidegger’s later hermeneutics is more about the ‘hermeneutic 
relation’ than about the hermeneutical being suggests, according to Palmer, that 
Heidegger invites us ‘to try to think the essence of interpretation from out of the 
phenomenon of the hermeneutical’. In this respect, Heidegger never ‘gets 
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definitively “beyond” meditating on the interpretation process that constitutes the 
existence of man.’ (p. 91) Interpretation, which coincides with Being and 
constitutes what brings us into the nearness of things, corresponds, however, to 
the very same process of perception that early Heidegger attempted to sketch 
drawing from the Kantian and Aristotelian interpretation of imagination. In this 
light, I do not so much support the idea that Heidegger remains a 
phenomenologist to the end ‒if, that is, he ever was one‒ but rather believe that 
Heidegger’s later investigations should not be opposed to his earlier ones: his 
thinking should instead be considered as the philosopher’s journey to thought 
through phenomenology, that is, through language or λόγος, that is, through the 
voice of imagination (logos is after all φωνή μετά φαντασίας), as pointed out by 
the philosopher himself. In this respect, what changes here is not the topic of 
investigation but the journey, which now, more than ever, is an investigation of 
nearness in language through language. Ziarek (1994) comments:  
 
This peculiar hermeneutics does not therefore present an interpretive 
task; it does not ‘read’ the meaning or truth of Being but instead draws 
attention to the proximity, the nearness, inscribed in what Heidegger 
calls Entsprechung ‒a fold into the way language occurs and ‘speaks’. . . 
(p. 9) 
 
In this light, I maintain that one of Heidegger’s recurring themes is imagination. It 
may be abandoned as word but not as topic. Imagination, as discussed in previous 
chapters, is inherent in interpretation and, in similar fashion to his earlier analysis, 
is understood in terms of the letting-relationship and nearness. This does not mean, 
however, that the focus of this investigation remains the same: the deflection from 
the subject is also a deflection from time. His approach is now more spatio-
temporal, while language is asserted as the basic element that lets-things-be and 
affords nearness. In this respect, there is a tension concerning technology’s role 
for the synthesis of time since, on the one hand, technology participates in the 
production of the social space in which time unfolds and, on the other hand, 
Heidegger maintains that language can single-handedly allow the proper revealing 
of the world. This, in consequence, suggests that the earlier Heideggerian 
dichotomy between authentic and inauthentic time is sustained through the new 
dichotomy between language and technology.  
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This prioritisation is challenged, when in later texts a new type of thinking (letting 
things be -Gelassenheit) or learning is discussed. This learning is possible for 
Dasein through its dispersion and embodied, spatio-temporal situatedness that is 
coupled with technology. Through this learning it is finally discussed how the 
ready-to-hand becomes ready-to-hand as prosthetic, mnemotechnic and exterior. 
This learning process takes place metaphorically and hermeneutically. For this 
reason, I turn now to later Heidegger’s understanding of metaphor. 
 
2. Returning to the House of Being 
 
One of later Heidegger’s most important metaphors is the one that implicates 
thinking, language, house and Being. In the Letter on Humanism Heidegger 
(2008b) writes:  
 
Thinking accomplishes the relation of Being to the essence of man. It 
does not make or cause the relation. Thinking brings this relation to 
Being solely as something handed over to it from Being. Such offering 
consists in the fact that in thinking Being comes to language. Language 
is the house of Being. In its home man dwells. Those who think and 
those who create with words are the guardians of this home. Their 
guardianship accomplishes the manifestation of Being insofar as they 
bring the manifestation to language and maintain it in language through 
their speech. (p. 147, emphasis added). 
 
From the Letter on Humanism and onwards Heidegger begins to describe thinking 
as a receptive process that is in accord with his previous non-dualistic descriptions 
of perception. According to Heidegger, there is no access to an exterior sensuous 
realm that is connected with an interior intelligible and linguistic realm. Rather, 
beings become beings through language. With language Dasein does not represent 
what has in some way been preconceived, but rather Dasein synthesises what is to 
be thought. Existence through interpretation is what Heidegger describes as the 
‘house of Being’. This phrase invites multiple interpretations, whilst its inherent 
metaphoricity is central for the understanding of Heidegger’s thought. With this 
metaphor we find a description of the hermeneutical relation, that is, a description 
of the very being that exists in hermeneia. Living in language, or living as the 
interpretive being, means that Dasein is constructed through thinking, which is 
always already a modification of an ‘origin’ that presences itself only to be 
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effaced. This, I believe, is a process of ‘exteriorisation’45 that brings into the open 
an interiority that does not exist prior to the process that exteriorises it. This is 
because it is a process of differance, that is, a process that differentiates and defers 
the word, effacing within every new context the possibility of an original meaning. 
In Contributions to Philosophy (1936-38) Heidegger (1999) meditates on this 
possibility that lies in the heart of the hermeneutical relation:  
 
Language and man. Is language given along with man or man along with 
language? Or does the one become and be, through the other, not at all 
two different things? And why? Because both belong equally and 
originally to be-ing. Why [is] man ‘essential’ for determining what is 
ownmost to language ‒ man as? [As] guardian of truth of be-ing. (p. 
276/350)  
 
For Heidegger language is not expressing an interiority or a human ‘nature’, but 
he does appear to consider the processes of ‘hominization’46  and language as 
intertwined. These are understood as processes that constitute each other, and this, 
in consequence, suggests that there must be stages of this co-constitution that are 
pre-linguistic. If this is the case, then the discussion must go deeper. A way into 
this is to follow Heidegger’s indication that the essence of language is not 
expression or communication, but rather Saying. In The Way to Language (1982) 
he explains:  
 
Language speaks in that it, as showing, reaching into all regions of 
presences, summons from them whatever is present to appear and to fade. 
We, accordingly, listen to language in this way, that we let it say its 
Saying to us. No matter in what way we may listen besides, whenever 
we are listening to something we are letting something be said to us, and 
all perception and conception is already contained in that act (p. 124).  
 
Heidegger remains loyal to his earlier notion of thinking and the letting 
relationship, and he understands language and thinking in terms of the 
modification effected by the synthesis of imagination. Is the movement he is 
describing −that is, the ‘reaching into all regions of presences’ and the 
summoning of presence− the synthesis in question? But, if it is, how is it possible 
for something that is absent to be called? How is something that does not have a 
name allowed to emerge? Is this possibility metaphor itself? And if it is, what are 
                                                 
45
 I have already used this notion, but in this chapter I will present it in its most immediate context. 
This is a notion employed extensively by Bernard Stiegler, but is itself borrowed from the 
palaeontologist Leroi-Gourhan. 
46
 Again the term belongs to Stiegler’s discussion by way of Leroi-Gourhan. 
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the regions that are summoned into presence? In order to answer these questions 
we need to return to metaphor. We need to return to the house of Being. 
Heidegger (2008b) writes: 
 
Thinking builds upon the house of Being, the house in which the jointure 
of Being fatefully enjoins the essence of man to dwell in the truth of 
Being. This dwelling is the essence of ‘being-in-the-world.’ The 
reference in Being and Time (p. 54) to “being-in” as “dwelling” is no 
etymological game. The same reference in the 1936 essay on Hölderlin’s 
verse, ‘Full of merit, yet poetically, man dwells on this earth,’ is no 
adornment of a thinking that rescues itself from science by means of 
poetry. The talk of the house of Being is no transfer of the image ‘house’ 
to Being. But one day we will, by thinking the essence of Being in a way 
appropriate to its matter, more readily be able to think what ‘house’ and 
to ‘dwell’ are. (p. 177) 
 
With a twofold move Heidegger both denies and affirms the necessity of 
metaphor, which he cannot conceptualise otherwise than metaphorically. Is this a 
definite characteristic of his philosophy, of philosophy in general, of language or 
of existence? Are these the regions into which language reaches to summon 
beings? And what does it mean that the summoning itself is metaphorical? 
Heidegger insists that the kind of metaphor he is talking about is not a mere 
transfer of an image. Of course, Heidegger is here referring to the way metaphor 
is usually and metaphysically understood and therefore feels the need to explain 
that his own metaphor does not accommodate the transfer of an image-
representation from the known thing to the unknown. So, what is his own 
metaphor about? What of the house of Being? Is this the originary image 
Heidegger is looking for and what does it consist in? When Heidegger sees 
language as the house of being, he also affirms that the familiar image of the 
house is of no use here; the transfer does not transcend a familiar literal, 
representational ground in order to reach an unfamiliar one, but there is certainly 
hope for some kind of revelatory transcendence from a fallible ground to a less 
fallible one. This suggests that the expression ‘Language is the house of being’ 
has the effect of rendering all of its terms strange or unfamiliar, which in the 
process undermines any simple literal/metaphorical distinction. This is not to deny, 
however, that a certain kind of connection has already been established between 
them. Derrida (2007) comments:  
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One might be tempted to formalize this rhetorical inversion where, in the 
trope ‘house of Being,’ Being tells us more or promises us more about 
the house than the house does about Being. But this would be to miss 
what the Heideggerian text means to say in this place, to miss what is, if 
you will, most proper to it. Through the inversion we’re considering, 
Being has not become the proper essence of this supposedly known, 
familiar, nearby being, which is what one believed the house to be in the 
common metaphor. And if the house has become a bit unheimlich, this is, 
not because it has been replaced by “Being” in the role of what is nearest. 
We are therefore no longer dealing with metaphor in the usual sense or 
with a simple inversion permutating places in a usual tropical structure. 
(p. 69)  
 
It would appear then, that Heidegger’s metaphor, or what Derrida calls quasi-
metaphor
47, could be Heidegger’s originary image. It is a type of thinking that is 
not representational or representative; it is neither theoretical nor practical, neither 
sensible or non-sensible. It rather dwells on (in) the house. These metaphors do 
not substitute one word or concept with another, as the traditional understanding 
of metaphor assumes. Rather they allow what is most familiar to become 
unfamiliar or unhomely (unheimlich) and thus let Being come near. This analysis 
is pretty close to the interactionist approach to metaphor as discussed by Max 
Black (1962). This approach holds that new meaning comes from the interaction 
between the metaphorical ‘focus’ of the sentence, namely, the ‘focus’ of the 
metaphor −in this case, the house of Being– and the ‘frame’ −in this case, 
language is. In this process, the words or phrases are understood as networks 
whose elements or ‘associated commonplaces’ are brought closer through 
metaphor, whilst the frame works as a filter that allows only certain aspects of 
meaning to be related to the focal part of the metaphor (Cazeaux, 2007; Indurkhya, 
2006). This brings about a certain kind of nearness both between terms, which 
themselves are not easily representable, and to an aspect of the focus that was 
previously not there. Paul Ricœur (1978a) sheds light on this interesting 
phenomenon. He writes:   
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 Ziarek (1994) comments that according to Derrida: ‘The phrase “das Haus des Seins” works, 
then non-literally and non-metaphorically; it is instead a quasi-metaphor, a transfer not between 
words but into words, which characterizes language on its way to expression. Derrida concludes 
that this Heideggerian saying opens in its design, in its incision into Being (entame, Aufriss), the 
space for the conceptual network. Consequently, such quasi-metaphoricity performs the linguistic 
transfer into the difference between the literal and the metaphorical, where the transfer into the 
difference between the literal and the metaphorical, where the transfer, the phora associated with 
metaphor, becomes possible as a result of a quasi-transfer, itself already in retreat (retrait), tracing 
and retracing, marking a mesh of traits (retrait, Gezüge).’ (p. 18) 
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Here the metaphor of space is useful. It is as though a change of distance 
between meanings occurred within a logical space. The new pertinence 
or congruence proper to a meaningful metaphoric utterance proceeds 
from the kind of semantic proximity which suddenly obtains between 
terms in spite of their distance. Things or ideas which were remote 
appear now as close. Resemblance ultimately is nothing else than this 
rapprochement which reveals a generic kinship between heterogeneous 
ideas. What Aristotle called the epiphora of the metaphor, that is, the 
transfer of meaning, is nothing else than this move or shift in the logical 
distance, from the far to the near. (p. 147, italics added) 
 
Repeatedly and persistently metaphor comes to us as a movement of nearing, 
while nearness becomes the central question in Heidegger’s thought. Is this what 
Heidegger was getting at from the beginning? Is nearness the metaphor par 
excellence for metaphorical thinking? Is nearness Heidegger’s most self-reflexive 
notion? Is Heidegger’s philosophising committed, then, to making metaphors of 
metaphors that are themselves implicated in the originary metaphor of dwelling? 
If this is the case, and nearness is the coming together of different regions, what is 
the nature of these regions? Are they words? Are they names? Are they meanings? 
The movement itself challenges the priority of the name and shifts the focus onto 
the interaction that allows for new meaning. In order to respond to these questions, 
and having in mind what we said about language as origin, we need to follow the 
road we are already on and study closely the metaphorical movement’s basic 
characteristics. Both Stellardi (2000) and Gasché (1997) believe that metaphor 
takes place through analogy.  The latter explains:  
  
Since analogy is, according to Aristotle, not only one genre of metaphor 
but the metaphor par excellence in so far as it is based on an equality of 
relations, the doctrine of the analogy of being ‒whatever the meaning of 
analogy may be‒ indicates that a certain metaphoricity is constitutive of 
the very unity of being. The as-structure of understanding unearthed by 
Heidegger characterizes understanding and the saying of Being as 
hinging on a movement of transfer. (p. 302) 
 
Stellardi (2000) goes deeper commenting that 
 
The possibility of the analogy must in all cases preexist, albeit not 
always explicitly, as a differential space of language, or rather in the 
general text of the inscribing of all traces, of all forms. A trait capable of 
sustaining the analogy must exist in advance somewhere. (p. 55)     
 
Can this trait that sustains all analogies be the copula provided by the verb “is”? 
Can this trait be the categorial intuition; the possibility of all possibility; the 
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possibility for something to be uttered; the possibility for something to exist since 
it, in similarity to other beings, too exists; it too is? The possibility of this trait 
may be what gives the multiplicity of beings, Being itself and the ‘ontological 
difference’. Conceived as such, metaphor finds its affordance in the trait that 
allows the connecting of different contexts and the emergence of new beings.   
 
This, in consequence, means that Being −that which allows beings to present 
themselves as they are
48
, in other words, the letting relationship I have been 
describing from the beginning− is an imaginative process that connects contexts 
and detects analogies. This resembles the Kantian description of imagination as a 
synthesis that connects and constructs the inner and outer realm, space and time, 
appearance and concept, empirical and pure intuition. Paul Ricœur (1978a) sees 
the ‘predicative assimilation’ that is inherent in the metaphorical process as 
supporting ‘his contention that the rapprochement [between heterogeneous ideas] 
characteristic of the metaphorical process offers a typical kinship to Kant’s 
schematism’ (p. 148). Ricœur is not the only one to make this connection. Derrida 
also links analogy to imagination, arguing that ‘productions of the new –
imagination– are only productions: by analogical connection and repetition, they 
bring to light what, without being there, will have been there [sans être là, aura été 
là].’ (AF, 53/71 cited in Gorkom, 1978, p. 148).  
 
There is a question that arises, however, about the nature of the things being 
connected and the nature of the synthesis that makes up the connection. Ricœur, 
remaining faithful to Kantian transcendentalism, maintains that metaphor brings 
together experience and language, whereas Derrida (1997), following his belief 
that ‘there is nothing outside the text’, will see metaphor as an interaction between 
meanings of words, that is, an interaction that differs and defers these meanings 
(p.158). Where, however, is Heidegger situated in all this? Clearly his 
conceptualisation of language as the house of Being and Dasein’s existence as 
interpretation asserts language’s and experience’s intertwinement. My question, 
however, is concerned precisely with this intertwinement that allows beings to 
present themselves as beings. This is a question about the possibility of  the as-
structure. With regard to this,   
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 Cazeaux (2007) in fact argues that in Heidegger ‘metaphor is a condition of possibility in as 
much as it provides the as-structure which allows an object to appear within a framework of 
anticipated similarities and differences’. (p. 192) 
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Gasché acknowledges that as-structure operates at more than one 
ontological level for Heidegger, for example at the ‘existential-
hermeneutic’ level which has the human being always encounter an 
object as something, and at the ‘apophantic’ level, whereupon objects 
are wrenched or torn from their immersed, wordless ‘furniture of the 
world’ state and described explicitly as something (1986, p. 300, cited in 
Cazeaux, 2007, p. 195) 
 
This would propose what I have already suggested in the second chapter, namely, 
that there are two types of metaphor working in thinking and, in fact, working 
within Heideggerian theory. The first type refers to a type of transfer as 
exteriorisation of the self onto things, which makes the self inseparable from the 
ready-to-hand realm; the second type refers to linguistic metaphor conceived 
anew, that is, as a transfer that allows new meaning to emerge but also de-
familiarises what was previously understood as familiarity −this refers to the 
present-at-hand realm. In what follows, I will attempt to discuss the first type of 
metaphor −that is, existential metaphor as exteriorisation− only to reach the 
conclusion that we cannot talk about it but metaphorically. This means that the 
two realms, that is the ready-to-hand and present-at-hand and the two levels of the 
as-structure, are connected through metaphor.   
 
2.1. Metaphor as Exteriorisation 
 
Metaphor as exteriorisation involves the meaningful space of existence which is 
never a sensuous something. In this space inscriptions (linguistic or figurative) are 
mediated by technology and allow the formation and the forming of imagination
49
. 
This take on metaphor can be traced back to Nietzsche’s (2000) position, as 
expressed in On Truth and Lie in An Extra-Moral Sense. In this essay Nietzsche 
argues that    
 
The ‘thing in itself’ (which is precisely what the pure truth, apart from 
any of its consequences, would be) is likewise something quite 
incomprehensible to the creator of language and something not in the 
least worth striving for. This creator only designates the relations of 
things to men, and for expressing these relations he lays hold of the 
boldest metaphors. To begin with, a nerve stimulus is transferred into an 
image: first metaphor. The image, in turn, is imitated in a sound: second 
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 From here on, when I talk about imagination I refer to lived time, nearness and the letting-
relationship.  
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metaphor. And each time there is a complete overleaping of one sphere, 
right into the middle of an entirely new and different one. (p. 55) 
 
For Nietzsche, the first metaphor is organic; it is lived by an embodied being that 
is in the environment and enacted through the nerves of the eye. During this first 
metaphor, there is an interiorisation that exacts a modification of the exterior, 
which takes place through the image. This process could easily have been 
described as representing, but it lacks the neutrality of such mirroring. On the 
contrary, it is described as metaphor, that is, a process during which Dasein is 
transferred −again I draw here from the connotations of the Greek word 
metaphora− into the exterior world, creating its Da (there) which is already part 
of its being and the world. Without this type of metaphor there is neither a world 
nor a being about whom we might speak or who might speak of this world. 
Metaphor, conceptualised in this way, becomes a type of nearing. Metaphor 
brings the human being near to things, and in their nearness the human being 
appears as the human being.   
 
Nietzsche thinks that the specific embodiment of the human being affects 
existence and, in fact, comments that ‘the insect or the bird perceives an entirely 
different world from the one that man does’ (p. 58). Heidegger does not dwell on 
the role of embodiment; for Heidegger language is the determinant factor for the 
creation of any meaning.  Their opinions do coincide, however, in the respect that 
both Nietzsche and Heidegger perceive image as the first step towards an 
abstraction that ultimately leads to metaphysics, representational thinking and 
nihilism. In fact, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1997) and Sara Kofman (1993) 
agree that Nietzsche’s understanding of metaphor as a kind of transfer and 
transposition is later transformed into the ‘will to power’. Kofman comments: 
 
The transposition is achieved by carrying over the ‘known’ on to the 
unknown. It presupposes an activity of assimilation, of digestion, of 
reducing differences, which is a fundamentally ‘unjust’ will to mastery 
(Nietzsche later calls it ‘will to power’). Operating already at the organic 
level, it is still present in intellectual activity, which is supposedly 
disinterested and at the highest level: the will of the ‘mind’, too, is to 
achieve unity out of diversity, to restrict and subjugate the unfamiliar. (p. 
33) 
 
It is no wonder then that later Heidegger attempts to ostracise not only the earlier 
voluntarism that afforded the authenticity discourse but metaphor as well. It seems 
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that for Heidegger the will-to-power is transformed into Enframing’s essence. 
However, if the essence of Enframing is the power to turn everything into an 
object, representation and resource, then technology is the power of metaphor par 
excellence. Technology is, similarly to metaphor, the power to turn the particular 
into the identical. In this light, metaphor is understood as the essence of 
metaphysics, and metaphysics as the essence of technological thinking. Metaphor 
becomes the seminal process that allows the assimilation of difference.  
 
But is this true? Is not the rapprochement of different realms the very possibility 
of difference and, in fact, the possibility of difference in representation? Is not 
metaphor the kind of exteriorisation that allows the coupling of Dasein with its 
environment through embodiment, technology and language? In Parmenides 
(1942-43) Heidegger (1998) seems to move towards this direction underscoring 
the hand’s involvement in every possible human activity. He writes:  
 
Man himself acts [handelt] through the hand [Hand]; for the hand is, 
together with the word, the essential distinction of man. Only a being 
which, like man, ‘has’ the word (μῦθος, λόγος), can and must ‘have’ ‘the 
hand.’ Through the hand occur both prayer and murder, greeting and 
thanks, oath and signal, and also the ‘work’ of the hand, the ‘hand-
work,’ and the tool. The handshake seals the covenant (p. 80) 
 
With Parmenides the discussion of humanity’s origin resumes. Language as the 
(im)possible origin of humanity was opposed to technology and embodiment in 
the interpretation of Antigone. Earlier than that, in BT, the hand was admittedly 
implicated in Dasein’s temporality, but not explicitly addressed. In Parmenides, 
however, Heidegger investigates the strong connection that exists between hand 
and language, and proceeds to a deconstructive reading of the ‘origin’ of the 
human being. He writes: 
 
The hand sprang forth only out of the word and together with the word. 
Man does not ‘have’ hands, but the hand holds the essence of man, 
because the word as the essential realm of the hand is the ground of 
essence of man. The word as what is inscribed and what appears to the 
regard is the written word, i.e., script. And the word as script is 
handwriting. (p. 80) 
  
With this move, Heidegger deconstructs the primacy of the spoken word that was 
previously understood as the main material of the house of Being and detects 
man’s essence in writing, that is, in inscription. In fact, he argues, ‘the hand holds 
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the essence of man’. This kind of interpretation is not, however, taken to its 
conclusions. Throughout this later period Heidegger maintains the primacy of 
language. It is language that makes the hand, and the hand along with language 
gives writing.  
 
For Bernard Stiegler (1998), conversely, the coupling between language and 
hand/tool shows something very fundamental. Relying on the paleontological 
evidence discussed by Leroi-Gourhan, Stiegler supports the view that the human 
being becomes human when the hand uses the tool. This, in consequence, frees 
the mouth for language. In this way, and ‘with primordial consequence’, it is 
suggested that “tools for the hand, language for the face, are twin poles of the 
same apparatus,” since they are ultimately co-responsible for the ‘specific cerebral 
organization’ that makes up the human being (Leroi- Gourhan, 1993, p. 20 cited 
in Stiegler, 1998, p. 145). Stiegler (1998) then infers: 
 
If paleontology thus ends up with the statement that the hand frees 
speech, language becomes indissociable from technicity and 
prostheticity: it must be thought with them, like them, in them, or from 
the same origin as theirs: from within their mutual essence. (ibid.) 
 
The question of technology is intertwined with the question of language, and this 
ultimately constitutes the question of origin. Stiegler argues that through 
prostheticity the human being exteriorises itself. This exteriorisation is ‘a putting-
outside-the-self that is also a putting-out-of-range-of-oneself’ (p. 146). It is only 
through this process, and through the use of tools, that the human being claims its 
nature existentially, since its own body becomes the very lack of origin; its nature 
is always incomplete and always in the making through the process of making 
everything else. This is because whatever is made brings to light new affordances 
for embodiment and existence, precisely because the one who makes them is also 
an embodied being. It is thus through the use of tools that Dasein becomes the de-
severing being that Heidegger is describing. Stiegler argues:  
 
With the advent of exteriorisation, the body of the living individual is 
no longer only a body: it can only function with its tools. An 
understanding of the archaic anthropological system will only become 
possible with the simultaneous examination of the skeleton, the central 
nervous system, and equipment. (p. 148) 
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Heidegger (1998) recognises the intrinsic relation between hand and language, but 
he does not see how technology ‘intrudes’. He thus maintains the notion of 
‘proper’ that sustained his other dichotomies. Language gives Being, while 
technology distorts this state of affairs. It is especially modern technological 
objects like the typewriter that intrude, and they do this in such a way as to 
deprive the human being of the most basic connectedness to the world, 
substituting for it a mere trace, an image, something typed. He writes: 
 
The typewriter tears writing from the essential realm of the hand, i.e., the 
realm of the word. The word itself turns into something ‘typed.’ Where 
typewriting, on the contrary, is only a transcription and serves to 
preserve the writing, or turns into print something already written, there 
it has proper though limited, significance. . . Mechanical writing 
deprives the hand of its rank in the realm of the written word and 
degrades the word to a means of communication. In addition, 
mechanical writing provides this “advantage,” that it conceals the 
handwriting and thereby the character. The typewriter makes everyone 
look the same (p. 81). 
 
Heidegger’s analysis here takes a strong Marxist tone: modern technology brings 
about estranged labour and alienation. This takes place through the mediation of 
image. Similarly to the discussion of the modern polis, which does not bring about 
true nearness, Heidegger claims that the revealing that is specific to modern 
technology does not bring about nearness. On the contrary, the typewriter turns 
the word into something typed and thus levels off Dasein’s particularity. In this 
light, individuality is sacrificed for the sake of efficiency. This technology allows 
the exteriorisation of an interiority, but this is done by levelling of the source and 
thus suspending its potentiality for a further, perhaps even more creative, 
manifestation.  
 
However, before addressing this point fully, let us assess the importance of 
Heidegger’s analysis so far. Heidegger considers the interaction of hand, tool and 
language, but he never questions the learning process that allows tools to become 
ready-to-hand.  In What is Called Thinking? Heidegger (1968) takes up this topic 
with reference to the cabinetmaker’s apprentice’s experience. He explains: 
 
His learning is not mere practice, to gain facility in the use of tools. Nor 
does he merely gain knowledge about the forms of things he is to build. 
If he is to become a true cabinetmaker, he makes himself answer and 
respond to the different kinds of wood and to the shapes slumbering 
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within wood to wood as it enters into man’s dwelling with all the hidden 
riches of its nature. In fact, this relatedness to wood is what maintains 
the whole craft. Without that relatedness, the craft will never be anything 
but empty busywork, any occupation with it will be determined 
exclusively by business concerns. Every handicraft, all human dealings 
are constantly in that danger. The writing of poetry is no more exempt 
from it than is the business of thinking. (pp. 14-15) 
 
He also adds: 
 
Every motion of the hand in every one of its works carries itself through 
the element of thinking, every bearing of the hand bears itself in that 
element. All the work of the hand is rooted in thinking. Therefore, 
thinking itself is man’s simplest, and for that reason hardest, handiwork, 
if it would be accomplished at its proper time. (pp. 16-17) 
 
Heidegger’s desire to differentiate between ‘calculative thinking’ –which 
epitomises the essence of modern technology− and Besinnung (mindfulness) or 
Gelassenheit (thinking as letting-be) draws him near to the much needed 
phenomenological description of embodied learning that would finally explain the 
way the hand participates in the constitution of the ready-to-hand. In the Zollikon 
Seminars the complexity of this phenomenon is pursued further, when the focus 
shifts from distant senses to touching. Heidegger (2001) writes: 
 
When I grasp the glass, I not only grasp the glass, but can also 
simultaneously see my hand and the glass. But I cannot see my eye and 
my seeing, and by no means am I able to grasp them. For in the 
immediacy of seeing and hearing turned toward the ‘world,’ the eye and 
ear disappear in a peculiar manner. If someone else wants to ascertain 
how the eye is functioning when seeing, and how it is anatomically 
constituted, he must see my eye as I see the crossbar. (p. 82) 
 
Heidegger’s phenomenological insights shed light on the phenomenon of ‘double 
sensation [Doppelempfindung]’ that I experience in terms of ‘what is touched and 
the sensation of my hand’ (p. 83). This phenomenon differentiates the hand from 
the eye since ‘(i)n grasping, the hand is in immediate contact with what is 
grasped’ whereas ‘(m)y eye is not in immediate contact with what is seen’ (pp. 
109, 83). This means that the eye perceives the hand grasping. This phenomenon 
is important for many reasons: First of all, it appears that exteriorisation  –that is, 
the very process of becoming human– needs the hand to instantiate intention by 
being-(the)-outside-(of)-the-human. This exteriorisation reveals the interiority that 
initiated the action but is itself formed by the process. Second, the hand creates 
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immediacy through the experience of distance. In contrast to the eye’s functioning, 
the hand grasps the glass only because it is able to experience distance; the hand 
brings-near by preserving distance. And this takes place with objects such as 
glasses, nails and computers, but also with my hand as well, since when I grasp 
my own hand grasping a thing I turn this thing into something graspable. But is 
not this the original meaning of Dasein  –that is, the very being that is its own 
there and whose there is already part of a world? It is not only in this respect that 
Dasein is not a subject: Dasein is the being that grasps the world (perceives it) 
only to realise that is itself always already grasped (interpreted) in the process that 
turns it into a certain being (Dasein as an interpretative being). Is not the 
functionality of the hand a basic form of perception? Does not the hand let things 
be (lassen)? Furthermore, is the hand with its double and unique ability to 
experience nearness in preserving distance the human being’s first differential 
possibility  –that is, the first affirmation of a distance between I and world, which 
makes me an I that is constantly differentiated from this world, which is not I but 
already part of me?  
 
If the above questions are answered affirmatively, then a different question arises. 
Is there a developmental process of learning that is similar to a transfer 
(metaphora) of the self out there in the world; a transfer which has in any case 
already happened, which is always a movement beyond this self by becoming this 
self and becoming other, becoming the glass, the nail, the computer and that being 
that has a world? Is this bringing-near an important metaphor (metaphora), a 
transfer of the non-yet-self onto the things it brings near? It is in the light of this 
possibility, that the metaphor of the house of Being moves beyond the distinctions 
between theory and practice, sensible and the intelligible, and more importantly, 
brings together language and technology. Both language and technology are 
implicated in the process of differential metaphorical learning. When, for 
example, the infant grasps her blanket she does not know the word for grasping 
and as such the action of grasping cannot present itself as this action. The action, 
however, is already metaphorical  –the infant is transferred onto things– long 
before metaphor is understood literally as a literary term. The body itself 
contributes to the constitution of the analogy that lies in the heart of metaphor; 
every time the child chooses to use one hand or the other, move back or forth, 
jump up or down, she does that in analogy to a possibility; she enacts a difference. 
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What is more, the experience of looking herself in the mirror  –the transfer into 
the image, being the image in analogy to being-here, being-there in analogy to 
being-here– that ultimately constructs the feeling of being-here-there, is the 
performance of analogy and metaphor as difference; it is being in differance. 
Every time the young child chooses to say the word (when, that is, she is able to 
say it) or merely grasp the blanket she participates in difference; she can either say 
it or grasp it. Technology becomes the focal point of this process, allowing the 
complicated interaction of embodiment and language. This process of metaphor 
can be very slow and passive, during which a specific social milieu is constructed 
through the preservation of inscriptions in time that is subsequently inscribed, that 
is, learned by individuals, allowing the emergence of ways of living and thinking. 
In Stiegler (1998) the equivalent of this process is ‘epiphylogenesis’. Metaphor, 
however, is a much richer notion for this process because it underlines the 
movement of nearing and passive learning that produces new meaning. In this 
respect, it resembles psychoanalytic transference, since it points to the redirection 
of feelings, the reproduction of thoughts, the imaginative connection between past 
and present, presence and absence and different types of representations. 
Metaphor as a process of learning and connectedness to the world, also underlines 
the role of image which is not simply understood as memory. Metaphor gives a 
Merleau-Pontyan take on image emphasising its connection to the body and its 
role for the constitution of the human being.  
 
Coming at the end of this section, I talked about existential metaphor that is 
immediate, passive and constructive; it is part of the process that allows the 
emergence of both technology and language. The second type of metaphor, that is, 
linguistic metaphor, was presented earlier in this chapter. It can be, especially 
when it is a new metaphor, a way to think about our being-in-the-world and the 
frame through which new meaning appears; it defamiliarises what is familiar and 
it requires imagination and inventiveness. Imagination, however, as that which 
allows time synthesis is already in-formed by the already-there, which is 
constituted by language and technology, and by existential metaphor, that is, our 
immediate transference onto things, which is itself not simply ineffable: it is 
effable to the point that it is through the copula of the verb “is”. But have we been 
able to see this existential metaphor through linguistic metaphor, that is by 
imagining the possibility of this type of metaphor, and the copula, or is the copula 
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already co-constituted by existential metaphor, which is a movement between 
technology and language, even a movement that allows the perception of language 
and technology? Are we talking here about the revealing possibilities of language 
or are we making inferences about its conditioned nature? Is existential metaphor 
thought in analogy to linguistic metaphor in the way that every metaphor is 
imagined or is linguistic metaphor allowed in analogy to existential metaphor? 
Where does this leave us? Language is metaphorical. Being is metaphorical. 
Through metaphor interpretation circles back to itself, after having imaginatively 
defamiliarised itself. But then again, is not this the very process of metaphor we 
have been talking about from the beginning? What is there then deeper than 
metaphor?  
 
2.2. Language, Ereignis, Metaphor  
 
The metaphor Heidegger uses and vaguely analyses, namely, the ‘house of Being’, 
is a kind of metaphor that challenges Heidegger’s own limited and traditional 
understanding of metaphor. It is a kind of metaphor that refers to the possibility of 
creative thinkers, that is, philosophers and poets, experimenting with the already-
there of tradition and participating in the emergence of the new. Bearing in mind 
what Ricœur (1978b) says, namely, that ‘what Heidegger does when he interprets 
poets as philosophers is infinitely more important than what he says polemically’ 
about ‘metaphors as particular philosophical statements’, I attempt to explore here 
the full potential of Heidegger’s work in order to illustrate the nature of language 
and metaphor as presented in his later thought (p. 333).  
 
As I pointed out, existential metaphor refers to a pre-linguistic sphere that 
participates in the becoming of the human being while technology as technology 
and language as language come to being as well. For this reason, existential 
metaphor remains veiled to a certain degree, whilst the second type of metaphor 
refers to the originary image that can potentially act as alētheia, that is, the kind of 
revealing of an aspect of being that is forgotten. Does this mean, however, that 
only language has revelatory powers? Is language the apophantic medium of our 
existence? Is alētheia afforded only through language? As suggested above, both 
technology and language refer to the as-structure, but in a complicated way. 
Technology creates certain possibilities since it promotes a kind of passive 
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learning that offers an immediate access to the world, whereas language may, at 
cases, push us to think about these conditions at a distance. Thinking is, thus, 
always already conditioned. In this respect, technology and language interact with 
each other in the process of revealing: technology creates new realities, and 
language new speculations about what is going on. This does not mean that 
language is not already involved in the production and use of technology: modern 
design is especially sensitive to the nuances of words and employs metaphor to 
affect the user’s experiences −the term desktop, for example is not an accidental 
one. Neither does it mean that technology does not affect language, since we tend 
to transfer technological terms and ways of thinking into other social and 
linguistic contexts. This interaction, between language and technology, is not 
something Heidegger is oblivious to, but he does see it in terms of threat and hope. 
 
In The Principle of Identity (1957) Heidegger (2002) claims that with Enframing, 
that is, within the dominion of technological and calculative thinking, we 
experience ‘a prelude’ to the original event of appropriation (Ereignis). Ereignis is 
Heidegger’s term for the event that will allow the human beings to appropriate 
their own potential as beings that receive Being (p. 37).
50
 This event is traced back 
to language since the ‘(a)ppropriation grants to mortals their abode within their 
nature, so that they may be capable of being those who speak.’ (p. 128) The abode 
of human beings seems to refer to dwelling, our being-in-the-world and human 
existence. In this light, the event delivers us to our ‘nature’, which is defined by 
the fact that we exist in language: we are those who speak. To see this, ‘we would 
need to think through the nature of mortals with sufficient completeness in all its 
respects and rapports’ (p. 129). It is, thus, through language that we receive the 
world and through language that we turn to it when in a perplexed, theoretical 
mood. Language, however, is always withdrawn; since, when it shows something 
it ‘disregards . . . itself, in order to free that which is shown’ (p. 131). Bret W. 
Davis (2007) situates the human being in this relationship as follows: ‘In thinking, 
man both draws on and gives back to language as the house of being. It is this 
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 The fact, however, that this discussion does not specify where the Event is temporally located 
contributes to the incredulity or even the marginalisation of this possibility and it is also the reason, 
that Heidegger’s theory is often interpreted as essentialist and pessimistic (Kolb, 1986). David 
Kolb reports on these concerns uttered by several scholars in the following way: ‘Is he talking 
about a deep meaning or our present world, or about the past, or a new age, or in some way about 
the event of there being any world?’ (1986, p. 189) 
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non-willing relational interplay that is named Ereignis, as the event of mutual 
appropriation between man and being.’ (p. 230) Heidegger (2002) explains that: 
‘In order to be who we are, we human beings remain committed to and within the 
being of language, and can never step out of it and look at it from somewhere 
else’. (2002, p. 134) This, however, means that any attempt to understand our 
reality must take place on the basis of language itself, from the ‘house of Being’ 
which is not only our dwelling but also our metaphor for its nature. As such our 
relation with language ‘defines itself in terms of the mode in which we, who are 
needed in the usage of language, belong to the Appropriation.’ (p. 136). 
 
Dasein will then always be attempting to talk about the event, but language will 
be always withdrawn. This is a process similar to that of Dasein’s temporality, 
Being, and imagination. Is the later description of language, then, a metaphor for 
all the rest? Derrida (2007) sees all these concepts interlaced
51
 with metaphor and 
argues:   
 
Being being nothing, not being a being, it cannot be expressed or named 
more metaphorico. And therefore it does not have, in the context of the 
dominant metaphysical usage of the word “metaphor,” a proper or literal 
meaning that could be intended metaphorically by metaphysics. 
Consequently, we can no more speak metaphorically on its subject, than 
we can properly or literally. We will always speak of it only quasi-
metaphorically, according to a metaphor of metaphor, with the overload 
of a supplementary trait, a re-trait. A supplementary fold of metaphor 
articulates this retreat/retracing, repeating the intra-metaphysical 
metaphor by displacing it, that is, the very metaphor that the withdrawal 
of Being has made possible (pp. 65-66). 
 
This will be a constant play, a folding and refolding, that never leads to an origin 
or a proper name. Heidegger’s own thinking may constitute precisely this effort 
‒that is, to escape metaphysics and, in consequence, metaphor− but as a result his 
own language is a retreat to metaphor, which he metaphorises as the withdrawal 
of Being. But the withdrawal exists precisely as withdrawal, and it resists 
capturing. Heidegger is thus engaged in an impossible task: to speak of that of 
which he cannot speak, to see that which needs to be absent. Is language the way 
to get to this impossible task? Is experience? Both? Neither? We have, after all 
claimed that for Heidegger no such separate realms exist. Heidegger is thus able 
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 ‘Interlacing’ is a term Derrida (2007) uses to introduce the discussion of metaphor in the text 
The Retrait of Metaphor.   
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not so much to see but to enact the very process that enables the interaction 
between the two, namely, metaphor. Metaphor can be understood only 
metaphorically: while it reaches into regions and draws connections that are not 
explicitly effable, not even when metaphor is uttered. In this respect, even the 
second type of metaphor, that is, the one I described as linguistic, cannot be 
representative, probably because of its intertwinement with existential metaphor. 
Ziarek (1994) detects this proto-linguistic
52
 character in Heidegger’s notion of 
Ereignis. He writes: ‘There is no doubt in this context that for Heidegger Ereignis, 
the event of manifestation, the phenomenon par excellence, must be of a proto-
linguistic nature ‒it is itself a form, or better, a design (Riss) of the saying.’ (p. 30) 
This proto-linguistic character refers also to our dwelling, and it conditions 
thinking since   
 
the saying refers to placing or positioning of a being in a nexus of 
“relations” (Besüge) to other beings, which lets that being be; it 
describes an interlacing (Geflecht) that underwrites signification and 
itself interlaces, nears, brings into proximity the linguistic and the 
phenomenal. (ibid., p. 30) 
 
What this process brings us is precisely this very feeling of nearness or proximity, 
between the linguistic and the phenomenal, even though these two realms 
ipromplicate and include the other. The metaphor ‘house of Being’ is an example 
of this process: it is a movement during which house, language and being come 
together, creating a network that redefines individual terms and their relations. 
Heidegger (1969b) relates this experience to a kind of thinking that ‘lies . . . 
beyond the distinction between activity and passivity’ or, to put it in other terms, 
as ‘Gelassenheit’, that is, a kind of letting-things-be (p. 61, emphasis added). Not 
surprisingly, this type of thinking contains the same ‘letting’ (lassen) element that 
is essential for the Heideggerian phenomenological method ‒imagination, 
originary temporality and every single phenomenological description. The most 
important of these early descriptions is Dasein’s ‘ownmost possibility’ to become 
authentic as (Zukommen-lassen) ‘letting-itself-come-towards-itself’ (2008a, p. 
325/372).  
                                                 
52
 The term ‘proto-linguistic’ is used here not to refer to the derivation of common ‘ancestor’ 
languages from existing ones, as in linguistics, but rather to recognise that the structures under 
consideration need to be understood, as it were, retrospectively in terms of their fully formed state 
in mature languages. This is akin to placing the child's initial fumblings with language not in 
parallel to the sign-making of the higher animals but in the light of language full-blown. 
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In the essay Conversation on a Country Path about Thinking (1944-45), 
Heidegger (1969a) describes Gelassenheit as an awaiting that ‘lets re-presenting 
entirely alone. It has no object.’ (p. 68) It is a speculation about a new kind of 
thinking that involves ‘letting ourselves in’ a true relationship with what is to be 
thought and a ‘(r)eleasement’ into the ‘nameless’ (pp. 69, 70). This thinking is last 
described as ‘Άγχιβασίη’ which means ‘moving-into-nearness’, resembling the 
very action of walking onto a path (p. 89). Nearness, in this light, is understood as 
a form of spatio-temporality, which is shaped through language and towards 
language. The affirmation that this is a movement into the nameless shows the 
enigmatic character of this movement. For example, how is this spatio-temporality 
constituted and experienced when the name is absent? A lyric of Stefan George 
provides a way into this: ‘Where word breaks off no thing may be’. Heidegger 
comments that ‘(t)he word alone gives being to the thing’. (p. 62). He, 
nevertheless, also asserts the importance and primacy of the specific copula that 
lets any thing be, arguing that: ‘An “is” arises where the word breaks up.’ (p. 108) 
In this respect, the copula allows any being to exist in analogy to previous beings; 
this process is, however, metaphorical since it does not represent but through a 
movement of nearing lets beings present themselves as the beings they are. It thus 
refers to the as-structure, which at some level is pre-theoretical and pre-linguistic 
and conditioned by technology. In fact, it may be that this intertwining of 
language and technology offers the very possibility of the trait of similarity. Their 
relation could be the very thing that makes up this substratum and affords the 
possibility of analogy. The copula of the “is” allows us to utter what something is 
in analogy to other things that exist, but the possibility of this analogy might be 
prior to all this and inhere in a compositional whole that allows the interaction 
between language and technology or what ultimately gets perceived as language 
and technology. This interaction is probably the reason language is 
instrumentalisable. For this reason, and according to Stiegler (1998), when 
Heidegger contrasts instrumentalised language to Gellasenheit, he neglects to see 
that  
 
if the instrumentalization of language is possible, this is because its 
instrumentality is inherent to it. The question is consequently one of 
knowing how an instrument should be understood, that is, as a being-
ready-to-hand, as the what. It is a question not of struggling against the 
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instrumentalization of language but of resisting the very reduction of an 
instrument to the rank of means. There is no point in looking to isolate a 
noninstrumental aspect to language; nothing of the kind exists. The issue 
is rather that of addressing the modalities of instrumentality as such, 
modalities that harbor the condition of idiomatic instrumentality as much 
as that of the condition of massive indifferentiation, together with all the 
multiple dimensions of what we might call, here, the instrumental 
condition. (pp. 205-206) 
 
With the contradistinction between language and technology, Heidegger seems to 
hold on to the possibility of a spatio-tempotality that is not mediated by 
technology or at least by modern technology. His later writings, of course, do tell 
a different story. In fact, they tell a story to the effect that language and 
technology co-constitute dwelling and cannot be strictly contrasted. On the other 
hand, the technological image, as representation, and originary image, as true 
thinking, are contrasted with regard to the experiences they afford.   
 
3. Nearness, Technology, Distancelessness  
 
In essays like The Thing (1950) and Building Dwelling Thinking (1951) 
Heidegger (1971d) addresses nearness as ‘Being itself’ (Richardson, 2003, p. 
567). Nearness is experienced in activities such as using a jug or crossing a bridge, 
and is juxtaposed to distancelessness produced by modern technology and 
experienced in activities like watching the news. The introductory paragraph of 
The Thing makes a good starting point for this discussion. Heidegger (1971e) 
writes:  
 
All distances in time and space are shrinking. Man now reaches 
overnight, by plane, places which formerly took weeks and months of 
travel. He now receives instant information, by radio, of events which he 
formerly learned about only years later, if at all. The germination and 
growth of plants, which remained hidden throughout the seasons, is now 
exhibited publicly in a minute, on film. Distant sites of the most ancient 
cultures are shown on film as if they stood this very moment amidst 
today’s street traffic. Moreover, the film attests to what it shows by 
presenting also the camera and its operators at work. The peak of this 
abolition of every possibility of remoteness is reached by television, 
which will soon pervade and dominate the whole machinery of 
communication. (p. 165) 
 
Heidegger describes the elimination of spatial and temporal qualities of places and 
the production of distancelessness -that is, the possibility of engagement with 
multiple locations and things that turn space-time into calculable in-differentiation. 
 179 
The shortening of distance is not easily perceptible, since distance, nearness and 
remoteness are all phenomena relating to our existential condition and modalities 
of thought that implicate technology. In Heidegger’s interpretation, modern media, 
because of their specific characteristics, replace one set of experiences with 
another; knowledge is replaced by information, the hidden processes of nature by 
the mechanical representation of them, the unfamiliarity of otherness by the 
commonality of TV programmes, and originary image by simulacra. This creates 
the illusion that otherness is accessible, but the truth is that this type of otherness 
is other than the originary image that is meant to defamiliarise the world. 
Heidegger thus states:  
 
Yet the frantic abolition of all distances brings no nearness; for nearness 
does not consist in shortness of distance. What is least remote from us in 
point of distance, by virtue of its picture on film or its sound on the radio, 
can remain far from us. What is incalculably far from us in point of 
distance can be near to us. Short distance is not in itself nearness. Nor is 
great distance remoteness. (p. 165) 
 
The nature of nearness experienced as that which allows things to reveal 
themselves withdraws further from us since beings fall into a ‘uniformity in which 
everything is neither far nor near’ (p. 166). Uniformity refers to such a levelling of 
experience as we find when we watch a report on television about a natural 
disaster that takes place far away from us. If we have not been previously 
interested in the specific country or in the nature and welfare of its people, the 
event stays away from us; it is experienced somehow, but it does not come closer; 
it does not enter our involvements or concerns, and it does not address us. This 
numbness has a further effect on us, however, since it can potentially transform 
the experience of all other events and places into uniform distancelessness. This is, 
in fact, what Heidegger considers the greatest danger of modern technology, 
which he understands as Enframing ‒that is, the dominion of a single frame of 
mind that suspends our capacity to receive things as the things they are and 
instead enforces the perception of things as resources.  
 
In this respect, Heidegger offers an analysis of modern media, connectedness and 
its effects on the human condition. There is, of course, a discussion of media in 
BT, and there Heidegger states that ‘With the ‘radio’ . . . Dasein has so expanded 
its everyday environment that it has accomplished a de-severance of the “world” 
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‒a de-severance which, in its meaning for Dasein, cannot yet be visualized.’ (p. 
106) Having in mind, that this early analysis lies on a curious middle ground 
between a negative evaluation of technology and an ontological exegesis, we 
cannot be certain about Heidegger’s intentions. Does this early suspension of a 
media-analysis suggest a hesitation concerning the possibly negative nature of all 
tools? The ready-to-hand, after all, is understood on the basis of its potentiality to 
open up spaces and extend Dasein’s reach and this is precisely what modern 
media are purported to do.   
 
Heidegger’s example of Dasein discovering other Dasein in the process of 
creating shoes is indicative of this point. Dasein discovers others indirectly when 
it uses tools. In the case of modern media, however, the discovery of others, that 
is, sociability, becomes the very product in demand. Dasein watches the news and 
listens to the radio so it can know about other Dasein. For Heidegger this knowing 
is nothing but curiosity. Now, if we transfer this critique in the sphere of modern 
social media curiosity intensifies. The desire for sociability is translated into an 
almost metaphysical desire for the maintenance of nearness and connectedness 
even with people we were never connected with and do not really wish to be 
connected to. It will not be satisfactory, however, if I merely offer here a 
reiteration of Heidegger’s critique. On the contrary, I aim to analyse new media in 
the course of this thesis, that is, through the seminal notions of imagination and 
metaphor. Social media offer a transfer (metaphor) and a configuration of the self. 
This is the path I intend to take in the final chapter. Before I do that, however, I 
need to show how Heidegger presents a meditation on technology that falls in the 
realm of what I called existential metaphor. Heidegger attempts to think nearness 
through things that once participated, or perhaps still do, in experiences of true 
nearness. For Michael Lewis (2005) this possibility is realised through a 
phenomenology of things. As he puts it:  
 
Today, this unifying trait of ‘beingness’ is named by Heidegger as 
‘technicizability’ or ‘makeability’, and it is precisely those singular and 
fragile beings called ‘things’ which technology is by definition unable to 
make, this inability marking its own blind spot. (p. 81) 
 
The things Heidegger mostly presents are handicrafts, which means technology of 
a different era, or as Lewis puts it, things that are not made by technology. This, in 
consequence, raises the following questions: Is it only pre-industrial products that 
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afford true nearness? Is nearness afforded by a different frame of mind? Does the 
change in our mindset change the way we relate to things as well? And if so, can a 
modern object like a social networking site or a GPS system afford true nearness? 
Is there a possibility for these objects to be used without imposing the mentality 
that produced them on the user and their world? Is there such a possibility? Can 
this mentality coexist with poetic thinking? And are the images that are 
indispensable for their functionality constitutive of the type of connectedness to 
the world they afford? Heidegger shows the path toward the much needed answers 
to these questions in The Thing. In this text Heidegger proceeds ‘by attending to 
what is near’, that is, common things like a jug. These things Heidegger 
understands as gatherings (1971e, p. 166). He mentions that the jug’s ‘full 
presence’ comes to light with its use, thus in the outpouring which Heidegger calls 
‘the poured gift’ (ibid.). In this way, the analysis diverges from the line taken in 
BT, since the tool is not here a mere node in a network that connects to other 
nodes, that is, other usable tools, people and projects, but instantiates a 
meaningful focal node that gathers a single time-space. This is a process of 
nearing, but contrary to the earlier emphasis on the towards-which, now the object 
gathers. This new conceptualisation of the tool puts into question Heidegger’s 
earlier analysis of technology and especially his conceptualisation of the home. A 
phenomenology of home, conceived indeed as gathering but without any 
ideological content, was precisely what was missing from BT, whereas the feeling 
of not-being-at-home was equated with the opportunity for authenticity.  
 
In the gift of outpouring, Heidegger, says we can observe a respectful 
receptiveness to things, and indeed a gathering of the elements of the fourfold. 
The notion of the fourfold is very poetic and ‘mythic’, but its ‘philosophical 
import’ … ‘is far from clear’ (Olafson, 1993, p. 117). For this reason, there are 
those who dismiss the fourfold ‘as an example of pious gibberish’ and others 
‘who leave it out of consideration altogether’ (Harman, 2002, p. 190). There are 
of course others who support that the strength of the fourfold relies in its power to 
offer a kind of preparation for an alternative living, a ‘deconstructive living’ since 
‘(t)alk of the Fourfold has the advantage of bringing in neglected dimensions of 
the event of the world, and it avoids the metaphysical temptation to interpret man, 
things and being in terms of constant presence’ (Kolb, 1986, pp. 184, 191). 
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What Heidegger says with regard to the jug’s outpouring is that it allows the 
elements of the fourfold −earth, sky, divinities and mortals− to stay true to their 
own nature. He says, for example, the ‘spring stays on in the water’, the rock stays 
as rock and in the rock ‘the dark slumber of the earth’ receives the rain and finally 
this is how the sky is found. This kind of respectful attitude is in contradistinction 
to Enframing’s tendency to transform every being into resource and energy that is 
locked, stored and consumed. Instead, the gift of outpouring constitutes a type of 
sacrifice and donation on behalf of the mortals to their gods. In The Thing (1971e) 
Heidegger says  
 
In the gift of the outpouring earth and sky, divinities and mortals dwell 
together all at once. These four, at one because of what they themselves 
are, belong together. Preceding everything that is present, they are 
enfolded into a single fourfold. (p. 173) 
 
Here, I do not aspire to give a full account of the fourfold. Such an effort would 
go against Heidegger’s attempt to sketch and perform a kind of poetic thinking 
that moves away from representing things. I discuss it, however, because it allows 
me to show how Heidegger differentiates between the nearness afforded by 
handicraft and the nearness afforded by modern technology. Nearness described 
through the fourfold allows the interaction of multiplicity, while the elements 
participating preserve their own nature and receive other elements in a process 
called ‘mirror-play’ (Heidegger, 1971e, p. 179). Heidegger describes the four 
elements in more detail: 
  
Earth is the building bearer, nourishing with its fruits, tendering 
water and rock, plant and animal.  
When we say earth, we are already thinking of the other three 
along with it by way of the simple oneness of the four.  
The sky is the sun’s path, the course of the moon, the glitter of the 
stars, the year’s seasons, the light and dusk of day, the gloom and glow 
of night, the clemency and inclemency of the weather, the drifting clouds 
and blue depth of the ether.  
When we say sky, we are already thinking of the other three along 
with it by way of the simple oneness of the four.  
The divinities are the beckoning messengers of the godhead. Out of 
the hidden sway of the divinities the god emerges as what he is, which 
removes him from any comparison with beings that are present.  
When we speak of divinities, we are already thinking of the other 
three along with them by way of the simple oneness of the four.  
The mortals are the human beings. They are called mortals because 
they can die. To die means to be capable of death as death. Only man 
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dies. The animal perishes. It has death neither ahead of itself nor behind 
it. Death is the shrine of Nothing, that is, of that which in every respect 
is never something that merely exists, but which nevertheless presences, 
even as the mystery of Being itself. As the shrine of Nothing, death 
harbors within itself the presencing of Being. As the shrine of Nothing, 
death is the shelter of Being. We now call mortals mortals ‒not because 
their earthly life comes to an end, but because they are capable for death 
as death. Mortals are who they are, as mortals, present in the shelter of 
Being. They are the presencing relation to Being as Being. (pp. 178-179). 
 
There are many interpretations of the four elements. Julian Young (2006) argues 
that earth refers to the ‘totality of things, animal, vegetable and mineral, with 
which we share our world’, while sky is ‘the representation of time changes, 
seasons and the weather’ (p. 374). Gods refer to the fundamental ethos of a 
community’, while finally Dasein’s mortality refers to the ‘defining feature of 
human beings’ (ibid., p. 375). Richardson (2003) agrees that both earth and sky 
refer to physical reality and nature, but he claims that the gods refer to ‘the entire 
domain of the divine’ (p. 572). His interpretation of mortality is, however, focused 
on the possibility of experiencing death as death, which, according to him, 
ultimately pertains to the experience of Being’s withdrawal. Richardson 
comments: 
 
Since Being cannot presence except in a limited (negativated) way and 
the limit of the presenc-ing in There is death, then death (limit) is a 
necessary condition for the presenc-ing we call “There,” and there is a 
limited sense in which we may say that death is precisely that point the 
There begins to be, that death from the very beginning is immanent in 
There-being, that There is at every moment dy-(end-)ing. (p. 573) 
 
If we accept Richardson’s account, then it is evident that, during this period, 
Heidegger moves away from subjectivism and voluntarism but maintains an 
unaltered belief that Dasein is the interpretive being. Mortals are the ones that 
receive the message from the gods. The experience of death is understood through 
the as-structure, since mortals do not merely perish but encounter death as death. 
The as-structure refers to Being, temporality and imagination, but it is now co-
constituted with the play of a multiplicity of elements, the interaction between 
them and the proximity of different realms. Heidegger (1977b) describes it as a 
gathering of the ‘fourfold into a single time-space, a single stay’ (p. 174). This 
appears itself to be a metaphor of being and thinking, that is, of thinking focused 
on a single concern without diminishing its multiplicity, a thinking that is 
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responsive to the thing without succumbing to preconceptions and representations. 
Heidegger writes: 
 
The thing things. In thinging, it stays earth and sky, divinities and 
mortals. Staying, the thing brings the four, in their remoteness, near to 
one another. This bringing-near is nearing. Nearing is the presencing of 
nearness. Nearness brings near ‒draws nigh to one another‒ the far and, 
indeed, as the far. Nearness preserves farness. (pp. 177-178) 
 
The distinction between nearness and distancelessness becomes very clear. 
Nearness does not abolish farness, and it is not its opposite. In fact, what is 
respected in its remoteness is the very thing that comes near. Nearness is precisely 
this. Heidegger explains: ‘Nearness is at work in bringing near, as the thinging of 
the thing.’ (p. 178) This is the event of the world, the ‘worlding’ of the world 
(1971c, p. 45).  Still, one might wonder, especially in the light of the obsessive 
tendency for connectedness that comes with modern technologies: can we make 
or build things that gather the fourfold? Can digital and computerised objects, 
such as social networking sites and search engines, really gather, bring near and 
preserve the farness? The answer to this question can be found in Heidegger’s 
famous essay Building Dwelling Thinking (1951) which will be discussed in the 
next chapter.  
 
4. Conclusion  
 
In later Heidegger, phenomenology is supposedly abandoned, but the philosopher 
resumes his investigations into the categorial intuition through a new focus on the 
hermeneutical relation or what I have called the letting relationship. This was 
previously understood through a temporo-centric lens focused on the future. Now 
Heidegger privileges language, which he sees as the only possible way to 
challenge the everyday inauthentic and technological familiarity of the world. His 
own text, however, proves that technology is itself already part of any possibility 
of thinking and that instrumentality is not a threat but a modality of language’s 
nature. Both language and technology participate in the letting relationship, in 
such a way that they both construct each other and ultimately construct perception. 
 
This process alters imagination, which is itself a learning process implicating 
technology and language. Metaphor can be understood as the very process that 
 185 
implicates both since it is a movement into the already-there but at the same time 
that which can potentially defamiliarise the world. Metaphor as such is the 
apotheosis of imagination; it is ‘the alien element in which the unknown god 
“sends” himself’; it is that which moves thought forward, namely into considering 
the most basic experiences of human existence, which are at the same time the 
most cryptic.  
 
This process as imagination is also a process of learning, and in Heidegger’s later 
text the question of how the ready-to-hand comes to be is finally posed and 
answered. This type of passive learning implies the coupling of the body and the 
implement. In this respect, other modalities of instrumentality such as 
prostheticity come to the fore. It is only through the supplement of technology and 
language that the human being learns to be human, but this process of 
exteriorisation and individuation suggests that there is no origin of the human 
being in the first place. This also suggests more radically that our tools work on 
our thoughts: that technologies make up our minds or, to speak more 
‘scientifically’, build our cerebral organisations. The discussion in The Thing 
suggests exactly that: technology participates in imagination, offering the already-
there, that is, the building in which dwelling takes place. In this respect, both the 
possibility of alētheia and the possibility of representation are conditioned by the 
metaphorical process which cannot be simply a matter of language’s or 
technology’s separate involvement. Are there, however, constructions that are so 
limiting that they inhibit imagination as metaphora from taking place? In other 
words, if we move from familiarity to familiarity (a kind of identity) can 
imagination shut down? Can dwelling be turned into homelessness? To put it in 
Stiegler’s terms, modern technology through its media provides secondary 
retentions that form our criteria for attention, and if these criteria are constantly 
the same then our imaginations become very constricted. To put it in 
Heideggerian terms, modern technologies may produce representations that 
include the subject within what is represented. The user becomes an image whilst 
the image conceals its constitution. Putting it in this thesis’ terms, a metaphor that 
takes place in the same context is bound to limit thinking. In the next chapter I 
examine this possibility. 
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Chapter 6  
        Metaphor, Nearness, Education 
 
 
This chapter discusses the following: 
 
51. Existence has been understood by Heidegger as being-there, that is, through 
metaphor. The notion of metaphor has been, however, re-conceptualised in this 
thesis. Online presence or tele-presence is similarly understood metaphorically. 
Metaphor should not, however, be conceptualised, as is often the case, as the 
vehicle for the understanding of online presence but that which gives and allows 
us to understand any form of experience. In this chapter, I investigate how 
existential and linguistic metaphor are implicated in this process.  
 
52. At first glance, dwelling and fourfold-existence cannot be realised in the 
circumstances allowed by modern technology. Can it be the case, then, that 
metaphor is entangled differently in the case of modern technology?  
 
53. Online presence is usually understood as a metaphor of presence. Heideggerian 
theory can, at different levels, both sustain and repudiate this understanding. My 
own take is quite distinct from the standard Heideggerian interpretations, since I 
argue that any type of being-there is metaphorical. In order to understand this I 
need to illuminate first the nature of digital or virtual things, because these are 
precisely the beings that are supposed to make online presence metaphorical 
−that is, metaphorical in the traditional sense.   
 
54. What are digital things? Digital beings can be understood as the result of 
mathematical abstraction −Heideggerian theory gives us ample scope to do so. 
They are therefore placeless and positionless beings. Digital beings, however, are 
also phenomenal beings: they are objects of our intentionality and have thing-tool 
qualities. But are they real things? It does appear that in order to dwell online we 
need to experience a disembodied transfer (metaphora) of the self in the digital 
region.  But is this something new? 
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55. The privation of the body is needed in every experience. There is a kind of 
disembodied transfer inherent in embodiment. Tools function as references and 
sings, and Dasein is in a constant state of embodied-disembodied transfer. Dasein 
is always ahead of itself. This is the structure described in BT and online presence 
can indeed be described in these precise terms. 
 
56. I criticised this early analysis here because with the analysis in Being and Time, 
Heidegger refrained from giving an account of presencing as gathering. 
Heidegger proceeded in this direction with his later discussion of the thing 
understood as gathering. Can, however, digital things like websites be such 
gatherings?  Can they afford existential metaphor, that is, the transfer of Dasein 
onto them? Also, how do they affect imagination? Is it possible to enable a certain 
transfer into the same and thus signal the end of differance?   
 
57. Digital things, it is widely argued, afford disembodied engagement. Can such 
things then be gatherings? Can we have rich practices when the privation of the 
body is prolonged? But what is embodiment, especially in later Heidegger? Is 
image that which ends existential metaphor?  
 
58. Existential transfer is mediated by image and by ‘representative’ image as well.  
Evidence taken from Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the body and from 
neuroscience underscores the important role of image for embodiment and 
metaphor. Technology produces images of the body (either as reflection in the 
mirror or avatar on the screen) and this suggests that embodiment can be 
mediated by technology. Technology co-constitutes embodiment. It does not 
eliminate it. This means that existential metaphor is sustained even online.  
 
59. Tele-presence is a complicated form of being-there. Online representation is an 
image that is selectively constructed according to the desires and intentions of the 
market.  Online presence or representation is then defined by the nature of the 
technology that affords it but also by the language (through spatial metaphors) 
that is used in order for this technology to come to be as the design process 
imagines it to be. 
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60. In this way, technology and language participate in the revealing of certain 
modes of connectedness, perception and imagination. They bring people and 
things together by (re-)forming them and their thinking. In this light, language 
and technology, co-constitute the new polis in which people individuate 
themselves. 
 
61. Digital things allow interaction. In order for this interaction to take place, 
however, Dasein needs to be transferred into the digital realm. This metaphor 
takes place through an image that becomes Dasein (an avatar, a page, a trace) and 
is already embedded in a greater picture.  Dasein becomes a meta-datum that 
along with other metadata create the web that is in turn further exploited. In this 
respect, digital technologies form a Dasein that cannot be separated from the 
webpage it is embedded in and the flow of information it participates in. The self 
becomes part of the structure. This specific iteration of Dasein becomes part of the 
internet’s architecture and of Dasein’s selection criteria, which determine what is 
to be perceived or imagined. It is a formation (Bildung) of Dasein. 
 
62. In Building Dwelling Thinking, building, constructing and production in general 
produce the very experiences we have as dwellers -namely, nearness, remoteness 
and distancelessness. In this respect, building just like, or as technology, cannot 
be understood as a means to an end since it conditions the ‘there’ of our existence, 
imagination and thinking. Heidegger’s examples illuminate the way something 
like a bridge affords nearness and possibilities for thought. 
 
63.  Technologies co-create our ecologies, that is, our already-there. The self is 
transferred onto these technologies. Thus, we need to study metaphor further 
and, in fact, particularly in connection with modern digital technologies. 
 
64. Dasein is formed by the technology it uses. Katherine Hayles notes that digital 
technologies encourage short and instant connections instead of deep ones. This 
connectedness forms Dasein. However, education as Bildung is supposed to do 
the forming. Education should aim to deconstruct these technological images and 
assert its own.  
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65. But how has education confronted the question of technology so far? The field of 
educational technology relies too much on misleading metaphors, like the one 
about harnessing technology’s potential for learning. 
 
66. Education should position itself so that it can deconstruct some of these 
metaphors/images, set its own metaphors concerning learning and imagination, 
and experiment with new metaphors.  
  
1. Introduction  
 
From the future-centred closeness of the ready-to-hand to the poetic nearness of 
the jug and the distancelessness imposed by Gestell, Heidegger has consistently 
identified nearness, technology and thinking as the focal points of a much needed 
discussion. Dasein is characterised early on as the de-severing being that 
determines its position in relation to its temporal involvement; Dasein is close to 
whatever concerns it, that is, whatever is grasped by it as a specific something. In 
this respect, nearness coincides with perception: that which comes near as a 
specific something is what concerns us and can be perceived by us; nearness lets 
things be. Because of these connections I have not limited my attempts to 
understand nearness to Heidegger’s characteristic statements. In other words, I 
have purposefully read in his philosophy not so much his designations but the way 
he forms his thought and discusses it. It is especially the way he approaches the 
question of Being, which is his original concern, that underscores Being’s need to 
be supplemented though metaphor in order for it to be discussed.  
 
In Being and Time the process that is considered to allow the as structure is 
imagination, re-inscribed as temporality and Being; in other words, it is what lets 
things be or what I called the letting relationship. The possibility, however, for 
time to be ‘tainted’ by technology points to imagination’s disposition to be 
affected by technology, that is, to be supplemented. At the same time, it points to 
technology’s disposition to form circuits that allow the emergence of modalities 
of thought. In this respect, phantasia matters to thought: technology contributes to 
the as structure and, in consequence, space and embodiment are involved in 
technology’s own formation and use. Dasein as a being that is not yet the being it 
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can be is affected by a having-been that is inscribed technologically. This means 
that technology is itself ultimately what defines the retentions that affect the future.   
 
In the Kantbuch Heidegger’s early investigations of the nature of transcendental 
imagination indicate that perception, because of its intense reliance on the future 
and the past, is necessarily a modification that involves the productive power of 
imagination. Through the consideration of a series of other philosophers such as 
Husserl, Derrida and Stiegler, I pointed out that this modification needs to involve 
the technical realm that co-creates Dasein’s already-there and forms anticipation. 
In this respect, re-petition and re-presentation (Vorstellung) are involved in the 
presencing of any being, and technology is always-already inscribed in perception 
and conception.  In the Kantbuch Heidegger indicates that representation exists 
both in sensibility and understanding, but he later focuses on representation’s 
tendency to objectify beings that, in consequence, are made present to the subject. 
Representing makes it impossible to get to the things-themselves. Instead Dasein 
deals with images (eidos, idea). Heidegger thus underlines representation’s role 
for creating distance between ourselves and the true nature of things. In this way, 
representation appears to be a devalued copy of the thing itself and is set against 
the original image. In The Age of the World Picture Heidegger (1977a) expands 
on this: 
 
In distinction from Greek apprehending, modern representing, whose 
meaning the word repraesentatio first brings to its earliest expression, 
intends something quite different. Here to represent [vor-stellen] means 
to bring what is present at hand [das Vor-handere] before oneself as 
something standing over against, to relate it to oneself, to the one 
representing it, and to force it back into this relationship to oneself as the 
normative realm. Whenever this happens, man “gets into the picture” in 
precedence over whatever is. But in that man puts himself into the 
picture in this way, he puts himself into the scene, i.e., into the open 
sphere of that which is generally and publicly represented. Therewith 
man sets himself up as the setting in which whatever is must henceforth 
set itself forth, must present itself [sich . . . präsentieren], i.e, be picture. 
Man becomes the representative [der Repräsentant] of that which is, in 
the sense of that which has the character of object. (pp. 131-132) 
 
On the opposite side of representation, lies the originary presencing of dwelling. 
Heidegger repeatedly attempts to come near to the nature of dwelling through 
metaphors that, as he warns us, should not be understood as metaphors, that is, as 
transfer of images. Taking into consideration that, in his reading of Plato’s 
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Allegory, Heidegger juxtaposes the image as copy to originary image as alētheia, 
there is plenty of evidence to assume that his own poetic-philosophical metaphors 
−which defamiliarise the world− are what he calls originary image. These 
metaphors constitute an alternative disclosure of the world that allows the 
perception of things in a new light, that is, that make possible the apophantic level 
of the as-structure, which is closely related to linguistic metaphor as I have 
discussed it in previous chapters. Where, however, does this leave us?  
 
The first type of metaphor, the one I called existential metaphor, refers to a 
transfer of the self onto things that implies a certain type of immediacy or 
nearness to things. With later Heidegger, I argued, this transfer is largely 
described as a kind of connectedness to things that implicates embodiment and 
learning. With texts like Parmenides (1998) and What is Called Thinking? (1968) 
Heidegger discusses this type of connectedness to the world. In order to do so, he 
contrasts handwriting, as the proper form of this nearness, and typewriting, as 
what reproduces predetermined, de-contextualised and disembodied images. The 
second type of production opens up a gap between Dasein and what Dasein 
produces. In Heidegger’s terms typewriting tears the hand from the realm of 
language and thinking. Of course, we can argue that both types of writing 
constitute a form of mediation that results in representation and repetition; 
handwriting is the repetition of letters and the reiteration of words. This would, 
however, be tantamount to the Derridean take on writing, which underlines the 
presentational possibility of representation, since every reiteration can be the 
illumination of meaning from a different perspective. Heidegger conversely, sees 
a qualitative difference between these types of writing: handwriting offers the 
possibility for an originary repetition, that is, an utterance that can potentially 
reveal an unfamiliar aspect of the world. By contrast, modern technology limits 
the possibility of unfamiliarity, allowing identical repetitions that turn the thing 
into an object. This is the point where Heideggerian destruction and Derridean 
deconstruction move away from each other: for Derrida the possibility of 
difference cannot be erased, whereas for Heidegger this very possibility 
constitutes the essence of modern technology. What then of digital technologies? 
This is precisely what needs to be investigated in this chapter, but this 
investigation needs to take place in connection with metaphor, since metaphor is a 
basic functionality of Dasein’s perception. Heidegger after all turns to another 
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metaphor in order to describe our time: man gets into the picture. Heidegger is 
obviously referring to another type of transfer or another type of connectedness 
that allows the domination of representation by including the one who does the 
representing within its boundaries. This process is now called digitisation. This 
process is a certain type of mathematical thinking that turns everything into a digit, 
while at the same time creating images the user can interact with, transfer 
themselves onto and eventually become a part of: that is, Dasein becomes en-
framed. In this light, digitisation is either the new nearness or distancelessness. 
With the discussion in Building Dwelling Thinking some of the dilemmas will be 
settled.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
2. Cyberspace, Embodiment and Metaphor 
 
Heidegger’s critique of the nearness afforded by modern technology assumes that 
originary nearness is not mediated by representative image. This is a very 
important point and in fact one we need to investigate. In the case of digital 
technologies not only does the user interact with representative images: she 
actually gets into the picture −as an avatar, trace or datum of some sort. The 
beginning of this experience, which echoes Nietzsche’s take on metaphor, is a 
transfer of the self to another place.  Margaret Wertheim (2002) argues: 
 
In some profound way, cyberspace is another place. Unleashed into the 
Internet, my “location” can no longer be fixed purely in physical space. 
Just “where” I am when I enter cyberspace is a question yet to be 
answered, but clearly my position cannot be pinned down to a 
mathematical location in Euclidian or relativistic space − not with any 
number of hyperspace extensions! (Wertheim, 2002, p. 228).    
 
The experience of being online has traditionally been understood as and through 
metaphor, that is, as transfer to some other place. Having in mind that any 
experience of Dasein is always already metaphorical, as I have argued so far, and 
that Heidegger himself uses metaphor to describe Dasein (being-there), there 
should be no cause for alarm when my tele-presence is understood as being-there, 
that is, metaphorically, as well. On the contrary, what this should tell us is that in 
both cases existence is understood metaphorically and beyond strict mathematical 
determinations of the body’s location. Heidegger’s understanding of Dasein as a 
being-there that is mediated by technology −in regard to its inauthentic aspects at 
least− clearly points to this. The problem, however, arises when we use 
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Heideggerian terminology to equate this specific technologically mediated being-
there with dwelling. Is online dwelling even possible? There appears to be a 
normative threshold in the Heideggerian theory around which being-there loses its 
possibility for authentic existence. In other words, there is a specific type of 
technology’s mediation, and especially the mediation of technologically produced 
images, that turns the possibility of nearness off: things cannot present themselves 
as they are; they are simply turned into representations.
53
 At the same time the 
individual becomes able to use them by turning itself into a representation, as I 
shall explain shortly.  
 
Tele-presence or digital presence is usually understood as an interaction with 
things that are not considered real things: they are bytes, images, digital 
representations. This type of interaction, is believed to make Dasein’s body 
redundant: Dasein needs to become immaterial in order to interact with 
immaterial things and thus needs to leave the body behind. Dasein substitutes the 
body with an image; it replaces its ‘real’ self with an avatar, a representation, an 
image. As the argument goes, this kind of being-there is, metaphorical (in the 
traditional sense): when I move in cyberspace I do not really move; I am 
implicated only indirectly in a representation of such movement; my being-there 
is simply a representation; it is an image. 
 
All these assertions interact with and co-constitute each other. Heideggerian 
theory can both sustain and dispense with them precisely because Heidegger’s 
interpretation of metaphor is vague. This is because, on the one hand, the 
philosopher criticises metaphor and on the other, his hermeneutics exists because 
of metaphor. My own interpretation is quite distinct from Heidegger’s, since, as I 
have argued, being-there is thoroughly metaphorical. Let us try to understand the 
reasons for this by turning first towards the differences between online and offline 
presence and between real and digital things. Are digital things not real? There 
are different paths to take here.  
 
First, there are those, with a Heideggerian background, such as Michael Eldred 
(2009), who support the idea that digital images are mathematically constituted 
                                                 
53
 Of course, by ‘representation’ I do not mean something which is opposite to the thing-in-itself, 
but a different synthesis of the thing, which is extremely limited when contrasted to other such 
types of synthesis. 
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entities and that the ‘digital dissolution of beings in progress today’ is nothing but 
‘the consummation of the mathematical casting of being’, which as a way of 
thinking has defined the realms of the physical sciences as well as the constitution 
of the world itself (p. 9). ‘The distilling of numbers out of physical beings’, 
Eldred continues,  
 
opens up the possibility of calculating with numbers; they are open to 
λογισμός but at the price (or the advantage) of becoming placeless and 
positionless. Such a lack of place and position, it seems, characterizes 
the digital beings which we deal with today. For them, matter in its 
continuity and fixedness with place becomes indifferent. (p. 13) 
 
Eldred, of course, is right in identifying the abstraction that comes about from 
mathematical thinking, and he, in fact, describes the effects of distancelessness 
already implied in our earlier discussion.  Heidegger (1971e), as we saw, 
identified the paradoxical situation of our world, that is, a world in which, on the 
one hand, distances are shrinking and, on the other hand, the experience of 
nearness is vanishing.  The tendency towards abstraction, he argued, is at the heart 
of the West’s decline and it has led to the emergence of the new science of 
cybernetics – a science he understood as ‘the theory of the steering of the possible 
planning and arrangement of human labor’. He also argued that: ‘Cybernetics 
transforms language into an exchange of news. The arts become regulated-
regulating instruments of information’ (Heidegger, 1972, p. 58).  
 
Such a critique, however, focuses more on the process of digitisation than on 
actual interaction with specific digital objects. Digital objects, it should be 
remembered, are things that are used by beings in a world. They may be 
questioned on the ground of their supposed lack of materiality, locality and 
substance, but they cannot be questioned on the grounds of their phenomenality 
and meaningfulness. By this I do not mean that digital things are necessarily 
valuable objects. They are, however, objects of our intentionality; they appear to 
us as phenomena synthesised in a meaningful context. Both the ‘real’ − or the 
edible apple − and the ‘digital’ apple are objects of our intentionality. This is even 
more true for the ‘real’ and the ‘digital’ book, and, in fact, in this case the 
difference shrinks dramatically. The way this elimination of difference takes place 
is of critical importance and needs to be pursued phenomenologically in order to 
examine the way these beings appear to us. 
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Let us consider Joohan Kim’s (2001) attempt to proceed to such an account. First, 
he sees digital beings as either ‘informative’ or ‘executable’. The first category 
consists of things that provide ‘various sorts of sensory data such as texts, sounds, 
still images, 3-D images, moving images, virtual reality, even “touch” or any 
combination of these’, and the second consists of ‘either “tools” (Werkzeug) with 
certain “handiness” (Zuhandenhiet), or a combination of tools rendering 
“equipmental contexture”’ (p. 90). Executable digital beings such as word-
processors, he adds, are run by computers, and they ‘provide certain “space” for 
working’ (ibid.).  Digital things, on Kim’s account, ‘have no determinable 
spatiotemporality’ because they are ‘perfectly duplicable’ (pp. 98, 99). He does, 
however, detect certain thing-qualities that digital things have, such as ‘durability’. 
For example, I can use a word-processor to write something, save and then reopen 
in order to change it once more.  Digital things also ‘have certain degrees of 
substantiality – colors and “quasi extensions” such as length, height and depth as 
well as surface properties like brightness, hardness, glossiness, and so on’ (p. 91). 
Additionally, they have ‘certain degrees of “thing-totality” of a “sensibly 
perceptible object”‘ (Heidegger, 1992, p. 43, cited in ibid., p. 91). Digital-things 
have, more importantly, a ‘quasi-bodily presence: a digital-being is not always a 
sign. In other words, digital-beings exist not only as a sign for other things, but 
they also exist for themselves’ (pp. 92-93). And digital things like websites also 
have the ability to be an ‘environing world’ (Umwelt) for users allowing them to 
dwell there. Kim says ‘I “dwell” in this “intelligible functionality whole” called 
the Web’ (p. 96).   
 
But of course, it can be argued, and this takes us back to the prevalent argument 
about cyberspace, that despite the meaningfulness of digital things our interaction 
with them is disembodied. It does appear that we leave the body behind in order to 
be transferred in cyberspace and this matter needs to be addressed. But is this 
something that happens online or is the privation of the body a presupposition for 
all experience?  In the Zollikon Seminars Heidegger (2001) pays heed to this 
phenomenon. He says: 
 
When the philosopher Thales, lost in thought, walked along a road, fell 
into a ditch, and was ridiculed by some servant girl, his body was in no 
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way ‘lost in space.’ Rather, it was not present. As in the case above, 
precisely when I am absorbed in something ‘body and soul,‘ the body is 
not present.  
Yet, this ‘absence’ of the body is not nothing, but one of the most 
mysterious phenomena of privation. (2001, p. 85) 
 
Discussions concerning the privation of the body online tend to neglect the fact 
that privation is necessary for any kind of connectedness to take place. The body 
as discussed by Merleau-Ponty (1964) acts as a medium for our interactions in the 
world by making itself simultaneously available and absent. We thus need not 
forget that digital tools, similarly to traditional tools, need bodiliness to make a 
connection: handling the mouse, for example, works similarly to opening a book; 
after the connection has been established the possibility opens also for wandering 
into wider virtual realms. This privation is then a kind of gesture that is co-
constitutive of transfer or metaphor. Privation is constitutive of the ‘bodying forth 
of the body’. Heidegger explains that 
 
we must characterize all comportment of the human being as being-in-
the-world, determined by the bodying forth of the body. Each movement 
of my body as a “gesture” and, therefore, as such and such a 
comportment does not simply enter into an indifferent space. Rather, 
comportment is always already in a certain region [Gegend]* which is 
open through the thing to which I am in a relationship, for instance, 
when I take something into my hand. (pp. 90- 91) 
 
 
We can argue, then, that there is a kind of transfer afforded by embodiment but 
not of embodied nature that is in fact prevalent in cyberspace. Embodiment works 
like imagination; it is an openness that receives but needs to withdraw itself in 
order to do so. This takes place in cases like reading a book or working on a 
digital text. Users already inhabit the things they interact with in this specific dis-
embodied manner. Books like all tools act as signs: they refer to other tools and 
other networks. This process is easily transferred online. Dasein being ahead-of-
itself is always looking for the next tool or the next link, and this is why 
hypertexts are so easily coupled with Dasein. The link, just like the tool, refers the 
user to a different link, and this can carry on indefinitely since the links 
themselves, just like tools, are structured as a toward-which, always directed 
towards the future. The web is a constant referral, a constant towards-which. The 
World Wide Web becomes a boundless workshop. Whatever exists, from the 
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simplest link to the most effective search engine, is built to perform this function; 
to refer to the next result or to bring the next thing near. This is how Dasein as 
ahead-of-itself comports itself.  
 
The WWW is built in order to respond to Dasein’s inherent propensity towards 
nearness. However, I criticised this type of closeness, at least as presented in BT, 
precisely because it emphasised the constant urge for the next project but failed 
adequately to expound what things do when we dwell in their nearness. Heidegger 
offered such descriptions when he talked about the thing as gathering. But can 
digital things, like social media, blogs, bookmarking tools, and presentation 
software, be such things and promote practices of gathering, or are they destined 
to remain workshops? Are, indeed, gathering practices possible online, especially 
when a prolonged privation of the body is sustained? Can we be dwellers equally 
offline and online when, in the latter case and as in the case of a hallucination or 
dream, disembodiment of this type carries on for long stretches of time? Is this 
kind of disembodiment what allows virtuality? Can image substitute the rich 
engagement that more embodied practices afford, and if it can, what are the 
effects of this process? Heidegger’s critique in Parmenides appears to suggest that 
it is Dasein that is precisely levelled off with disembodied involvement, and even 
in the Zollikon Seminars he explains that the thing that I have at hand opens the 
region I can interact with. This means that the kinds of things I interact with co-
constitute the type of relatedness I have to the world. Can then the something 
‘typed’ afford existential metaphor? Does image terminate the possibility of this 
transfer or does it suggest the identical repetition of a type of transfer that levels 
off experience? In other words, is it possible for some technologies to short-circuit 
imagination so that every repetition leads into sameness? This possibility would 
be equal to the end of differance.  In order to respond to these questions we need 
to understand what, for later Heidegger, embodiment is.  
  
In the Zollikon Seminars Heidegger explains that the grasping of the hand offers a 
double sensation: it simultaneously grasps and is grasped. In this light, the 
grasping of my hand is for me to be both a ‘subject’ and an ‘object’, or, to put it in 
other terms, it is being Dasein when the Da refers to a compositional quality that 
precedes dualities like belonging to a world and having a world, or being in a 
world and thinking about the world. The hand can be thought as the first 
 198 
exteriorisation of the human being since, in contrast to the mouth, which earlier in 
life allows the small child to grasp an object, it can be viewed. When the hand 
grasps something that belongs to the ‘outside’ world, it allows the interiorisation 
of this world. The hand is what makes me human. My hand, precisely because it is 
a hand in this world, can grasp it as a world. This constitutes my taking place in 
this world; this is the Da of Dasein. Because of the hand, Dasein is the de-
severant being. But is this the first existential metaphor? Is Being the constant 
transfer into things? Is this nearness? Is the body that which transfers, and is it the 
transferable at the same time? Is the body the initiator of metaphor, as Lakoff and 
Johnson (1980) assert? If this is the case then originary transfer does not need 
images to take place. And if this is the case, then modern technology, with its 
great reliance on images, should constitute a completely different process. But is 
this right? Is not the body itself mediated by the image? Merleau-Ponty’s (1964) 
phenomenological distinction between body-image and body-schema directs us 
towards an answer. According to him,    
 
We grasp external space through our bodily situation. A ‘corporeal or 
postural schema’ gives us at every moment a global, practical, and 
implicit notion of the relation between our body and things, of our hold 
of them. A system of possible movements, or “motor projects,” radiates 
from us to our environment. Our body is not in space like things; it 
inhabits or haunts space. It applies itself to space like a hand to an 
instrument, and when we wish to move about we do not move the body 
as we move an object. We transport it without instruments as if by 
magic, since it is ours and because through it we have direct access to 
space. For us the body is much more than an instrument or a means; it is 
our expression in the world, the visible form of our intentions. Even our 
most secret affective movements, those most deeply tied to the humoral 
infrastructure, help to shape our perception of things. (p. 5, emphasis 
added) 
 
The use of instruments extends the body’s ability to inhabit space, just as the blind 
man’s cane becomes ‘an area of sensitivity, extending the scope and active radius 
of touch’ (p. 143). It is not that the blind man touches what the cane interacts with, 
but the cane’s mediation does not obstruct a connection from being made. The 
initiating power of the connection between the body-schema and the instrument 
makes further connections possible. The cane probably functions in the same way 
as the keyboard; through successive clicking, the user moves between places and 
is transferred into digital things. Merleau-Ponty’s  insight is very useful here. He 
writes: ‘To get used to a hat, a car or a stick is to be transplanted into them, or 
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conversely, to convert them into the bulk of our own body’. (ibid.) During this 
process ‘the body “turns onto things”’; it becomes a tabula to be inscribed and the 
necessary spacing for ‘infralanguage’ (Gil, 1998, cited in Hansen, 2003, p. 43). 
Gil explains: 
 
[I]t is in the body that the codes find their point of convergence and their 
first point of application: the very one that will allow language, and in 
particular symbolic language, to translate codes among themselves. This 
property of the body to be the home or the agent for the translation of 
signs can be designated by characterizing it as an infralanguage. (p. 129, 
cited in Hansen, 2006, p. 258)  
 
According to Gil the body’s surface is a Gestalt made out of many surfaces that 
relate to each other and to surfaces in the environment. It is precisely this relating 
that makes the connection itself possible. He writes: 
 
The space of the body is made of plates, exfoliations, surfaces, and 
volumes that underpin the perception of things. These spaces ‘contain’ 
the relations of the body to things, insofar as they are integrated in the 
body itself and insofar as they are translated among themselves. The 
elaboration of these spaces in the course of the development of an 
infant’s mobility and organic maturity implies their constitution as 
spaces decidable into other spaces ‒ that is, their constitution thanks to 
their activity of the decoder-body, or the infralinguistic body, each of 
which is thus connectable to others, associating, intermingling, and 
boarding according to the laws of a specific mechanism. (ibid.) 
 
In the light of this analysis, what is believed to be lost in cyberspace is a 
connection that is developmentally engraved on the human being; or, to put it in 
other terms, it is what makes the user a human being that exists through its 
possibility to be connected. This connectedness is the metaphor that turns the tool 
into the ready-to-hand; it is what allows things to come near, and as such it 
perseveres in cyberspace as well. The problem that is specific with digital 
technologies, however, is the following: if embodiment contributes to the 
constitution of the human being as that which allows the transfer onto things ‒that 
is, if nearness is the coupling between an embodied agent (like the craftsman) and 
a material thing (like the hammer)‒ how can this coupling take place in 
cyberspace? How can it take place where there is no place at all? How can taking 
place take place if Dasein is transferred not onto things but where there are no 
things at all?  Even though I have already pointed out the initiating role of the 
body for these practices, I need to deal with this question on its own terms, and for 
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this I need to stay within the Merleau-Pontean theory a little bit longer. For the 
French philosopher the body-image is necessary, even though derivative from the 
body-schema, since it ‘operates in a common, intercorporeal interactional domain’ 
(Hansen, 2006, p. 51). Merleau-Ponty describes this complicated interaction as 
experienced by the infant. He writes: 
 
It is a problem first of understanding that the visual image of his body 
which he sees over there in the mirror is not himself, since he is not in 
the mirror but here, where he feels himself; and second, he must 
understand that, not being located there, in the mirror but rather where 
he feels himself interoceptiveley, he can nonetheless be seen by an 
external witness at the very place at which he feels himself to be and 
with the same visual appearance that he has from the mirror. In short, he 
must displace the mirror image, bringing it from the apparent or virtual 
place it occupies in the depth of the mirror back to himself, whom he 
identifies at a distance with his interoceptive body. (1964, p. 129 cited in 
Hansen, 2006, p. 56) 
 
Hansen (2006) comments that ‘the mirror stage belongs within a broader 
developmental trajectory and concretely instantiates the more fundamental 
experience of essential separation that Merleau-Ponty will increasingly identify 
with embodied (human) being.’ (p. 56) This experience is necessary for the 
construction of a self that is constituted through connectedness as responsiveness 
to the image. Hansen attributes ‘the essential adherence of the visual image ‒and 
the power of imaging as such‒ to the ontogenesis of the phenomenal body.’ (p. 
57). In this respect, the image is constitutive of embodiment since it defines the 
realm of potential action.  
 
The discussion as unfolded thus far suggests that the discourse of online 
disembodiment, which has assumed the clichéd guise of ‘leaving the body behind’, 
is a metaphor that conceals the synergetic role of body and image for the 
constitution of presence, which is always a form of tele-presence, that is, being 
present from afar as the Greek tele-stem suggests. This is not to suggest that the 
presence of an avatar, which reflects my decisions, causes the same feeling as the 
reflection of my own body in a mirror or even on screen. But it is one strong 
indication that embodiment’s constitution relies on image and technological 
mediation. In this light, tele-presence is a different iteration of this process instead 
of being its annihilation.  
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Research from neuroscientists such as Dieter Lohmar (2005) has just begun to 
uncover the strong connection between image and embodiment. Other researchers 
like G. Rizzolatti and V. Gallese, who conduct research on the function of neurons 
located in the ‘premotor cortex’ ‒that is, the ‘part of our brain which controls 
motor activities such as walking, gripping, turning and pulling’‒ found out that 
some of these neurons record other animals’ movements and that ‘(t)his activation 
provokes identically the same pattern of neuronal activity as appears in movement 
of one’s own body’. For this reason, ‘these neurons are called mirror neurons’. (p. 
163). Lohmar (2006) adds that similar results have been reported when human 
subjects are tested, explaining that  
 
neurons are activated and act in the same way regardless if it is I that 
does the grasping or someone that I watch. This means ‘Visually 
registering a specific movement of another animal provokes the same 
pattern of neuronal activity as appears in the analogous movements of 
one’s own body.’ (p. 7).   
 
Lohmar (2005) possibly sees this connection since he traces the empirical results 
back to Husserl’s belief that  
 
our access to the other’s mind starts from our experiences of the relation 
of our physical body (Körper) to our lived body (Leib), i.e. the body that 
is animated by our feelings, cognitions and volitions. The same relation 
is then transferred analogically to the complete outer appearance of the 
other’s physical body (Körper) and his subjective willings and feelings 
(p. 164).   
 
This is precisely the realm of existential, proto-linguistic metaphor, which is part 
of the development of the self and is initiated by the mirror. As Hansen points out, 
image creates a ‘kind of identity at a distance, a ubiquity of the body; the body is 
at once present in the mirror and present at the point of where I feel it tactually’ (p. 
139). In this light, distance is experienced as an original chasm between tactility 
and sight that is opened up by image-producing objects like mirrors. These objects, 
in turn, function as bridges between me and what I see. This for Hansen is a 
thoroughly technological process. In Stiegler’s understanding, it is prosthesis. 
Hansen writes:   
 
If the self-exfoliation of the phenomenal body occasioned by the 
specular image is a thoroughly technical process, it does not, however, 
introduce technics into embodiment as if for the first time. No more a 
fall into technics than (pace Lacan) a fall into social alienation, worldly 
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specularization merely instances the concrete technical conditions for the 
phenomenalization of embodiment at any given historical moment in 
what Bernard Stiegler has called the history of the supplement. If there is 
a history of specularization, that is precisely because embodied life is 
‘essentially’ technical, because the generalization of specularity always 
already implicated in the concrete operation of the body schema finds its 
enabling, sensible-transcendental or infraempirical condition in the écart 
constitutive of sensibility. We could equally say that technologies are 
always already embodied, that they are in their own way ‘essentially’ 
embodied, if by this we mean that they mediate ‒that they express‒ the 
primordial fission, the gap, within the being of the sensible.’ (p. 59) 
 
In this respect, in cyberspace the body cannot be left behind because it is the one 
that opens up the possibility for connectedness in the first place. What is more, 
even digital technologies that rely on representational processes can afford 
embodied action, albeit of a different kind. Digital images can become the mirror-
traces of the body-schema embedded in virtual space. These traces, no matter how 
abstract they get to be, can serve as images of the body and contribute to the 
constitution of embodiment; they become the inscriptions of the body-schema on 
the electronic mirror, and it is for this reason and because of this new coupling 
that we can be-there in the digital realm.  
 
Mirrors, however, just like perception, do not merely reflect –as if such a neutral 
process ever existed. Mirrors construct. Electronic mirrors construct according to 
design. To put it in other terms, there is never a neutral representation. Online 
representation is an image that is selectively constructed according to the desires 
and intentions of design. Similarly, the spaces created are not mere 
representations of places: they are constructions of places. It is for this reason that 
discussions concerning the reality of ‘virtual spaces’ are irrelevant to what is at 
stake here. Stiegler (2011), in fact, mentions ‘virtual space’ in quotation marks, 
explaining that he  
 
put(s) these words in quotation marks because we are now faced with a 
metaphor that can conceal the real dynamics of the process at work here. 
‘Virtual spaces’ are the sum total of retentional data, physically retained 
on/in digital supports that are inaccessible without the mediation of a 
representational mechanism for their information, constructing an 
intuitive image using interfaces to represent and render these unreadable 
material states manipulable by a nonprofessional consciousness ‒ and 
this is not in any case a matter of ‘immateriality,’ a concept that is 
frequently bandied about and that means absolutely nothing. (p. 136) 
 
 203 
Heidegger’s concerns regarding the metaphysical structure of metaphor are 
echoed in Stiegler’s discussion. The term ‘virtual space’ is supported by several 
Platonic dichotomies −thing and idea, matter and form, actuality and potentiality, 
for example− that should not affect the existential analysis of being-online. 
Heidegger’s concerns about the stillness inherent in metaphor seem justified by 
this. Metaphors of the leaving the body behind type create the frame through 
which intelligibility is currently taking place, and in this light digital technology 
does nothing less than embody Platonist theories. Digital objects can be viewed as 
immaterial forms or prototypes that define everything else. In this way, Cartesian 
dreams come to life; cyberspace is the realm where the mind wanders free from 
the constraints of the body. But should we not wonder about the fact that we use 
metaphors of spatialisation in order to get to grips with the supposed absolute 
absence of space in cyberspace? Spatial metaphors point to the complicated ways 
that exist in order for the human being to experience something as something. 
They also illuminate the interaction between existential metaphor and linguistic 
metaphor and point to the way that the revealing and concealing powers of 
language and technology are constantly intertwined. Existential metaphor 
suggests an immediate transfer onto things that is defined by the nature of these 
things, that is, by the type of technology used. Technology, however, is getting 
more and more complicated, making it extremely difficult for us to understand the 
way this process takes pace. At the same time, language can interfere, making this 
process even more obscure.    
 
An example of language’s ‘interference’ comes from design. Werner Kuhn (1996) 
notes that ‘user interfaces use spatial concepts, even if the application domains are 
not spatial’. (p. 1) During this process, which is called ‘spatialization’, designers 
rely on people’s lived experiences of space and purposefully use spatial 
metaphors in order to effect similar experiences. According to Kuhn, this is 
because ‘Metaphors create ontologies in applications by projecting structure from 
the source domain. A useful ontology is one that leads to an appropriate work 
division and effective ways of solving problems’. (p. 2) Metaphors, it can be said, 
create affordances, prescriptions of what something can do with these 
technologies. ‘For example, an office document affords filing or throwing away 
and the desktop metaphor maps these affordances to computer file manipulations’. 
(p. 3) For this reason, Kuhn (1991) explains that ‘interface metaphors are a 
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conceptual, not only a presentational device’ (cited in Kuhn, 1996, p. 2). In other 
words, these metaphors build our thought instead of merely representing what is 
already there. The already-there is, in fact, co-constituted by metaphor. This is 
because the user as an embodied being supplements experience with spatial 
structures where it deems it necessary. This structure is then lived as embodied 
experience. This means that ‘‘information requires a frame to be constituted as 
information, and that a frame is provided by the active constitution and assembly 
of human embodiment’ (Lenoir, 2006, cited in Hansen, 2006, xxii-xxiii).  
 
The complicated way metaphor constructs online spaces is now quite clear. 
Existential metaphor can at stages be proto-linguistic, as in the case of early 
human development, but it can also function as the source domain so that other 
metaphors can be drawn, perhaps even linguistic ones. Linguistic metaphor can be 
part of the metaphysical tradition, as in the case of ‘leaving the body behind’, or it 
can be a structure that familiarises an unknown object by defamiliarising a known 
one and thus offering new perceptions of the world. In this light, we can infer that 
embodiment is possible even in the context of the most disembodied 
environments, since metaphor, which is always constitutive of existence, works 
through image. This makes tele-presence possible, but does it afford dwelling as 
well?   
 
Existential metaphor, as I have shown, promotes a kind of passive and perhaps 
immediate learning. In the case of digital tools, however, learning should not be 
expected to be immediate. Digital things do not, after all, reveal their affordances 
in the way that a hammer does since they lack the tool’s easily accessible 
possibility for handling. On the contrary, their affordances are constructed through 
metaphors offered by technology and language. In this case affordances need to be 
‘read’, decoded and learned.  
 
It is for this reason that the nature of the digital image needs to be investigated 
further. The real question here, however, has nothing to do with the reality of 
virtual space or digital things. The real question concerns the construction of these 
things, the connectedness they allow, and the practices they encourage. A term 
like ‘virtual space’ can easily disorient the discussion since a virtual thing is by 
definition not real, or at least so the name implies. The truth is, however, that 
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virtual spaces are conceptual and existentially lived constructions designed to 
promote certain modes of bringing-near (connectedness) that ultimately create our 
new polis, that is, the spaces of our being-there. The ‘straightforward’ 
representation of geographical space turns into the sci-fi fantasy of the avatar of 
Second Life (SL). The user is offered the means to build a self through the 
construction of an ecology. The building blocks of that ecology, however, already 
contain the possibilities of the structure to be made. Bringing-close is redefined 
according to a logic of representation that indexes you and puts you into a picture 
already painted for you. This new ecology is, in effect, a new kind of polis, whose 
marketing is predicated on the belief that every citizen has participated in this 
design, that every user has individuated themselves. 
 
Several decisions need to be made for the design and the construction of this 
communal space. These decisions are made based on the characteristics of the 
targeted user-populations and thus, it can be assumed, are political in nature. 
Designing these spaces should be understood more in terms of designing a bridge 
than a hammer. This design defines the kind of retentions needed and thus 
enforces a certain type of connectedness that concerns such a great number of 
users that it becomes the new thoroughfare for interaction, a new arena for 
individuation. This fact has, of course, tremendous interest for every social 
institution and especially for education. In what follows, instances of digital 
technologies are investigated through a certain Heideggerian perspective that 
incorporates the Stieglerian critique and this thesis’s focus on metaphor. In this 
light, digitisation is understood as the technology of nearness par excellence.   
 
3. Technologies of Nearness 
 
Digital technologies like social networking sites possess many of the 
characteristics Heidegger attributes to tools: they are ready-to-hand and used 
without theoretical contemplation. They also act as nodes in greater networks that 
bring other human beings and things closer. Most importantly, digital things can 
act as signs that refer to other signs in the grand structure of the internet. They are 
thus references that produce connectivity with a simple click and allow the 
emergence of nearness through predetermined digitalised hyperlinks. However, 
they also possess and, in fact, are created as mnemotechnics: they retain memories 
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that define their scope and mode of connectivity. Their essence is prescribed by 
the kinds of memories they retain. In this light, digital technologies, similarly to 
other technologies, constitute our already-there: that is, they constitute a pros-
thesis that is not chosen but inherited by us.  
 
Digital tools can also function as prosthesis in the Merleau-Pontean sense. In 
other words, they are Dasein’s extensions into the virtual realm. This takes place 
as a transfer of Dasein. Even though in this case the body does not respond with a  
limitless variety of practices, it certainly functions as what allows Dasein’s 
coupling with immaterial information. This coupling is what interests us here 
since it is precisely this that allows Dasein to ‘get into the picture’. It is a process 
of metaphora that works through images and turns the individual into image. 
Heidegger is perhaps the first to address this matter, but his theory needs to be 
supplemented by Stiegler’s interpretation in order fully to understand this 
process’s effects on thinking.  
 
As pointed out in previous chapters, Stiegler (1998), being influenced by Husserl, 
argues that what has passed contributes to the anticipation of what is to be 
received, experienced and imagined. What has just passed can potentially be 
anything that exists. Understanding this becomes possible only with the advent of 
identical repetition. Before the gramophone a human being was not able to hear an 
identical temporal object twice. With this technology, however, infinite repetitions 
are possible. Yet repetition does not equal the reception of the same temporal 
object since when we listen to the same melody for the second time our past 
experiences shape our selection criteria for what is to be heard: the already-there 
constructs our anticipation of the future. This is, how the tool forms memory and 
attention as a ‘pros-thesis’ that is already set in front of us not only spatially but 
also temporally: it guides our future by supplementing ourselves and constructing 
possibilities of becoming something different. In our age, however, Stiegler (2011) 
argues, it is the culture industries, the media or even technologies in general that 
form our experience, impose their selection criteria on us and thus constitute the 
milieu in which we live. In order to understand this process we need to turn to 
some examples. 
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Search engines work on the premise that a disparate and abundant field of online 
information needs to be filtered in order for relevant information to be provided to 
the individual user. This access to information is not merely a matter of 
representation but a movement determined by a structure of specification that 
selects the criteria determining relevance. Google’s search engine, for example, 
works through the following three steps: first, the Googlebot, a web crawler, 
accesses pages, either by crawling from link to link or via their URL, and 
downloads them in Google’s browsers. Then the indexer ‘sorts every word on 
every page and stores the resulting index of words in a huge database’ so that the 
query processor ‘compares your search query to the index and recommends the 
documents that it considers most relevant’ (Blachman and Peek, 2007). Relevance 
of texts is determined by a ‘judgement’ made by PageRank, which is an 
agglomeration of more than a hundred selection criteria ‘including the popularity 
of the page, the position and size of the search terms within the page, and the 
proximity of the search terms to one another on the page’ (Blachman and Peek, 
2007). As a patented algorithm, Google’s PageRank cannot be revealed in its 
entirety, but we do know that it ‘gives more priority to pages that have search 
terms near each other and in the same order as the query’ (Blachman and Peek, 
2007). Emphasis on popularity, proximity and measured presence suggests that 
PageRank relies on an identity principle. Information resembling what is searched 
for is judged more relevant and, hence, graced with more presence, whereas 
information more obliquely related, though potentially more significant, is 
marginalised. That the popularity of a page is one of the selection criteria suggests 
that search engines maintain a hierarchy of information interpreted in the modality 
of the representation of results. This means, however, not only that the top ten are 
considered the most relevant but also that their being visited on this basis gives 
them yet more visibility and, thus, presence. Even though individual searches vary, 
results tend to homogenise and, therefore, to define what is to be searched for. It is 
for this reason that, as Lucas D. Introna and Helen Nissenbaum (2000) argue, ‘not 
only are most users unaware of these particular biases [selection criteria], they 
seem also to be unaware that they are unaware’ (p. 176). In this light, and despite 
the common belief that online information is accessed without constraints, the 
truth is that the modality of its access takes on the characteristics of ‘presence’ 
offline: things that are hard to find offline probably will remain so online. 
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Otherwise put, the presentation of information by search engines is a re-
presentation that hides the fact that it is a representation: it excludes information 
in order to give the selected item greater presence. Representation thus becomes a 
matter of political importance since, in concealing its own nature, it masquerades 
as presencing. ‘Memory is,’ as Stiegler (2009) puts this, ‘always the object of a 
politics, of a criteriology by which it selects the events to be retained’ (p. 9). 
 
Online retentions are inscribed by each and every search. This is at the heart of the 
criteriology search engines employ. When search engines offer additional services, 
such as email accounts and social networking (including such applications as 
profiles, photos, posts, etc.), the user’s online activity is turned into index material 
that enables the customisation of the search. This is supposedly personalisation, as 
are those ‘autocomplete’ Google functions that not only provide results but also 
generate queries by completing search words even before they are typed. Those 
retentions that are supposedly inscribed by me, constituting my ‘already-there’, 
become criteria of my search: they synthesise my protentions and construct my 
anticipation displacing the exercise of imagination. Accordingly Google tells us: 
‘If you’re signed in to your Google Account and have Web History enabled, the 
algorithm may show some predicted queries based on searches that you’ve done 
in the past,’ adding the frail reassurance that ‘Data that you send to Google is 
protected by Google’s privacy policy.’(Google, 2013) Despite possible gains in 
terms of time, this process can lock you into a certain temporality in which the 
has-been does not simply contribute in the formation of anticipation but fully sets 
it in order: it suspends possibilities of difference, deferral and deviation in the 
search, leaving the searcher doomed to return to the same, to an identity routinely 
reinforced by recurrent retentions. This is a technique common to web portals. 
Robert Luke (2003) invokes the panoptikon in order to explain this in detail: 
 
As we are enticed to increase browsing and/or spending habits according 
to what is on the network, we are also influenced by (while we influence) 
the market. We become the market even as we track the market via W3 
and W4 portals: ‘the technical structure of the archiving archive also 
determines the structure of the archivable content in its very coming into 
existence and in its relationship to the future. The archivization produces 
as much as it records the event’ (Derrida, 1995a, p. 17). The archive has 
a direct relationship to the future in so far as the past habits are re-
presented for future consumption. That is, the habit is an archive wherein, 
while we watch stock quotes filter through our portals, we are tracked in 
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this watching in a panoptic, pan info con becomes the archive even as we 
create it, add to it, participate within it. (p. 335) 
 
Selection is indeed manipulated by economic and political criteria since 
influential organisations, companies or even historical events can gain presence. 
This is illustrated by the fact, noted by Introna and Nissenbaum (2000), that ‘of 
the top 100 sites—based on traffic—just 6 are not .com commercial sites’ (p. 177). 
This puts into question the very idea of the internet as a public good: 
 
[S]earch engines . . . raise political concerns not simply because of the 
way they function, but also because the way they function seems to be at 
odds with the compelling ideology of the Web as a public good. This 
ideology portrays the fundamental nature and ethos of the Web as a 
public good of a particular kind, a rich array of commercial activity, 
political activity, artistic activity, associations of all kinds, 
communications of all kinds, and a virtually endless supply of 
information. In this regard the Web was, and is still seen by many as, a 
democratic medium that can circumvent the hegemony of the traditional 
media market, even of government control. (p. 178) 
 
The traces users leave behind and the filters of what is to be retained raise ethical 
and political questions. They shape the nature of where we live and the limits of 
our world. When we enter the picture, we become part of this world and subject to 
its limits, and this intensifies in the case of other digital technologies. It 
determines what comes near. 
 
Internet users are invited to produce tags, keywords, indexations and 
annotations of all kinds for this ‘new screen,’ which becomes a 
collaborative effort, what one calls Web 2.0 and which constitutes the 
participative architecture of an infrastructure itself based on cloud 
computing. This has led to an age of the bottom-up production of 
metadata, which in turn constitutes a radical novelty in the history of 
humanity. (Stiegler, 2009, p. 52) 
 
The movement of nearness through representation comes to its apogee with social 
networking sites. The user gets into the picture, (re)constructing themselves in the 
digital image. Dichotomies between self and tool, tool and environment, and 
representation and presentation intertwine in a single system of self-construction. 
Social networking sites offer infinite possibilities for self-inscription, and these 
can become techniques of nearness. Their manner of bringing close derives from 
the inseparability of the self from its representation, the inseparability of Dasein 
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(being-there) from its Da (there). Facebook, for example, demands the constant 
renewal of presence with the following options: 
 
 Create your profile (by posting of personal details about your place of 
residence, work placement, education, date of birth, relationship status, 
sexual interest, languages spoken). Include an ‘about me’ section showing 
what is unique about you. Automatic notifications will be sent to your 
friends each time you update your profile. 
 Update your status by posting a comment about your life. 
 Post photos and create albums. 
 Follow threads by posting comments on a friend’s wall. Log in to read the 
comments other users have left. 
 
To a significant extent, this constant self-representation and supposed 
personalisation of the page happens involuntarily. Facebook sets its own demands 
and criteria for representation. All these techniques, constantly updated, while 
many others, constantly added, allow you to customise your page and thus create 
your own personalised habitat. Given longer duration or granted presence on the 
web, things appear to come closer. You post a photo and a comment about what is 
going on in your life, and a thread of reactions has begun. For this to happen, 
however, that first post must be easily, quickly intelligible; it must be user-
friendly. Pensive remarks or complicated political views, for example, rarely 
provoke the responses that other posts do. 
 
If there is a stream of response, this first post will recur in your News Feed, and, if 
you choose ‘top stories’ instead of ‘most recent’ as your criterion of presentation, 
this will remain visible on Facebook. Top stories ‘are stories published since you 
last checked News Feed that we think you’ll find interesting. They’re marked with 
a blue corner and may be different depending on how long it’s been since you last 
visited your News Feed.’ (Facebook, 2013) As with search engines, specific 
selection criteria for a story to be considered ‘top’ are not made apparent. Yet 
what they result in is a synthesised construction of temporality (what is more 
recent) and significance (what is most important), and this is not a judgement 
made by you. Techniques such as these have real effects: Facebook makes 
decisions concerning the types of representations that build your supposedly 
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personalised environment. This is effected through a constant archiving and 
representing of your traces: it not only allows the inscription of traces as a 
construction of yourself but constantly rearranges these traces in order to 
strengthen your presence ‒ always on the pretext of bringing you closer to your 
friends and interests. This is the there where you are. 
 
With applications that allow you to view your page as it would be viewed by a 
friend or by the public ‒ offering representations of your interaction with other 
users (your friendship history), collecting your traces and turning them into the 
retentions that create your Facebook history, and presenting this as a ‘timeline’ ‒ 
this constitutes a complicated new profiling where posts, photos, and preferences 
are presented as your life. These applications have one common imperative: 
connect and be connected; activate potential connections to make your online 
presence stronger and more interesting. This has been there from the start with 
‘People you may know’ and ‘Find friends’, but there is increasing urgency to 
make visible the greater network of which you are evidently a part by representing 
it online. The notion of bringing-close is increasingly turned into the potentiality 
for representations and the insertion of the constructed self into this greater picture. 
You then become, so it seems, the creator, and the focal point of the network or 
picture to which you belong. Yet nothing could be further from the truth. 
Everybody and no one is at the centre, and our personalised ecology is the product 
of what are in effect commercial decisions determining the selection criteria for 
our representations.   
 
In this respect, being online becomes a very limited being-there (Dasein) that is 
inseparable from its world and the technological-metaphysical structure that 
allows for the synthesis of meaning. On the one hand, this asserts that the letting-
relationship is synthetic and mediated by technology, language and image as it 
always was. On the other hand, this letting-relationship becomes very constricted 
since what is to be received is predetermined not simply by my memories but by 
the selection criteria that define the way as to which I represent and conduct 
myself and also the way I experience my spatiotemporal situatedness. Another 
way to look at this is through the metaphor of the bridge that Heidegger uses in 
Building Dwelling Thinking. 
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3.1.  The Digital Bridge: Facebook, Nearness and Metaphor  
In Building Dwelling Thinking Heidegger (1971a) asserts that building is not a 
means towards dwelling, but on the contrary ‘to build is in itself already to dwell’ 
(p. 146). This assertion clearly confirms the very point introduced in The Thing, 
that is, building, constructing and in general producing, produce the very 
experiences we have as dwellers. In this respect, building, as a form of technology 
or as technology, cannot be understood as a means to an end, since in its own 
capacity building conditions the there of our being allowing further 
understandings and iterations of this being. Despite this important point, 
Heidegger quite early on in the text makes sure to underline the fact that ‘[i]t is 
language that tells us about the nature of a thing’ (p. 146) and thus proceeds to an 
etymology of the German word for building (Bauen) and the verb buan, which 
means to dwell. He comments that ‘ich bin’ means ‘I am’ and infers that: ‘The 
way in which you are and I am, the manner in which we humans are on the earth, 
is Buan, dwelling. To be a human being means to be on the earth as a mortal. It 
means to dwell.’ (p. 147). Heidegger then distinguishes between two different 
connotations of the verb: bauen, he argues, means ‘preserving and nurturing’, as 
in agriculture, but also ‘constructing’, as in ‘ship-building and temple-building’ (p. 
147). He also retrieves from the ‘Old Saxon word wuon’ the meanings of staying 
in place, ‘sparing and preserving’, that underline an attitude of responsiveness 
towards things that lets them be instead of submitting them to the will of the 
subject. It is only in this respect that we dwell as ‘mortals on earth’ or mortals in 
the fourfold (p. 149). In fact, Heidegger says: ‘Saving the earth does not master 
the earth and does not subjugate it, which is merely one step of spoliation’ (p. 
150). This message, however, exceeds its ecological connotations, which are 
indeed very powerful. Heidegger’s description of the fourfold’s mirroring, that is, 
its ability to receive the things as they are, refers, as I have already stated, to the 
categorial intuition. Dwelling refers, indeed, to perception, interpretation or the 
metaphorical movement into nearness, which is itself already a construction: 
‘Dwelling, insofar as it keeps or secures the fourfold in things, is, as this keeping, 
a building’ (p. 151). It is for this reason that the bridge as the ‘built thing’ receives 
special consideration in Building Dwelling Thinking (p. 152).  
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Heidegger explains that the bridge ‘gathers’ but also ‘leads’, thus pointing to the 
different ways constructions construct the experience of mortals, synthesising 
time and forming space (ibid.). He further explains:  
 
Bridges lead in many ways. The city bridge leads from the precincts of 
the castle to the cathedral square; the river bridge near the country town 
brings wagons and horse teams to the surrounding villages. The old stone 
bridge’s humble brook crossing gives to the harvest wagon its passage 
from the fields into the village and carries the lumber cart from the field 
path to the road. The highway bridge is tied into the network of long-
distance traffic, paced as calculated for maximum yield. Always and ever 
differently the bridge escorts the lingering and hastening ways of men to 
and fro, so that they may get to other banks and in the end, as mortals, to 
the other side. (pp. 152-153) 
 
Heidegger’s consideration of different types of bridges points to the fact that 
different constructions, which evidently refer to different historical epochs, 
constitute different processes of nearness to the world remaining, nonetheless, 
within the realm of the fourfold. His analysis also demonstrates that, the bridge is 
never an instrument but a mode of connectedness that constructs the very nodes of 
the network it creates, while concealing other nodes and modes of connectedness. 
It appears that for Heidegger technology builds thinking as implied in the title of 
this essay: Dasein is exteriorised onto the things it lives with, and this interaction 
circles back to make it human. This, however, is a clear affirmation that 
spatiotemporality is always already mediated by technology and that every 
technology contributes to a different mode of perception. Stiegler’s critique 
implies that Heidegger denies this, but with the later texts Heidegger’s 
ambivalence concerning technology is settled to a great degree. Modern 
technology, Heidegger asserts, is a mode of revealing in which human beings 
participate, but, contrary to other modes of revealing, modern technology 
challenges things forth instead of allowing them to be. What Heidegger does not 
tell us, however, is the precise way that this challenging forth takes place in the 
individual. This evasion can be attributed to Heidegger’s efforts to get rid of the 
metaphysical vocabulary that includes notions like subject and object, etc., but 
this obliges him to leave notions like imagination undiscussed. The deconstruction 
of his thought has, however, proved that imagination, Being, temporality, the 
letting relationship and nearness refer to the same realm of existence, which is 
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either more passive, as in the case of existential metaphor, or more active, as with 
linguistic metaphor.   
 
Heidegger’s position here is very assertive of technology’s contribution to the 
construction of the human condition. In fact, his focus on the bridge clarifies this 
further.  Heidegger claims that a bridge is ‘a thing of its own kind’ that ‘gathers 
the fourfold in such a way that it allows a site for it’ (p. 154). The bridge is a 
location and only such a thing can ‘make space a site’ (ibid.). This means that 
‘(t)he location is not already there before the bridge is’ but, on the contrary, ‘a 
location comes into existence only by virtue of the bridge’ (ibid.). This clearly 
suggests that technology becomes part of the hermeneutical structure and the very 
possibility of dwelling. In this way, Heidegger finally confirms the technological 
constitution of the already-there which opens up or synthesises a certain revealing 
of reality. This, however, suggests that there is a complicated relation between 
time, space, language, technology and embodiment. Therefore, human 
situatedness, which was equated in early and middle Heidegger with futural 
projection, is now understood as a spatio-temporal limit that both gathers and 
leads.    
 
The limit is very important in Heidegger. In fact, he argues that space is 
something set within boundaries, while he explains that a boundary according to 
its ancient Greek equivalent, namely, ‘peras’, ‘is not that at which something 
stops but, as the Greeks recognized, the boundary is that from which something 
begins its presencing.’ (p. 154) Boundaries allow for a unique way of being, and, 
in fact, multiple and differential ways of being. A thing within its own boundaries 
can be received imaginatively in many ways, but not in all possible ways. This 
allows it to maintain its own presencing.  
 
A spatio-temporal limit exhibits the capacity of gathering and leading. A house 
for example needs to have both walls and windows. Walls are needed for the 
house to be demarcated. Windows and doors are also needed in order to allow for 
connectedness with the rest of the world. Likewise buildings qua locations bring 
us into their nearness by maintaining farness. The networks these buildings allow 
to emerge do not connect every node. Farness is respected. The bridge gathers but 
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also crosses; it constitutes the perception of the possibility that comes from the 
future, but it also allows mortals to experience their unique situatedness. To 
understand space otherwise is to understand it as having any kind of possibility 
available, that is, any connectedness available; it is to turn space into extension, 
dimension, distance and mathematical grid. In this space any location is the same 
with any other, or rather locations do not exist at all. Places become points that 
exist nowhere in particular, and in consequence Dasein itself is turned into a point 
through the practices it enacts. For a point everything is equally far and equally 
near, not because there is no difference in distance but because the point’s own 
one-dimensionality does not let distance be experienced. Heidegger says, that this 
kind of space ‘contains no spaces and no places’ (p. 155). It is in this respect that 
technology is finally included in any potentiality of being and dwelling, 
authentically or not; ‘building is a distinctive letting-dwell’ (p. 159).  
 
In order to be able to dwell, our already-there needs not to restrict us. Heidegger 
says: ‘Only if we are capable of dwelling, only then can we build’ (p. 160). 
Thinking about building and dwelling is already a thinking originating from this 
dwelling, which corresponds to a certain type of building. This suggests a 
circularity, which is however imaginative and as already suggested metaphorical 
since it re-imagines the realities that allow it to exist. In this respect: ‘Building 
and thinking are, each in its own way, inescapable for dwelling’ (pp. 160-161). 
And it is for this reason that mortals ‘must ever learn to dwell’ (p. 161). How are 
we though to learn to dwell in digital times? Digital beings appear to be limitless; 
they seem to be connected to almost everything else and this suggests that their 
own presencing is somewhat different. Is dwelling with digital things and within 
digital ecologies possible or do they refer to a quite distinct realm of existence? 
The very metaphor of the bridge can lead us into this discussion. 
 
As already mentioned, in Building Dwelling Thinking Heidegger is concerned 
with the bridge as a ‘built thing’, but what he is really interested in is the 
possibility of dwelling in our current technologised ‘precarious age’ (p. 161). The 
question of dwelling is for him always in need of an answer. As he says: ‘The real 
plight of dwelling lies in this, that mortals ever search anew for the nature of 
dwelling, that they must ever learn to dwell’ (p. 161). In this respect, the metaphor 
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of the bridge is quite helpful but it is also quite a literal example of dwelling since 
dwelling itself requires for the most part built things, like bridges. Heidegger, as 
noted, leaves aside the house and moves on to examine the bridge, which ‘gathers, 
as a passage that crosses’ (p. 153). This distinct characteristic of the bridge; its 
ability to gather and lead seems to be shared by digital beings like Facebook, 
since the latter’s users, just like people crossing a bridge, are here and there 
‘always themselves on their way to the last bridge’ (ibid.). In this light, one of the 
most important characteristics of digital beings, that is, their hyperlinking nature 
simply simulates and exteriorizes Dasein’s ‘essential tendency towards closeness’, 
its characteristic inclination to experience the present through anticipation and its 
essential need to perceive imaginatively. As Heidegger might have put it, Dasein 
is always on its way to its next link, it is the here-there. Dasein is always in the 
process of being transferred somewhere else through a process of metaphor 
(metaphora) instead of representing. The way this takes place is described by 
Heidegger in what follows: 
 
Even when we relate ourselves to those things that are not in our 
immediate reach, we are staying with the things themselves. We do not 
represent distant things merely in our mind ‒as the textbooks have it‒ so 
that only mental representations of distant things run through our minds 
and heads as substitutes for the things. If all of us now think, from where 
we are right here, of the old bridge in Heidelberg, this thinking toward 
that location is not a mere experience inside the persons present here; 
rather, it belongs to the nature of our thinking of that bridge that in itself 
thinking gets through, persists through, the distance to that location. 
From this spot right here, we are there at the bridge ‒we are by no means 
at some representational content in our consciousness. From right here 
we may even be much nearer to that bridge and to what it makes room 
for than someone who uses it daily as an indifferent river crossing. (p. 
157) 
 
Anticipation is not a strictly temporal dimension of thinking; it is itself formed by 
the nature of Dasein’s specific spatial movement, the things with which it engages 
and the images that are inscribed in its memory. Nearness refers to the experience 
of a thinking that connects Dasein with the world while this connectedness is 
affected by the very things brought together. Things are not represented in 
Dasein’s mind; rather Dasein is transferred onto the things to which it is 
connected. In the same light, Facebook affords a kind of relatedness to things that 
are not in our immediate reach. This is, as it is obvious, not a novelty of the digital 
 217 
age; it is merely an image or metaphor of what has been happening all along, that 
is, Dasein’s ability to synthesise time through imaging. Facebook’s own images, 
however, form anticipation differently, since these images are different in the way 
discussed in the previous section. Therefore, Facebook leads in its own way, as all 
bridges do. It leads according to its own structures allowing for a dwelling that 
brings along the experience of a different death, which is lived by mortals who 
await different divinities and dwell on a new earth receiving things as certain 
things, taking in reality already burdened with meaning and already interpreted. 
This new dwelling, however, needs to be further clarified.  
 
Facebook, itself a complex digital being, allows navigation from link to link not 
only within its own limits but also, by continuously enhancing its own 
connectivity, within the limitless peripheries of the entire web. What is at stake, 
after all, is for Facebook to maintain and increase its popularity, and this can only 
become possible by its increasing the continuous clicking from link to link. But 
where does this ultimately lead us? Can this seeming boundlessness afford any 
possibility for gatheredness? The nature of digital beings can boil down to the fact 
that they possess a unique URL. Similarly a bridge can be located through a 
unique set of coordinates. In contrast, to the bridge, however, a digital being is 
accessible through this URL, regardless of the the user’s own location. Does this 
mean, then, that digital things are by definition boundary-less, placeless and 
timeless entities? On the one hand, this indeed appears to be a possibility. A 
digital thing, like Facebook, appears infinitely connectable and thus un-locatable. 
On the other hand, Heidegger himself notes that this is among the possibilities of 
the existential experience of space in general, since he says that ‘nearness and 
remoteness between men and things can become mere distance, mere intervals of 
intervening space’ (p. 155). In other words, geographical space can itself be 
extremely territorialized, timeless and placeless, and not only under extreme 
dictatorial conditions, but also under the influence of economic interests that make 
something selectively accessible. Langdon Winner (1980), for example, in his 
classic ‘Do Artifacts Have Politics?’ discusses the way that many bridges on Long 
Island are surprisingly low, in comparison with the standard American highway 
bridge. He then explains that this is not mere coincidence since the bridges were 
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designed and built by architect Robert Moses in such a way as to ‘discourage the 
presence of buses on his parkways’. This, he adds, reflects 
 
Moses’s social-class bias and racial prejudice. Automobile-owning 
whites of ‘upper’ and ‘comfortable middle’ classes, as he called them, 
would be free to use the parkways for recreation and commuting. Poor 
people and blacks, who normally used public transit, were kept off the 
roads because the twelve-foot tall buses could not get through the 
overpasses. One consequence was to limit access of racial minorities and 
low-income groups to Jones Beach, Moses’s widely acclaimed public 
park. Moses made doubly sure of this result by vetoing a proposed 
extension of the Long Island Railroad to Jones Beach. (pp. 123–124) 
 
In this light, highway bridges and digital bridges seem very well to be equally 
burdened with politics and selection criteria that define the way they are 
accessible. Bridges lead, after all, in their own ways. It could be argued, however, 
that highway or stone bridges do, in fact, lead to other bridges, other roads, other 
modes of transportation and connectedness. Is it, though, the case that 
connectedness, at least within the limits of Facebook’s territory   if there is such a 
thing  reveals new landscapes, weather conditions, feelings, aspirations and 
moods? In other words, does this form of connectivity allow for different 
syntheses of time? Does it allow things to be as they are by mirroring each other, 
or does it oblige the users to have identical experiences of time and space? Given 
the fact that Facebook’s feeds are given as discussed above and interaction is 
constrained mostly to liking and disliking, or even to the system’s own production 
and pre-selection of data, it does not seem possible to experience and participate 
in different modes of time-synthesis. A piece of news about a coup d'état is 
presented identically to a post about a friend’s new shoes. In this respect, 
Facebook does allow memories of different content to come into the system, and 
in fact ones to which the user can choose to relate or not, but the mode of 
connectedness tends to be monotonous obliterating other possibilities. In this light, 
Facebook, in contrast to the bridge, does not seem to lead     in terms of ways of 
thinking    anywhere but towards the reproduction of the very mode of thinking 
that constitutes it. It thus affords the representation of thinking instead of its 
creative and metaphorical movement. If, however, this is the way that Facebook 
leads, what is its way of gathering?  Heidegger says that a bridge    in fact, all 
different types of bridges     can gather the fourfold. He says: ‘The bridge gathers 
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to itself in its own way earth and sky, divinities and mortals’ (p. 153). 
Nevertheless, in what does this gatheredness    apparently a mode of connectedness 
in its own right    consist? Heidegger explains:  
 
The bridge swings over the stream “with ease and power.” It does not 
just connect banks that are already there. The banks emerge as banks 
only as the bridge crosses the stream. The bridge designedly causes them 
to lie across from each other. One side is set off against the other by the 
bridge. Nor do the banks stretch along the stream as indifferent border 
strips of the dry land. (p. 152) 
 
It is clear that Heidegger, contrary to Western metaphysics, does not prioritise the 
potentiality of nature over and above everything else. Quite the reverse, he 
recognizes that the built thing, not a form or idea, comes forth in order to reveal a 
new reality. Technology reveals in this way: by bringing forth experiences of time 
and space that have not been imaginable before. The experience of time, 
especially, the experience of a certain time, as Heidegger suggested early on in his 
career, is a form of synthesis, interpretation and imagination. It is, in fact, the 
letting-relationship, which, as argued here repeatedly, refers to the hermeneutical 
relation and the as-structure that allows the presencing of things as things. Things, 
however, need time in order to give time. A feeling of gatheredness demands a 
certain pace of relatedness. Currently, digital objects give us instant connectivity 
by eliminating remoteness. The specific type of nearness these technologies afford 
is a type of synchronization that ensures that every change the user inflicts upon a 
digital object is automatically inscribed on all of the object’s copies, while these 
changes are instantaneously received by other devices and users. Cloud 
computing, which serves as an apt metaphor for the web’s nature and structure, 
seems to refute the very movement of nearness. Think about this: when I upload a 
document in a cloud storage service things are here and there, at the same time, in 
no time and no space. Digital technologies appear to be technologies of nearness, 
but can there be nearness and gatheredness in the absence of remoteness? Does 
instant-differentiation lock us in a specific type of interpretation of reality that 
imposes certain types of time-synthesis and conceals all others? Is this a process 
similar to the one depicted in the Orwellian dystopian universe of Ninety Eighty-
Four? Can it be equated with the absence of history? Here is a brief description 
from the book:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
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As soon as all the corrections which happened to be necessary in any 
particular number of The Times had been assembled and collated, that 
number would be reprinted, the original copy destroyed, and the 
corrected copy placed on the files in its stead. This process of continuous 
alteration was applied not only to newspapers, but to books, periodicals, 
pamphlets, posters, leaflets, films, sound-tracks, cartoons, photographs –
to every kind of literature or documentation which might conceivably 
hold any political or ideological significance. Day by day and almost 
minute by minute the past was brought up to date. … All history was a 
palimpsest, scraped clean and reinscribed exactly as often as was 
necessary. (Orwell 2004, 53) 
 
Of course, this could appear paradoxical since the case has been repeatedly made 
here that it is precisely the fact that digital beings have history that makes them 
exploitable by markets and limitedly constructed by pre-set selection criteria that 
define the user’s perception. This, however, can very well be the other site of the 
same coin. The constant accessibility of the digital object predisposes the user to 
perceive the latest iteration as the most and only present one. Even when the 
previous iterations are at the user’s disposal the user synthesises their time with 
what is latest, preventing a certain experience of dwelling that could perhaps have 
resulted to the gatheredness around a topic of importance. This constant 
accessibility is not in any case openness. The statistical nature of the data 
produced and inscribed in the system, which can potentially reveal histories of the 
user’s behaviour that are not evident even to the user themselves can be accessed 
only by the system, since they constitute commodities of great worth. The 
concealment of this knowledge, however, is, as discussed above, often the case 
with iron bridges as well. 
 
The experience of the bridge, it appears, is not completely different from the 
experience of connectedness with Facebook; it is a relating to things that are not 
in our immediate reach, but, as underscored by Heidegger, this process of 
nearness is not a matter of a certain mental representation that is contained in the 
mind. Neither does the relationship of being-in-the-world refer to the containment 
of a certain body or I in space. In other words, the description of the experience of 
space, itself a metaphor, is now a description of the experience of thinking about 
space and time. Digital beings themselves allow us to speak, perhaps 
metaphorically, about our being-in-the-world by bringing to light exterioriosed 
processes of our humanity. Is this another metaphor? Can we escape talking 
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metaphorically about thinking? In the light of these questions, the metaphor of the 
bridge is not merely another metaphor. It is the performance of a thinking that 
dwells metaphorically. Put in different terms, this thinking does not merely 
represent but synthesises, drawing and weaving threads coming from inside and 
outside. Digital things like Facebook allow us now to draw from a different 
outside, and what we thus draw will be transferred and form the inside. This cycle, 
that is, the hermeneutical cycle has no beginning and no end, and its processes 
keep pushing deeper. This is discussed next. 
 
3.2. Technology as Bildung 
 
According to Katherine Hayles (2007) modern technologies that offer the 
possibility of a constant shift of attention have produced a cognitive mode she 
calls ‘hyper attention’, which entails ‘switching focus rapidly among different 
tasks, preferring multiple information streams, seeking a high level of stimulation, 
and having a low tolerance for boredom’ (p. 187). Conversely, it is the more 
traditional cognitive mode, namely, ‘deep attention’, that is ‘traditionally 
associated with the humanities’ and ‘is characterized by concentrating on a single 
object for long periods (say, a novel by Dickens), ignoring outside stimuli while 
so engaged, preferring a single information stream, and having a high tolerance 
for long focus times’ (ibid.).   
 
Hayles sees ADHD (Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder) as the extreme but 
now common manifestation of hyper attention. Relying on research from ‘brain 
imaging studies’, she infers that the use of different media causes synaptogenesis 
to proceed in different ways. To put this in other terms, different technologies 
−the book, the video game, the web− wire the brain differently (p. 192). Hayles 
explains: 
 
Through a process known as synaptogenesis, a newborn infant 
undergoes a pruning process whereby the neural connections in the brain 
that are used strengthen and grow, while those that are not decay and 
disappear (Bear, Bear, Connors, and Paradiso 175–96). The evolutionary 
advantage of this pruning process is clear, for it bestows remarkable 
flexibility, giving human beings the power to adapt to widely differing 
environments. Although synaptogenesis is greatest in infancy, plasticity 
continues throughout childhood and adolescence, with some degree 
continuing even into adulthood. In contemporary developed societies, 
this plasticity implies that the brain’s synaptic connections are 
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coevolving with an environment in which media consumption is a 
dominant factor. Children growing up in media-rich environments 
literally have brains wired differently from those of people who did not 
come to maturity under that condition. (ibid.) 
 
In this respect, it seems that technology is literally formation: it is the formation of 
our minds. To paraphrase Nietzsche: ‘Our (writing) tools are working on our 
thoughts’ (Kittler, 1999, p. 200). Tools have different affordances that extract 
different types of embodied reactions, rhythms and modes of perception, and 
these define the limits of that which can be anticipated and imagined. In this 
context, a brain which is wired so that it can respond to the swift changes of a 
video-game environment will not be able to engage with literature or cognitive 
tasks that demand concentration over long periods of times. This, however, points 
to another fact, namely, that what counts when it comes to digital technologies is 
not simply the content of the chosen memories that become our selection criteria 
but also the connectedness they afford, which in turn forms our modes of attention 
and thinking. In this light, thinking is at the same time a response to the tools we 
use and what constructs our site of existence, our individual and collective there. 
Tools synthesise our receptivity, constitute the source origin that allows transfer 
and define what comes near. 
 
Stiegler (2010) calls these technologies ‘psychotechnics’ (p. 93). The term can be 
a little misleading, bringing to the fore binaries of body and mind and body and 
soul, questioned by both Stiegler and Heidegger. But, of course, Stiegler’s (2010) 
own argument in Taking Care of Youth and the Generations, which builds on 
Hayles’ analysis describes how psycho-technics ultimately forms the brain and 
thus points to the inescapable unity of the psychosomatic. Data from neuroscience 
research support these views offering objective images that give a clear picture of 
what is it to get into the picture, that is, to interiorise the functionality of tools at 
the level of synapses. The tools we use ultimately form a circuit between the 
individual and the environment, that is, a kind of connectivity or hermeneutical 
cycle that determines what is to come near. So the situation, at least for Stiegler 
and Hayles, is this: the brain because of its plasticity is without form, and thus 
already is the process of formation. This creates a responsibility for increased 
awareness about what causes such formation.  
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Interestingly enough, ‘(human) formation’ is a phrase that is often used when the 
term Bildung is translated in English. Education has been traditionally thought to 
be endowed with this responsibility; education is thought to be the agent of 
formation. But how, if technology conditions the environment in which we are 
embedded and if technology wires our there in the ways we have been describing, 
can education take up this role? Does this mean that technology precedes 
education’s efforts to form? 
 
Bildung means following in the example of, moulding oneself in the shape of −a 
Bild (a vision, a paradigm, an image). Sven Erik Nordenbo (2002) explains that 
the term Bildung itself refers to ‘an image−a model−of which somebody or 
something is to become an image or model’. (p. 341) He nevertheless points out 
that 
 
In the educational context . . . it is not clear whether the person 
possessing Bildung has generated this himself or herself, or whether it is 
a consequence of somebody or something else. However, according to 
the standard German understanding of the concept as an educational idea, 
a person has acquired Bildung only if he or she has assisted actively in 
its formation or development. In other words, in the educational context, 
the concept of Bildung contains a reference to an active core in the 
person who is gebildet [educated, cultured]. (p. 341, parenthesis added) 
 
In this respect, technology can be the cause of formation, that is, itself some kind 
of Bildung, but if the individual has not in some way contributed in this process, 
then this formation is not really Bildung. The individual needs to be allowed to 
individuate themselves, and this means that they need to be alert to what is 
causing the forming. In our current context, this makes a demand in respect of 
technology, media or digital literacy that goes beyond superficial understandings 
of representations in the media. It is a demand concerning the understanding of 
the technological Bild (image) that causes formation, and probably obstructs 
Bildung, and concerning the possibilities of thinking in general. 
 
With this thesis, I attempted to participate in this discussion with Plato’s Allegory 
of the Cave. In this text the images (shadows) produced by the fire are contrasted 
to the real images (ideas) of the objects outside of the cave, the most important of 
which is the sun. In this reading, Heidegger maintains the distinction between 
artificiality and nature, even though he does present Bildung in a way quite similar 
 224 
to technical production, that is, to the very model of thinking he considers 
responsible for the construction of western metaphysics. He does not pay, 
however, enough attention to the role of the fire, that is, the device that produces 
artificial images. The prisoner who is liberated and attempts to leave the cave 
faces for the first time the source of their world, one could say, the source of 
reality. The realisation that there is another reality (that of physical object, light 
and the sun) does not come without this knowledge. The sun is understood in this 
case metaphorically, that is, in analogy to the fire. The prisoner’s newly acquired 
knowledge allows them to proceed to the other reality. However, the shadows are 
indeed a part of our real world, that is, a part that allows the liberated human 
being to understand both the fire and the sun. For Plato the sun is the ultimate 
reality. For Heidegger there is, clearly, no such origin, but there is the possibility 
for an aletheic nearness to the world. This connectedness, however; this originary 
image, needs to go through the understanding of the fire’s nature. For this reason, 
education is encumbered with the responsibility of opening up the discussion 
about technology. Is this, however, what educational institutions have been doing, 
or have they been themselves seduced by misleading metaphors?   
 
4. Educational Technology and the Metaphor of Potential  
 
Educational discourse tends to understand technology as an instrument that is to 
be used so that schools will catch up with the economy’s demands and need for 
development. There is also the enhancement perspective, which is based on the 
belief that technology improves learning, and constructivism, which underlines 
this possibility and appears to challenge the instrumental take on technology. 
These theoretical frameworks admit, on the one hand, that technology’s 
involvement will bring about a change in learning, and on the other hand, 
maintain the human subject’s pre-eminence. In this light, the subject employs 
tools for their own purposes, but these tools are never properly addressed. Martin 
Oliver (2012) discusses this in connection with the field of educational technology. 
He says 
 
While there are discussions of theory within educational technology 
research, these typically focus on learning. Technology itself is seldom 
considered, being treated instead as “natural” or given. This is in marked 
contrast to other fields of study, in which robust theories of technology 
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have been developed. The consequence of this is that technology is 
treated as if it will cause learning −and when it does not, there is no clear 
explanation of why.  (p. 31) 
 
Of course, the cognitive perspective, which I discussed in the first chapter, can be 
held to be distinct from the rest, but, as I pointed out, it tends to understand 
thinking through the computer metaphor. The metaphor of the mind as an 
information processing machine gives a certain direction to educational discourse, 
in fact, one that seems ‘scientific’. The computer is after all designed to process 
information, and as such its functions can be monitored and enhanced −that is, the 
computer offers measurable and controlled variables. Why should not this be the 
case with the human brain? Why should not this be the way we think and learn? 
What this last perspective shows is that the way we describe technology, and the 
metaphors we use while using it, becomes the frame through which we understand 
thinking in general. An important metaphor that I want to examine here is the one 
that defines education’s relation to technology par excellence and solidifies the 
desire to ‘harness the power of technology’. As Neil Selwyn (2011) puts it,  
 
Educational technology is an essentially ‘positive project.’ Most people 
working in this area are driven by an underlying belief that digital 
technologies are −in some way− capable of improving education. This 
mindset is evident, for example, in the recent tendency to refer to 
‘technology enhanced learning’ or before this to ‘computer-assisted 
learning’ −descriptions that both leave little doubt over the inherent 
connection between technology and the improvement of learning and 
teaching. As such, the de facto role of the educational technologist is 
understood to be one of finding ways to make these technology-based    
improvements happen and −to coin a phrase often used in the field− to 
‘harness the power of technology’. (p. 713) 
 
Educational technology as the field that is most responsive and aware of 
technology’s development seems driven by this belief. It is after all a field that is 
sustained in this way because of and through its access to new technology and 
knowledge concerning its potential use. Selwyn, however, comments that  
 
[d]espite repeated predictions of inevitable change and impending 
transformation, digital technologies are used inconsistently in 
educational settings, usually with little large-scale conclusive ‘effect.’ 
Much of what is written and discussed about educational technology is, 
therefore, more a matter of faith than it is a matter of fact. In this sense, 
educational technology is perhaps best understood as being like many 
other faith systems −i.e., a ‘system of radical optimism’ that persists 
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despite the lack of immediate experience or evidence (Inge, 2003/1912, 
p. xiii). (ibid., p. 714) 
 
The fact that a field that relies on the methodical and systematic processes of 
technological production is guided by the unproven belief that there must be 
something educational in every new product is quite paradoxical. But where does 
this leave us? On the one hand, it appears that the tools we use subvert our 
intentions; the discourse of Enframing is perhaps the most important evidence of 
the way technology imposes its structures. On the other hand, and as already 
discussed in the first chapter, actual technologies seem to have little or no effect 
on education, in the respect that the kind of enhancement they are supposed to 
offer to teaching and learning is not really achieved. How then is this situation 
possible? If, as I have argued, the tools co-constitute our reality and synthesise our 
perception, why do they fail to affect education, indeed at a time when efforts to 
the contrary are ubiquitous? The study of metaphors that articulate the absolute 
need for the use of technology in education could be our first step out of this 
conundrum.  
 
David Buckingham (2007) focuses on the BETT (British Education, Training and 
Technology) exhibition, which is ‘reputed to be the largest educational trade fair 
in the world’, in order to explain how the desire to include technology in 
education is reinforced by the synergy between the market and educational 
institutions. Each year’s slogan is indicative of the kind of technological 
evangelism that is promoted by the market. The ‘show’s 2006 slogan was, 
technology is “Engaging - Enriching - Empowering”’. (p. 5) This year’s slogan 
(2013) is “powering learning” and “Inspiring minds through technology” (BETT, 
2013). Buckingham explains that this rhetoric is employed by ‘individual 
exhibitors’ who ‘reinforce this almost mystical message: ‘lighting the flame of 
learning’ (Promethean); ‘inspiring creativity in the classroom’ (Smoothwall); 
‘share knowledge, spark brilliance (Adobe) . . .’’, while he comments that ‘‘(e)ven 
the DfEs partakes of the same rhetoric, albeit in slightly more muted terms: 
technology is about “creating opportunities, realizing potential, achieving 
excellence” ’ (p. 5).  
 
As noted, BETT is an excellent example of the rhetoric employed by the market 
in order to make its products indispensable, but we need to pay attention to this 
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rhetoric’s different facets. On the one hand, ‘there is some rhetorical 
recognition . . . of the “‘techno-savvy child”’ − the notion of children as a “digital 
generation” that is somehow spontaneously competent in its relationship with 
technology . . . ’, but at the same time ‘the image is generally played down in 
favor of a view of the child as essentially incompetent, and hence in need of 
technological training’ (p. 17). These two extremes are used on their own or even 
in combination according to the market’s interests. The competent child, we are 
told, is bored at school, and for this reason teaching must comply with the 
learning styles the children acquire through the use of technology at home. At the 
same time, the incompetent child must be trained and acquire skills in order to 
increase their potential for employment. Much of this conflicting discourse is not 
supported by evidence, and this suggests according to Buckingham, that the 
market is interested in ‘workers with good communication skills, literacy and 
numeracy, and other attributes that are often associated with a traditional liberal 
education (Hockey and Wellington, 1994).’ (ibid., p. 18) These voices, are, 
however, rarely heard, whereas the rhetoric of technology’s educational potential 
assumes different guises, and these turn the need for technology’s integration into 
a matter of equal access and social justice. The economic stakes of this discourse 
are, of course, immense.  Buckingham (2007) comments that, in the British 
context,  
 
the government has provided more than £100 million per year for 
schools to spend, albeit only on ‘DfES-approved products and services.’ 
(p. 9) ‘The promotion of ICT in education represents a form of ‘public-
private partnership’, although it is arguably one in which the private is 
significantly more powerful than the public. While the state acts as a 
facilitator of the market (not least, in this instance, through forms of 
financial ‘pump-priming’), it is ultimately assumed that the market will 
provide. (p. 10) 
 
One of the most important questions that come up here, however, is the degree to 
which these technologies can cause the educational and social changes they are 
purported to cause. At least at the international level, we can see that partnerships 
are formed between global organisations, local governments and corporate giants, 
and these turn the task of technology’s integration in education into a humanistic 
or even humanitarian crusade. UNESCO’s (2005) reports rely on this rhetoric to 
underline the close relationship between technology, education, and development, 
emphasising that  
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In emerging knowledge-based economies and information-intensive 
societies, technology now increasingly serves both education and 
development goals. ‘Knowledge and information’ are the new forms of 
wealth and are the driving force for development. (p. 3)  
 
It is also stated that 
 
The strong three-way link binding development, education and 
technology constitutes a deep and systemic argument that ties investment 
not only with progress in education, but (more importantly) also with the 
development process itself. It represents the key strand in a reciprocal 
link through which development, education and technology can become 
mutually reinforcing within a dynamic framework for progress. It also 
represents what is increasingly seen as a fundamental human right for 
every citizen to have access in a global era. This, in a sense, equates 
education with ‘empowerment for development’. (p. 3) 
 
In this light, nearness is conceptualised as commodity and human right. Access 
becomes the possibility of being near to ways of being that ensure a better way of 
life for individuals and countries. As it is stated ‘(c)onnectivity has become a new 
human right. If you deny a child connectivity, you might be denying him or her 
access to the textbook of the 21st century.’ (UNESCO, 2011, p. 5) Technology 
becomes the mode of individuation that everybody should be entitled to. 
Connectivity becomes self-actualisation. But what exactly is the interaction 
between technology, development and education? Technology, as discussed in 
section 3.2. of this chapter, can be the cause of formation, a Bildung of some kind, 
but should not education be the one that decides what images are to be emulated 
and what types of connectedness are to be pursued? Technology progresses 
through and with different social and economic processes, but what is best 
economically maybe not what is best for learning. Look at the popularity of social 
networking sites, for example, which can turn nearness into a commodity. Should 
this popularity serve as a criterion for education’s aspirations? What’s more, can 
all these technologies that target the adult user be effortlessly transferred to the 
realm of childhood? The nearness experienced by an adult is surely not the 
nearness experienced by a child. A child’s world is ego-centric, and environments 
that create ego-logies should be questioned before they are forced upon 
educational systems. A person who is at the stage of figuring out what the world is 
should have the space to experiment with several types of connectedness, and in 
fact with those that do not conceal all others. Constructions of nearness that limit 
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this openness should be treated with caution. These kinds of concerns, however, 
do not easily enter the discussions concerning the potential of technology for 
education. UNESCO’s report (2011) about mobile learning might count as an 
example of this kind of discourse. In this document it is stated, that  
 
There are low levels of mobile learning initiatives in education, but 
outside the school walls there is massive, and ever increasing, uptake. 
Mobile phones are touching peoples’ lives in many ways: 
communication, entertainment, socialising, health, etc. But education is 
struggling to make sense of this change. Does this reflect the bigger 
challenge of education, that it is, struggling to respond to a rapidly 
changing world and workplace? The mobile phone is almost the poster 
child of this tension. (pp. 6-7) 
 
The tension in question is read as education’s own failure: education is not 
responding to the demands of the outside world. But what does this mean? Clearly 
the answer is not that teachers do not use mobile phones. All professionals, 
teachers themselves included, interact in communities, communicate, exchange 
information, organise and produce their work and socialise via mobile phones, 
among other media. Educational institutions use mobile phones to enhance 
connectivity between home and school, and students use mobile phones for play, 
communication and socializing. This being said, we need to answer the following 
question: What do we mean when we say that education is struggling to respond 
to the changes imposed by digital technologies? As I see it, there can be different 
possible answers to this:  first, we fail when we do not teach via mobile phones; 
second, education is failing in general; and third, mobile phones can enhance 
teaching and produce learning, and not acknowledging this possibility is wrong.   
 
Let us examine the first hypothesis or perhaps rephrase it. Mobile phones were 
originally designed and produced in order to offer ‘any time’-‘any place’ 
connectivity and communication. They have, however, evolved into intelligent 
devices, hence the term ‘smart phones’, that rely on internet connectivity to 
perform many of the functions that a laptop provides. They thus appear to enhance 
the possibilities for learning, if indeed we accept that the laptop does provide 
certain possibilities for learning. The mobile phone may very well be the most 
appropriate tool for mobile learning or informal learning, or what is otherwise 
called just-in-time learning. However, is not this a kind of tautological thinking? 
Mobile phones, it appears, constitute the most appropriate tool in order to provide 
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mobile learning. This is true if and only if we accept that mobile phones afford 
some kind of learning. If this is the case, then we need to examine what kind of 
learning this is and the reason we need it. In the UNESCO document it is 
mentioned that ‘there is a mobile learning policy vacuum’ in ‘the five major 
regions of the world (Asia, Africa and the Middle East, Europe, Latin America, 
and North America)’. There are, in fact, ‘three official responses to the emergence 
of mobile technologies: ignore, ban or engage.’ But, as the report makes clear: 
‘Many countries are ignoring them, some are banning, but eventually they all need 
to engage’. (p. 8) What establishes this need, however, this inevitable outcome 
and deterministic demand? Is it a fact that mobile phones have been proven 
indispensable learning aids, in fact ones that enhance learning? The answer is 
never given in connection with the actual kind of learning that mobile phones 
provide. However, there is a strong assertion that ‘technology represents a 
‘solution’ −although it is never quite clear what problems it solves.’ (Buckingham, 
2007, p. 6) In the aforementioned report, however, things appear different. Mobile 
learning is supposed to undo spatiotemporal barriers, that is, to offer learning 
where there is none.  In this respect, there appears to be a good match between 
educational need and educational technology. The report, clearly mentions that 
mobile phones will help in 
 
 Reaching previously unreached students and communities.   
 Extending support for students, both in and outside classrooms, e.g. 
tutoring provided in the evenings via mobile chat and collaborative 
learning between students.  
 Self-directed learning, including the potential for more personalised 
instruction and student-centred learning.  
 Generating up-to-date information about school systems in places where 
good data about systems is hard to come by, e.g. mobile phones can be 
used by teachers in rural villages to track attendance. (p. 8) 
 
In this light, mobile phones are understood as the factor that ultimately will 
change situations affected by powerful economic and social structures and by 
spatiotemporal conditions. But how are we to believe that such a tool, which was 
not designed as a learning tool and, in fact, has not given any proof for 
spontaneous self-transforming learning, will single-handedly allow the reversal of 
the adverse conditions that have hitherto inhibited learning? Well, the answer 
comes right away: 
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mobile learning has significant (although currently unrealized) 
potential. . . While mobile learning is not new, its widespread adoption 
was, in the 1990s and 2000s, handicapped by prohibitively expensive 
technology and the limited functionality of typically small headsets with 
low-resolution screens and processors that were weak compared to 
computers. Tablets were virtually unknown before the launch of the iPad 
in 2010. Recently however, the mass of adoption of mobile technologies, 
coupled with piquing interest in mobile learning, means that there is now 
a real possibility of governments beginning to engage with mobile 
learning on a large scale. There is currently a window of opportunity to 
try to understand and capitalise on this potential to benefit students and 
educators around the world. It is therefore important to develop policies 
that can leverage mobile technologies to facilitate learning and scale-up 
existing mobile learning pilot projects in order to assist more people. (p. 
9) 
 
The rhetoric of harnessing the potential of technology returns with a vengeance. It 
is a rhetoric that cannot be proven wrong, since potential is always something on 
the way; it is a promise that can be uttered at any time and never be refuted. 
Potential will thus remain potential until the right situation occurs and the right 
version of technology is produced. But what does this tell us? What is it precisely 
that convinces us about the potential in the first place, if not the tool itself? And 
what if the tool were never designed to afford learning? Some kind of learning 
does take place, of course, with every technology, and this is how a piece of 
equipment becomes ready-to-hand. This is precisely the point I have been making 
all along. If this kind of learning was not taking place, then the kind of forming 
that technology imposes on us would not have posed a challenge to education. If 
this kind of connectedness to the world was not a certain kind of distancelessness, 
why even discuss it? The ‘harnessing rhetoric’, however, seems to ignore the 
specific types of learning −or formation− already performed through these 
technologies and, in fact, asserts that there are unexplored affordances that can 
emerge if these technologies are put to a different use, that is, in an educational 
context.  
 
In any respect, every new product needs to be promoted as offering new 
possibilities, but is it?  This is a burden advertising is encumbered with, that is, the 
task of convincing the consumers that each new product is radically different from 
and an improvement over the previous one, in fact that it procures new existential 
possibilities for thinking and being. Advertising is meant to sell different types of 
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being-in-the-world, connectedness and nearness, but every new product or 
generation of products is not essentially different from the previous one and thus 
does not essentially make a radical difference to our being-in-the-world. 
Digitisation is indeed characterised by increased alterability, which offers endless 
possibilities for personalisation. But what needs to be questioned is the nature, 
importance or even existence of these differences for education. Does the 
multiplicity of these little differences, in fact, hide the effects of digitisation in 
general? The usual discourse goes something like this: education should offer 
opportunities for active, project-based, creative, constructivist, self-paced learning, 
and new digital technologies, because of their multifaceted nature, afford this. 
Web 2.0 is the read/write web that is bound to afford creativity and interactivity. 
Millions of users discuss in forums, show their preferences in social networking 
sites, campaign for worthy causes and contribute content to sites like Wikipedia or 
YouTube. Digitisation appears to give endless possibilities for interactivity, 
individuation, citizenship and literacy, but how are these to be incorporated in 
teaching and, in fact, to afford innovative learning experiences?  In the following 
section, I discuss some of these examples. 
 
4.1. Difference in the Digital Sphere  
 
Many digital technologies appear to revolutionise communication, interaction and 
individuation, but this is not what is actually happening. Grusin (2009), in fact, 
argues that ‘in our current era of wireless social networking the emphasis is not on 
radical new forms of mediation but on seamless connectivity, ubiquity, mobility 
and affectivity’. (p. 65) In this respect, and according to the affordances of 
digitisation in general, several new technologies comprise successful −or not so 
successful− agglomerations of previous technologies (iPhones and tablets are 
some of these). In other words, there is a ‘remediation’ of previous media, or what 
‘Henry Jenkins . . . understands as “convergence culture,” the collision of old and 
new media.’ (pp. 65) In fact,  
 
Jenkins proclaims YouTube as the fullest embodiment of convergence 
culture, which exemplifies a completely networked media environment 
in which different cultural forms of production converge to provide 
alternatives to the forms and practices furnished by consumer culture. 
(pp. 65-66)  
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This has come about, through the simplicity of the medium, which was ‘co-
created, as a more or less “empty” platform to be filled by the YouTube 
community with originally produced content of various kinds’. (Snickars and 
Vonderau, 2009, p. 10) Users respond to the medium’s affordance by uploading 
their own videos, and this has established ‘a clip culture that outpaces cinema and 
television’ (ibid., p. 11) The discourse of emptiness is really important here: 
digital technologies are designed as matrixes; they can receive everything and 
everybody; they also function as our collective depository of retentions of any 
kind −recreational, political and even educational− and ultimately become our 
perceptive organs. 
 
YouTube’s educational aspects are mainly of two types: the first is spontaneous 
and informal created by numerous users, and the second structured and formed 
displaying content for educational use in TeachersTube. Let us, however, examine 
the informal ‘educational’ aspect first. When the word ‘tutorial’ is typed in 
YouTube’s search bar the results are impressive: on the 18th of November 2012 
this search produced 5,870,000 results, and on the 28th of the same month 
6,010,000 results, exhibiting thus an increase of 140,000 results in just ten days. 
During these tutorials the ‘expert’ shows off their skills, predicts the difficulties 
the novice will face with the task at hand, and gives common-sense instructions 
having to do with problems the novice will encounter while attempting to perform 
the tasks they have been taught to perform. These tutorials have different purposes, 
such as teaching about hairstyles and the application of make-up, or about the use 
of digital applications and processes like uploading videos on YouTube. This does 
not mean that there are no theoretical tutorials. Indeed, there are, ranging from 
lectures in philosophy to algebra lessons for high school students. One such 
example comes from the videos of MIT graduate Salman Khan’, who entered the 
realm of YouTube ‘teaching’ after his cousin Nadia asked for some help with her 
maths. Khan responded with phone calls, MSNs and Yahoo’s Doodle Notepad 
tutorials (Wikipedia, 2013a). Khan even prepared short video tutorials about the 
concepts he wanted to teach. After a while Nadia confessed that she preferred the 
videos instead of the real-time teaching over the phone. With the videos she could 
learn at her own pace, pausing and rewinding according to her own needs. The 
principle was very simple: one-to-one teaching with the possibility for unlimited 
repetitions. Khan respected Nadia’s wishes and began uploading video tutorials 
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on YouTube after other relatives and friends asked for help as well. Soon people 
with no previous connection to him responded enthusiastically to the videos and 
this led Khan to quit his job in order to make teaching his priority. When his 
efforts where noticed by organisations like the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 
and Google, Khan created a website and a foundation that offered ‘a free online 
collection of more than 3,600 micro lectures via video tutorials’ (Wikipedia, 
2013a). With the financial support, Khan’s site −now called Khan Academy− is 
purported to have offered ‘200 millions lessons’ (ibid.). Videos are usually 10-17 
minutes long and are presented on a black screen where explanations are written 
and problems are solved while a voice-over explains what is going on. Khan 
explains that this presentation takes place 
 
as if “popping out of a darkened universe and into one’s mind with a 
voice out of “nowhere” in a way akin to sitting next to someone and 
working out a problem on a sheet of paper: “If you’re watching a guy do 
a problem [while] thinking out loud, I think people find that more 
valuable and not as daunting”. Offline versions of the videos have been 
distributed by not-for-profit groups to rural areas in Asia, Latin America, 
and Africa. While the current content is mainly concerned with pre-
college mathematics and physics, Khan’s long-term goal is to provide 
“tens of thousands of videos in pretty much every subject” and to create 
“the world’s first free, world-class virtual school where anyone can learn 
anything” (ibid.). 
 
Khan Academy’s website explains that the site offers a ‘free world-class 
education for anyone anywhere’ through a ‘custom self-paced learning tool’ 
(Khan Academy, 2012). Every student can choose the pace with which they watch 
the video and do the exercises. The site also offers statistics for every user so that 
the student can assess their progress or the teacher monitor the students’ activity. 
The tutorials have been used in order to flip the classroom: that is, to offer the 
opportunity to students to watch the tutorial at home and then, whilst in the 
classroom, proceed to drilling exercises and receive personalised teaching when 
needed (Thompson, 2011). 
 
At this point some discussion is necessary. Does the Khan Academy do what it 
purports it does? Tutorials are extremely popular and users, or even teachers, 
appear to respond enthusiastically. The same applies for the foundations that 
support the project. The fact that every student would be required to have their 
own personal computer at home and in the classroom in order for the Khan’s 
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Academy model of teaching to be more generally applied cannot but keep 
computer companies satisfied. In addition, the video tutorials appear to offer the 
user the possibility for customised learning and quick progress into complicated 
concepts. The fact, however, that Khan Academy began with a focus on 
mathematics is not at all accidental. The tutorials appear to substitute the 
traditional blackboard with the electronic one eliminating time restrictions. The 
lecture can be repeated again and again. There are, however,  critics’ ‘who argue 
that Khan’s videos and software encourage uncreative, repetitive drilling −and 
leave kids staring at screens instead of interacting with real live teachers’ (ibid.).  
 
Discussions about Khan Academy are usually centered around Khan’s charismatic 
teaching, but should not this be a warning of some kind? Why are these tutorials 
needed? What is their ‘added value’ −to use a term popular in current educational 
technology jargon? It seems that if educational systems did not come with so 
many shortcomings, if textbooks were better, if we had a better idea of what 
constitutes learning, and if teaching was not so poor, then Khan Academy would 
not be a solution of any kind. It almost seems that Khan Academy’s success 
suggests that technologies of this kind offer solutions when other teaching and 
learning practices are deficient. These solutions are not so much innovations: they 
are easy fixes that fail to address foundational educational issues. Instead of 
focusing on the fundamental problems of teacher training and discussing what 
learning is or should be, we rush to find sticking-plaster solutions, which in the 
end are nothing more than standardised, teacher-centered teaching.  
 
Khan Academy can be related to another widely used metaphor in education, 
namely, the ‘digital divide’, which, as is well known, refers to the difference in 
access to digital resources and skills that characterises different populations, 
geographical areas or countries. Quite often technology’s integration in education 
has been considered a way to bridge the gap and eliminate these differences. 
However, Rosado and Bélisle (2007) note that things are not so clear-cut. They 
argue: 
 
The question has arisen as to whether fighting the “digital divide” is 
being used to implement more social equality, better public education, 
in-depth cultural values, or are the different programmes and policies 
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using social inequality and hierarchy as an opportunity to develop and 
diffuse profit-reaping technologies? (p. 8) 
 
But even if decisions are not made on the basis of profit and corporate interest, the 
mere inclusion of technologies in existing educational systems cannot be the 
solution. In fact, Rosado and Bélisle (2007) note that 
 
fighting the digital divide at the technological level is senseless as it is 
the deeper social barriers and inequalities that organise social life. If 
people do not have the experience, the know how, the incentive and the 
self-confidence that these technologies require, then they will find no 
relevance to using them to answer their daily needs. (p. 9) 
 
Khan’s success story seems to suggest that one specific technology can bridge 
several gaps −good and bad education being one of them− but a few charismatic 
teachers cannot compensate for the lack of talent and knowledge that is found 
more generally in teacher education. Khan’s teaching excludes the conversational 
element that is essential not just for language arts but also for the formation of 
pedagogical relationships, that is, relationships crucial to the development of 
people. Similarly, YouTube is not in any way a conversational medium. 
YouTube’s ‘formal’ use in education follows more or less the traditional 
methodology of educational TV. The range of YouTube content, as already noted, 
covers every region of interest, and YouTube is indeed one of the web’s self-
explanatory tools since it explains, through the use of tutorials, the use of every 
other tool. There are, however, digital media, like blogs and wikis, that appear to 
encourage conversation, collaboration and the negotiation of ideas. Wikipedia, for 
example, allows the interaction between users’ views, since as explained, on the 
relevant wiki, Wikipedia refers to 
 
a free, collaboratively edited, and multilingual Internet encyclopedia 
supported by the non-profit Wikimedia Foundation. Its 23 million 
articles, over 4.1 million in the English Wikipedia alone, have been 
written by volunteers around the world. Almost all of its articles can be 
edited by anyone with access to the site, and it has about 100,000 active 
contributors. . .’ (Wikipedia, 2013b)  
 
The technical skills needed to contribute to Wikipedia are quite basic, namely, 
clicking on the edit button and adding content. The history of content negotiation, 
which is itself a very heated matter and an interesting source of information, can 
be viewed by clicking on the View history link. Wikipedia, however, raises a 
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whole other set of questions having to do with credibility, academic rigour and the 
degree that there really is collaboration. Does it, in fact, create ‘the culture of the 
amateur’, as Andrew Keen (2007) contends, while at the same time ‘deceptively 
spreading corporate propaganda’? (p. 4) This matter becomes very important since 
Wikipedia ‘has become the largest and most popular general reference work on 
the Internet’. (Wikipedia, 2013b) In fact, Wikipedia and YouTube are among the 
most popular tools for research among young people. As Elsaesser (2009) 
comments: ‘we also know, from our frequent, if shamefaced use of say, 
Wikipedia, how seductive it is to take as reliable fact what has been written, 
rewritten, amended, deleted and once more rewritten by many hands in a single 
Wiki entry’. (p. 168) This constant amendment can appear as the result of  
collaboration but the end product might very well be the decision of a single user. 
This fact turns out to be one of the greatest challenges education has to face. As 
Featherstone (2009) comments:  
 
The Internet is rapidly changing the nature of academic activity and is 
becoming the key interface in a new scholarly apparatus which is 
reconstituting the normal way of working, communicating, searching, 
researching and accessing. Knowledge becomes information. The 
Internet, then, forms an unstable digital field, a potential space between 
the archive and the encyclopaedia, which we have termed the 
encyclomedia. In effect, the digital media become both a topic and 
resource, something researchers need to study and theorize to make 
sense of the world, but also the resource, the interface which cuts into 
and opens up that world (see Featherstone and Venn, 2006: 15). (p. 2) 
  
This, of course, refers to digital technology’s self-explanatory nature. Web tools 
refer to one-another; they become the map of the empire in the Borges’ story. 
Because of digital being’s infinite alterability, digitisation promises infinite 
possibilities of difference. The emergence of so many Web 2.0 applications attests 
to that. This difference works largely as remediation, a combinatory logic that 
brings different media together in new configurations. Every new image is a 
metaphor of something else, and these new metaphors create networks of images 
or ecologies that include the user; they constitute our processes of individuation. 
At the same time, it is claimed that the user contributes to the building of these 
ecologies with the production of content and the customisation of its structure. 
Digital objects purport to offer the possibility of active engagement and 
personalisation. But what is imagination’s role in a market that turns the YouTube 
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inventors into millionaires? What kind of authoring skills should the user have? 
And should education focus on the acquisition of skills that become increasingly 
easy to acquire but indecipherable in their constitution? Clicking the editing 
button on Wikipedia is quite easy, but the knowledge of Wikipedia’s actual socio-
technological constitution and the ability to construct coherent, convincing and 
original arguments is a different matter. These are not mere skills but complicated 
ways of thinking and modes of being-in-the-world that will ultimately allow 
somebody to have a voice and the right to negotiate and contribute ideas. But is 
not this the aim of a liberal education, that is, of Bildung as usually conceived?  
 
Education currently seems infatuated by digital technologies that afford the 
possibility of producing content relevant to the market. Third-grade students who 
produce e-books instead of writing and crafting them get a feeling of achievement 
quite easily; their products appear similar to real products. These applications, 
however, promote at the same time a type of learning that has nothing to do with 
the rich engagement exemplified in Heidegger’s example of the carpenter’s 
apprentice. These technologies impose certain rhythms on children: a book cover 
can be produced in less than a minute. Within these time restrictions children do 
not have enough time to respond and imagine. The easiness with which the end-
product comes to life cannot afford such responsiveness. In other words, 
imagination synthesises in the specific way these technologies prescribe. 
 
Similarly, with technologies like e-portfolio what is important is that the student’s 
performance and achievements become demonstrable. These processes, however, 
take away the virtuality of learning since everything must be produced with a 
purpose in mind, and for this reason, the possibility for the transfer of meaning 
into unspecified realms, and the emergence of new metaphors is limited. In other 
words, these technologies promote a ‘metaphysics of presence’ and impose 
specific images on thinking that limit imagination’s potential to imagine. 
 
In this light, education’s real concern should be about the kinds of retentions that 
make up these emerging ecologies and the tools that we use to build them. These 
ecologies are indeed complicated images or imaginary bridges that offer 
possibilities of constant connection and becoming, and it is assumed that they 
need to be represented as intelligible and user-friendly. But this familiarity is 
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precisely what needs to be questioned.  Metaphors of the ‘harnessing potential’ or 
the ‘added value’ type need to be replaced with ones that defamiliarise both 
technology and learning. We need to think once again about what kinds of 
relations teaching and learning are and what we want them to be. Technology is a 
Bildung that already exists and forms society. The anxiety that technology has yet 
to influence education should thus be eased. Education should take the 
opportunity to reconsider its role through these technologies and maybe even to 
counteract what is already happening. 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
I have attempted in this thesis to participate in the dialogue between philosophy of 
technology and philosophy of education. This discussion has pointed out the fact 
that both technology and education are processes of human formation. Education, 
however,  is portrayed as the one endowed with this role, but, it should be noted 
that there is nothing natural about its method: all of education’s means involve 
technical decisions concerning the way the human being is to be formed. Reading 
and writing are methods of attention formation (Stiegler, 2011). If these 
techniques are not purposefully applied the modes of thinking and connectedness 
to the world that education aims to encourage will not be achieved. Technologies 
found in the child’s environment −and by technologies I mean anything ranging 
from the pacifier to the iPad− always already form the child. In this light, 
childhood is the most important stage in human development; it is the stage 
during which the absence of origin of the human being’ is most intensely felt. 
During childhood learning becomes the human being’s mode of connectedness to 
the world. It is the stage during which the ready-to-hand first becomes ready-to-
hand. Heidegger was never explicitly concerned with childhood or with the 
process of learning the ready-to-hand. When these matters are addressed the 
question of learning as a basic mode of nearness comes to the fore. For early 
Heidegger things are always already ready-to-hand and close, but this presupposes 
a phase of learning that refers to a negotiation between ready-to-hand and present-
at-hand that constitutes the possibility of both.   
 
Dasein learns what is near, and, as I have pointed out, this can be a differential 
process that involves the regions of technology and language. A child alternates 
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between possibilities of use and possibilities of speech until they can do both. 
These possibilities, however, participate in the construction of both language and 
technology. Embodiment has an important role in this process, but this does not 
mean that we need to engage in a quest for an origin or pure presence. 
Embodiment is itself compositional; it is a process always already engaged with 
the world, tools and images. Discussions concerning the derivative nature of 
images as representations that turn online experiences into virtualities is not the 
road to take here. Image participates in the constitution of embodiment, lived time 
and space. Currently, technologically produced images allow children to 
synthesise their thinking and experience their time. This kind of participation 
constitutes the child’s process of individuation, and for this reason we need 
images that allow children to think critically about thinking.    
 
Modern images can be useful but they need to be able to enter greater discourses. 
Nearness, for example, cannot simply be imagined through the paradigm of Social 
Networking Sites. We, as Heidegger did, need to imagine new metaphors that 
convey meaningful ways of connectedness. Of course, nearness is synthesised 
through technology, but we need to be aware of each technology’s effects on 
thinking and imagination. We also need to take cognizance of the metaphors we 
use to describe each technology since these metaphors, which can be misleading 
and prescriptive, construct the experiences we have with technology. 
Technologies like SNS, for example, are promoted through the metaphor of 
nearness, but what we should really do is to look at the kind of practices they 
allow and question the kind of nearness they really afford. Martin Oliver (2012) 
discusses this in connection with the discourse of affordance in  general. He says: 
‘The analysis in terms of affordance results in simple claims, but conceptual 
slippage (what sort of thing should be counted as an affordance?) and analytic 
confusion (to what should the affordance be attributed?) complicate these.’ (p. 10) 
 
SNS and search engines bring us near to things and people, but they do not allow 
for distance. Dasein enters the pictures these technologies create, annihilating the 
very distance that allows the difference between a self, a tool and an environment. 
These technologies create a kind of immediacy that leaves the construction of the 
self unquestioned. For this reason René Arcilla (2002) ponders the following: 
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How seriously and critically can one examine oneself if one is prevented, 
by the nature of the online experience, from examining what supports 
that self-examination, namely, its medium? How can one have online 
experiences that stimulate reflection −if that technology is designed to 
manufacture experiences of immediacy that curtail reflection? However 
useful this technology is for other kinds of learning, therefore, according 
to one important and relevant measure of educational quality, 
particularly the quality of our secondary and higher education −that of 
being able to foster liberal learning −we should find online education 
distinctly wanting. (p. 463) 
 
Of course, it can be stated that the kind of learning that is required in order for 
these technologies to become ready-to-hand is passive but not completely 
immediate. Children do not automatically become users or inventors of 
applications. Education can therefore intervene, either by slowing this process 
down or by juxtaposing it to processes that afford different types of connectedness 
to the world. We surely want our students to be active citizens and contributors of 
content but students should be knowledgeable and critical of this content and the 
media that contain it.  Instead of looking for the productivity and efficiency of 
tools we can start questioning their nature.  Nearness, for example, can be pursued 
on a more conversational and active ground offering a range of offline and online 
practices that cultivate the children’s hermeneutic and existential possibilities.  
 
Under digitisation’s dominance, education is pressured not only to produce 
learning results but also to fabricate demonstrable market-worthy results. In this 
way, modes of thinking, communication and expression that are not glossy 
enough may be excluded from its practices. Trying to comply with this, we tend to 
forget that what drives invention, design and new technological realities is 
precisely imagination, and people with a round education −that is, people with 
open imaginations, deeper connections to the world, and the ability to think and 
argue from a multiplicity of perspectives– will certainly be needed. This would be 
a new kind of phronēsis, in a way, a techno-phronēsis, that is, an ability that 
allows the individual to ‘deliberate rightly about …what is conductive to the good 
life generally’ but only because they can deliberate about what is conductive to 
life generally. Technology is one of those elements that, precisely because is not 
neutral but essentially value-laden, cannot be ignored.  For example, imagination 
is, as I pointed out, trainable and formable. Images form imagination’s forming 
power. Imaging-technologies, therefore, have an important role to play in all this 
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since they condition what we can imagine and even what we can imagine about 
imagination. This takes place even at a very particular and practical level of 
neuroscience, since imaging-technologies offer the principal access we have to the 
brain. Representations construct the way the world presences and we should have 
knowledge of this. 
  
As already noted, images produced by current technologies of nearness like search 
engines and networking sites tend to merge the self with the online environment; 
the self becomes part of the picture, though this has, in a sense, always been the 
case. The essence of being-there is precisely this. But what differentiates being-
there as conceptualised in Being and Time from its specific online iterations is that 
we now realise that digital tools impose their structure on what can be thought 
about thought. This I discussed in connection with metaphor. In fact, I have 
argued that being-there is a metaphorical process performed in a bifurcated way. 
On the one hand, existential metaphor is a passive transfer of the self onto things 
that implicates image. On the other hand, linguistic metaphor has a twofold nature: 
it can be a repetition of an idea about the world, or the denial of an absolute 
ground. This denial means that neither part of the metaphor used refers to settled 
knowledge. The fact that there is existential and linguistic metaphor does not 
mean that I am repeating here the usual distinction between 
experience/technology and language. Existential and linguistic metaphor as 
discussed above problematise this distinction. The former is proto-linguistic and 
part of human development. It perseveres when Dasein is engaged with the ready-
to-hand, that is, at a time when language has already manifested itself and Dasein 
uses words as ready-to-hand. The domination of image makes this even more 
possible. The second type relies on language, but since it also works through 
analogy, it reaches into regions where things do not have names and thus is itself 
co-constituted by the types of experiences we have with technology.             
  
This kind of interaction is one that education should be sensitive to, and this 
cannot take place when we perceive technology’s instrumental nature narrowly. 
Of course, technology is something we employ and, of course, we can choose one 
writing tool over the other, but these tools have an effect on us; they allow one 
way of revealing instead of another. Technology should never be thought of as an 
exterior element; technology is already part of children’s lives. But then again this 
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should not be the criterion for the use of technology: technology forms children; it 
produces childhood, along with elements like language and embodiment, and we 
should, at least, be aware of the way it enters educational practices. Technologies 
should not form learning aims: learning aims should correspond to the type of 
learning we want to induce in children. If we want to teach critical or digital 
literacy, children should be taught quite early on that each tool changes their 
learning and that tools focused on the presentation of results should not be their 
first concern. Technology should be understood critically. 
 
This is knowledge with political significance. Digital technologies produce 
representations that are themselves constituted by retentions. These retentions 
make up the limits of our world. One more example will be helpful here. 
Wikipedia is structured on the basis of a very constricted type of ontology that 
dictates what something is. In a way a wiki is a definition of some sort, and this in 
itself can be very limiting since it sets firm and sometimes simplistic boundaries 
to the way we relate to the world and the things we can say about it. The kinds of 
descriptions we employ to fill in each one of its categories can also be a very 
heated political matter. When we address, for example, a matter about health, it is, 
indeed, a political decision to say what is ‘conventional’ or ‘proper’ and what is 
‘alternative’ medicine. This is especially so when we consider the immense 
economic interests that are at stake.  
 
Stiegler, contrary to Heidegger, and precisely because the former accepts that 
humanity is always engaged and, in fact, produced by a process of 
instrumentalisation and technologisation, pays attention to this process. In contrast, 
Heidegger attempted to imagine an impossible separation between humanity and 
technology that partly led to his outrageous political escapades.  Heidegger never 
paid proper attention to the political dimension of technology. Hannah Arendt 
(1998), who was his student, followed a similar path, arguing that things are part 
of the vita activa, namely, the realm of action instead of the realm of theoretical 
contemplation. The vita activa presupposes labour and work, and both of these 
activities involve production. However, the vita activa also refers to political 
action, that is, to the kind of activity that aims to produce itself instead of a 
separate product. Political action is the expression of human freedom; it does not 
originate from necessity but it is the way human beings aspire to change the world. 
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It is also what is closer to the most important aspect of the human condition –that 
is, birth and subsequently ‘new beginning(s)’. Even though, Arendt supports the 
idea that political action is ‘the only activity that goes on directly between men 
without the intermediary of things and matter’ (p. 7), it is, indeed, hard to imagine 
how this is possible since action takes place according to the possibilities afforded 
by the technological infrastructure that makes up the world. In other words, the 
citizen produces the city, but the city makes up the citizen as well.   
  
This is because technology persistently re-enters and re-shapes the complicated 
nexus of connections that constitute society in such a way that makes it difficult to 
decipher the nature of its influence. Technology, in its complicated interaction 
with language, constructs the relational sub-stratum that is our home and our 
circles of familiarity. Here, I have argued that is not only language that constitutes 
this relational whole but technology as well. Equipment is also a referential 
totality and thus participates in the construction of our social space. In this light, 
digital media do share with other tools this common characteristic: their public 
and social character. However, their survival relies on popularity, and thus it is 
supposed that these tools increase social interaction; digital tools need to be used, 
and use increases the desire to use them. In this way, some digital tools aspire to 
serve a need that is never to be satisfied; sociability is not the byproduct of their 
use but their raison d’être. In this respect, they appear to offer increased nearness 
to things and people, without any contemplation on the behalf of the users 
concerning the intentions and the reasons for this nearness. This desire for 
nearness is incorporated in the very structure of the applications used. These 
applications make it known that they can offer access to whatever we can imagine 
that we can have access to. But what happens if the limits of our imagination 
become precisely that?  
 
The realisation of the multiple dimensions of this complicated relationship 
between technology, language and society is critical for education, that is, for a 
domain that exists in and because of society, and is influenced or even shaped by 
technology, but that nevertheless aspires to awaken in students a desire for 
enquiry concerning the nature of that society. Metaphors to the effect that we can 
‘harness the educational potential’ of new technologies are quite misleading in 
that some of the new technologies are not actually new, that some technologies 
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are not designed for learning (even though we may force them to illustrate such 
potential), and that these very metaphors constitute the ‘idle talk’ that is produced 
by designers and marketeers of technology. This kind of metaphorical idle talk, 
along with the actual ontologies that are created by design, attempts to sell us the 
supposed affordances of technology, but this should be a matter of critical 
investigation. Education should begin deconstructing some of these metaphors 
and the images digital technologies impose; it should establish and foster images 
that are not that restrictive concerning the potential of learning and imagination, 
and it should experiment with new metaphors concerning the nature of technology. 
Stiegler (2009) comments on this: 
 
Human society is always founded on a technicity to which psychic 
functions are delegated and by which they become social apparatuses. 
The latter are supported by these organa that Plato called pharmaka – 
which he describes from the outset as teletechnologies, and thus as 
poisons. In order to implement such remedies, while trying to avoid their 
functioning as poisons, a system of care is needed; this supposes, on the 
one hand, a pharmacopoeia, and, on the other hand, a medical science 
which exceeds the know-how of pharmacists. (p. 34) 
 
Care is nothing natural: care for Heidegger is the towards-which that, as I have 
been arguing, is a form of synthesis, namely, a synthesis of time and imagination 
that demarcates what comes near. For Stiegler (2010), however, it is our 
positioning towards care that comes first −that is, our responsibility concerning 
the technology that we use and that uses us. These technologies are employed by 
the market, Stiegler argues, to cause a kind of ‘deformation: a destruction of the 
formation of the individual that education has constructed’ (p. 184). It is precisely 
because of this that matters of ethical responsibility arise and arise especially in 
connection with education and technology. Ethics, however, takes us back to 
dwelling; to inhabit a world is also to bear the responsibility of thinking 
normatively about that world. It is through this that ethics comes into view. 
Heidegger (2008b) expresses this better when, in the Letter on Humanism, he 
argues: 
 
If the name ‘ethics,’ in keeping with the basic meaning of the word ēthos, 
should now say that ‘ethics’ ponders the abode of man, then that thinking 
which thinks the truth of Being’ [ontology] as the primordial element of 
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man, as one who ek-sists
54
, is in itself the original ethics (p. 176, 
parenthesis added). 
 
Ethics then is the thinking of the oikos (from the Greek word for home). This is a 
certain kind of economy (oikos + nomos, which means law) that legislates our 
comportment and produces discourses of normativity; it is an ecology in its 
original sense (oikos + logos). 
 
With this realisation we might now be more ready to realise the importance of 
thinking through what digital technology is: to think through what it means that it 
is ubiquitous, to ponder those processes through which it can open worlds where 
the user feels at home, and to consider how such knowledge might be employed to 
the benefit of education. In this respect, this thesis has attempted not so much to 
answer the question concerning technology but to pose some new questions and 
perhaps point to a way towards some answers. It thus has focused on a neglected 
notion in Heideggerian scholarship, namely nearness, and has discussed this in 
connection with technology, language, image and thinking. Metaphor has proven 
to be a notion that allows a reconsideration of being-in-the-world and, in fact, one 
that challenges distinctions between technology and language, representative and 
originary image. In pursuit of the questions set in this investigation, I have 
unearthed some basic notions of Heidegger and attempted to deconstruct and 
follow his thought through Derrida’s and Stiegler’s critique and respective 
theories. In this way, I have proposed a new notion of metaphor, which describes 
a movement of nearness between different domains resulting in the synthesis of 
new meaning. The nature of these domains and their interaction are matters for 
further research. There has recently been renewed interest in metaphor in such 
diverse fields as psychoanalysis, cognitive linguistics, neuroscience and many 
others. They all point to the fact that metaphor is not a literary contrivance but a 
basic mode of cognition, a basic mode of existence, I would add, that needs 
further interdisciplinary investigation.   
 
The long discussion of these matters throughout Chapters 1-5 attempted to 
unsettle the centrality of the Enframing discourse that often en-frames philosophy 
                                                 
54
 As pointed out, the word is written in this way in order to denote Heidegger’s understanding of 
human temporality as one that is continually projected into the future. 
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of education, to challenge Heidegger’s thinking from different perspectives, to 
illuminate the centrality of the concern about image in the philosopher’s thought, 
and to supplement this thought in a way that makes it relatable to new instances of 
technology. In no way, however, was this discussion a formula for the analysis of 
digital artefacts in Chapter 6. If that was the case, then Chapter 6 would have been 
an application of the previous discussion and not the kind of phenomenological 
research that allows digital things’ specific nature to come to the fore. In this 
respect, the discussion of actual artefacts in Chapter 6 may appear to be a small 
portion of the thesis, but new technologies demand new attention, and an extended 
discussion would have required another thesis, one that might lack the critical 
component of the reconsideration of Heidegger’s work. New technologies will 
continue to enter into and form our world, and we ought to stay vigilant to the 
new realities they bring with them. This, however, does not mean that the 
discussion in Chapters 1-5 is irrelevant to actual technologies since the focus there 
is repeatedly on the movement of nearness enacted by social networking sites, for 
example, the role of the image for the formation of imagination and the role of 
metaphor as an existential mode of relating to tools and not just language. 
  
This theoretical discussion, as already noted, had several tasks, but it aimed 
mainly to illuminate the notion of nearness and its rhizomatic movements in 
Heidegger’s work. In this respect, it relied heavily on Heideggerian scholars and 
philosophers like Derrida and Stiegler and marginally touched upon other 
philosophies of technology and traditions. This, however, was done because of the 
specificity of the thesis’s focus, which precisely had to do with nearness, image, 
technology and metaphor in Heidegger.  
      
Metaphor, as noted, has been discussed here as a movement of imagination that 
reconfigures the domains that brings together and allows things to emerge as 
certain things. In this respect, metaphor participates and conditions the 
hermeneutical relationship but it is already itself conditioned by language, image 
and technology. The importance of childhood –that is, a stage of human existence 
during which the very possibilities of interpretation are formed– is a matter of 
further research. A child, it might be argued, is a becoming and a site under 
construction, a complicated bridge-to-be-built whose unique connectedness allows 
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the child to individuate themselves such that they have a there and experience a 
certain kind of nearness. Responding to these distinctive characteristics of 
childhood, education relates to the child’s provisional there by offering not only 
things to connect with but modalities of connectedness. The child as an 
interpretive being in formation perceives its world mediated by education’s 
techniques of nearness. Education is a process of individuation and essentially a 
process of nearness. What it is to come near is not a matter of covering spatial 
distance, but a matter of experiencing time as a meaning-making, interpretive 
process. This complicated relationship points in the direction of further research 
that is needed concerning possible ways of conceptualising nearness, childhood 
and education as formation.    
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